

BT 21 .F57 1896 copy 1
Fisher, George Park, 1827-
1909.
History of Christian
doctrine

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library

https://archive.org/details/historyofchristi00fish_1

INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

HISTORY

OF

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BY

GEORGE PARK FISHER, D.D., LL.D.

TITUS STREET PROFESSOR OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY
IN YALE UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1896

COPYRIGHT, 1896, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith
Norwood Mass. U.S.A.

PREFACE

Several years have elapsed since I engaged to prepare this work. The unexpected delay in its publication is owing chiefly to the pressure of other and more imperative engagements. One reason for it, however, is the fact that, although the subject is one which I had long studied and on which I had given instruction to many successive classes, more time was required for the composition of the book than I had anticipated. This is partly for the reason that it appeared to me, for the present purpose, expedient to abandon for the most part the method which I had always followed in my Lectures of arranging the matter under the heads of General and Special Doctrinal History. On this topic something more is said in the introductory chapter. This change of plan has involved an entire recasting of the materials to be incorporated into this volume.

A number of the ablest of the recent German writers on *Dogmengeschichte* confine themselves to a description of the rise and establishment of *dogmas* in the official significance of the term, according to which it denotes simply the accredited tenets of the principal divisions of the Church. The terminus of this branch of study is, therefore, set not later than about the opening of the seventeenth century. In the present work, the history of theological thought is carried forward through the subsequent essays at doctrinal construction down to the present time. In other words, the present work is a history of *Doctrine* as well as of *Dogmas*. Those who hold that such a treatise should have a more restricted

aim are at liberty to look on the chapters which cover all the additional ground, as being, to use the lawyers' phrase, *obiter dicta*. It is, after all, a question of nomenclature. A history of modern doctrinal theology, none will deny, is a legitimate undertaking.

It is hardly necessary to say how much, in common with all students of Doctrinal History, I owe to the old masters in this department, among whom the names of Neander and Baur have so high a place. I wish to add here that not unfrequently I have received aid from the writings of my lamented friend, Dr. Schaff. Möller is one of the more recent authors on the general history of the Church who has been specially serviceable. There are three writers of a late date to whom particular acknowledgments are due. These are Harnack, Loofs, and Thomasius. The vigorous and brilliant *Dogmengeschichte* of Harnack is — whatever opinion may be held as to its theological tendencies — an indispensable auxiliary in studies of this nature. The numerous references in the following pages will indicate how much I have been stimulated and instructed by it. From the *Leitfaden* of Loofs, written from the same general point of view as the volumes of Harnack, I have likewise derived important assistance. The *Dogmengeschichte* of Thomasius, a conservative Lutheran in his creed, is acknowledged by scholars of all shades of belief to be a work of extraordinary merit. It has been read and consulted by me with no little profit. In particular is it of service side by side with the treatises representing more or less decidedly the prevalent Ritschlian school. I may be permitted to add that I deem the Ritschlian tendency to be justified so far as it lays stress on the fact that in the earlier centuries the types of Greek philosophy then current had no inconsiderable influence in the formulating of doctrine. This, to be sure, is not a new discovery, but has been widely recognized by competent historians, like Neander. Yet it may be well that a new emphasis should be attached to it. Moreover,

there is no room for question that the Reformers mingled in their teachings much that was drawn from Scholastic sources. All this should be conceded to the Ritschlian movement, however large the dissent may be from specific conclusions concerning the extent and character of the modifications of Christian doctrine from extrinsic influences, concerning the real purport of the New Testament teaching, and concerning the trustworthiness of the Gospel narratives.

The special design of this volume and the limitations of space have compelled the exclusion of a larger amount of critical comment than its pages contain. The primary aim has been to present in an objective way and in an impartial spirit the course of theological thought respecting the religion of the Gospel. Whatever faults or defects may belong to the work, the author can say with a good conscience that nothing has been consciously inserted or omitted under the impulse of personal bias or prejudice. The precept of Othello is applicable to attempts to delineate theological teachers and their systems:

> "Nothing extenuate,
> Nor set down aught in malice."

In the revisal of the proof-sheets, I am glad to acknowledge the generous assistance which I have received from Professor Egbert Coffin Smyth of the Theological School at Andover, whose learning and accuracy eminently qualify him for such a friendly service. I have likewise received a number of valuable suggestions from Professor Arthur Cushman McGiffert of the Union Theological School in New York, who has given in his annotated edition of Eusebius ample proof of the thoroughness of his historical investigations. The index has been compiled by Mr. John H. Grant, a member of the Senior Class in the Yale Divinity School.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PAGE

Nature and Scope of the Subject — Theology Possible — Its Relation to Faith — Its Relation to Philosophy — Its Need and Origin — Factors in formulating Christian Truth — Development in Theology — Divisions in the History of Doctrine — Sketch of its Course — History of the History of Doctrine — The Literature of the Subject 1

PART I

ANCIENT THEOLOGY

PERIOD I

THE RISE AND EARLY TYPES OF THEOLOGY TO THE COMPLETE SYSTEM OF ORIGEN AND TO THE FULLY ESTABLISHED CONCEPTION OF THE PRE-MUNDANE PERSONAL LOGOS (c. A.D. 300).

CHAPTER I

Apostolic Christianity — Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism — Greek Philosophy and Gentile Culture 23

CHAPTER II

The Ecclesiastical Writers 34

CHAPTER III

Doctrine in the Apostolic Fathers 41

CHAPTER IV

The Judaic Separatist Parties — The Gnostic Sects — Marcion . . . 48

CHAPTER V

PAGE

The Beginnings of Theology: The Greek Apologists 61

CHAPTER VI

The Rise of the Old Catholic Church — The Rule of Faith — The Canon — The Episcopate — The Rise and the Exclusion of Montanism . 70

CHAPTER VII

The Catholic Doctrine in the Asia Minor School: Irenæus, Melito of Sardis — in the North African School: Tertullian — The Alexandrian Christian Philosophy: Clement 84

CHAPTER VIII

Monarchianism — Monarchianism overcome in the East — The System of Origen — Theology after the Death of Origen — Novatian — Dionysius of Alexandria and Dionysius of Rome — Methodius . . 98

PERIOD II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATRISTIC THEOLOGY IN THE EAST AND IN THE WEST.

In the East, from A.D. 300 to the Death of John of Damascus (c. 754); in the West, to Gregory I. (c. A.D. 600).

CHAPTER I

The Controversy with Heathenism — The Danger of Division — The Seat of Authority — The Canon, Scripture and Tradition — The Grounds of Theistic Belief 117

CHAPTER II

Doctrines converted into Dogmas — Church and State — The Great Controversies — The Ecclesiastical Writers, East and West . . 125

CHAPTER III

PAGE
The Development of the Doctrine of the Trinity to the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381) 134

CHAPTER IV

The Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ to John of Damascus 148

CHAPTER V

The Doctrines not defined in the Œcumenical Councils . . . 161

CHAPTER VI

The Theological System of Augustine — The Pelagian Controversy . 176

CHAPTER VII

Pelagianism and the Theology of the East on the Controverted Topics — Semi-Pelagianism — Gregory I. 194

PART II

MEDIÆVAL THEOLOGY

PERIOD III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, AND ITS REDUCTION TO A SYSTEMATIC FORM.

CHAPTER I

From Gregory I. to Charlemagne — The Work of Mediæval Theology — Theology in the Eastern Church — Theology and Education in the West — John Scotus 199

CHAPTER II

PAGE

From Charlemagne to the Beginnings of Scholasticism — The Adoption Controversy — Gottschalk's Doctrine of Predestination — Radbert's Doctrine of the Lord's Supper — The Penitential System — The Tenth Century — Controversy of Berengarius and Lanfranc on the Lord's Supper 205

CHAPTER III

Characteristics of Scholasticism — The Scholastic Maxim — Philosophy: Nominalism and Realism — Scholasticism and the Universities — The Method of Scholasticism 212

CHAPTER IV

Subdivisions of the Scholastic Era — The First Section: Anselm; Abelard; Bernard; the School of St. Victor — The Books of Sentences — Peter Lombard 216

CHAPTER V

The Second Section of the Scholastic Era — St. Francis and the Franciscan Piety — Mysticism — Aquinas and Scotus 229

CHAPTER VI

The Scholastic Doctrines: Natural Theology and Christian Evidences — The Trinity and the Incarnation — Divine and Human Agency — Original Sin 234

CHAPTER VII

Scholastic Doctrines: The Atonement — Conversion and Sanctification — Justification — The Church and the Papacy 245

CHAPTER VIII

Scholastic Doctrines: The Sacraments 254

CHAPTER IX

The Catharists — The Waldensians — The Mystics — Wesel; Wessel; Savonarola — The Doctrines of Wyclif — Huss — The Renaissance and its Influence — Erasmus 263

Part III

MODERN THEOLOGY

PERIOD IV

The Principal Types of Protestant Theology — The Age of Polemics — The Crystallizing of Parties and Creeds.

CHAPTER I

PAGE

The Theology of Luther 269

CHAPTER II

The Theology of Zwingli — The Eucharistic Controversy — Parties in the Lutheran Church to the Form of Concord (1580) 285

CHAPTER III

The Theology of Calvin 298

CHAPTER IV

Rise and Progress of Protestant Theology in England 310

CHAPTER V

Sects in the Wake of the Reformation — The Socinian System . . . 317

CHAPTER VI

The Roman Catholic System restated in the Creed of Trent — The Theology of the Jesuits 326

CHAPTER VII

The Arminian Revolt against Calvinism — The School of Saumur — Pajonism — The Federal Theology 337

CHAPTER VIII

Theology in England in the Seventeenth Century — "Rational Theology" — The Latitudinarians 353

CHAPTER IX

PAGE

The Arian Controversy in England — The English Deistic School — The Theology of the Quakers — Efforts on the Continent for the Reunion of Churches 370

PERIOD V

THEOLOGY AS AFFECTED BY MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHES.

From the Philosophy of Locke and Leibnitz to the Present.

CHAPTER I

Philosophy on the Continent after Descartes: Spinoza; Leibnitz — Philosophy in England: Francis Bacon; Locke; Berkeley; Hume; Reid — The Writings of Butler and Paley — Character of English Theology to the Middle of the Eighteenth Century — The Wesleyan Theology 381

CHAPTER II

Theology in America in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries — Theology of the First Settlers — Jonathan Edwards and his School ("The New England Theology") — The Rise of Unitarianism: Channing; Emerson; Parker — The Rise of Universalism — New Developments in the New England School — The Theology of Horace Bushnell — The Theology of Henry B. Smith — Calvinism in the Presbyterian Church; Charles Hodge 394

CHAPTER III

Theology in England in the Nineteenth Century: The Evangelical School in the Established Church — The Philosophy and the Theology of Coleridge — The Early Oriel School: Whateley; Arnold — The Oxford Movement: Its Sources and Leaders; its Principles and Aims; the Tracts; the Hampden Controversy; the Conversion of Newman; the Doctrine of the Eucharist and Other Tenets of the Oxford School; the Gorham Case; Canon Liddon; Canon Gore; J. B. Mozley's Theological Teaching 446

CHAPTER IV

PAGE

Theology in England in the Nineteenth Century (*continued*): The Broad Churchman — The "Essays and Reviews" — The "Broad Church" in Scotland: Thomas Erskine; McLeod Campbell — Theological Opinions of Matthew Arnold — The Christian Agnosticism of Hamilton and Mansel — Positivism (Comte) — The Revival of Hume's Philosophy: J. S. Mill — The Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer — Influence of Darwinism on Theology — Agnostic Opinions of T. H. Huxley 473

CHAPTER V

Conclusion: Certain Theological Tendencies in Recent Times . . 545

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

INTRODUCTION

NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT — THEOLOGY POSSIBLE — ITS RELATION TO FAITH — ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY — ITS NEED AND ORIGIN — FACTORS IN FORMULATING CHRISTIAN TRUTH — DEVELOPMENT IN THEOLOGY — DIVISIONS IN THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINE — SKETCH OF ITS COURSE — HISTORY OF THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINE — THE LITERATURE OF THE SUBJECT

Christianity is the revelation of God through Jesus Christ whereby reconciliation and a new spiritual life in fellowship with Himself are brought to mankind. The religion of Christ is inseparable from the life and character of its Founder and from his personal relations to the race and to the community of his followers.[1] Herein Christianity is differentiated from systems of philosophy. They might remain unaltered were their authors forgotten or never known. Equally is it contrasted with ethnic religions, whether they spring up in the darkness of prehistoric times, or are linked to the names of specific founders, real or imaginary. To undertake to dissever Christianity from Christ is to mistake its nature and to ignore some of its essential requirements. Nevertheless, Christianity is composed of teachings which are to be proclaimed, and which call for a clear and connected interpretation. Although not without ritual observances, it is not a religion of mystic ceremonies, the meaning and effect of which it is impossi-

[1] He appears in the character of a second head of the race, the author of a new spiritual creation. See 1 Cor. xv. 45 ("The last Adam *became* a life-giving Spirit"). Cf. Rom. v. 12 sq.; also Eph. i. 22, 2 Cor. v. 17 ("a new creature; the old things are passed away"), Gal. vi. 15. See, also, John xv. 5 ("ye are the branches").

ble to state or to understand. Its doctrines do not lie outside the limit of intelligible expression. The History of Christian Doctrine is the record of the series of attempts made in successive periods to embody the contents of the Gospel in clear and self-consistent propositions.

The History of Doctrine admits of a wider or a more restricted treatment. It may be the aim simply to exhibit the history of dogmas; that is, of the definitions of doctrine which have been arrived at either in the Church at large, or in leading branches of it — definitions which, when once reached, were held to be authoritative. A dogma is a distinct conception and perspicuous statement of a doctrine professed by the body, or by a considerable body, of Christian people. The word 'dogma' denoted in the Greek a tenet or an ordinance. It was either a settled article of faith or a precept sent forth from a recognized authority. In the Bible the term is used in the last of these meanings, — that of an edict or enactment.[1] Among the Stoics "dogmas" meant fundamental truths which have the character of axioms. Their title to credence was conceived to partake of the sanctity of law. So among the Christian Fathers, "dogmas" were not conceived of as the injunctions of a superior, but rather as verities which orthodox believers are agreed in accepting.[2]

It is to be borne in mind, then, that dogmas are not the opinions of an individual merely, but are the interpretations of Christianity which have been cast in an explicit form, and have been raised to the rank of doctrinal standards and tests. The history of dogmas is thus an account of the process of formulating the contents of Christianity in the creeds of acknowledged authority.

By a number of recent writers, of whom one of the ablest and most conspicuous is Dr. A. Harnack, the function of the history of doctrine is confined to the description of the genesis and development of "dogmas." The plan of Harnack's doctrinal history is conformed to this conception of the subject. The dogmatic interpretation of Christianity, the author justly considers, was at

[1] In the Sept., Dan. ii. 13 ("decree" of Nebuchadnezzar), vi. 9 (interdict of Darius), Esther iii. 9, Luke ii. 1 ("decree" of Augustus), Acts xvi. 4 ("decrees" of the apostles and elders), Eph. ii. 15, Col. ii. 14 (ordinances of O. T. law).

[2] On the history of the use of the word 'dogma,' see K. I. Nitzsch, DGM., p. 52; F. Nitzsch, DG., p. 1.

first, and to a great extent, a product of Greek thought, working from the points of view and in the spirit peculiar to the Hellenic mind. The outcome of this process of thought, which was carried forward through several centuries of controversy, appears in the œcumenical creeds pertaining to the Incarnation and the Trinity. Through Augustine, the system underwent an essential modification. There came in a practically new element, which stamped upon the theology of the West its distinctive character. In Augustine the old and the new, the Greek and the Latin elements, stand in juxtaposition. Later through Luther the Pauline type of teaching became a more determining factor in dogmatic construction. Through the great Reformer there was achieved an inchoate, incomplete re-formulating of that dogmatic system which had assumed a definite form in the Middle Ages. The result of the Protestant movement in the dogmatic field was threefold: the Lutheran theology, Socinianism, and the restatement of the Roman Catholic system at the Council of Trent, — this last system being amplified in recent days, especially through the Vatican Council.[1]

But it has been the custom of former writers to give a broader scope to the History of Doctrine. It may undertake to trace the history of theology, not only so far as theological inquiry and discussion have issued in articles of faith, but likewise so far as movements of religious thought are of signal interest, and are often not unlikely to influence sooner or later the moulding of the Christian creed. The present volume will include a survey, as full as is practicable within the space at command, of the course of modern theology down to the present day.

How shall we state concisely the essential truth in Christianity, — that truth which Christian theology seeks to explicate? Light is thrown on this question by the response of Jesus to the declaration of Peter: "Thou art Christ, the son of the living God." "On this rock," said Jesus, — meaning by the "rock," if not this avowal of Peter, the Apostle himself in the character of a leader in the confession and promulgation of the faith, — "I will build my church."[2] This living conviction of Peter, it is added, was inspired from above. Identical in substance with this passage

[1] See Harnack, *Lehrb. d. DG.* (2 ed.), I. 1–10; *Abriss d. DG.* (2 ed.) pp. 1–5, p. 334 sq.

[2] Matt. xvi. 16–18. (Cf. John iv. 42.)

are the words of the Apostle Paul: "No man can say Jesus is 'Lord' but in the Holy Spirit."[1] In that title Jesus is recognized as the predicted Messenger of God and the head of the kingdom. By way of protest against the denial of the true human nature and experiences of the Christ the Apostle John propounds the test: "Every spirit which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God."[2] In the New Testament it is constantly assumed where it is not expressly affirmed, that mankind in character are alienated from God, and that Christ is the Deliverer through whom reconciliation is made and a filial relation reëstablished. The substance of Christianity is expressed in the word 'Redemption,' with its postulates and results.[3]

Is theology possible? Is the human mind capable of forming accurate conceptions and expressions of religious truth? If not, then the History of Doctrine is nothing more than a register of incessant, but forever abortive, experiments. A denial of the possibility of theology is heard from the various schools of Agnosticism. Comte, the founder of the Positivist system, who is not counted technically among the Agnostics, denies that we have any evidence of the reality of either efficient or final causes. All science dwindles to a record of bare phenomena, arranged by their sequence in time and their likeness or unlikeness. Of course theology is expunged from the list of sciences and degraded to a level with astrology. Herbert Spencer, affirming the reality of an absolute "Power" at the root of all phenomena, yet asserts that it is utterly inscrutable. It *is*, but is an "Unknowable." This one step Mr. Spencer takes in advance of the position of Comte. There is, moreover, a theistic and Christian class of Agnostics, who, while they do go farther than barely to admit the existence of the object-matter of theology, still banish it beyond the purview of conceptive thought. We may not *know*, although we are warranted in *believing*. Kant set out to confute the skepticism of Hume, but Kant, in the theoretical part of his philosophy, so far as the point in question is concerned, really organized skepticism. He substituted for custom or imagination as the source of mental intuitions nothing but a purely subjective necessity and universality. Sir William Hamilton followed in the path of Kant so far as to pronounce our religious beliefs — our belief in God and

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 3. [2] 1 John iv. 2.

[3] John i. 12, 1 John iii. 1, 2 Cor. v. 19, Gal. iii. 26, Rom. viii. 15–17, etc.

freedom, for example — to be a choice between inconceivables which exclude one another, — this choice finding a warrant in moral grounds alone. Hamilton's theory was carried out in a philosophy of religion by Mansel in his "Limits of Religious Thought." 'Faith without science' is the watchword of this philosophy. The contention is that all our notions of the infinite and of God, being relative, are merely approximate. They will not answer, therefore, as a basis for reasoning. They constitute no materials for science, strictly so-called. The prop on which Agnostics lean is the assumed relativity of human knowledge. Our knowledge, it is alleged, is solely of phenomena, of things as they appear to us. It is only symbols, realities transformed into something different from what they are, that the human mind can discern. But phenomena are not masks; they are revelations of reality, and to know is not to transmute or to create. There are bounds to the knowledge possible to finite intelligence. Emphatically is this true as concerns the spiritual world. But this circumstance does not justify the casting of discredit upon the knowledge of which we are possessed. It affords no reason for affixing to it the stamp of unreality.

It has sometimes been contended that theology can never be a science, on account of the infirmities of language. These are said to preclude exact expression. This view was propounded by an eminent American preacher and author, Horace Bushnell.[1] It is an inference drawn from the material origin of language, by which a merely symbolical character is given to all words denoting spiritual things. They are attempts to picture things invisible. They are in their very nature figurative — a "fossil poetry." Underneath this opinion there really lies the contention of Occam, the Nominalist leader in the latter part of the Middle Ages, by whom theological nescience was inferred from a denial to man of the conceptive faculty. If the objection were sound, it would be equally valid, for example, against ethics and political science. Intellectual notions "are at the foundation of all science." It is no doubt an important truth that words which signify spiritual states that involve feeling — since feeling so varies in depth and warmth — mean different things to different persons.[2] The impressions

[1] *God in Christ* (1849), Preliminary Essay: *Christ in Theology* (1851).

[2] This fact is instructively dwelt upon by Cardinal Newman, *University Sermons*, pp. 114, 115, and in his *Grammar of Assent*. The difference be-

excited in different minds by the words that denote virtues and vices, and by epithets of praise and blame, differ exceedingly. This difference affects the force of probable reasoning. But, apart from the emotions that are stirred, it is enough to say with J. S. Mill as to abstractions in general, that "in some cases it is not easy to decide precisely how much a particular word does or does not connote."[1]

What is the relation of theology to that faith which, as it is the first demand of the Gospel, is the initial element in Christian experience? Discussions concerning the relation of faith to knowledge we shall meet with at every period in the History of Doctrine.[2] First, knowledge is not a stage above that of faith, as if faith were a ladder to be dropped when once the ascent by it is made. This idea of the provisional function of faith is suggested by Clement of Alexandria, yet is not by him consistently adhered to.[3] His partial error is the result of a failure to grasp firmly the Pauline idea of faith. Faith is made by Clement the precursor of knowledge. It is the path to that love and holiness which qualify us to know divine things.[4] It follows from this conception that there is an esoteric Christianity. There is a higher plane than that which the ordinary believer attains to. But faith, we are taught by the Apostle, merges at last, not in science, but in sight. Faith "abides" until beyond the veil it is resolved into vision.[5]

Secondly, there is another view which recognizes that faith has roots of its own, yet holds that scientific knowledge may become, and is destined to become, coextensive with it. That which faith, impelled by the moral nature embraces, theology demonstrates. This is the Scholastic theory. It is traceable to Augustine, and is propounded by Anselm. Stress is laid, however, on the influence of faith in clarifying the intellect and thus empowering it to do its work. Later, in the thirteenth century, the inability of reason to

tween knowing certain truths and knowing them as they exist in another individual's mind, is illustrated by J. B. Mozley, *Miracles*, p. xxviii.

[1] *Logic*, I. ii. § 5.

[2] See an excellent essay, "Gedanken über Glauben u. Wissen," in Julius Müller's *Dogmatisch. Abhandll.*, pp. 1–42.

[3] Cf. Neander's exposition of Clement, *Ch. Hist.* (Torry's transl.), I. 529–541.

[4] "In Clement's view the supreme End of all is not Love, but Knowledge." Bigg's *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 88.

[5] 1 Cor. xiii. 12, 13.

do more than partially to fulfil its task was more explicitly asserted. The goal is approached, but it is never reached. But according to both Anselm and Aquinas, as fast as science advances faith is displaced. From a point of view in general quite different from that of the Scholastic theologians, Lessing, herein the spokesman of a type of modern Rationalism, regards faith as a temporary leaning upon authority up to the time when reason is so far developed as to be able to cast aside this crutch. Hegel comes to the same result in making faith an unscientific apprehension of that truth which the philosopher evolves in its pure form without help from abroad. The orthodox creed is construed as a popular version of the Hegelian metaphysic.

The true view is that the faith of the Christian disciple is not the product of science, but science is the intellectual apprehension of its contents. Faith, to be sure, includes a perception of truth. It presupposes ideas, in particular the idea of God and that of moral freedom and responsibility. Its object is Christ, the personal Saviour, coming to minister to the needs of the spirit, dying, rising from the dead, reigning, but not forsaking his disciples. In this faith, as a practical experience, are the materials of theology. It is to be observed, however, that faith is not here taken as in the vocabulary of the Church of Rome, where its object is made to comprehend the entire body of ecclesiastical teaching, which is to be accepted on the ground of authority.

What is the relation of Theology to Philosophy? For the reason that their problems are to a considerable extent the same, the point of difference between them is to be carefully observed. Christianity is an historical religion. At the foundation of Christian theology are facts which occur within the sphere of freedom, and therefore do not admit of being explained upon any theory of necessary evolution. As students of the Gospel we are in a province where the agency of personal beings is the principal matter. It was the love of God to mankind that led to the mission of Christ. It was a free act of love, the bestowal of an "unspeakable gift." The method of salvation is a course of self-sacrifice which culminates in the cross. These things cannot be made links in a metaphysical chain. They are not so many steps on a logical treadmill. Their analogue is to be found in the purest deeds of love, patience, and self-devotion which the annals of humanity contain. Nevertheless, the facts of Christianity are

not barren occurrences. They are capable of an explanation. They are not without a significance. They are in fulfilment of a purpose. Their fitness to the end sought, theology with the aid of Scripture seeks to point out. But philosophy has another starting-point. It begins with the data of consciousness and builds its structure by a process in which historical events have no place.

That there is room for a science of Christian theology is evident for a threefold reason. In the first place, Christianity is set forth in the Scriptures in a popular, as distinguished from a literal and methodical style of teaching. We meet there not the precise phraseology of the schools, but the language of common life. The Gospel was addressed principally to plain people. The Apostles, with a single exception, were not educated men in the ordinary sense of the term. It was for this reason that the impressiveness with which they spoke astonished cultivated hearers.[1] The training of the Apostle Paul himself was not acquired from Greek masters. He was a student not of Aristotle, but of Gamaliel. His education was in the lore and by the methods of Rabbinical teachers, although in his case indeed there was mingled a degree of influence from personal contact with Gentile debates and speculation.

In the second place, the appeal of Christianity was immediately to the moral and spiritual nature. It did not aspire to rival the Greeks, the seekers of "wisdom,"[2] on their own field. The awakening of conscience, the new life of faith, the uplifting hopes kindled by the Gospel, are, to be sure, not inwrought as by a magical spell. They imply perceptions of truth. Yet they are distinctively experiences of the heart. Converts embraced the Gospel from practical motives and in a practical spirit. It was the question, "What shall I *do* to be *saved*," to which an answer was craved and rendered. In the third place, there is a diversity, — not a contradiction, — but a diversity in the ways in which the Apostles themselves conceive of the Gospel. For example, there is a Pauline type of doctrine, and a Johannine type of doctrine, an Epistle of James as well as an Epistle to the Romans. There are points of variety as well as of identity, between these various representations of the Christian revelation. It was looked at from different points of view. The foregoing remarks may suffice to show that an open space was left for the researches and generalizations of

[1] Acts iv. 13; cf. John vii. 15. [2] 1 Cor. i. 22.

theology. They may serve, also, to make it clear how theology, or the understanding of the Christian Revelation, may be progressive, and yet that Revelation itself not be defective or faulty.

The incentives to a search for exact and coherent conceptions of Christian truth are not far to seek. We are made to think as well as to feel and to act. The yearning for knowledge, innate in the human mind, could not fail to be stimulated by the teaching of the Gospel and the reception of it. Inquiries would spring up unbidden. Problems would suggest themselves that would press for a solution. Apart from these inducements, opinions clashing with Apostolic teachings and with Christian experience would arise and create a need for definitions of the truth. Theology arose in the Church as a means of self-defence. In resisting assailants, lines of circumvallation are required. These must be related to the positions taken by the attacking force. When, for example, it was asserted, on the one hand, that compliance with the ritual law of the Old Testament is indispensable, and, on the other hand, that the entire Old Testament system is alien to the Gospel, the true relation of the Old to the New, of Judaism to Christianity, must needs be defined. Other illustrations are needless. Along the whole course of Church History — in a marked way, in the early period — the menace contained in erratic speculation has been a spur to theological thought and the precursor of dogmatic definitions.

Doctrinal history includes the history of heresies. Heresy denotes an opinion antagonistic to a fundamental article of the Christian faith. When Christianity is brought into contact with modes of thought and tenets originating elsewhere, either of two effects may follow. It may assimilate them, discarding whatever is at variance with the Gospel, or the tables may be turned and the foreign elements may prevail. In the latter case there ensues a perversion of Christianity, an amalgamation with it of ideas discordant with its nature. The product is then a heresy.[1] But to fill out the conception, it seems necessary that error should be aggressive and should give rise to an effort to build up a party and thus to divide the Church. In the Apostles' use of the term 'heresy' contains a factious element.[2] A heretic was likewise a schismatic. The word 'sect' — from the root of *sequi* — means

[1] Cf. Rothe, *Anfänge d. Christl. Kirche*, p. 333.

[2] 1 Cor. xi. 18, 19; Gal. v. 20.

etymologically the 'following,' or *clientèle*, of a leader, — not a fraction broken off, as it is sometimes thought to signify (as if it were from the root of *secare*). The word 'heresy' meant originally 'choice'; then an opinion that is the product of choice or of the will, instead of being drawn from the divine Word. It is a man-made opinion. Hence the term was given as a name to departures from orthodox teaching which carried in them a breach of church unity. 'Heresy' is to be distinguished from defective stages of Christian knowledge. For example, the Jewish believers, including the Apostles themselves, at the outset required the Gentile believers to be circumcised. They were not on this account chargeable with 'heresy.' Additional light must first come in and be rejected, before that earlier opinion could be thus stigmatized. Moreover, heresies are not to be confounded with tentative and faulty hypotheses broached in a period prior to the scrutiny of a topic of Christian doctrine, and before that scrutiny has led the general mind to an assured conclusion. Such hypotheses — for example, the idea that in the person of Christ the Logos is substituted for a rational human spirit — are to be met with in certain early Fathers. Attention to what are called heresies fills a considerable space in Doctrinal History. This is because they are in themselves interesting, and especially because of their indirect agency in the origination of finally accepted beliefs. It is a subject which is handled more fairly and dispassionately than was formerly the case, when the prominent heresiarchs were often held up to execration. At present it is more clear that moral depravity is not of course the concomitant of intellectual error.

From age to age, in the spread of Christianity by missionary labor, in the guidance of ecclesiastical affairs, and in the sphere of Christian philanthropy, there have appeared eminent leaders. The same is true in the field of theological thought. Names like those of Origen, Athanasius, Augustine, Luther, are themselves landmarks in the course of doctrinal history. Yet no more than in secular history is the agency of individuals to be magnified. Not only their personal influence, but not less the force of a general current of which it is partly the outflow, is to be taken into the account. They may furnish a voice to widespread, albeit undefined and unspoken, convictions, and for this reason may evoke responsive assent from Christian people.

There are three factors which are, or should be, conjoined in

the framing of theological doctrines. The first is the authoritative source of knowledge on the subject, namely the Scriptures. Even the Church of Rome holds that the supplementary contents of tradition are found, obscurely at least, in the sacred writings. Normative authority belongs to the Bible. It is the objective rule of faith. It is not robbed of this character in consequence of modified theories of the mode and extent of inspiration. If it be alleged that Christ is the one authority, yet it is through a critical study of the Scriptures, apart from subjective prejudice, that the knowledge of Christ is to be obtained. But Christianity is designed to mould the inward life. Christian experience, the correlate of the written Gospel, has its place as a touchstone for distinguishing Christian truth from error. Believers are taught by the Spirit. They are enabled to discern spiritual things, which are presented in verbal form on the page of Scripture.[1] The Intellect, moreover, has an office to perform. Its function is to translate the truth which the Bible teaches and the soul appropriates in a living experience, into lucid statements. The Word, the Spirit, the Intellect, or Scripture, Experience, Science, are the factors by whose combined agency the Gospel is rendered into systematic expressions of doctrine. When the right relation of these several factors to one another is disturbed, when an undue predominance is accorded to either of them at the cost of its associates, ill consequences ensue. There may be an abuse of the authoritative element. There may be a servile reliance on inherited interpretations of Scripture, or the adoption of meanings having no other ground than ecclesiastical prescription. The result is a traditionalism, which fails to penetrate to the core of Scriptural teaching. This spirit prevailed in the Middle Ages, and is with difficulty exorcised from most of the branches of the Church. There must be scope for the free activity of the Intellect and of Christian Feeling. When Feeling, however, comes to be considered an immediate fountain of knowledge, the intelligence is deprived of its rights, and the Bible sinks below its proper level. The result is Mysticism in the objectionable form. This term is not unfrequently used to stigmatize all forms of religious experience in which there enters an unusual warmth of emotion. If it be Mysticism to hold that obedience is the road to

[1] For good remarks on the relation of faith to the objective form of Scripture, see Dorner's *Hist. of Prot. Theology*, Vol. I. Div. ii. c. 4.

knowledge, in respect to divine things, and to certainty of conviction, or to hold that insight into the realities of religious faith presupposes an inward experience, the New Testament is open to the charge of being a mystical book.[1] "It is plain that the religious, the believing, man as such is a Mystic; for whoever is not conscious of God, does not feel Him, can neither know Him nor revere Him; but whoever only makes Him an object of thought without loving Him and becoming pure in heart, cannot know Him in a living way."[2] Mysticism may be used as the synonym of ecstasy, — the transport of feeling in which thought and will are merged. Mysticism, in the sense in which it is productive of error in the sphere of Christian doctrine, is the assumption that to the individual there are vouchsafed visions of truth exceeding the limits of the written Revelation. It involves the assumption that feeling is a direct source of knowledge. "When," says Coleridge, "a man refers to inward feelings and experiences of which mankind at large are not conscious, as evidences of the truth of any opinion, such a man I call a Mystic."[3] Illumination is made to stretch over ground not within the circuit of the Christian Revelation. Of course, the Mystic is tempted to undervalue the Scriptures. Why take a lamp in our hands when the sun's rays are falling directly upon us? It is likewise natural for the Mystic to disparage reason and science. Why should the understanding explore for truth which we have only to look within to behold? A third species of perversion in the framing of doctrine arises from the exaggeration of the intellectual factor. The consequence is Rationalism. Rationalism has been well described as "a usurpation of the understanding." The function of conscience and the affections as auxiliaries in the ascertainment of truth is partially or wholly ignored. The authority of the Scriptures is openly or virtually set aside. The attempt is made to construct theology in the dry light of the understanding, independently of spiritual experience and of objective authority. Under this process the deeper truths of Christianity, which shade off into mystery, are likely to be discarded. In the end religion is spun out of the mind through a metaphysical process in which the facts of Revelation, if recognized at all, are shorn of historical reality.

[1] See John vii. 17, xviii. 37; Matt. xi. 15, xiii. 16; 1 John iv. 8.

[2] C. I. Nitzsch, DGM., p. 37.

[3] *Aids to Reflection* (Conclusion).

Such was the outcome of the modern Pantheistic Schools of speculative Philosophy in Germany. Mysticism and Rationalism are at one in rejecting an objective standard of doctrine, an authority exterior to the individual. The one enthrones feeling, the other enthrones understanding, in the seat of authority. They are different forms of a one-sided subjectivism. But they often afford an illustration of the maxim that extremes meet. An excess of emotion in the one, or the quenching of fervor in the other, leads to an exchange of places. The Mystic cools into the Rationalist; the Rationalist warms into the Mystic.[1]

Writers in past times on the History of Doctrine have remarked that the principal topics or branches of Christian doctrine have each, to the exclusion of the rest, absorbed the attention of a particular people. Theology, or the Person of Christ and the Trinity, engrossed attention in the ancient Greek Church; Anthropology, the subject of sin and grace, was the subject of investigation in the Latin Church; and Soteriology, or the doctrine of Reconciliation, in the Teutonic Church, the Church of the Reformation. It has been said that in each case the subject of absorbing interest corresponded to the mental habit of the people by whom it was especially considered and discussed. Athanasius, Augustine, Luther, stand as representatives of tendencies of thought inherent in the nations or races to which they respectively belonged. It has been objected to this representation, that in no period has it been the real intention to take up and solve a single problem, that the general end of Christianity has been conceived of essentially in the same way, and that the purpose has always been — the purpose of Greek, Latin, and Teuton — to set forth Christianity in its entirety.[2] This criticism is just. The statement should rather be that in each of the epochs the prevailing interpretation of Christianity has corresponded to the special characteristics of time and race. The historic result, however, has been substantially that which is expressed in the statement that is criticised.

Among theories pertaining to the historical development of Christian theology, there have been brought forward in modern

[1] "Die Mystik," says Harnack, "ist in der Regel phantastisch ausgeführte Rationalismus, und der Rationalismus ist abgeblasste Mystik." DG. Vol. II. 416, N. 2.

[2] Ritschl, *Die Christl. Lehre d. Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung* (2 ed.), Vol. I. p. 3.

days two, unlike in their character, that are especially worthy of notice.

1. The theory of Dr. Baur, the leader of the Tübingen School, was matched to the Hegelian dialectic. In the process of evolution, thesis involves and produces antithesis, thesis and antithesis engender a higher unity. This in turn is differentiated and leads on to like triple movements, until the implicit contents of the idea are completely evolved, and the finality, the developed absolute, is reached. Baur assumed an original Petrine, judaizing type of doctrine, of which the Pauline teaching was the antithesis; thesis and antithesis resolved themselves into a compromising system. By a process of this kind, catholic theology emerges, the final stage of which is the Nicene definitions. In this naturalistic development, which runs through several centuries, most of the New Testament canonical writings come in as post-apostolic productions. They are so many landmarks in the progress of the historic evolution. In this theory, retrograde movements, aberrations of greater or less moment, are excluded. The course of opinion moves on under a necessary law. The fundamental postulate, which history must be so construed as to verify, is an ideal Pantheism.

2. An interesting theory of development has been brought forward in later times by distinguished writers of the Roman Catholic Church. It has served as a means of upholding specific tenets and practices for which it is increasingly difficult to find a basis either in the canonical Scriptures or in the primitive Church. The most eminent expounders of the general theory have been De Maistre in France, Möhler in Germany, and the late Cardinal Newman. We confine our attention here to Newman's exposition. It is presented in his Essay on Development, which was written in 1845, simultaneously with his passage from the Anglican over to the Roman Church. The starting-point of Newman's theory is the avowal that the teaching comprised in the original deposit of revealed truth, which was promulgated by Christ and the Apostles, opens its contents in an explicit form only by degrees and as time advances. There has been a continuous unfolding of the latent contents of the original teaching, and this has gone forward under the guardianship of the infallible Church, by which error is kept out. All ideas, it is said, except such as are on the plane of mathematical truth, — all living ideas, such as have to do with human nature or human duty, politics or religion, — are fruitful ideas.

They do not remain inert in the minds into which they fall. They are not passively received. They produce agitation, they are turned over and over in reflection, new lights are cast upon them, new judgments arise respecting them, ferment and confusion ensue. At length from all this commotion definite doctrine emerges. The new idea is looked at in its relation to other doctrines and facts, to other religions and philosophies. It is questioned and assailed, it is explained and illustrated. In the case of a moral or theological truth, the final outcome is an ethical code, a theological dogma or system. The point to be observed is that the germ stands to the outcome in a genetic relation. The latter is the just and adequate representation of the original idea. It was in that idea as the blossom is in the bud. It was what the original idea *meant* from the first. For example, the Wesleyanism of to-day may be said to be the legitimate growth of the seed sown in the last century by its founder. Newman recognizes the possibility of corruption, as in the case of any growth. This interrupts or prevents healthy development. But there are tests which avail to determine whether given phenomena in the religious province are normal or the opposite. These are such as 'preservation of the idea,' 'power of assimilation,' 'logical sequence,' 'chronic continuance,' and so forth. On the basis of this general view, Newman argues that there is an *a priori* probability of a development in Christianity, and a further probability of the same sort that there will be a developing Authority to discriminate between that which is sound and that which is corrupt. The main contention is that the Roman Catholic religion, as we now behold it, is the legitimate heir, successor, and representative of primitive Christianity.

There is not a little which is not only striking but well-founded in the preliminary portions of Newman's discussion — that part which deals with the vital character of moral and spiritual truth. But as soon as the possibility of corruption through the introduction of alien and false elements is recognized, the question whether there is a constituted authority competent to detect and cast aside what is thus abnormal must be settled, and it must be settled, not by an *a priori* speculation, but by a searching inquiry into the consistency of Roman teaching with itself and with the primitive documents of the Christian religion. The theory must be brought to the touchstone of history. In such a matter, no merely *a priori* inference, even if it may seem plausible, can be deemed to be con-

clusive. Another point of much weight was brought forward by Canon Mozley in his answer to Newman.[1] There may be corruption from mere exaggeration. The circumstance that an opinion or a practice grows out of something true and good does not of itself prove that opinion or practice to be true and right. An overgrowth is in itself an abuse. Aristotle's theory of the virtues is that they are a mean between extremes. For example, rashness is courage in excess; timidity is caution in excess. That a natural and proper veneration of the Virgin Mary runs into the worship of the Virgin is no sufficient defence of such a practice. The theory of Newman was directly at variance with the position taken by the old polemical writers in behalf of Rome, such as Bellarmine and Bossuet. As was early pointed out, Newman's thesis involves the concession that the Roman Catholicism of to-day is not the same as the faith of the primitive Church. The old ground of a literal identity is forsaken. The limit of the contention is that the system of to-day is an offshoot from the system planted by the Saviour and his Apostles, as that system is disclosed in the documents of the Christian religion and in early Church History.[2]

It has been customary up to a recent date to divide Doctrinal History into two parts, the General and the Special History of Doctrine, and to complete the account of each period before advancing to the next. Under the General History there is presented a sketch of the characteristics of the period, with a notice of the principal themes of discussion and of the principal writers to whom we are to resort for materials. The General History is an outline map of the period to be traversed. Under the Special History the matter is collected under the *loci* or rubrics of the theological system. This is the method of Münscher, Neander, also substantially of Baur and of most of the other authors. Baumgarten-Crusius gives the General History as a whole, under successive periods, and lets the Special History follow under like divisions. The same course is pursued by Shedd. Ritschl, in an essay published in 1871, objected to the traditional method of

[1] J. B. Mozley, *Theory of Development, a Criticism of Dr. Newman's Essay*, etc. (1879). Ambiguities in Newman's theory, and voices against it from the Roman Catholic side, are referred to by Mozley on pp. 196–223.

[2] See Bishop Thirlwall's Charge. For a trenchant criticism of Newman's theory, see Fairbairn's *The Place of Remains, Literary and Theological* (Vol. I. pp. 99–144). *Christ in Modern Theology*, B. I. c. i.

separating the General from the Special History, and to the plan of arranging the matter under the topics of the doctrinal system.[1] He styled it an anatomic as distinguished from an organic or physiologic method. It fails to give due emphasis to that which is distinctive in the current of thought in each period. Ritschl's essay was a review of the work of F. Nitzsch, who had made an approach to the method approved by him. This method has been exemplified by Harnack and by some other authors. It has the advantage of presenting better in its unity the system of a great theologian, as Origen or Augustine, instead of bringing forward its parts — the *disjecta membra* — separated from one another. Thomasius, in the part of his work which covers the patristic age, takes up the three "Central Doctrines," one by one, but he connects with each leading section, either "peripheral" matter on other topics, or illustrative supplements. In the subsequent periods, this method gives way to a more miscellaneous classification. Whatever plan is adopted, the suggestions of Ritschl ought to be kept in mind, and a due perspective and a proper unity to be secured. This is measurably effected — for example, by Neander — through cross-references and brief recapitulation. It is difficult and needless to carry through all the periods a uniform scheme.

The chief landmarks in the course of Doctrinal History are easily discerned. The earliest writings of a theological cast were naturally apologetic. Christian truth was defended against assaults without and within the Christian fold. Then followed within the Church widespread controversy on central points of doctrine — especially the Trinity and the Incarnation — the issue of which was the Catholic theology. In the West there were controversies on Sin and Grace, which settled, on these themes, but with less precision, the bounds of orthodoxy. A period of intellectual stagnancy ensued, not entirely unbroken, but lasting for several centuries. Then occurred the Rise of Scholasticism, and the opening of a new theological era, which extended to the Reformation. At that point begins the modern period in which criticism and essays at reconstruction are defining characteristics.

The Ancient Period, embracing — to speak generally — the first six centuries, was productive as regards the contents of the theological system, and certain doctrines were stamped with the seal

[1] *Jahrb. d. deutsch. Theol.* (1871, pp. 191–214); reprinted in Ritschl's *Gesämmelt. Aufsätze* (pp. 147–170).

of church authority. The Mediæval Period set in order transmitted beliefs and reduced them to a systematic form, with the aid of Philosophy and under the eyes of the Roman hierarchy. The Modern Age has witnessed efforts to reconstruct the system in the light of the Scriptures and in relation to the discoveries of science in its various departments. During the first three centuries discussions went forward without verdicts from a universally recognized authority. In the several centuries that immediately follow, there intervenes the authoritative action of œcumenical councils. From the end of the Patristic Period to about the middle of the eleventh century there is an interval wherein — save in a brief season in the age of Charlemagne — the products of intellectual activity, except in the form of compilations, are scanty. At that date there springs up a fresh intellectual life, the Scholastic era opens, and the work of organizing the system fairly begins. Protestantism initiated the attempt to reform the creed on the basis of the exclusive authority of the Bible and of an exchange of the Scholastic theory of Justification for the Pauline teaching. The various Protestant confessions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were framed on the basis of the principle of the supreme authority of the Scriptures. With the approach of the eighteenth century there are discerned the beginnings of a new era. It may be described, in a general way, as aiming to conform the theological system to the conclusions of scientific inquiry and criticism, or to bring into unity and harmony the knowledge derived from revelation and that ascertained through man's natural powers. It is the modern era in which we are now living.

In warfare with the Church of Rome and with one another the different Protestant bodies intrenched themselves behind elaborate Confessions. There arose in process of time a kind of Protestant Scholasticism. Resistance was awakened. It was more and more felt that the freedom of thought which Protestantism had seemed to promise was unduly restricted. Owing to this discontent, in conjunction with other causes soon to be adverted to, there sprang up an intellectual revolt. This was unhappily not tempered and kept within bounds by a spirit of practical piety, which had been chilled by theological contention and by the religious wars in the different countries — of which the Thirty Years' War was the most prolonged and destructive. The skeptical tendencies of the Renaissance, which had been stifled for the time by the religious life

of the Protestant Reform, revived in full activity. There were other phenomena of marked effect in the same general direction. Society had advanced to a new epoch in culture. Education was becoming liberated from exclusively clerical control. The partial blight which absorption in theological conflicts had cast for the time upon the literary life of the Renaissance was passing away. Other studies were drawing away a portion of the attention which had been so much concentrated upon theology. Under the auspices of Descartes, philosophy was breaking away from the leading-strings by which it had been held by the Church. The names of Copernicus and Francis Bacon suggest the dawn of the new epoch in the inductive investigation of nature. The cultivation of natural and physical science, and the knowledge thus derived, have brought forward new problems for the theologian to solve. Zeal in historical inquiry has kept pace with the ardor felt in the studies which pertain to the material world. Traditional beliefs in theology, heretofore unquestioned, are confronted with data gathered by historical researches. It might be expected that in this wide range of curiosity, this quest for knowledge in all directions, the Bible would become the object of a more exhaustive scrutiny. Nor is there cause for wonder if the critical spirit, with no spiritual discernment to accompany it, working solely in the dry light of the understanding, should give rise even to extreme developments of Rationalism. That the modern age is scientific is a truism. Men are everywhere seeking for defined and verified knowledge. Science, in the comprehensive meaning of the term, requires theology to take account of its teachings and to adjust itself to them. Conflicts thus occasioned, modifications of opinion thus produced, characterize the present period of Doctrinal History.

The Fathers of the first and second centuries who wrote against heresies, especially Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian, were the first authors who brought together materials for the History of Doctrine. Epiphanius, in his polemical treatise, the "Panarion," describes not less than eighty heretical parties. The series of the ancient Greek ecclesiastical historians, of whom Eusebius is the first, are sources of knowledge respecting doctrine as well as Church affairs in general. In the eight century, the Greek theologian, John of Damascus, presents in his theological treatise both a catalogue of heresies and numerous extracts from the Greek

Fathers. In the West, a still earlier writer, Isidore of Spain, furnishes a collection of excerpts from the Latin authors, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and others. The Reformation stimulated researches into the tenets of the early Church as well as of later ages. In the "Magdeburg Centuries," and in polemical publications without number, the history of the doctrines in dispute was discussed, of course commonly in a controversial spirit. The great English divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries explored the writings of the patristic and scholastic doctors, and used the learning thus acquired in the contests between Protestant and Catholic, Churchman and Puritan. The famous scholars of the Arminian School, on the continent, devoted to the early Fathers, as well as to the Scriptures, a critical examination. In the middle of the seventeenth century there appeared the first works treating expressly of the history of doctrine. These were two in number, one by a Protestant, the other by a Roman Catholic. The first was written by a learned Scotchman, John Forbes of Corse — the *Institutiones Historico-Theologicæ* (Amsterdam, 1645). It was designed to demonstrate the agreement of the tenets of the Reformed Church with primitive orthodoxy. The second is the work of the Jesuit scholar, Dionysius Petavius — *De Theologicis Dogmatibus* (Paris, 1644–50). It is not only erudite and acute; it is written with a certain liveliness of style. The concession that Ante-Nicene Fathers contain statements on points of doctrine which fall below the creeds of later date has led to the hasty inference that the author was an Arian in disguise. Bishop Bull's conjecture that his purpose was to compel his readers to fall back on Church authority as the umpire in doctrinal questions, is equally unsupported.[1] Petavius was not blind to the principle of theological development. In the eighteenth century the contributions of Mosheim to the history of doctrine are thorough and candid. The Rationalistic School, of which Semler was the leader, gave to Doctrinal History its distinct place as a branch of theology. But from the point of view of this school it could only be regarded as a record of clashing opinions. In this period, the most meritorious author in this department was Münscher. His text-books are mostly made up of passages from the ecclesiastical writers, arranged under appropriate topics. It is only during the present century that works have been produced on Doctrinal History

[1] See Bull's collected *Works*, Vol. V. pp. 12, 13.

which have exhibited a due insight and attained to a scientific form. The History of Doctrine by Baumgarten-Crusius brings together a mass of concisely stated, accurate information, drawn from original sources. But the scientific character of which we speak belongs eminently to Neander's historical writings on the subject, and to the writings of Baur. Gieseler's posthumous fragment stops at the Reformation. It is not without value as a supplement to his Church History, in which the history of doctrine is of great value for its documentary references and extracts. Hagenbach's work contains a store of information, but would be more valuable were it less a conglomerate. The American edition (from the author's fourth edition) was enriched by additions on English and American theology from the pen of Henry B. Smith. The excellent book of Friedrich Nitzsch terminates at the end of the patristic period. The Doctrinal History of Harnack, in which the distinction between the General and Special History disappears, is a brilliant exposition of the subject, and presents, more especially in the early period, the fruits of a quite thorough investigation of the sources. The author's opinions as to the origin of the New Testament writings and on Christian doctrines are made apparent on its pages. The briefer work of Harnack is a condensed but spirited review of the subject. One of the best of the compendiums is the *Leitfaden* of Friedrich Loofs. Seeborg's *Lehrbuch* is a valuable aid to students. In Schmid's *Lehrbuch* (edited by Hauck), the text is brief, but the collection of extracts is judiciously made. The excellent text-book of Thomasius is the production of a scholar versed in the sources, writing from the point of view of evangelical Lutheranism. Renan's series — *Histoire des Origines du Christianisme* — contains chapters pertaining to doctrine which are well worthy of attention. Shedd's History of Doctrine is a vigorous discussion of leading topics by an earnest defender of Calvinism. It terminates with the rise of the Socinian and Arminian systems. Sheldon's History of Doctrine is lucid and is brought down to a recent date.

There is a considerable number of valuable monographs on particular doctrines. Such are Dorner's History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, Ritschl on the Doctrine of Justification, Baur on the Trinity and on the Atonement. Treatises not distinctively historical contain much historical matter. Such, for example, are Julius Müller's work on the Doctrine of Sin, Liddon's

Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of Christ, Fairbairn's "The Place of Christ in Modern Theology." The Protestant *Real-Encyclopedie* (edited in the new edition by Herzog, Plitt and Hauck), Wetzer and Welte, *Kirchenlexikon* [Roman Catholic], (2d ed. 1886 sq.), Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, are instructive on the subject of Doctrinal History. As to the first three centuries, the Prolegomena and Notes of Professor McGiffert, pertaining to this subject, in his edition of the *Church History* of Eusebius (1890), are very valuable.

PART I

ANCIENT THEOLOGY

PERIOD I

THE RISE AND EARLY TYPES OF THEOLOGY TO THE COMPLETE SYSTEM OF ORIGEN AND TO THE FULLY ESTABLISHED CONCEPTION OF THE PRE-MUNDANE PERSONAL LOGOS (c. A.D. 300)

CHAPTER I

APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY — PALESTINIAN AND HELLENISTIC JUDAISM — GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND GENTILE CULTURE

THE testimony and teachings of the Apostles constitute the authentic sources of Christian theology. They are comprised in the New Testament writings. The exposition of these documents is the proper work of Biblical Theology, for which the Introduction to the New Testament prepares the way. It is only brief comments on the New Testament doctrine that can here find a place. The bond that unites the Old Testament with the New, the religion of Israel with the Gospel, is the idea of the kingdom of God. It is predicted, prefigured, initiated, in the earlier system; it is realized in the later. The new dispensation is the fulfilment of that which was foretokened in the old. John the Baptist discerned that his office was that of a herald of the messianic kingdom.[1] So it was represented by Jesus.[2] Jesus Himself appeared

[1] Matt. iii. 11.

[2] Matt. xi. 13, 14 (Luke xvi. 16); Mark ix. 12, 13 (cf. Malachi iii. 23).

in the character of the head of the kingdom. If He avoided publicly proclaiming His regal station, it was to preclude popular demonstrations springing from false ideals of the Messiah and the messianic reign. The Sermon on the Mount was the legislation of the new kingdom. The Mount of the Beatitudes succeeded to the Sinai of the Decalogue. Holiness and peace are offered to those who come to Him and surrender themselves to His guidance. The contrast between the course which He pursued and the ideas and expectations even of those who believed in Him, naturally gave rise to doubts and questionings as to His precise rank among divine messengers and the exact import of His mission. So we may account for the conversation at Cæsarea Philippi,[1] and the message of John the Baptist.[2] In the Synoptical Gospels, Jesus stands in such a relation to God that He alone knows God and is known by Him.[3] He is the organ of the self-revelation of God. The devotion to Him required in His disciples transcends that which is due in the dearest and most sacred human relations.[4] His acceptance of the designation 'Son of God,' and the added assurance that from that time onward would be made manifest His participation in divine power and honor was felt by the High Priest, who discredited this avowal, to be nothing short of blasphemy.[5] By Him were to be determined the allotments of the final judgment.[6] Rejected by the Jews, He is nevertheless conscious that the deadly blow aimed at His cause will open a way to its final victory. His death will be the means of spiritual deliverance, a "ransom" for many, the ground of the forgiveness of sin.[7] The kingdom is to advance gradually, as leaven and as seed planted in the ground. It is to come, and yet it is a present reality.[8] If taken away from the chosen people, it will be carried beyond their limits, even among the heathen.[9] It is in the souls of men; it is a living force in the bosom of society. Yet there is an apocalyptic side in the Synoptical portraiture of the kingdom. There is a goal in the future, a consummation, or Second Advent of the Christ to judgment. The Disciples, knowing that

[1] Mark viii. 27–31.
[2] Matt. xi. 2, 3.
[3] Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22.
[4] Matt. x. 37.
[5] Matt. xxvi. 64; Mark xiv. 61.
[6] Matt. xxv. 32.
[7] Matt. xx. 28; Matt. xxvi. 28.
[8] Matt. v. 3, 10; Mark x. 14, 15; Matt. xxi. 31; xi. 11 (Luke vii. 28).
[9] Matt. xxi. 41; Mark xii. 9.

they were living in the "Last Time," the final stage of Revelation, looked for the speedy coming of the last day. This anticipation is more or less distinctly expressed in almost all of the New Testament writings.[1] Principally through the agency of the Apostle Paul, the Gospel of the kingdom, with all its privileges, was first proclaimed to the heathen. The older Apostles, moved by the undeniable evidence of God's approbation of his work, gave him "the right hand of fellowship," it being agreed that while they should preach to the Jews, he, with Barnabas, his companion for a while, should "go unto the Gentiles."[2] In the Synoptical Gospels it is in the Eschatology that the higher nature and dignity of Christ are most apparent. In the Epistles of Paul, the divine side of His being, His preëxistence, His agency in the work of creation, are explicitly taught.[3] The success of the mission to the Gentiles, the manifest marks of the divine approval of it, the embittered temper of the Jews as time went on, the fall of Jerusalem and the breaking up of the Jewish nationality, had the effect fully to establish that catholic interpretation of the Gospel of which Paul had been the fervent, unflinching champion. That, after the death of Paul, the Apostle John took up his abode at Ephesus is a fact which is too well attested to admit of a reasonable doubt. The influence of his life and teaching, emanating from that centre, is satisfactorily proved. Whatever opinion may be held respecting the Johannine authorship of the book of Revelation, the circumstance that it was so early attributed to the Apostle John[4] is a sufficient proof of his residence in Asia Minor and of his authority in the churches of that region. It is impossible to review here the discussion concerning the authorship of the Fourth Gospel and of the First Epistle which bears the name of John. The external proof is a cumulative argument the weight of which has seldom been duly estimated by the opponents of the genuineness of these writings. The necessary and pretty steady retreat backward of the adverse criticism, from the date assigned to the Fourth Gospel by Baur and his followers

[1] Matt. xxiv. 29, Luke xviii. 7, 8, John i. 21–23; cf. 1 John ii. 18, 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17, 2 Thess. ii. 7, Phil. iv. 5, 1 Cor. xvi. 22, 1 Peter iv. 7, etc.

[2] Gal. ii. 9.

[3] Phil. ii. 6, 7, 2 Cor. viii. 9, 1 Cor. viii. 6.

[4] Justin, *Dial. c. Tryph.*, c. 81; Iren. v. 35. 2; Tertullian, *Adv. Marcion.*, III. 14, *Ibid.* IV. 5; *De Præscr. Hæret.* 33.

(c. 160), renders the problem of accounting for its origin, if it be considered spurious, more and more difficult of solution. It is now frequently admitted by the negative criticism that the Gospel includes authentic traditions of the teaching of John, edited, it may be, by one of his disciples. In the Fourth Gospel and in the Epistle, the conception of the Son of God is deepened and is carried back into a metaphysical relation of Christ to the Father. The preëxistence as well as the divinity of the Messiah are plainly set forth. The term 'Logos' in the prologue is taken up from current phraseology, which had its roots in the Old Testament and the Old Testament Apocrypha, and which the Alexandrian Jewish philosophy did much to diffuse. The term is adopted by the Evangelist to designate the divine Saviour, the Revealer of God. The new spiritual life through the believer's union with Christ and fellowship with the Father involved therein, is the condensed expression of the benefit imparted by the Gospel. The apocalyptic element, although distinctly present in the Johannine teaching, is in the background. The reality of the Incarnation is affirmed as a cardinal truth.[1]

Christian believers in common with the Jews received the Old Testament writings as sacred Scriptures. The Disciples of Christ were protected by His teaching from an ensnaring casuistry and from other kinds of sophistry in the interpretation of them. Exclusion from the synagogue and the antipathy of the Jews operated to keep off the same or like abuses of exegesis. Yet there were traditional ways of explaining the Old Testament which the early Christians could not but share. The rabbinical habit of attaching double meanings to words, or of finding in them a mystic sense of some sort, was not without its influence on Christian minds. A natural fruit of the idea of verbal inspiration was the allegorical treatment of Old Testament passages, or fanciful inferences from the orthography or sound of words. The Haggada — the mass of comment, mingled with legend, which had grown up about the historical, prophetic, and ethical portions of the Old Testament Scriptures — contributed something to the stock of Christian beliefs. In the Jewish commentaries there was a union of two distinct elements. There was the scholastic, casuistic element, and there was the fanciful element. These amplified and embel-

[1] 1 John iv. 2, 3. The common authorship of the Gospel and the Epistle is beyond reasonable doubt.

lished the writings regarded as inspired. There was, moreover, an influence from the Jewish apocalypses, — for example, the book of Enoch, which underwent modification in the hands of a Christian editor. Other books of this class were the Apocalypse of Baruch, the Fourth Book of Ezra, and, among the Hellenistic Jews, the Sibylline Oracles. Papias repeats a prophecy of the wondrous fruitfulness of the vine in the millennial times, when it will bear colossal grapes, — a passage taken from the Apocalypse of Baruch. What influence was exerted on Christian thought by speculations in this literature [1] relative to the preëxistence of persons and things, it is not easy to define.[2] The Jews generally conceived of the Messiah as a mere man. Trypho, the Jew, in Justin Martyr's Dialogue, speaks of the idea of the Messiah's preexistence as absurd.[3]

It was natural that the Hellenistic Jews should be, as a rule, less rigid and more conciliating towards the Gentiles than their Palestinian brethren. To some extent they stood as mediators between the Jewish religion and Gentile thought. This was true especially of that Alexandrian Judaism of which Philo is the foremost representative. He was an old man when he headed a deputation of Jews to the Emperor Caligula (A.D. 38 or 39). The germs of his system were of an earlier date. They are seen in the Wisdom of Solomon, an Alexandrian production. It was at Alexandria, the meeting-place of nations, the confluence of streams of thought from all directions, that this eclectic system, this union of Biblical teaching with Platonic and Stoic tenets, took its rise. Philo was a believing Jew, without any thought of perverting the Old Testament, but aiming to extract what he considered its deeper purport. His opinions in religion and ethics, nevertheless, were imbibed from the Greek philosophic teachers. By means of allegory, he undertook to read into the Hebrew Scriptures the tenets of the Academy and the Porch. Where the Scripture had a literal meaning that was unobjectionable, it might be accepted, but even in such a case there lay beneath it an occult sense which unveiled itself to the discerning. In Philo's teaching there is a sharp antithesis between God and the world.

[1] Irenæus, v. 33. 3; Schürer, *Gesch. d. Judisch. Volkes*, etc., Vol. II. p. 644, c. 48.

[2] The "Notion of Preëxistence" is discussed by Harnack, DG., I. 710 sq. See, also, Ewald, *Gesch. d. Volkes Israel*, Vol. V. p. 73 sq.

[3] c. 48.

This dualism is taken up from Plato. To God we may attach none of the predicates which characterize finite things. To connect with Him specific qualities is to divest Him of His supreme rank. There can be no action of God upon the world of matter save through intermediate agents. These are constituted by the Platonic ideas and the efficient causes of the Stoic system, — which are, also, the angels of the Jewish religion and the demons of the Gentile mythology. These intermediate Powers are now spoken of as personal, and again plainly fall short of personality, being, rather, vivid personifications. The conception of the Logos has a central place in Philo's system. The Logos is the Power of God, or the divine Reason, endowed with energy, action, and comprehending in itself all subordinate Powers. Now the Logos is conceived of as personal, and again, to exclude the idea of a separation from God, it is represented as if impersonal.[1] The Logos is not only the First-Born of God, the Archangel among angels, the Viceroy of God in the world, but, also, represents the world before God, as its High Priest, its Advocate or Paraclete. The world is not created outright, but is moulded out of matter. Hence evil arises. Souls are preëxistent; while in the flesh they are in a prison. Therefore the end to be sought is to break away from sense, to destroy its control. In this life the highest achievement of the wise and virtuous is to rise in a sort of ecstasy to the immediate vision of God. This direct access to the divine Essence in rapturous contemplation, which is ascribed to the sons of God, is something altogether above the blessing which is open to the "sons of the Logos." Their knowledge of God is in symbols; their intercourse with the Supreme is indirect.[2] The idea of an incarnation of the Logos clashes with the fundamental principles of Philo.[3] Nor is there a distinct messianic expectation. Peace will be the inheritance of

[1] Drummond contends that all ascriptions of personality to the Logos in Philo are figurative. "From first to last, the Logos is the Thought of God, dwelling subjectively in the infinite Mind, planted out and made objective in the universe." The cosmos is "a tissue of rational force," imaging the perfections of God. "The reason of man is the same rational force entering into consciousness," etc. *Philo Judaeus*, etc., Vol. II. p. 273.

[2] *Conf. Ling.*, 28. Cf. *Somn.* I. 11, *SS. Ab. et Cain*, 38, *Leg. All*, III. 31.

[3] On the contrast between Philo's idea of the Logos and the Johannine conception, see Edersheim's Art. "Philo," *Dict. of Christ. Biogr.* IV. 379, 380.

those who are established in virtue. Especially will the Israelites be blessed and brought together in their own land. The largest influence of the Philonic teaching was, not on the Jew or the heathen, but on Christian schools of thought.[1]

In the age that preceded the introduction of Christianity, the disruption of nationalities, the increased intercourse of peoples with one another, and other kindred causes, had rudely shaken the old fabrics of mythological religion. The rise of scientific and philosophical inquiry had dealt a mortal blow at the traditional systems of faith and worship. In the writings of Cicero we are presented incidentally with a picture of the skepticism that prevailed in the cultivated classes. There was a growing tendency to seek for mental rest through schemes of syncretism, by combining ingredients of various religions and by adopting rites drawn from the most diverse quarters. In the first century there were strong indications of a revival of religious feeling. Augustus had undertaken religious reforms which were not wholly ineffectual. There were attempts to breathe fresh life into the ancestral forms of worship and to save an almost worn-out creed from extinction. Quite conspicuous was the drift towards monotheism. Faith in a future life and in personal immortality revived from its decay. Serious thinkers, such as Plutarch, whose philosophy was a Platonic eclecticism, made room for the old divinities by reducing them to the rank of subordinate beings. Repulsive tales in the legends of the gods Plutarch connected with the action of inferior demons, in which deities of a higher order had no part. He labored to strike out a middle path between the follies of superstition and the gloom of atheism. Philosophers began to assume an office not unlike that of pastors or confessors. Cynics engaged, on the streets and highways, in a distinctively missionary work, addressing their counsels and rebukes to whomsoever they chose to accost.

Special attention is required to the influence of the Greek philosophy on Christian doctrine. Ethical philosophy owed its begin-

[1] Respecting Philo and his system, the older works of Gfrörer (2 vols. 1831) and Dähne (2 vols. 1834) are still of value. In the copious recent literature on the subject, among the authors specially worthy of attention are Schürer, *Gesch. d. Jüdisch. Volkes*, P. II. pp. 831–886; Zeller, *Die Phil. d. Griechen*, Vol. III.; Drummond's *Philo Judæus, or the Jewish Alexandrian Phil.* (1888); and Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, etc. (1875).

nings to Socrates. He turned his back on the physics and speculative cosmology with which previous philosophers had busied themselves. As a practical reformer, in opposition to the undermining process of the Sophists, he felt the need of laying a scientific basis for morals. By his method of cross-examination he cleared the minds of his auditors of confusion and elicited accurate definitions. In his ethical doctrine in which virtue was identified with knowledge or insight, he introduced a partial truth which gave rise to a one-sided intellectualism, to the idea of an aristocracy of thinkers. This conception produced far-reaching consequences, not only in the Greek schools, but also within the pale of Christianity. In Plato's doctrine of ideas, there was given to concepts, or abstract general notions, the character of supersensible realities — the abiding realities of which concrete, visible things in the world around us — things that appear only to vanish — somehow partake. Compared with the ideas the world of concrete things is a world of shadows. The ideas are coördinated and subordinated, until we reach in the upward ascent the supreme idea of "the good." The idea of the good is the cause both of being and of cognition. Sometimes this idea is identified with God. Yet Plato teaches that God is a personal intelligence, by whom the world is fashioned from the matter which is eternal and is partly intractable. The souls of men enter into material habitations from a preëxistence, either conceived of as actual or mythically imagined. Redemption is, therefore, physical or, one might better say, metaphysical, — a release from the bondage of sense. It is reached through enlightenment, wisdom and goodness being regarded as inseparable. In the Platonic theory of ideas there was a door opened for Philosophy to pursue afterwards a Pantheistic direction. The theory of the relation of spirit to matter invited to endless vagaries of speculation. The hypostasizing of ideas, through a tendency Oriental in its source, or through an imagination for some other cause lacking in sobriety, might call into being Gnostic mythologies. After the creative epoch of Plato and Aristotle, Philosophy, owing partly to political and social changes, took a decidedly practical turn. Ethical and religious inquiries, pertaining to the individual and to the attaining of tranquillity of spirit, were uppermost in the two principal systems that emerged. Epicureanism with its doctrine of a cosmos self-produced from primitive atoms, of deities unconcerned about

mundane affairs, and of a morality synonymous with prudent pleasure-seeking, had little affinity with the Gospel and little influence upon its teachers. Respecting Stoicism the case was different. The metaphysic of Stoicism was borrowed from earlier systems, especially from that of Heraclitus, and had no genetic relation to the nobler system of Stoical ethics. The metaphysical theory was a materialistic Pantheism. But the indwelling force from which all things spring, if it operates blindly, is held to operate rationally. The universe is subject to one all-ruling law. The world, looked at as an organic unity, is perfect. Evil is relative ; all things considered, there is no evil. Zeus, like Providence and Destiny, is another name for the totality of things. There is no space for free agency. Logos, the divine reason or wisdom, designates the power that pervades the universe, yet is corporeal in its nature. It is sometimes styled, according to the analogy of a seed stored with vital energy, the Generative or Seminal Logos. The virtuous man, the Sage, is he who lives according to nature, either his own nature or the nature of the universe, — for the discrimination is not always made. He is calm within, murmurs at nothing that is or that occurs, implicitly obeys reason, uninfluenced by sensibility or emotion. The system of Zeno and Chrysippus parted with much of its rigor in the later Stoicism of the Roman School. In Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and the Greek freedman Epictetus, there is a recognition, though not uniform and persistent, of the personality of God, of the reality of the soul as distinguished from the body, and of the continuance of personal life after death. The cosmopolitan element in Stoicism, the idea of mankind as a single community, ripens into the conception of the brotherhood of mankind, and of God as a universal Father. In Seneca, precepts enjoining patience, forgiveness, benevolence, approximate to the purity and elevation of the precepts of the Gospel, while the metaphysical setting remains quite diverse. The sense of the need of divine help is a new element grafted into the later Stoicism. It is among the New Platonists that Philosophy assumes the most decidedly religious aspect. Philo was a forerunner of this school, Ammonius Saccas its reputed founder; but it was Plotinus who gave it a systematic form. God was conceived of as the Ineffable One, the undifferentiated Absolute. He is incomprehensible. He is utterly separate from the world, for the system is thoroughly dualistic. Asceti-

cism is the path to the self-purification of the soul. The highest attainment, the ideal blessedness, is the ecstatic state wherein the soul soars to the intuition and embrace of the Supreme Being. The enraptured spirit loses the sense of individuality, and lies, so to speak, on the bosom of the Infinite.

The influence of Greek Philosophy upon the early Christian theology is too obvious to be questioned. The sciences were the creation of the Greek mind, and theology forms no exception to this general statement. There was a "psychological climate" in which theology took its form. There was an environment of thought and culture from the influence of which it would have been impossible for the theologians of the Church to escape. The point of most importance is to determine the nature and the extent of that influence by which they were necessarily affected. That the *form* of enunciations of doctrine was affected by it, the bare inspection of the ancient œcumenical creeds is sufficient to show. Newman says that the use of the term 'consubstantial' by the Nicene Council is "the one instance of a scientific word having been introduced into the creed from that day to this."[1] There are other terms in the creeds, however, such, for example, as the word 'nature,' which imply a classification of our mental faculties that does not conform precisely to our modern views. Aside from the phraseology of the œcumenical creeds, the patristic teaching is stamped with the traces of philosophical ideas that run back as far as Plato and Aristotle. It has been alleged by some scholars in the past, and the assertion has been renewed by certain recent authors, that the substance as well as the form of Christian theology was essentially modified by the Greek moulds into which Christian truth was cast. Views tending in this direction have been presented of late by two learned scholars, Hatch and Harnack. The question for the student to determine is, how far have the ancient creeds, their authors and expounders, gone beyond an intellectual *equivalent* of the New Testament teaching? What is to be referred to the Gospel, and what to Greek philosophical thought? If alloy may be inwrought from alien sources, it is the task of Biblical and historical scholarship to ascertain its nature and limit.[2]

[1] *Grammar of Assent*, p. 138.

[2] The influence of the Greek Mysteries on Christian usages is a separate, although kindred, topic. Here the point of chief moment is the *disciplina*

arcani, embracing the secrecy observed respecting the Baptismal Confession, etc., and the exclusion of non-communicants from being present at the Sacrament. Justin describes the Eucharist obviously without any idea of concealment in connection with it (Apol. I. 65 sq.). From about A.D. 150, with the development of the Catechumenate, and under the dangers incident to persecution, this sacred reserve — the *disciplina arcani* — arose and continued until the Church emerged to a position of safety. But from Justin's time, the Sacraments began to be looked upon after the analogy of the Mysteries, and the effect of this habit of thought is perceptible both upon the language respecting them and, in some degree, on the practices connected with them. Yet the measure of this effect may be exaggerated. On this subject see Zezschwitz's Art., *Arkan-Disciplin*, in the *Real-Encycl.*, I. p. 637, Möller's *Kirchegesch.*, I. pp. 281, 282. The subject is discussed by Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas*, etc. (Lect. X.), and by Harnack, DG., I. pp. 176 sq., *et al.* (See the Index at the end of Vol. III.) See, also, Anrich, *Das antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluss auf das Christenthum* (1894).

CHAPTER II

THE ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS

I. *The Apostolic Fathers.* — This is an inaccurate title given to the group of earliest ecclesiastical writers after the Apostles. The designation is owing to the fact that they were supposed to have been immediate pupils of the Apostles. We have an *Epistle of Clement,* who is designated in the tradition as the first Bishop of Rome. Whether or not he wore this title exclusively, or was simply the leading presbyter, it is no doubt by him that this letter from the Church of Rome to the Church at Corinth was written. Its date is about A.D. 96. It contains moral injunctions of a general nature, which are followed by special exhortations occasioned by discord in the Corinthian Church, which was thought to pay less than due respect to its presbyters. The document styled the *Second Epistle of Clement* is a Homily, which not unlikely was addressed, either orally or in writing, to the same church, but is the production of an unknown author, who wrote probably as early as A.D. 150. The first distinct mention of it is by Eusebius. It is not ascribed to Clement by the early ecclesiastical authors. It is the most ancient of extant homilies. *Hermas,* the author of *The Shepherd,* wrote his book at Rome. Its division into three parts is from a later hand than the author's. It comprises a series of visions, with which are connected precepts, warnings, and parables. The Church, which communicates the revelations made to Hermas, is personified as an aged woman. Afterwards, in the guise of a shepherd, the "angel of repentance" appears, by whom are delivered the teachings in the closing parts of the book. The date assigned in the ancient tradition (c. 140–155) seems late, in view of the fact that shortly after the middle of the second century, the work is known to have been in circulation in the churches of the East and

West. This circumstance, with other indications, leads Zahn and some other critics to place its date as early as about 90–100. It is cited by Irenæus and by Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria was familiar with it. The *Epistle* with which the name of *Barnabas* is connected, was written, not by the companion of Paul, but by an unknown writer, probably an Alexandrian. It is strongly anti-Judaic in its spirit. There are widely different judgments as to its date. It is placed by some as early as A.D. 70; by others as late as the beginning of the reign of Hadrian (117–138). The determination of the question is partly dependent on the relation of the book to the *Didache,* with which it has chapters in common. This last named work, the *Didache*, or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, was discovered in 1873 by Bryennios, an Eastern prelate, but was not published until 1883. It is one of the most interesting literary discoveries of recent times. It consists of two portions. It is a church manual for catechists and for congregations. The catechetical part, in the first six chapters, presents moral precepts under the scheme of Two Ways, the way of life, and the way of death. The second part contains directions pertaining to worship and church discipline, with statements relating to Eschatology. The first portion of the *Didache*, the Two Ways, is nearly identical with passages in the Epistle of Barnabas, and in the Apostolical Canons, a work composed probably as early as the beginning of the third century; and it is found, also, in a more expanded form, in the Apostolical Constitutions. The *Didache* is assigned by most critics to a time not later than the beginning of the second century. As to its relation to the Epistle of Barnabas, that it is not dependent on the Epistle has been shown by Zahn and others. Harnack has considerable support in the opinion that both books drew from a common source, but not in the conclusion that the *Didache* has a much later origin (from 120 to 165). *The Epistles of Ignatius,* mainly from their bearing on the rise of Episcopacy, have long been a subject of discussion. It was a gain when at last the subject of controversy was narrowed down to the question of the genuineness of the seven shorter Greek Epistles. That these are the productions of Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, who was transported to Rome and perished under Trajan, has been rendered, to say the least, extremely probable, especially since the publication of the works of Zahn and Lightfoot. The objections made to the integrity of the Epistles can hardly be made good, especially

when it is remembered that the Episcopacy for which Ignatius is a zealous champion is not sacerdotal in its character, but is commended as a means of order and unity, and that he is struggling to secure for bishops a degree of authority to which, it would seem, they had not as yet attained. The date of the Ignatian Epistles, according to Lightfoot, is about 110. Harnack is peculiar in advancing the hypothesis of a much later date for the martyrdom of the author, and so for the composition of his writings. *Polycarp*, Bishop of Smyrna, who had personally known the Apostle John, died as a martyr in 155 or 156. The *Epistle to the Philippians*, which was in the hands of Irenæus, who had known Polycarp, is unquestionably genuine. *Papias*, Bishop of Hierapolis, was a contemporary of Polycarp, and is said to have been, like him, a pupil of John the Apostle. But this statement of Irenæus is called in question, possibly with truth, by Eusebius. *The Martyrdom of Polycarp* is an account by the Church of Smyrna of the circumstances of the death of their aged pastor at the hands of Roman executioners. It is enlarged and interpolated by subsequent additions, but there is good reason to conclude that it is essentially genuine. Papias wrote, in five books, the *Exposition of the Oracles of the Lord*, of which we have preserved to us a few fragments, one of which is the highly interesting and valuable statement in Eusebius respecting the origin of the Gospels of Matthew and of Mark. Besides comments on the teachings of Christ, the work of Papias included information respecting the Gospel histories which he had gathered from oral sources.

II. *The Apologists.* — Only a portion of the writings of the authors who first took up the defence of Christianity are extant. These writings were addressed either to individuals, or to heathen readers in general. They belong mostly to the age of the Antonines. *Quadratus* may have addressed to Hadrian his apology, which is lost. The work addressed to Antoninus Pius by *Aristides* has lately been in part recovered. We have it in an Armenian translation, also in a Syrian translation, and in an imperfect Greek text. Fragments of an apologetic work of *Melito*, Bishop of Sardis, addressed to Marcus Aurelius, are preserved in Eusebius. A writing by *Claudius Apollinaris*, Bishop of Hierapolis, addressed to the same Emperor, and a work of *Miltiades*, a rhetorician of Athens, addressed to M.

Aurelius and L. Verus, have both perished. The most important of the writers of this class in the second century is *Justin Martyr*. He was a native of Samaria, and was born about A.D. 100. He had received a philosophical training, and was himself a philosopher by profession. He was a disciple of the Platonic school, but was influenced, also, by the ethical ideas of the Stoics. We have from his pen two Apologies, a longer and a shorter, which, however, originally formed one work, and the Dialogue with Trypho (a Jew). The Discourse of the Greeks and The Exhortation to the Greeks, which are often ascribed to Justin, are by later writers. The Apologies were written not later than 152 and not earlier than 138. The Dialogue is a little later than the Apologies. *Tatian* was born in Assyria and was perhaps of Syrian parentage, but was educated in Greek learning. At Rome he came into connection with Justin. He wrote a Discourse to the Greeks, about 152 or 153. The "Diatesseron" was a work by him, formed by combining selections from the Four Gospels. Besides the Commentary upon the work by Ephraim of Edessa (who died in 373), we have two, possibly three, very free translations of it into other languages.[1] Whether it was first written in Greek or Syrian is uncertain. Tatian became a Gnostic and the leader of an ascetic sect, the Encratites. *Theophilus*, Bishop of Antioch, (168–c. 190) wrote an Apology addressed to Autolycus, a cultivated heathen. It is directed against heathenism in its popular and philosophical forms. The *Epistle to Diognet*, by an unknown author, written about the end of the second century, is full of force and eloquence, but exhibits an antagonism to the Jewish religion. One of the most cogent of the early defences of Christianity is the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix, which, were we certain of its early date, would be distinguished as the first of the Latin Apologies. Whether it was composed as early as 180, or as late as the middle of the third century, is still a litigated point.

III. *Irenæus and Hippolytus.* — By far the most valuable writer, as a source for the History of Doctrine, in the second century, is Irenæus. Born in Asia Minor, about 125 or 130, separated by only a single link from the Apostle John, whose pupil, Polycarp, he had seen and heard, Irenæus became first a Presbyter in the Church at Lyons, as the colleague of the aged Pothinus, and afterwards succeeded him in the bishopric. We

[1] See Harnack, *Gesch. d. Altchristl. Litt.*, I. 2, p. 495.

have the record of at least one visit, and probably of two visits, made by him to Rome. Such was his standing that he could address an admonitory letter to Victor, a Roman bishop. His copious work *Adversus Hæreses* was written to confute the Gnostics, about the year 180. He died probably in 202. The wide acquaintance of Irenæus with the churches East and West, the sobriety of his character, and his unimpeached reputation for orthodoxy, render him an invaluable witness, both respecting the tenets of the Gnostics and of the Christians of his time. He was clear in his perceptions, practical, and averse to speculation. The work of Irenæus exists only in a literal and crude Latin translation; but we are fortunately in possession of copious extracts from the original in Hippolytus, Eusebius, and Epiphanius. Besides this work there are fragments, including the Epistle to Florinus, which contain the reminiscences of Polycarp; but the "Pfaffian" fragments are of doubtful genuineness. The longest of them is certainly spurious. *Hippolytus* was a pupil of Irenæus. Although he was a celebrated man in his day, our information concerning his personal history is scanty. He was a Presbyter at Rome when Zephyrinus and Callistus were bishops, the first of whom acceded to office in 199, and the last of whom died in 222. Strenuous in maintaining the strictest theory as to Church discipline, and energetic in opposing Patripassianism, he waged a contest against these bishops, and would appear to have been a bishop of a seceding party in opposition to them. His *Refutation of all Heresies*, which was found in 1842, and first published in 1851, under the title of *Philosophumena*, throws much light on the opinions of Gnostic sects, whose errors he traces to the heathen philosophers. Missing parts of the work probably treated of Chaldean and other Oriental opinions.

IV. *The Latin Writers, Tertullian and Cyprian.* — Tertullian was the first to make the Latin language a vehicle for theology. He was a Presbyter at Carthage, was born about 160, and died about 220. At school, in addition to other branches, he learned Greek. He was trained to be an advocate, and one peculiarity of his writings is the frequent occurrence in them of legal ideas and phraseology. Although not unacquainted with philosophy, he inveighs against the philosophers, going so far as to denounce Plato as the *condimentarius* of all heretics. Acute and fertile in thought, he infuses into his writings a vehemence which belongs to

his temperament. Yet his genius shines through the cloud of exaggeration. An enthusiast by nature, he at length became an avowed Montanist. His numerous works are upon a variety of themes. They embrace polemical and apologetic works, against parties without and within the Church, and discussions of an ascetic and ecclesiastical cast. *Cyprian,* Bishop of Carthage, who died as a martyr in 258, was largely influenced by the writings of Tertullian. His own literary activity was mainly upon topics relating to Church government and discipline.

V. *The Alexandrians.* — It was at Alexandria, the seat of all science, that philosophical theology first acquired a firm footing. The union of philosophy and theology, of which we see the beginnings in the Apologists, was there consummated. Catechetical instruction, when cultivated and inquisitive heathen converts were to be taught, necessarily assumed a new form. The school for catechumens developed itself into a school for the training of the clergy. The Alexandrian teachers met the educated heathen on their own ground. Instead of pouring out invectives, after the manner of Tertullian, against the Greek philosophers, they recognized in the teachings of the Greek sages materials which Christian teachers might accept and assimilate. Attainments in knowledge which were above the capacity of all believers might be open at least to a part. The scholarship of the Church was at Alexandria. Pantænus, the first teacher, who began his work not far from 185, had been an adherent of the Stoic school, while mingling in his creed elements of Platonic doctrine. His writings have perished. In his pupil, Clement, who succeeded him, and who taught — with an interval of absence on account of the Severian persecution — from about 191 until he retired in 202, the peculiarities of the Alexandrian type of theology are distinctly marked. He was born in Greece, and had studied philosophy in different lands and under various masters. In Christianity he found the satisfaction which he had elsewhere sought in vain. In his writings, his large acquisitions of learning and the fertility of his genius, as well as his lack of system, are apparent. In his Discourse to the Greeks, the superiority of the Gospel to the heathen systems of worship and of thought is insisted on, with a generous recognition, however, of the truth to be found in their poets and philosophers. The *Pædagogos* was designed for the ethical training of converts, as a preparation for gaining an insight into the deeper mysteries of the

Christian teaching. Here Clement intermingles ideas drawn from the Stoical morals. The crowning treatise of Clement is the *Stromata*, or Patchwork—for the term denoted a coverlet made of patches. The author expatiates on the truths of Christianity, without care for systematic arrangement. In a briefer Essay, "Who is the Rich Man that is Saved?" Clement undertakes to evince that not the possession of riches, but an inordinate attachment to them, debars from the kingdom. At the same time, in this Essay the ascetic feeling as concerns earthly good and the pleasures of sense finds expression.

Origen, who in genius stands on a level with Augustine, and is outstripped in power and achievements by none of the Fathers, was a pupil of Clement. Born in 185 of Christian parents, he received a classical as well as a Christian education, and succeeded Clement as a teacher,—a post from which he was driven by the Bishop of Alexandria, Demetrius. In consequence of sufferings inflicted on him in the Decian persecution, he died at Cæsarea in Cappadocia, in 253. He was initiated into the study of philosophy by Ammonius Saccas, the Neo-platonist; but he made himself conversant with the tenets of all the philosophical schools. The writings of this great scholar are exceedingly various. His *Hexapla*, a comparison of the text of the Septuagint with the Hebrew text of the Old Testament and with other Greek versions, was the fruit of twenty-seven years of labor. His commentaries, of which those on Matthew and John are specially valuable, as exhibiting his theological opinions, extend over nearly all the Scriptures. The treatise *De Principiis*, or concerning First Truths, is the earliest systematic treatise on doctrinal theology. We possess it only in the very free translation of Rufinus, who omits, also, parts of the original. In his later days Origen composed his *Reply to Celsus*, a masterly defence of Christianity against the ablest of its assailants, and a work which demonstrates, if proof were required, that the speculations on doctrine which characterize his numerous treatises had not the effect to loosen his hold on the historical facts and essential verities of the Gospel.

CHAPTER III

DOCTRINE IN THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

With the earliest Christian teachers authorship was not a habit or a profession. Like the Apostles themselves, they wrote, as a rule, to meet some exigency. "When the heavens might part asunder at any moment, and reveal the final doom," "there was no care for literary distinction."[1] The Apostolic Fathers are intermediate between the New Testament writers and distinctively theological authors. We miss in them the depth and power of the canonical writers. Like these they have in view practical ends. The light which they throw on the contemporary doctrinal beliefs is incidental. And respecting the early ecclesiastical writings, it must be borne in mind that such of them as survive are the relics of a larger number that have perished. What Grote says of the classical literature of Greece is applicable to the literature of the Early Church: "We possess only what has drifted ashore from the wreck of a stranded vessel."[2] Yet it is true of at least a portion of the early ecclesiastical writings that remain, that their preservation is due to the special value that was attributed to them. Hence there is no occasion to speak slightingly of the aid which they lend us in ascertaining the opinions and the modes of thought prevalent in the sub-apostolic age. The theory, which was advocated by Baur, of a radical antagonism in this period between Petrine and Pauline disciples, is now so generally given up that it requires no special confutation. Clement speaks of Peter and Paul as "the good apostles" who merit equal honor.[3] In like manner, the two Apostolic leaders are placed in conjunction by Ignatius.[4] Polycarp makes mention of the wisdom of "the blessed and glorious Paul."[5]

[1] Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers*, p. 1.
[2] *History of Greece*, Vol. I. Preface.
[3] 1 Cor. 5. [4] Rom. 4. [5] Phil. 3.

It may be added that Hegesippus, a Christian writer of Jewish birth, in a fragment of his book, which was written about the middle of the second century, refers with approval to Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians. He is a witness, not for, but against the Tübingen hypothesis. The theory of two opposing parties, amalgamated later by methods of compromise, it is no exaggeration to say "can be upheld only by trampling under foot all the best authenticated testimony."[1] A glance at the career and the teachings of a single man, Irenæus, is of itself sufficient to disprove it.

The Apostolic Fathers wrote before the writings of the Apostles had been collected into a canon. Although, with a single exception,[2] passages obviously taken from them are not introduced by the formula usually prefixed to quotations from the Old Testament, they are nevertheless treated as authoritative. The Apostolic Fathers make no claim to stand on a level with the Apostles. While they contain references to pre-Christian apocryphal writings, we find in them no distinct references to a New Testament Apocrypha.

The Apostolic Fathers abound in allusions to the doctrine of free forgiveness through the grace of God in the Gospel. "And so we," writes Clement, "having been called through His will in Christ Jesus, are not justified through ourselves or through our own wisdom or understanding or piety, or works which we wrought in holiness of heart, but through faith, whereby the Almighty God justified all men that have been from the beginning."[3] This passage is emphatically Pauline in its purport. Yet, at the same time, we meet in Clement, and in the Apostolic Fathers generally, a strain of thought which may be styled legalism, or — to borrow a word from the German — "moralism." Not only is the Pauline doctrine of justification seldom brought out in so clear and positive a form as in the passage just quoted; there is besides an emphasis laid upon right conduct, and upon works of obedience, which is somewhat in contrast with the manner of St. Paul when he is defining the method of justification. Even Clement, in the place mentioned above, goes on immediately to insist on the importance of good works. Abraham was found faithful in that he "rendered obedience."[4] It is not merely that

[1] Lightfoot, *The Apostol. Fathers*, p. 9.
[2] Barnabas, 4.
[3] 1 Cor. 32.
[4] Clement, 1 Cor. 10.

"Faith" and "Love" are often conjoined — which is especially common in Ignatius. There is a lack of a distinct perception of the genetic relation of faith as the root of Christian virtues. Hermas makes continence the daughter of faith, simplicity to spring from continence, guilelessness from simplicity, etc.[1] In the *Didache*, we read of "the knowledge and faith and immortality made known" to us through Christ.[2] Allusions to the cross of Christ, to His death for our sins, to salvation through Him, are quite frequent. Yet more often than is the custom of writers thoroughly imbued with the Pauline spirit, the relation of the death of Christ to the procuring for us of the means of repentance and to opening the way to a new obedience is dwelt upon. A large space is given to the preceptive parts of the New Testament. This type of evangelical legalism becomes still more marked much later in the century when the *nova lex*[3] of the new dispensation is held up to view as being, along with better promises, its defining characteristic.

This peculiarity of the early Christian writers, it is worth while to reiterate, springs from no conscious dissatisfaction with the teaching of St. Paul. It must be borne in mind that the Apostle's sharply defined and resolute exclusion of the doctrine of salvation by works of obedience was part and parcel of his warfare against a Pharisaic theology. That contest with Judaism and Judaizing Christianity had now passed by. Whether salvation is through faith or on the ground of obedience was no more "a burning question." The special occasion for an energetic uprising to withstand a narrow and intolerant party, on this subject, no more existed. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that the Apostle Paul himself, when he speaks of the judgment, makes it turn upon "deeds done," upon the personal righteousness or unrighteousness of the individual. The creed of Trent quotes against the Protestant doctrine the Apostle's anticipation of the "reward," the "crown of righteousness," which the Lord, "the righteous Judge will give" him.[4] In short, St. Paul himself uses the terms of the Jewish "scheme of debt and works," — terms, however, which are capable of an interpretation consistent with his teaching elsewhere on the adequacy and the life-giving power of faith.[5] It is the

[1] M. II. 8.

[2] *Didache*, 10.

[3] Tertull., *De Præscr.* 13.

[4] Sess. VI. Decree on Justification, CXVI.

[5] On this topic, see the remarks of Stevens, *The Pauline Theology*, p. 359 sq.

characteristic of the earliest Christian writers that they bring together the teachings of the different Apostles. They may be said, not so much to strike an average, as rather to combine indiscriminately the various passages in the Apostles which relate to pardon and the new life. There is a failure, notwithstanding the Christian fervor of these authors, to penetrate to the inmost meaning and the mutual connection of these various forms of representation.

We find, especially in Hermas, traces of an ascetic drift, which is in a large measure the result of the earnest reaction of the Christian mind against the immorality, in particular the unchastity, so prevalent in heathen society. This ascetic tendency is conjoined with the legalism just adverted to. It was a question whether repentance would be of any avail in the case of grievous offences committed after baptism, the rite which was understood to bring with it the remission of past sins. The solution in Hermas is, that a single lapse of this character does not shut the door upon the delinquent; but this is the limit beyond which the spirit of leniency in the Church will not go.[1] Second marriages are not forbidden, but abstinence from a second marriage brings "exceeding honor and great glory before the Lord."[2] Christian believers fall into different classes as to their degree of holiness, some being on a higher, and others on a lower plane. The distinction between a more exalted and an inferior type of Christian virtue is even more definite in the *Didache*.[3]

If in the Apostolic Fathers we miss a firm grasp of the New Testament teaching on the subject of Justification, no such defect appears in their conception of the doctrine of the person of Christ. Inexact as their phraseology naturally is in comparison with what is observed in authors of a later age, it is evident, as well in their habitual tone as in particular passages, that in their minds Christ is dissociated from the category of creatures. Clement styles Him "the sceptre of the majesty of God," who "came not in the pomp of arrogance or of pride though He might have done so, but in lowliness of mind."[4] "To whom," he exclaims in another place, "be the glory and the majesty for ever and ever."[5] In Igna-

[1] L. III. Sim. 7. "Thinkest thou that the sins of those that repent are forgiven forthwith? Certainly not; but the person who repents must torture his own soul," etc.

[2] M. IV. 4.

[3] VI. 2. Cf. Clem. II. Cor. VII.

[4] 1 Cor. 16.

[5] 1 Cor. 20.

tius, it is a central thought that through Christ man is delivered from the dominion of death and made a partaker of incorruption.[1] This is through the Incarnation, and the Resurrection following upon the death on the Cross. The divine life in Christ is in veritable humanity. Docetism, the idea that the human Christ is a phantom, is combated. The mystical tendency of Ignatius appears in his conception of the connection of the bishop with his presbyters about him with the like relation of the incarnate Christ to the Apostles.[2] Ignatius asserts the preëxistence of Christ. He "was with the Father before the world, and appeared at the end of time."[3] Christ is "His Word (Logos) that proceeded from silence"; that is, in becoming incarnate. "There is only one physician," Ignatius writes, "of flesh and of spirit, generate and ungenerate, God in man[4] . . . Son of Mary and Son of God."[5] The eternity of Christ is explicitly affirmed: "Await Him that is above every season, the Eternal, the Invisible, who became visible for our sake, the Impalpable, the Impassible, who suffered for our sake."[6] Ignatius gives to Christ repeatedly the name "God," not as if He were God absolutely, yet implying proper divinity.[7] He is "the Son of the Father," through whom the patriarchs and the whole Church enter in.[8] Polycarp declares that "every one who shall not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is anti-christ," — a passage corresponding to the statement of John (1 John iv. 3), from whom it is probably quoted.[9] Barnabas refers to the suffering of Christ, though He was the Lord of the whole world, and interprets the words, "Let us make man in our own image" (Gen. i. 26), as spoken to Him.[10] Hermas says of "the Son of God" that He "is older than all His creation, so that He became the Father's adviser in His creation."[11] "The Holy Preëxistent Spirit," it is said, "which created the whole creation God made to dwell in flesh that He desired."[12] Whether the "Spirit" is here a designa-

[1] ἀφθαρσία.

[2] See Lightfoot, *Apostol. Fathers*, P. II. Vol. I. pp. 39, 359, sq. Cf. Gore, *The Christian Ministry*, p. 302. See, also, Von der Goltz, *Ignatius v. Antioch, als Christl. Theolog.* Gebh. u. Harnack's *Text. u. Untersuch.*, XII. 3.

[3] Magn. 6.

[4] ἐν σαρκὶ.

[5] Ephes. 7.

[6] Polyc. 3.

[7] Ephes. Introduct., 18.

[8] Philad. 9.

[9] Ep. Polyc. 7.

[10] Barnab. 6.

[11] Simil. IX. 12.

[12] Simil. V. 6. Cf. IX. 1. The passage is obscure, partly because "the servant" in the Parable is said (6) to be "the Son of God," while another, who

tion of the preëxistent Logos — a usage of which there are not wanting other examples — or, as some think, Hermas considered the Holy Spirit to be one and the same with the preëxistent Christ, there is at least here a clear assertion of the Saviour's preëxistence and divinity.[1] The personality and distinct office of the Holy Spirit are clearly set forth in Ignatius.[2] The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are brought into close connection.[3] Clement writes: "Have we not one God, and one Christ, and one Spirit of Grace that was shed upon us?"[4]

That Baptism brings the remission of sins and the purifying grace of the Spirit is frequently said or implied in the earliest writers. In one place Ignatius ascribes to the death of Christ a purifying effect upon the baptismal water.[5] "We go down into the water," says Barnabas, "laden with sins and filth and rise from it, bearing fruit in the heart, resting our fear and hope on Jesus in the spirit."[6] As to the formula used in baptism, it is thought to have been, at the outset, in the Apostolic age, the shorter form in the name of Christ.[7] It is remarkable, however, that while in the *Didache*, baptism "into the name of the Lord" is said to be required for admission to the Eucharist,[8] we have in the directions for administering the rite the injunction to baptize "into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."[9] This shows that the shorter form does not necessitate the inference that the longer formula was not in use.

is called His "beloved son" and "heir" (2), is also spoken of. As to the use of the term "Spirit" (πνεῦμα) to denote the Logos, see Lightfoot's note, *Clem. Rom.* IX. 4. On the other view, that Hermas does not, in V. 6 and IX. 4, use this term as the equivalent of Logos, see (against Zahn) Gebhardt and Harnack, *Patrum Apostolics*, Opera, Fascic. III. p. 150 sq. See, also, Harnack, DG. I. p. 160 — who considers Hermas an Adoptionist — and Prof. McGiffert's Ed. of *Eusebius*, p. 135. Dorner has a full discussion of the topic, presenting the opposite interpretation, *Gesch. d. Lehre v. d. Person Christi*, I. p. 205 sq. But Dorner has a different reading of Simil. v. 6 from that adopted (with Lightfoot, *Apostol. Fathers*) above.

[1] On the passage in the *Didache* (X. 6) — "Hosanna to the God of David" — and the question of the reading (θεῷ or υἱῷ), see Schaff, *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, p. 197.

[2] See Ephes. 9.

[3] Philad. Introduct.

[4] I. Cor. 46.

[5] Ephes. XVIII. 5.

[6] Barnabas, 11.

[7] See Acts xix. 5, 1 Cor. i. 13; cf. Neander, *Planting and Training of the Church*, p. 29; Harnack, DG. I. p. 68, n. 3.

[8] IX. 5.

[9] VII. 1.

The Lord's Supper, as we infer from the passages bearing on the subject in Ignatius, was still connected with the Agape, or Love-Feast, as it was in the days of the Apostles. If it had become dissevered when Pliny wrote his letter to Trajan, the separation may, perhaps, have been a local usage, which, it may be, was adopted by the Christians in consequence of the rigid policy introduced by that Emperor. We cannot expect in the Apostolic Fathers clearly defined views respecting the import of the Lord's Supper. Ignatius speaks of the Eucharist as "the flesh of our Saviour, Jesus Christ, which flesh suffered for our sins,"[1] and styles the "one bread" "the medicine of immortality and the antidote that we should not die,"[2] etc. We cannot be at all sure that he is not using symbolical language.[3] The bread and the wine were gifts of Christian believers for this sacred use, and, in connection with the prayers, were styled an offering; but with no other significance. From the prayer of thanksgiving, the rite was styled the Eucharist. From the *Didache* the character of the Eucharistic prayers can be learned. Thanks are given to God for the food and drink, the natural gifts of God to men, as well as for the "spiritual food and drink" bestowed on believers through Christ.[4]

The Second Coming of Christ is looked upon as an event not remote. In one of the parables of Hermas, it is to follow the building of "the Tower," and "the tower," it is said, "will soon be built." The post-communion prayer in the *Didache* ends with "Maranatha"—"The Lord Cometh."[5] In Barnabas, the temporal reign of Christ for a thousand years is expected to follow His advent. Papias, who cherishes the same idea, presented a fantastic picture of millennial bliss and comfort.[6]

[1] Smyrn. VII. [2] Ephes. XX.

[3] See Philad. V., Trall. VIII. Cf. Lightfoot (ad Smyrn. VII.). A more literal interpretation is given by Thomasius, DG. I. p. 421.

[4] c. X. [5] c. X. 6 (as in 1 Cor. xvi. 22). Cf. *Didache*, c. XVI.

[6] See above, *infra*, p. 88.

CHAPTER IV

THE JUDAIC SEPARATIST PARTIES — THE GNOSTIC SECTS — MARCION

Before Jerusalem was invested by the army of Titus, there had been a flight of Jewish Christians to places on the east of the Jordan in the neighborhood of the Dead Sea. There a portion of these fugitives were brought in contact with the Essenes, and probably adopted some of their tenets and customs. When the rites of Jewish worship were excluded from Jerusalem by Hadrian (A.D. 135), there were Jewish Christians — a part of those who had come back to Jerusalem from their temporary exile — who joined with the Christians of Gentile origin, thus giving up the Mosaic ceremonies. But there were Jewish Christians who were not ready to part with the ceremonies prescribed in the ancient Law. These constituted the heretical class who were called Ebionites. The name was not derived, as Tertullian and other Fathers conjectured, from an imaginary founder named "Ebion." The term was from the Hebrew, and was a name early adopted by Jewish disciples, signifying "the poor," in contrast with their Jewish countrymen, who were higher in rank and more favored of fortune. Justin Martyr distinguishes between different types of these sectaries, and Origen makes a like distinction.[1] The milder class, Justin tells us, do not turn their backs on their Gentile brethren who reject circumcision and the Jewish Sabbaths. The more rigid class endeavor to compel Gentile believers to conform to the Old Testament rites.[2] It is not said by Justin that any sharp line of division separates these different phases of Judaic Christianity. They all belong to one group. The name 'Ebionites' and the name 'Nazarenes' were applied by the Fathers indiscriminately to Jewish Christians, although the differences among them are recognized. The less rigid Ebionites made use

[1] C. Celsum, V. lxi. [2] Dial., c. 46.

of a Hebrew Gospel of Matthew. They accepted the miraculous birth of Christ. They held that He was conceived of the Spirit of God. They made no objection to suffering and death as connected with the Messiah. To the baptism of Jesus they attached great consequence, as the epoch when He was furnished with qualifications for His messianic work. Unlike the more intolerant fraction of the Ebionites, they did not deny that Paul was a true Apostle. This class of Moderates are described by Jerome, for in his time they were still in being. They are commonly called, he says, Nazarenes. He sketches their tenets, and adds that in trying to be at once Jews and Christians, they fail of being either.[1] The rigid, Pharasaic Ebionites insisted that circumcision is necessary to salvation, that the Mosaic ceremonial ordinances are still binding on Christians. They rejected and hated the Apostle Paul. They denied the miraculous conception of Jesus, and regarded Him as literally the son of Joseph. They looked upon Him as a Jew, whose distinction from others lay in His fulfilment of the Law. His legal piety caused Him to be selected as Messiah by God; but of this He, in His humility, was not conscious until His baptism. Then the Spirit was given to Him, and He began His messianic work. It was the work of a prophet and teacher. He wrought miracles and enlarged the law by precepts of greater strictness. This class or school of Ebionites was reluctant to think of the Christ as subject to suffering and death, and preferred to dwell on His laws and teachings, and on His future advent in regal splendor. Then He would establish for Himself and His followers, especially for the pious Jews, a millennial kingdom of glory and blessedness.

With these intolerant Ebionites, Justin will have no fellowship. He denies to them the hope of salvation. As to the treatment proper for the more charitable branch of the party, he would regard them as brethren, although, he tells us, some other Christians were not disposed to do so. At a later day — exactly when it is impossible to determine — even the moderate class were also banished from Christian fellowship. It is not difficult to recognize in these last, whatever modifications may have come in, the successors of the Jewish Christians of the Apostolic age who, while observing the ritual for themselves, were not inimical to the Apos-

[1] Dum volunt Judæi esse et Christiani, nec Judæi sunt nec Christiani. Ep. cxii., 13 (ad Augustin.).

tle to the Gentiles; while the rigid Ebionites are the successors of the Judaizers who denied his claim to be an Apostle and pronounced the ban on such disciples as failed to conform to the ceremonial parts of the Law.

There was a third type of Ebionitism which may be denominated Essenian Ebionitism. It embraced distinctive features of Ebionite doctrine, with an admixture of Gnostic elements. Its nascent tendencies are clearly seen in the heretical party in the church at Colosse, which is described in St. Paul's Epistle to the Colossians.[1] How far what are called the Essenian features of the system sprung out of the intercourse of Jewish Christians with the Essenian sect, or were due to indirect agencies of a kindred nature, it is not easy to decide. One faction of the Jewish Christian party, of which the peculiarities are foreshadowed in the Colossian heresy, bears the name of Elkesaits. This title is derived from Elkesai, which is not the name of a man, but of a book prized by the sect. The characteristics of the Essenian Ebionitism appear in a curious work of a much later date, the Clementine romance, or the Pseudo-Clementine writings, — the Homilies and the Recognitions,[2] the date of which is probably near the beginning of the third century. They contain a story of one Clement, a fictitious creation who is identified with Clement of Rome and figures as the author of the narrative. Clement, after long wanderings, meets his lost parents and brothers. The tale is merely a vehicle for conveying to the reader a set of religious ideas. It is related of this Clement that he was converted by Peter, and listened to disputations of Peter with Simon Magus, the champion of Gnostic heresies. Among the main Ebionite elements in the Clementine romance is the essential identity of Christianity with Judaism. Christ is the restorer of the pure, primitive religion of Moses. Christ is the last of a series of eight prophets, — Abraham, Moses, and Christ being the chief, — by all of whom the same truth has been inculcated. There are traces of hostility to the Apostle Paul, and Peter is represented as the founder of the Roman Church. On the other hand, there is a disposition to find an original religion to which all religions are traceable; there is dualism in the idea of matter and respecting the

[1] Lightfoot's instructive Dissertations on "The Colossian Heresy" and on "The Essenes," are prefixed to his "Commentary on the Colossians," and are printed also in his *Dissertations on the Apostolic Age* (1892).

[2] The *Epitome*, the third book in the series, is a briefer writing of later date.

nature of sin, a repudiation of sacrifices, and no expectation of an earthly theocratic kingdom.

In the absence of authentic information, various hypotheses have been broached respecting the origin of the Clementine writings. Baur conceived that he had found in these productions a warrant for his theory of the prevalence of a Judaic, anti-Pauline theology in the Church of the second century. That no support can be derived from them for such a theory is now generally perceived. Gieseler's conjecture was that a Roman Christian whose mind was distracted by doubts and queries sought and found in the East, among the Elkesaits, religious ideas which were in accord with his predilections, and which he incorporated with opinions having a different source and character.[1] The most plausible suggestion that can be offered at present to account for the phenomena is that old Elkesait or other Jewish Christian writings were, to some extent, taken up and read with interest by Christians; that they were worked over in order to render them more edifying and to eliminate from them heretical ideas, and that such were the sources of the Homilies and Recognitions. Not unlikely reflections cast upon the Apostle Paul were not wholly excluded, but traces of them were undesignedly left to stand.[2] As Harnack remarks, "the Pseudo-Clementines contribute nothing to our knowledge of the origin of the Catholic Church and doctrine." Even as concerns the knowledge of the tendencies and inner history of the syncretistic Jewish Christianity, they "can be used only with great caution."[3]

The Ebionites would have robbed Christianity of its universal character and world-wide destination, and have narrowed it down to the limits of Judaism. The Gnostics, had they gained the day, would have accomplished just the reverse. Gnosticism would have swept away the barriers by which Christianity, as the one absolute religion, fenced off the manifold systems of mythology and philosophy, and the multiform cults which existed among the heathen. Gnosticism may be described as an eclectic philosophy in which heathen, Jewish, and Christian elements are

[1] Gieseler, *Kirchengesch.*, I. iii. 2, § 58.

[2] See Harnack's Discussion, DG., Vol. I., p. 264 sq.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 268. "We are precluded from assigning to the syncretistic Jewish Christianity, on the ground of the Pseudo-Clementines, a place in the history of the origin of the Catholic Church and its doctrine." *Ibid.* p. 270.

commingled in various proportions, giving rise to a diversity of systems; the ideas of these systems being incorporated in mythical or mythological forms. When we speak of Gnosticism as eclectic and as a philosophy, it is not to be understood that its origin was due either to a skeptical or a merely speculative turn of mind. The Gnostic leaders were for the most part deeply interested, from practical motives, in the problems of religion, and laid stress not by any means exclusively on theoretical tenets, but even more on ritual forms, ascetic practices, and other matters pertaining to conduct. In the second century, the flourishing period of the Gnostic systems, while, as we learn from the explicit testimony of the Fathers, the mass of Christians belonged to the humbler and uneducated classes, there were found cultivated men who could not fail to be inquisitive as to the foundations of the Christian teaching, and its relations to the origin and constitution of things. Moreover, the all-prevailing drift in the direction of syncretism, the disposition to amalgamate mythology with philosophy, to explain, and to assimilate, as far as might be, Oriental religious systems and cults, created a ferment on the borders of the Christian societies everywhere. The authors of the different speculative and theosophic systems, the fruit of this passion for a universal solvent of religious and of philosophical problems, would be glad to discover a warrant for their ideas in an authoritative revelation. The canon of the New Testament had not yet arisen. The Old Testament was an authoritative book in the churches. Already the Judaic propaganda, through the Alexandrian Jewish school, had fused by means of allegorical interpretations the facts and doctrines of the Old Testament with the teachings of Platonism and Stoicism. It had given currency to certain theological conceptions; to the dualistic idea of an absolute Deity, separated at the widest remove from the world of matter; to the idea of a chain of intermediate beings; to the idea of the Logos, as a second deity, a demiurge, stamping by its energy the divine ideas upon the world; to the idea of an escape from matter as the true deliverance of the soul. The very earliest Gnostic developments were from the Judaic side. Yet the ideas and tendencies just referred to, being common to the metamorphosed Judaism of Philo and to the Hellenic schools from which he borrowed, we cannot attribute the Gnostic systems generally to the Judaic source. The historical circumstances

of their rise would not justify us in this conclusion. The various religions of Syria and Asia Minor furnished copious materials, as well as leaders, to the Gnostical movement. The dualistic religions of Persia and India made their contribution, although it seems probable that it was through an Hellenic appropriation of such elements that they found their way into the Gnostic creations.

There were two main points to which Gnostic thought was directed. The one was the absolute Being. The other was the origin of Evil. How did man become entangled in the fetters of matter, and how should he be delivered? The Gnostics were necessarily led to the consideration of cosmogony, and they were in quest of a satisfactory theodicy. With all their errors and vagaries, they aspired after a wide view, after a theology in a broad and comprehensive sense, and after a philosophy of history. Underlying the creations of phantasy which puzzle and bewilder us — the "æons" emanating in a well-nigh endless succession, to span the gulf between the transcendent Deity and brute matter — there were earnest convictions. It was probably the practical side of the Gnostic teaching, the pastoral, so to speak, rather than the didactic office which the Gnostic heresiarchs assumed, that gave them influence over the body of their adherents to whom the region of abstruse speculation was a *terra incognita*.

The two prominent and prevailing peculiarities of the Gnostic systems are the following:

First, the Gnostics laid claim to a deeper insight (γνῶσις), or knowledge of divine things than was open to common believers. This *Gnosis* stood in contrast with *Pistis*, or the faith of Christians generally. On this higher plane, the Gnostic alone stood. Dorner has styled Gnosticism "the Pelagianism of the intellect." In essence it was identical with the postulate of the Greek philosophers, who asserted the existence of a race of intellectual patricians. There was an esoteric Christianity — something more profound than the popular creed.

Second, the Gnostic systems agree in this fundamental dogma, that the Creator of the world is not the Supreme God, but is either a subordinate, but not hostile, instrument, or an inferior, antagonistic being. Hence the God of the Old Testament is not the God who sends the Redeemer into the world, but is another being, the Demiurge.

In conformity with the requirements of their whole theory respecting the Absolute and the identification of matter with evil, the person of the Redeemer was conceived of in a docetic manner; the divine was not really incarnate, but in temporary juxtaposition with humanity.

It is not strange that in the hands of Gnostic teachers utterances of the Apostle Paul were tortured into props of a theory quite alien to his teachings. He had written of a "wisdom" (σοφία) which was reserved for "the perfect," in contrast with the rudimentary knowledge imparted by him to the immature,[1] and of a knowledge (Gnosis) which was possessed in different measures by Christian disciples; although with the Apostle it was an insight and a practical perception from which none were debarred on account of a deficiency in natural endowments. So the language of the Apostle respecting the law and the Old Testament system, as temporary stepping-stones to something higher, was equally capable of being construed as a warrant for a radical disconnection of the Old from the New. The loose and flexible method of allegory which was applied by Christian as well as Judaic teachers to the ancient Scriptures opened the door for the application by Gnostic theologians of a like method to the facts and doctrines of the Gospel. The habit of looking for symbols everywhere, of regarding historical occurrences as having their value in some occult spiritual suggestion, invited speculative minds to transmute the realities of the Evangelical history into materials for their own use. We know that not a few of the Gnostics busied themselves with the interpretation of the Apostolic writings, and that some of them wrote commentaries upon them. It was not, as a rule, by casting aside these writings, but by devices of exegesis, that they sought for a support for their doctrines.[2] Sometimes, it is true, the documents were altered, and romances in the shape of apocryphal gospels and other apocryphal writings of a kindred character were composed for the diffusion of their ideas. They made much of unwritten traditions of Apostolic teaching.

Of the forms and the extent of the influence of the Gnostics, we covet more information than we possess. They were found within the churches. Sometimes they formed a circle or sodality, without separation from the societies of Christian believers.

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 6.

[2] See Iren., *Adv. Hær.* III. ii. 2; Tertullian, *De Præscr. Hær.*, c. 14.

Often, and more and more, they were organized into distinct bodies, having a cult and discipline of their own. Generally the rites and symbolical ceremonies, and the rules of conduct which were enjoined, formed conspicuous features of Gnosticism in its various ramifications.

Traces of Gnosticism in its nascent forms are observable in the New Testament, — in Simon Magus, who afterwards figures prominently in history and legend; in the Epistle to the Colossians, where the adversaries of Paul are represented as ascetic, and as holding to a God who reveals himself in ranks of angels, one above another; in the Epistles to Timothy, in a class who busy themselves with Angelology; in the First Epistle of John, in those who denied the reality of the incarnation; in the Nicolaitans of the Apocalypse, and in the false teachers referred to in the Epistle of Jude who fell into an antinomian immorality.

Gieseler gives a geographical classification of Gnostic systems, putting in the first class, the Alexandrian, in the second, the Syrian, and in a third class, the Gnostics of Asia Minor and Rome, — including the system of Marcion. In the Syrian systems, the dualism was more pronounced. In the religions of the world, as in human nature, in the room of contrasts of higher and lower, there were held to be absolute contrarieties. Baur's classification is based on the views taken respectively by the several classes of Gnostic systems, of the three principal forms of religion, Christianity, Judaism, and Heathenism. In the first class, these three forms of religion are conjoined; in the second class are placed the systems which separate Christianity from both of the other religions; and in the third, those which identify Christianity and Judaism, and oppose them both to Heathenism. Under this third class, Baur places the doctrine of the Pseudo-Clementine writings, which we have placed under the head of Ebionitism. Niedner's classification is not essentially diverse from that of Baur. Niedner also has a second classification based on the more friendly or more hostile relations of *pistis* and *gnosis* in the several systems. Neander makes two leading divisions, the criterion being the relation of the Gnostic systems to the religion of the Old Testament. The ground of the distinction is a milder or a sharper dualism. The principle of the world and the state of the world are conceived of either as only making up a lower sphere, or as wholly foreign and adverse to the Supreme Being.

There was supposed to be either a continuous development running through pre-Christian and Christian times, or there was the denial of any such unity. There was either a connecting, or a sundering, of the Old and the New Testament. The first division embraces the Alexandrian systems; the second, the Syrian. But in the second division, the opponents of Judaism may, or may not, exhibit a leaning towards Heathenism.

Simon Magus is without doubt an historical person whose existence and influence are attested not only in the book of Acts (viii. 9 sq.), but also by Justin Martyr, who was himself a native of Samaria.[1] Simon was considered by his adherents "that power of God which is great,"[2] and was reverenced as the incarnation of the godhead. His companion, who wandered about with him, Helena, was styled Ennoia, the first thought, the creative intelligence of the Deity. Simon mingled in his teachings astrology and the arts of magic. An influential follower was Menander, and another Samaritan leader of like character and pretensions was Dositheus.

Cerinthus may be styled an Ebionitic Gnostic, or a Gnostical Ebionite. He derived his ideas from Alexandria, but came to Asia Minor, where he was a contemporary of the Apostle John. He represented the Supreme God as utterly separate from any immediate relation to matter. Between them are ranks of angels, one of whom, in a lower grade, was the maker of the world and the God of the Jews. Cerinthus rejected the miraculous conception, and held that with Jesus at His baptism a heavenly spirit was united, but forsook Him at the beginning of His sufferings. The Roman writer, Caius, imputes to him a sensuous Chiliastic belief, but this statement may be a mistaken inference. Hippolytus says that Cerinthus held to circumcision and the Sabbath.

We begin now with the Syrian Gnosis. Saturninus lived probably in the time of Hadrian. In his system the highest God, the "Father Unknown," creates a realm of spirits in descending gradations, the spirits of the seven planets being on the lowest stage. By them, or by the Demiurge at their head, the visible world was made, and also man. The Demiurge is the God of the Jews. A divine spark has been imparted by the Supreme to the race of men. Over the realm of matter, or the Hyle, Satan presides. The human race is composed of two classes diamet-

[1] Apol. 1, 56. [2] Dial. c. Tryp. 120.

rically opposed. The good God sends an Æon, Nous, who appears in an unreal body as a Saviour to deliver the spiritual class, not only from Satan, but also from the Demiurge and the associated planetary spirits. The means of deliverance embrace abstinence from marriage and other forms of asceticism.

Allied in their conceptions to the Saturninians were the Ophites, in their various branches, — the Naassenes, the Peratæ, and others. The Ophites paid reverence to the serpent, as the symbol of hidden, divine wisdom. The maker of the world and God of the Jews is Ialdabaoth, — Product of Chaos, — a narrow, evil being, full of pride, but forced to carry out the plan of the Supreme, as an instrument. To his psychical Christ the Heavenly Christ descends from the pleroma, and, when the former is crucified, places himself at the right hand of Ialdabaoth, where, invisible to the latter, he guides all spiritual life upward from its debasing mixture with matter into the pleroma. The Cainites, who were a branch of the Ophite class, revered the bad characters of the Old Testament as the really good, belonging to the pneumatic natures.

Of the Alexandrian type of Gnosticism, Basilides, who, like Saturninus, lived under Hadrian, was the first of the noted leaders. There are two diverse expositions of his system, that given by Irenæus, and that of Hippolytus, which is drawn from different sources. According to the latter, Basilides placed at the head of all things the Being who is pure nothing; i.e., nothing concrete, the Ineffable One. From him comes the world-seed, the seminal, chaotic universe, containing in it potentially all beings, higher and lower, almost numberless, in their distinct spheres. The Archon, who is the God of the Jews, is not hostile to the Supreme, but unconsciously fulfils his designs. The problem is for all beings to develop their nature and to rise each to its appropriate place. It is a scheme of self-evolution. The pneumatic natures, such of them as require purification, — which is the third class of these natures, — are delivered through the Gospel, which brings in a new period and redemptive influence from the most exalted sources. Jesus is the Soter, a compound "microcosmic" being; and at His death, the several parts of His being rise each to its proper home. Basilides taught a moderate asceticism in which marriage was not forbidden, although celibacy was commended. He made use of the canonical Gospels, and,

according to Hippolytus, of the Gospel of John among them; also, of the Epistles of Paul. The foremost of his pupils was his son, Isodorus. Later disciples, the Pseudo-Basilidians, became degenerate and forsook the better tenets of their master.

Valentinus was probably an Alexandrian Jew who was converted to Christianity. He taught in Alexandria and Rome about A.D. 140. His system has clearer logical and philosophical ideas than any other of the Gnostic schemes, and discovers throughout the influence of Platonism. It is the Gnostic system which was most widely diffused and is best known to us. There is an unfolding of the Absolute into finite forms of being in long succession, and in two spheres, a higher realm, the scene of a theogony, and a lower realm, the sphere of sense. This lower world is the province of the Demiurge, but the human beings formed by him have in them pneumatic elements. Redemption is undertaken by Jesus, the Messiah of the Demiurge, upon whom, at his baptism, the heavenly Soter descends to proclaim divine truth, and by imparting the Gnosis for the sake of opening the eyes of the pneumatic beings, to aid them in finding their way to the pleroma above. The Demiurge falls in with the plans of the Soter. The psychical Christ is crucified, but the heavenly Christ prosecutes His redemptive work to its completion. In all this, Judaism is not presented as antagonistic, but as subordinate, to the supreme powers.

Marcion is the most prominent figure among the Anti-Judaic Gnostics. Yet, such are the peculiarities of his system that he stands in important respects by himself. He was born in Asia Minor, and came to Rome about A.D. 140. His intensely practical temper and his moral earnestness are traits which command respect. Deeply moved by the revelation of the merciful character of God in the Gospel of Salvation, and by the Apostle Paul's proclamation of the freedom and universality of divine grace, Marcion conceived that the Old Testament system, especially its representations of the character of God, are in contradiction to the truth which had so profoundly stirred his sympathy. He inferred that the Old Testament could not have had the same origin as the Gospel. He magnified the contrast of law and grace into a direct antagonism. Moreover, nature struck him as imperfect, and therefore as not proceeding from the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ. Marcion assumed the existence of three principles: Hyle, or matter, which is eternal; the God of love, incapable of

contact with matter; and the Demiurge, a being of limited power who strives with but partial success to form and shape matter. The resistance of this element to the Demiurge is concentrated in Satan. The Demiurge is a God of justice, but justice, retributive displeasure, penalty, are incompatible with Love. Christianity, therefore, is an utterly new system, standing in no organic connection with the former dispensation. It is hostile alike to Judaism and heathenism. Without an insight into the progressive character of divine revelation, and not resorting, like so many of his contemporaries, to allegory as a solvent of difficulties, he had no alternative but altogether to discard the Old Testament. The Demiurge, he held, created men after his own image, giving them material bodies, subject to evil desires, and revealed himself to the Jews whom he chose for his own people. He gave them a law made up of externals, together with a defective system of morals, void of an inner, life-giving principle. He promised them a world-conquering Messiah who should bring the heathen to a rigid judgment. But the good God would not suffer this harsh sentence to be carried out. In the fifteenth year of Tiberius, He suddenly descended to Capernaum, in an unreal body, but styled Himself the Messiah. Jesus, however, was not the Demiurge's Messiah, and disregarded his laws. The Demiurge caused Him to be crucified. But His sufferings were only apparent; the Demiurge saw himself deceived and his power destroyed. Christ descended to Hades and transported the poor heathen to the third heaven. He then revealed Himself to the Demiurge and compelled him to acknowledge his guilt in crucifying an innocent person. It is only those who reject the fellowship of God who fall under the Demiurge's avenging justice.

Marcion regarded Paul as the only true Apostle. The other Apostles had corrupted the Gospel. For this reason he accepted no other Gospel except that of Luke, from which he endeavored to eliminate passages not congruous with his ideas of the Law. With this Gospel, which was acceptable to him partly on account of the relation of the author to Paul, he joined ten of Paul's Epistles. Marcion asserted no higher place for a *gnosis* above the faith of ordinary Christians. His code of morals was ascetic. Marriage and the partaking of flesh and of wine were abjured. His system was an aggressive one and was zealously propagated. The Marcionites were found in Egypt and Syria, as well

as in Italy and Africa. The number of polemical books written against them indicates how wide was the diffusion of the sect in its different branches. Its votaries were still found several centuries after the death of its founder.

The danger to which the Church and the Christian religion were exposed from the seductive influences of Gnosticism was far greater than the peril arising from the antipodal heresy of Ebionitism. Ebionitism was the struggle of an obsolescent system to maintain its standing. It was a desperate effort to cling to a receding past. The freedom and catholicity of the Gospel were truths too evident to be obscured, and too precious to be surrendered. The exaltation of Christ in His relation to God was felt to be vitally connected with the Christian experience of Reconciliation through Him, and too plain in the Apostolic teaching to be given up. But the Gnostic sects professed to furnish a rational and comprehensive system of religious truth, in which redemption through Christ should have a place of honor. They connected with their doctrines the charm of mystery, holding out to the initiated the welcome promise of light, and alluring many by ascetic prescriptions. Christianity manifested its innate power in withstanding this flood of error. The doctrine of one God, of the origin of sin, not in any natural necessity, but in a moral fall, and the doctrine of a real incarnation, proved to be barriers too strong to be swept away. Gnosticism stands on the page of history as a perpetual warning against all endeavors to substitute a physical or metaphysical for an ethical doctrine of sin and redemption. One of the marked effects of the Gnostical theories was the influence exerted by them in stimulating the development of theology within the limits of the Church. It may almost be said that it was in the storm and stress occasioned by the Gnostical movement that Christian theology was roused to grapple with its most weighty problems. The indirect agency of the Gnostic movement in determining the character of the old-Catholic church is manifest.

CHAPTER V

THE BEGINNINGS OF THEOLOGY: THE GREEK APOLOGISTS

THE beginnings of Christian theology are to be found in the Greek Apologists. These writers treat Christianity predominantly as a body of teachings pertaining to religion and morals. It is true that we must bear in mind the special regard which they have to the character and situation of those whom they address. This circumstance is not sufficient, however, to explain their pervading tendency. It is really the point of view from which they habitually look at the Gospel. Justin Martyr, in the early part of the First Apology, in a summary way describes Christianity as consisting of the doctrine of the true God, in contrast with the superstitions of the heathen — who, with the exception of the philosophers, are misled by the demons — of the doctrine of virtue, and of rewards and punishments in the world hereafter.[1] The Gospel is a new and improved philosophy the truth of which is attested by revelation. There is this heaven-given guaranty of its truth, which is wholly wanting to the heathen in reference to the beliefs which they have in common with Christians. This claim for Christianity that it is a philosophy, and as such merits attention and respect, pervades the Apologetic literature. Even Tatian, who speaks with scorn of the pride of the Greeks and the boasting and wrangling of the philosophers, professed to be the disciple of an older philosophy, superior in its contents, although of "barbaric origin," and having the peculiar merit of being accessible to all, "the rich and the poor," even "old women and striplings."[2] The Apologists are at pains to adduce from the heathen sages ideas and precepts coincident with those of the Gospel. Their teachings, it is affirmed, are mixed to some extent

[1] Apol. I. 9–12. Cf. 6–8, 13–20.

[2] Orat. c. xxxii. Cf. xxxv., xlii.

with error. They are borrowed, it is sometimes alleged, from the older teaching of Moses and the prophets. Yet, Justin emphatically maintains, what is best in Plato and the other philosophers was imparted by the divine Logos, who did not withhold light even from those guides of the heathen. Christ, says Justin, "is the Logos (or Word) of whom the whole human race are partakers, and those who lived according to reason are Christians, even though accounted atheists. Such among the Greeks were Socrates and Heraclitus, and those who resembled them."[1] Justin is not silent respecting the work of Christ as a Redeemer. It was a part of the mission of Christ to overcome the demons.[2] "He cleansed by His blood those who believed on Him."[3] By His blood and the mystery of His cross, He bought us.[4] Yet in some places there is coupled with expressions of this kind language indicating that, nevertheless, it is the teaching of Christ which holds the central place in Justin's thoughts. In keeping with this way of looking at Christianity as a collection of tenets respecting God and duty and future rewards and punishments, is the view taken of its proofs. It is true that the Apologists do not fail to refer to the purity and elevation of Christian doctrines, in comparison with ethnic teaching. They dwell, moreover, with emphasis on the restraining and refining power of Christianity as evinced in the lives of its adherents. But the grand proof on which reliance is placed is the miracle of prophecy. The appeal is constantly made to the marvellous correspondence of the history of Christ with the predictions of the Old Testament. Here is the Gibraltar in which the early Greek defenders of the faith plant themselves.

We proceed now to speak separately of the leading points in the theology of Justin in their proper order. In his writings a certain contrast is perceptible between what strike us as customary phrases respecting the Gospel — expressions used, to be sure, with no lack of sincerity — and the interpretations of Christianity which spring from his own reflection, under the influence of his philosophical bent.[5] We find him attributing to God all the varied personal attributes and agencies which it is usual for

[1] Apol. I. 46.

[2] *Ibid.* I. 45; II. 6; Dial. 131.

[3] Apol. I. 32. Cf. Dial. 40, 54.

[4] Dial. 134.

[5] The difference here pointed out is well illustrated by Purves in *The Testimony of Justin Martyr to Early Christianity* (1889).

Christian believers to ascribe to Him. He is the living God, just and compassionate, the Father and Maker of all, knowing all things, ruling all, caring for the individual as well as for the world in its totality. Yet we have presented prominently another conception, Platonic and Alexandrian Jewish, of God as the transcendent, ineffable One, too exalted to be the subject of definite predicates, the ordinary representations of Him being merely relative to our finite apprehension. It is only through an intermediate being that He is revealed. It is through the Logos or Word, that God is manifested. Justin knew and used the Fourth Gospel. It is not reasonable to suppose that the identifying of Christ with the Logos in the extent to which he carries it, is to be explained had he not been conscious of a warrant from Apostolic authority. Yet Justin's particular idea of the Logos is not consonant with that of John, but corresponds to that of Plato and Philo. The Logos of Justin is not, as in the Palestinian sources, including John, the Word of God, but the divine Reason. The Logos, impersonal in God from the beginning, becomes personal prior to the creation. "God begot of Himself a beginning, before all creatures, a certain reasonable Power, which is called by the Holy Ghost, Glory of the Lord, at other times Son, Wisdom, Angel, God, Lord, and Logos."[1] In the production of the Son, God was not Himself changed, more than a man's mind is changed by the utterance of a word, or a fire lessened by having another fire kindled from it. He is the only-begotten by the Father of all things.[2] He is from the Father "not by abscission, as if the Father's essence were divided off."[3] He is not an emanation as the light emanates from the sun.[4] The language of Justin implies that the inner nature of the Son is identical with that of the Father. The sonship of Christ is thus traced back to the ante-mundane generation of the hypostatic Logos. Moreover, the Logos, next to the Father, is the recipient of divine honors. He is associated with the Father when it is said, "Let us make man in our own image" (Gen. i. 26).[5] It was the Logos who appeared in the theophanies of the Old Testament. Nevertheless, Justin does not fully succeed in taking Christ out of the category of creatures. He is begotten, or assumes a personal form of being, by an act of God's will. He was generated from

[1] Dial. 61. [2] *Ibid.* 105. [3] *Ibid.* 128. [4] *Ibid.* 128. [5] *Ibid.* 62.

the Father "by his power and will."[1] The Logos is another "in number," but not in "mind (or will)."[2] There is a personal distinction, but this is not eternal, and it springs from an act of God's will, anterior to the creation of the world.[3] To the Son is assigned the second place in relation to the eternal God.[4] Moreover, while the "unbegotten God" does not move, nor is he contained in any place, the Logos enters into the limits of place and time.[5] In Tatian and Athenagoras, the Logos is from eternity potentially in God, and "came forth to be the idea and energizing power of all material things."[6] "By his simple will," says Tatian, "the Logos springs forth," "the first-begotten work of the Father," "the beginning of the world." Here is no abscission, there is a participation on the part of the Logos,[7] a function devolved on the Logos, the power or principle from which he springs being still inherent in the Father.[8] Theophilus distinguishes the internal Logos from the Logos expressed.[9] The former is said to be not distinguishable from God's mind and thought.[10]

The Logos is the origin of divine revelation. It is God who creates, but the rationality of the creation springs from the Logos. He bears, according to Justin, the closest relation to the reason of man. The human reason is akin to the divine, and all of its perceptions of truth are derived, in a way that is only vaguely indicated, from the Logos. Justin speaks of the "seminal Logos" of whom all men partake. To the Logos are ascribed functions which a riper theology, in conformity with Scripture, attributes to the Holy Spirit. Justin says that it was the Logos who caused the Virgin Mother to conceive.[11] Little space is left in human history for the activity of the Holy Spirit. It is the Logos which inspires the prophets and is everywhere active. Yet Justin speaks

[1] Dial. 128. He is *μονογενής* (only-begotten) — Dial. 105. When He is called first-born (*πρωτότοκος*) it is not implied that beings and things below Him are begotten in the same sense. On this topic see the remarks of Engelhardt (in answer to Weizsäcker), p. 146.

[2] Cf. Dial. 56, 62, 128, 129.

[3] Apol. II. 6.

[4] Dial. 127, cf. 34, 60.

[5] *Ibid.* 127; cf. 34, 60. Athenagoras, 10.

[6] Athenagoras, 10.

[7] He comes into being *κατὰ μερισμόν*. Tatian, c. 5.

[8] *ἐνδιάθετος*.

[9] *προφορικός*.

[10] Ad. Autol. II. 10, 22.

[11] Apol. I. 33.

of the Spirit in conjunction with the Father and Christ, in such terms as naturally to imply that the Spirit is regarded as distinct from both, although subordinate to them.[1] It is evident that his conception of the Holy Spirit and of the relation of the Spirit to the Father and Son is not well defined in his own thoughts.[2]

It is clear that Justin considered the humanity of Christ a reality and not an illusive appearance. But in one particular a question arises respecting his views on this subject. In one passage he

[1] Apol. I. 13, 61, 65, 67. Cf. Dial. 1, 4, 29.

[2] In Apol. I. 6, Justin enumerates as the objects of Christian worship the most true God, the Son who came from Him, "and the host of other good angels," and the Spirit of Prophecy. The placing of the angels in the list before the Spirit was probably an accident, being suggested not unlikely by the mention of the Son as sent from God; that is, as a messenger, the literal sense of "angel." But what of the worship which is said to be accorded to angels? As Justin nowhere else refers to a worship of angels, but asserts that only the Father, Son, and Spirit are to be worshipped (Apol. I. 13, 61, 65, 66), it is probable that the term 'worship' is used in Apol. I. 6, without reflection, in a loose sense, his aim being here to confute the charge of atheism. The Christians, he would say, are not so destitute, as you assert, of celestial objects of veneration. The apologetic motive leads Justin here to show that these are numerous. (On this point, see Baumgarten-Crusius, DG., p. 175, note 1. The various opinions upon the sense of the passage are given in Otto's ed. of Justin, *ad loc.*) It must be observed, however, that Justin represented material things and the care of men to have been committed to the charge of angels (Apol. II. 5). There is ground for the remark of Neander, that "we may observe a wavering between the idea of the Holy Ghost as one of the members of the Triad, and a spirit standing in some relationship with the angels." (*Church History*, Vol. I. p. 609. See especially the note on the same page.) On this subject, there is an instructive passage in Engelhardt, p. 146. His quotation from Nitzsch (DG., p. 186) is worthy of attention. Athenagoras makes a part of Christianity, "τὸ θεολογικόν μέρος" — or the doctrine of God — the affirmation of a multitude of angels and servants — "meaning, probably, angels that are servants — whom the Creator has appointed to occupy themselves with the elements, and the heavens and the world and the things that are in it, and with the regulating of them" (Emb. 10. Cf. c. 24). Here there seems to be the recognition of divine beings of a secondary class. The subordination of all these to the one God and Father was felt to be adequate to the securing of monotheism. "So fluctuating (fliessend) and indeterminate," says Thomasius (DG., 1, 175) "is everything as yet. The above-named Church teachers are themselves still struggling for the expression that shall correspond to the common Christian faith." Or, in the words of Neander, "the common (Christian) feeling did not find at once its corresponding expression in the forms evolved by the understanding." (*Church History*, I. 609.)

speaks of Christ as composed of body, Logos, soul.[1] Since he elsewhere analyzes human nature into three elements, spirit, soul — that is, animal soul — and body, it is inferred that in his conception of Christ, the Logos takes the place of the rational human spirit. It is not certain, however, that he might not use "soul" in the more comprehensive sense.[2] It is not unlikely that the question was not in his own mind a subject of discriminating thought.

Justin asserts creation to have been by an act of the divine will. But it is principally to the ordering of the world, the forming of the cosmos, that his attention is directed. There is no explicit rejection of the doctrine of the eternity of the preëxisting matter, the chaotic material.[3] Even if he himself did not hold the Platonic view, as did his pupil, Tatian, he nevertheless does not consider that opinion an error of sufficient moment to call for a denial of it.

In common with the other Apologists, Justin is strenuous in his repudiation of Stoic fatalism. His earnestness in asserting the liberty and responsibility of the individual carries along with it the failure adequately to perceive the power of sinful habit. Sin, he teaches, was brought into the world by the agency of demons, but not without the consent of the transgressor in each case of guilt. And it is still in the power of men to cast off sin by the exertion of their own wills.[4] There is no predestination to sin, but simply foreknowledge of it. All men will be judged, each for himself, "like Adam and Eve."[5]

It has been remarked that when Justin makes the ordinary statements respecting the efficacy of the cross, it is not an expiatory work of Christ which is prominent in his mind. It is the Incarnation rather than the Atonement that interests him. Yet a passage quoted by Irenæus from Justin's lost work against Marcion, suggests that in the other writings not extant Justin may have had something more definite to teach on this last theme. In this passage, he speaks of the only-begotten Son as sent into

[1] σῶμα, λόγος, ψυχή — Apol. II. 10.

[2] The interpretation of Justin is impartially discussed, with a statement of arguments on both sides, by Dorner, *Person Christi*, I. 433 sq.

[3] The attitude of Justin on this point is well explained by Engelhardt, pp. 139, 140.

[4] Apol. I. 28, 43, 44; Apol. II. 7; Dial. 88, 102, 140.

[5] Dial. 124.

the world from the Father, and "gathering in Himself the work of His own hands — suum plasma in semetipsum recapitulans." In Irenæus, as we shall see, the gathering up (*recapitulatio*) of mankind in Christ as their head is the thought at the root of his exposition of the Atonement.[1]

Justin believed in the doctrine of a temporal millennium, which in the second century was widely diffused. Christ was to come in a visible advent, and make Jerusalem the centre of His kingdom, which was to continue for a thousand years and was to be followed by the resurrection and the judgment. In the Dialogue with Trypho he teaches that there will be two resurrections, separated by the interval of the millennium.[2] The Second Advent was not far distant. The Jews are not described as to be in any way distinguished in the triumphal advent of the Lord. Nothing is said of a restoration of them to Jerusalem.

Justin departs from Plato in affirming that souls are not essentially immortal. Their continuance in being depends forever on the will of God. The statement is not seldom reiterated, that punishment in the world to come is eternal. The idea that it is supposed by Justin to terminate, and that immortality in the strict sense is made conditional on being righteous, is erroneously inferred from what is said of dependence on the will of God for the continuance of being. "Immortality" in Justin, as in other Apologists, includes the vision of God and blessed fellowship with Him. This it is that the wicked are to be forever deprived of. "I affirm," he says, "that souls never perish — for this would be in truth a godsend to the wicked."[3] "We have been taught that they only will attain to immortality who lead holy and virtuous lives like God; and we believe that all who live wickedly, and do not repent, will be punished in eternal fire."[4]

Of the intermediate state of the condition of souls, whether righteous or wicked, prior to the resurrection, nothing definite is said by Justin.

The Church, in Justin's conception of it, was a Gentile community. The number of Jews who had accepted the Gospel is said to be small. He would not deny fellowship to Jewish believers who kept up the Mosaic ceremonies, provided they did not strive to induce Gentile Christians to adopt them. This was the limit

1 Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.* IV. 6, 2.

2 Dial. 81, 113.

3 Ἕρμαιον. Dial. 5.

4 Apol. I. 21. Cf. Dial. 130, Apol. I. 28.

of his charity in this direction. In his teaching relative to the origin of the new life in the Christian soul, and its continuance, there are found what have been not inaptly called Pelagian statements in juxtaposition with teaching of an opposite character. On the one hand, the Christian life is said to begin in the virtuous choice, a choice that is spoken of as if it were wholly self-originated and self-sustained; and, on the other hand, there is not wholly wanting a recognition of an opening of "the gates of life" by divine grace, "the grace of understanding."[1] Now Baptism is spoken of as ensuing upon a conviction of the truth of Christianity and a self-dedication to a life of virtue, and again it is described as "regeneration" and as bringing "illumination" to the soul.[2] Baptism brings the remission of sins previously committed. It thus clears the way to a hopeful endeavor to voluntary efforts to obtain the rewards of heaven through a course of obedience.[3] As regards the Lord's Supper, nothing is said of any direct effect of it to remove sin or guilt. But our flesh and blood are said to be nourished by assimilating[3] the bread and wine of the sacrament, — nourished, the meaning probably is, with reference to the resurrection and the future life of "incorruption." The food thus received is said to be "the flesh and blood of Jesus."[4] The idea of Justin appears to be that the divine Logos is mysteriously present in the bread and wine, as in the Incarnate Christ. There is no probability that literal transubstantiation is meant.

The pearl of the Apologetic literature is the Epistle to Diognetus. None of the early writings of this class rival it in spirit and impressiveness. The author fails to discern, as it would seem, the preparatory office of the Mosaic system, and puts the sacrifices and ceremonies of the Jews as on the same level with the external services rendered by the heathen to their divinities. The true character of Christian disciples and the cruelty with which they were treated he depicts with nervous eloquence. The incarnation and divinity of Christ are asserted with all earnestness. The Creator of the Universe has sent to men, not an angel or any other subaltern, but "the Artificer and Creator of the Universe Himself," by whom He made and ordered all things. He sent Him not to

[1] Dial. 7, 30. [2] Apol. I. 61. [3] *Ibid.* I. 66.

[4] The passage is in Apol. I. 66. This is the sense of μεταβολήν. See Otto's *Justin*, I. p. 180 (ed. 3).

inspire terror. He sent Him to use persuasion, not force. He sent Him "as sending God," and "as a man unto men."[1] "He sent His only-begotten Son." He communicated His merciful plan to His Son alone.[2] He planned everything in His mind with His Son.[3] "The Word, who was from the beginning. . . . He, I say who was eternal, who to-day was accounted a Son" — by Him the riches of grace are bestowed on the faithful and on all who seek for it.[4] If Justin touches lightly the Atonement, the opposite is true of the author of this Epistle. God "in pity took on Him our sins, and Himself parted with His own Son as a ransom for us, the holy for the lawless, the just for the unjust. . . . In whom was it possible for us lawless and ungodly men to have been justified, save only in the Son of God? O the sweet exchange. . . . that the iniquity of many should be concealed in One Righteous Man," etc.[3] The love and pity of God are set forth in glowing words; yet the penalty that awaits the wicked and unrepenting is "eternal fire."[5]

[1] *Epist. ad Diognet.* c. 7. [2] c. 8. [3] c. 9. [4] c. 11. [5] c. 10.

CHAPTER VI

THE RISE OF THE OLD CATHOLIC CHURCH — THE RULE OF FAITH — THE CANON — THE EPISCOPATE — THE RISE AND THE EXCLUSION OF MONTANISM

The course of the development of doctrine is intimately connected with the rise of the Ancient Catholic Church. An essential element in this historic change is indicated in the new meaning which came to be attached to the term 'Catholic.' In Ignatius it signifies Christians generally, the Church of which Christ is the centre, in contrast with each local church, the centre of which is the bishop. The contrast is between the Catholic Church and a particular body of Christians.[1] Later, in the age of Irenæus, the Catholic Church has come to signify orthodox Christianity in its organized form in the world at large, as this Church stands aloof from heretical sects. The three principal topics which we have to consider under the general subject are the Baptismal Confession or "Apostles' Creed" and the "Rules of Faith," Tradition and Scripture, including the rise of the Canon, and organization under the developed Episcopate.

I. The authoritative source of Christian knowledge was always considered to be the Teaching of the Lord through the Twelve Apostles, which forms the title of the *Didache*. In phraseology of this kind the teaching of the Apostle Paul was understood to be included. The instruction given to the young and to the converts was not confined to an inculcation of the precepts of the Gospel such as we find in Hermas and the *Didache*. The baptismal formula, as we find it in Matthew, was early expanded into a brief statement of fundamental truths. As thus enlarged it was repeated by the candidates for baptism and served as the basis of preliminary instruction. Probably as early as the third

[1] *Smyrn.* 8. See Lightfoot, *Ignatius and Polycarp*, II. 1, p. 310.

century the story had sprung up that this Confession of faith was not only made up of elements common to the Apostles' teaching, but also that it was composed by the Apostles themselves, each of them contributing a portion. The legend grew until it finally embraced the statement that the creed was brought to Rome by Peter. The oldest form of this Confession of which we have any knowledge is the Roman Symbol. It was in use in the Church at Rome before the middle of the second century. It read as follows: "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, and in Christ Jesus his only-begotten Son, our Lord, who was born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, was crucified under Pontius Pilate and was buried, on the third day He rose from the dead, (He) ascended into Heaven, (He) sitteth at the right hand of the Father, whence He will come to judge the quick and the dead; and in (the) Holy Spirit, the Holy Church, the remission of sins, the resurrection of the body. Amen."[1] This creed is thought by Zahn to have been in use in Ephesus as early as 130.[2] There are not wanting arguments in favor of the opinion that it originated in Asia Minor.[3] Near the end of the century it is found in Smyrna, in Southern Gaul, and in Carthage. In somewhat modified forms the creed spread among the churches of the East and West.[4] In the shape which it assumed in Southern Gaul, probably in the fifth century, it established itself in the churches in communion with Rome, superseding the older forms. In the East it was not ascribed to the Apostles, and since there was no check upon mutations in its text, it melted away, never gaining a permanent lodgment among the authoritative creeds.

Under the influence of the *disciplina arcani* — the obligation of silence respecting the mysteries of the Christian faith — the Apostles' Creed was not committed to writing or disclosed to the heathen. But under the name of "rules of faith," we find in Irenæus, Tertullian and Origen, statements of Christian doctrine which are equivalent to a paraphrase or expansion of the creed.

[1] Hahn, *Biblioth. d. Symb.*, etc., 15. See the texts and critical remarks in Kattenbusch, *Das Apostol. Symbol*, I. pp. 59–78.

[2] Zahn, *Apostol. Symbol*, etc. (2 ed. 1893), p. 47.

[3] Kattenbusch, however, maintains the reverse — that the "Grundstock" of the Oriental symbols is the Roman. *Ibid.* I. 368–392.

[4] See the collection of these forms in Denziger, *Enchirid. Symboll. et Definitt.*, pp. 1–8.

These are the *regulæ fidei.*[1] They are not the same, save as to their substance, in the different writers. In Irenæus the Rule of Faith is presented, in three places, in as many different forms. In Tertullian also there are three varying forms of the *regula.* But the Rules of Faith are represented to be the belief of "the Church, scattered through the whole world," — the belief "which has been received from the Apostles and their Disciples."[2] In this definite, authoritative teaching, the Church everywhere finds a bulwark against Gnostical innovations and perversions. It is a wall about the Church for defence against open and covert assaults. If one would ascertain what the Apostles taught, we are told that it is only necessary to repair to the churches which they planted and within which their doctrines have been preserved.[3] These churches are so many witnesses against the novelties of heresy.[4]

II. At the beginning of the second century there was no Canon of the New Testament.[5] That is to say, there was no body of New Testament writings which were recognized by the churches as authoritative scriptures. As far as writings are concerned, the Old Testament was in the foreground of their thoughts and constituted their Bible. It was to the Old Testament that they referred their adversaries in proof of the divine mission of Jesus and of the facts of the Gospel. They appealed to the correspondence between prediction and fulfilment. At first the eyes of Christian believers were directed upwards with a yearning expectation of the advent of the Lord. For a time tradition did not become in a perceptible degree insecure. The combined influence of oral narration and writings of Apostles and their disciples sufficed for the understanding of what Christianity was. There was no distinct impression of the fact that the period of revelation had

[1] They are collected in Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, II. 12 sq.

[2] Iren. *Adv. Hær.* I. 10, 1.

[3] Tertullian, *de Præscr.* c. 36. Iren. *Adv. Hær.* III. 3, 1 sq.

[4] Tertullian, *de Præscr.* c. 21.

[5] The title "Canon" as a designation of the normative Scriptures first appears in the 59th Canon of the Council of Laodicea (A.D. 363) and in the Festal Epistle of Athanasius. On the origin and meaning of the term 'canon,' see Westcott, *Hist. of the Canon*, p. 1 and App. A. For the names given to the Bible, — "The Scripture," "The Scriptures," "The Holy Scriptures," "The Scriptures of the Lord" (*αἱ κυριακαὶ γραφαί*), "The Prophets," "The Prophets and Apostles," "Testament," "Old and New Testament," "Instrument," "Instruments," etc. — see Zahn, *Gesch. d. N. T. Kanons*, I. i. 85–150.

come to an end. Moreover, the Apostolic writings had not been altered by heretical leaders or mingled with forged compositions. But when an opposite state of things arose, the importance of preserving, collecting, and distinguishing the authentic documents of the Christian Revelation, was appreciated. More and more, oral traditions became less secure. Heretical parties set up the claim to possess traditions of their own, by which they sought to sustain their novel speculations. The Apostolic writings began to undergo alteration. Works having no title to be ranked with them were brought forward by sectaries. The means of forming the Canon, as soon as the need of it was felt, were at hand. From the outset, there had been a circulation of Apostolic writings from one church to another.[1] Basilides, the Gnostic, quotes as Scripture, the Epistle to the Romans, and the First to the Corinthians.[2] Paul's Epistles were so regarded when the Second Epistle of Peter was written.[3] The authority of the Apostles' Writings was not questioned in the churches. They are referred to by Ignatius, at least by implication, as a class of writings in the same rank with the prophets.[4] Clement of Alexandria divides the Christian books into the Gospel, the Apostles, — or "the Apostle," — and the Prophets.[5] "Take up the Epistle of the blessed Paul the Apostle," writes Clement of Rome to the Corinthian Church.[6] It is "the voice of God," Justin affirms, which Christians believe, — that voice "which is both spoken again through the Apostles of Christ and proclaimed to us by the prophets."[7] "The preaching of the Church," Irenæus declares, "is on all sides consistent and continues like itself, and hath its testimony from the prophets and apostles."[8] When Hegesippus found in the churches which he visited the doctrine taught by "the law and the prophets and the Lord,"[9] we cannot be sure, although it is possible, that other New Testament writings besides the Gospels are referred to.[10] The "Memorabilia" of which Justin speaks, and of which he says that they were written

[1] See Col. iv. 16. The Ep. to the Ephesians may have been addressed to the circle of churches in Asia Minor. See Weiss, *Einl. in d. N. T.*, p. 261.

[2] Hippolytus, *Hær. Ref.* VII. xiii., xv., xiv.

[3] 2 Peter iii. 16.

[4] Phil. 5, 9.

[5] Strom. III. 455 (ed. Potter), V. 561, VI. 659, 676, VII. 757, IV. 475. See Reuss, *Hist. of the N. T.*, II. 303.

[6] 1 Ep. 3.

[7] Dial. 119.

[8] Iren. III. 24, 1.

[9] Euseb. *H. E.* IV. 22.

[10] See Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 319.

by Apostles and their companions and were read on Sunday in the meetings of the churches in city and country, were the Gospels, and the evidence that they embraced the Four of the Canon is convincing. That any other evangelical narrative besides these is referred to by him under this title cannot be safely inferred.[1] Marcion made up a canon composed of a mutilated Gospel of Luke and ten Epistles of Paul. It is not at all probable that he was the first to set about a work of this kind. In relation to the subject before us, the Muratorian Fragment, which was probably composed about 170 or 180, is an invaluable monument. It is clear that it contained all of the New Testament books except 1 John, 1 Peter, the Epistle of James, 2 Peter, and the Epistle to the Hebrews. 1 John is quoted at another place in the Fragment. The only book added is the Apocalypse of Peter, which is said, however, not to be universally received.[2] In the Peshito, which represents the Canon of the Syrian Church at the end of the second century, there are wanting only 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, and the Apocalypse. From the way in which the collections in each case were brought together, it could not be expected that the contents would be the same in all of them. The bare fact of the omission of books here or there does not warrant an unfavorable verdict respecting their origin and claims. In the early part of the third century, Tertullian, Clement and Origen give ample testimony to the existence and acceptance by the churches of a New Testament Canon. Yet the second part of the Canon, that which follows the four Gospels, was not inclosed by definite lines. The criteria for deciding what books should be considered inspired and normative had not been determined. While, therefore, the New Testament Canon, when Irenæus wrote, or in the last decades of the second century, had attained to an equal authority with the Canon of the Old Testament, there were still open questions respecting the books to be included in it. Its boundary was unsettled. A century later, as we learn from the report of Eusebius, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Apocalypse, James, 2 and 3 John, 2 Peter, and Jude were not universally received. There

[1] See my *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*, p. 190 sq. It is probable that the apocryphal Gospel of Peter is not referred to by Justin. See Salmon, *Int. to the N. T.* (7th ed.), p. 587 sq.

[2] For a correct text of the Fragment, see Westcott, *Hist. of the Canon*, App. C.

were two considerations which were practically influential in the ultimate decision of doubtful points relating to the limits of the Canon. The first was the historical test. Was the authorship of books apostolic, or, if not, did their authors have such a relation to Apostles as to raise their books to the level of the Apostles' writings? Secondly, had the contents of a given book such a character, such a spirituality and elevation, as to make it worthy of this rank? In a word, the test was partly external, and partly internal. By the use of these tests, certain books, as the Epistle of Clement and the Shepherd of Hermas, which for a considerable time were not unfrequently read in churches, were dropped from the recognized body of authoritative Scriptures.

According to the legend which originated among the Alexandrian Jews, the seventy authors of the Septuagint version were, each of them writing independently of the others, inspired to make the same translation. A similar conception of the passivity of the human mind when inspired with the visions of prophecy prevailed among the heathen. So the relation of the divine Spirit to the soul was conceived by Plotinus. It was natural that a like extreme view should be entertained by Christian teachers. The Alexandrian legend is accepted as true by Irenæus.[1] Athenagoras,[2] Theophilus,[3] and Tertullian[4] describe the prophets as organs of the Spirit, who are moved upon as are the flute or the lyre. The Montanists held to ecstatic inspiration. Tertullian made the ecstatic condition the characteristic of the inspired state.[5] The position of the Montanists on this point was disputed by orthodox opposers, or possibly by Miltiades. As regards the inspiration of the New Testament writers, Irenæus rejects the theory of passivity. Notwithstanding his belief in verbal inspiration, he accounts for the transpositions of words in Paul by the "velocity" of his utterance, and the vehemence of his spirit.[6] The Alexandrian writers, Clement and Origen, taught that the New Testament writers were in the conscious exercise of their own powers. Origen says of the prophets that the Spirit's influence made their own minds clearer.[7] Origen

[1] Iren. III. 21, 2.
[2] *Embassy*, 7.
[3] *Ad Autol.* II. 9.
[4] *Adv. Marc.* IV. 22.
[5] "Amentia," "excidat sensu," are his terms of description.
[6] *Adv. Hær.* III. 7, 2. "Spiritus" signifies the Apostle's own mind.
[7] *C. Celsum*, VII. 4; *Comm. on John*, T. I. c. v.

ascribes the peculiarities of style in the New Testament authors and their linguistic errors to their natural traits. Human agency was thus made one of the factors in the production of the Apostolic writings. He held to a difference in the degree of inspiration among the sacred writers. The inspiration of the Apostles was not the same as that of the prophets. In the former are many passages which spring from no immediate divine influence. Yet the New Testament writers were shielded from every kind of error.

In the interpretation of the Scriptures, the Fathers, not only Irenæus and Tertullian, but still more the Alexandrian teachers, disprove the sophistical and fanciful exegesis of the Gnostics by appealing to tradition as a witness to its error. The contents of the "rule of faith" were known to be accordant with the Scriptures, because the doctrines affirmed in it had been handed down in the churches. Hence no interpretation at variance with these doctrines could be correct. There was this barrier against erroneous interpretation. The characteristic fault of the orthodox interpreters was their allegorical exegesis. This method of understanding the Sacred Writers was derived from the Jews. It was generally adopted, but was carried to the farthest extent by the Alexandrian School, as it was in Alexandria that Jewish allegorizing had flourished most.

III. The tradition of Apostolic teaching came to be considered as under the special guardianship of the line of bishops, and the unity of the Church to be secured through the unity of the episcopate. Clement of Rome — with whom 'bishop' and 'presbyter' are one and the same — tells us that the office of "the episcopate" was instituted by the Apostles, who appointed presbyters as ministers in each church and, to prevent contests later, prescribed that "other approved men" should succeed them. Presbyters who were appointed by the Apostles, or by other men of weight (ἐλλογίμων), with the consent of the whole church, ought not to be ejected from the ministry without good cause.[1] An uninterrupted succession was secured by a mixture of appointment and popular election. The precedence of the bishop over the presbyters had arisen gradually. A certain superintendence was exercised by James at Jerusalem, which was probably not without influence as an example.[2] Clement of Alexandria

[1] Clem. *Ep. ad loc.*, XLII, XLIV.

[2] According to Hegesippus (Euseb. *H. E.* III. 11), another relative of

records a tradition that the change whereby the bishop was endued with higher authority than the presbyters associated with him took place in the Asia Minor churches, under the direction of the Apostle John.[1] The same tradition is implied in Tertullian.[2] The early episcopacy where it existed, as we see from the Epistles of Ignatius, was valued as a means of preventing division and preserving order. It was local, not diocesan, and it was purely governmental. At as late a period as the age of Irenæus, a sacerdotal function was not yet ascribed to it. If there was a bishop at Philippi who was distinguished from other presbyters in that church when Polycarp wrote his Epistle to the Philippians, the distinction between the two offices was so slight as to be deemed by him not worthy of notice.[3] The Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians is of such a character that allusion would certainly have been made to the office of bishop had such an office, raised above that of the presbyters, existed then at Corinth. It is a letter of one church to another. The author makes no reference to himself as bishop. He makes no mention of himself at all. The recently discovered *Didache* shows that episcopacy had not spread in the region where this book was in use.[4] Jerome's statement respecting the church at Alexandria admits of no reasonable interpretation except that which points to an original identity of the bishop and presbyter. This he asserts to have originally existed in the churches.[5] It was long recognized at Alexandria in the appointment, by the presbyters, when a bishop died, of one of their own number, to take his

Jesus, Simeon, succeeded James. The choice was still from the family of Jesus.

[1] *Quis Div. Salv.* 42. [2] *Adv. Marcion*, IV. 5.

[3] Instead of there being a vacancy, it is "more probable that the ecclesiastical organization there was not yet fully developed." Lightfoot, *Ignatius and Polycarp*, P. I. Vol. I. 578.

[4] "Episcopacy has not yet become universal." Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, p. 216. The reference of Ignatius (*Eph.* iii.) to "bishops established in the farthest parts" (κατὰ τὰ πέρατα) cannot be pressed in opposition to specific facts. If it were stronger than it is, it might not be more of an hyperbole than Justin's assertion as to the spread of the Gospel (*Dial.* 117), or even the Apostle Paul's language (*1 Thess.* i. 8) on the spread of the faith of the Thessalonians "in every place," or the same Apostle's language in *Col.* i. 6 or in *Rom.* i. 8. On this expression of Ignatius see *Lightfoot, Ignat. and Polycarp*, Vol. I. p. 381.

[5] The passages are cited in Gieseler, I. iii. § 34, n. 1.

place. If there was any ordination or consecration, it is implied that it was by those who selected him.[1] It is one of a great variety of proofs tending to show that the episcopate was developed out of the presbytery, and began in a simple presidency in the board of presbyters. Its beginnings, however, were very early, not improbably within the lifetime of some of the Apostles, and the spread of the primitive, rudimental form of the episcopate was so rapid that it was not very long before it became universal.[2] In the latter part of the second century it was usual to assume that existing ecclesiastical arrangements were of Apostolic origin. This habit is illustrated in the erroneous assumption by Irenæus that it was bishops *and* presbyters, and not presbyter-bishops, as Luke plainly relates, who met the Apostle Paul at Miletus (Acts xx. 17 sq.).[3] Bishops are looked upon as the guardians of Apostolic doctrine. Importance is attached to the idea of an

[1] Mr. Gore questions the correctness of Jerome. But Mr. Gore is not willing to stake his view of Apostolic succession on the validity of the doubt. He falls back on the supposition that the episcopal office may have been committed to presbyters by their ordination (see Gore's *Ministry of the Christian Church*, pp. 143 sq., 72 sq.). This view makes room for a temporary *jure divino* Presbyterianism.

[2] A theory as to the offices in the early Church, which is in some respects peculiar, was proposed by Hatch and is advocated in a somewhat modified form by Harnack. It is held by him that at the outset, in the Gentile churches, the presbytery — the "*elders*" — were not technically officials, but simply the older men. To these was left the work of pastoral guidance and discipline. There were *bishops* who, in connection with the subordinate officers, the *deacons*, were appointed to see to the cultus, especially to the receiving and distributing of alms. Later in the Apostolic age, it is held, the presbyters became a select official body. The bishops sat with them. According to Hatch, the members of the body thus constituted were called indiscriminately "*elders*" or "*bishops*." So much is evident from Acts xx. 17 sq., Titus i. 5, 7, 1 Tim. iii. 1, 8. The standing of the bishops increased with the increasing importance of their functions. Harnack thinks that the bishop owed his advancement largely to his being considered to have, as the apostles, prophets and teachers had previously, a relation to the entire Church, in contrast with the local relation of the elders. (See Harnack's *Texte u. Untersuchungen*, etc., II. 140.) How *one* of the bishops rose above the others is not made clear. For the exposition of the theory, see Hatch's *The Organization of the Early Christian Churches*, and the additions of Harnack to his German translation of this book; also Harnack's discussion just referred to. The theory has to encounter quite serious difficulties. Some of the most weighty of them are stated by Weizsäcker, *Theol. Lit. Zeit.*, 1884, p. 312.

[3] *Adv. Hær.* III. 14, 2.

unbroken chain of succession. It was like the Roman idea of the continuity of an office, the prerogatives of which were conceived to pass down without a break from each incumbent to his successor. Hegesippus was interested in tracing the succession of bishops at Rome and elsewhere.[1] He conferred with bishops respecting the traditions of doctrine in their respective churches. It was not a historical work that he wrote, but a compilation of "the plain tradition of Apostolic doctrine."[2] Irenæus attributes to bishops a certain gift of grace for the custody of the truth, a function of which Ignatius has nothing to say. In Clement of Rome the providing for an orderly succession, as already said, was to keep off divisions. Irenæus goes so far as to say that the bishops standing in the succession have received "a sure gift of the truth" — "charisma veritatis certum."[3] Hence separatists who withdraw from the "principal succession" are to be looked upon as heretics and schismatics. They have broken away from the truth. It is an "incorrupt guardianship" by which Christian teaching and sound exposition of the Scriptures have come down to us in the Church, with its "several successions of bishops."[4] The bishop is no longer the mere head of a local church; he has a relation to the Church Universal. He has a part in the episcopate, which is one and single. The truth is guarded by the Church as a "treasure in a precious vessel." Within the Church is the Holy Spirit. "Where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God, there is the Church."[5] It was an easy, yet a marked step, in advance of Irenæus, when Cyprian, in his book on the "Unity of the Church," not only gives increased emphasis to the conception of Irenæus, but attributes a distinct sacerdotal function to the bishops. Phrases in Tertullian and Origen that might seem to sanction a like view, are shown by other passages not to bear this interpretation.[6]

[1] Euseb. *H.E.* IV. 22. Cf. c. 11.

[2] *Ibid.* IV. 8. See Weizsäcker's remarks in Herzog and Plitt's *Real-Encycl. d. Theol. u. Kirche*, V., *sub voce Hegesippus*.

[3] Irenæus, IV. 26, 2.

[4] *Ibid.* IV. 33, 8. If Clement and Origen broach a like view, they neither rigidly nor uniformly adhere to it. See the passages in Gieseler, I. iii. c. 4, § 67.

[5] *Ibid.* III. 24, 1.

[6] See Lightfoot, *Dissertations*, pp. 222, 224. Expressions of Hippolytus (*Hær. Ref.*, Proem) may imply that sacerdotal terms in reference to the clergy were coming into vogue.

The exalted position of Rome, in comparison with other churches, consists, according to Irenæus and Tertullian, in the signal advantages belonging to the Roman Church for the custody of the doctrines transmitted by the Apostles. The trustworthiness of the traditions preserved there, Irenæus tells us, is preëminent.[1] There the great Apostles, Peter and Paul, had taught and died. The idea that Peter was the first bishop of Rome is first met with not far from the end of the second century. The gradual elevation of Peter to this post of dignity, and the partial obscuration of Paul, spring from no opposition to the latter, no wish to cast discredit upon him. The special controversy which the Apostle Paul had carried forward with so much energy had ceased to have any practical interest. The commission to the Twelve to proclaim the Gospel through the Roman world, and the relation of Peter to the Twelve as their head, were prominent in the thoughts of Christians. Justin remarks on the "twelve obscure men who went out from Jerusalem to proclaim the truth to the race of mankind."[2] To the mission of the Twelve, Aristides makes reference in the Fragment of his Apology. The mission of the Twelve, their unity in doctrine, an œcumenical Church, the episcopal precedence of Peter, Rome as the seat of his bishopric, the corresponding rank of his successors in comparison with other bishops, — these formed a group of conceptions closely connected. Cyprian, who did not hesitate on occasions to assert his episcopal independence even in reference to Rome, could still speak of Rome as the "See of Peter," "the principal church, whence sacerdotal unity proceeded."[3] In the *Didache*, the Apostles (or Evangelists), prophets and teachers, who are bound to no one place of abode, but stand in relation to all the churches, hold the chief place of honor. To quote from Lightfoot, "the itinerant prophetic order has not yet been displaced by the permanent localized ministry."[4] But the second century witnesses a remarkable change. It is this permanent ministry, with the bishops at their head, who are foremost. To them is attributed a special illumination by the Spirit. Not a mere local, but

[1] This is the meaning of the noted passage (III. 3, 2) on the impossibility that other traditions should disagree with the traditions of the Church at Rome.

[2] Apol. I. 39.

[3] "Unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est." *Epist.* xii. 14, ad Cornelium Migne, pp. 317, 321.

[4] *Apostol. Fathers*, p. 215.

a catholic, relation is ascribed to the chief pastors. They fill the station vacated by the Apostles chosen by Jesus. The Synods, which began to be held in opposition to Montanism, increase their dignity. A sharp line of distinction is drawn between the clergy and the laity. The former constitute an order elevated in rank above the *plebs*. It is Tertullian who first applied these terms to the ministry and the people, although he says that it is the authority of the Church which has made the difference between the two.[1] Moreover, to carry back to the first centuries the associations of diocesan episcopacy, would be an anachronism. The position of the bishop of a city "in many respects resembled that of the rector of a parish surrounded by his assistant clergy rather than that of the modern bishop of a diocese, containing perhaps several large towns."[2] During several centuries, it was the custom for presbyters to sit with bishops in the synods and to take an active part in their proceedings.

In the last decades of the second century the Ancient Catholic Church thus emerges to view,—a single, visible, compactly united Body, with officers succeeding to their stations under fixed rules, and conceived to be endowed in virtue of their office with exalted functions committed to them by Christ. Whether this system was a normal and wholesome development of the Christianity of the Apostolic age, is a question on which men's minds are still divided. One thing is certain; it was a change momentous in its results.

It was a change that awoke manifestations of repugnance. Montanism unquestionably partook of the character of a reaction against ecclesiasticism, or institutional Christianity. It was, however, a reaction pushed by its promoters to an extreme. It gave rise to an excess of enthusiasm which had no warrant in the precedents of the Apostolic age. But Montanism was one form of protest against restraints upon freedom of utterance under the influences of the Spirit; it was a demand for stricter discipline in the Church, for more disconnection with the world and its ways; it was a revival of apocalyptic hopes; it was an uprising in behalf of ideals which it was felt had been realized in the Apostolic age, but which were now vanishing under the blight of officialism. Montanus, the leader, appeared in Phrygia shortly after the middle of the second century. His movement embraced the proclamation

[1] *De Exhort. Cast.* 7.

[2] Cheetham, *Ch. History*, p. 128.

of himself as the inspired organ of the promised Paraclete, and the announcement of the restoration of the primitive gifts of the Spirit. The Father and the Son were now really to take up their abode in the souls of believers. Prophets and prophetesses were again supernaturally inspired to utter heaven-given messages. Joined with Montanus were two prophetesses conceived to be thus illuminated, Prisca and Maximilla. The Lord Himself was shortly to come in person, and to establish His kingdom at Pepuza in Phrygia. In this place Christians were summoned by the new prophets to assemble. To prepare for this kingdom, an austere strictness of life was enjoined. Celibacy was to be practiced, fasting was to be strict and was to be regulated by fixed rules. Delinquents were to be subjected to severe ecclesiastical penalties. Such as were excommunicated from the Church were not to be received back. Montanism spread in Asia Minor and in other places. It attracted a qualified sympathy in the churches of Southern Gaul, and was regarded for a time at Rome with considerable favor. In North Africa especially, it won numerous converts, of whom Tertullian is the most famous. Not a few, and among them Irenæus, were not disposed to question the reality of the revived gift of prophecy, but rejected the extravagant notions which the Montanists associated with their tenet on this subject. Montanism was condemned so far as it was unfriendly to the institutional system, which was too firmly established to be weakened. The ground taken by Tertullian was that the power of binding and loosing belonged not to the bishop, but that to the prophet as the organ of the Spirit it belonged to determine whether the repenting offender in any case is forgiven of God. He may be thus forgiven without being received back into the communion of the visible Church, which is bound in its discipline to prevent in the future, as far as it can, transgressions of the same character.

The contests in the Church on this matter of the discipline of the excommunicated or of those deserving this sentence, and on the connected question of the authority of the bishop, were strenuous and long continued. It was against the lax principles of Callistus, the Roman bishop (217–222), respecting the treatment of such as had fallen into mortal sin that Hippolytus led a schismatical party. It was a resistance to what was considered a secularizing spirit that had crept into the Church along with its growth in numbers. In North Africa, Cyprian, who was at first a rigorist on the disci-

plinary question, engaged in a struggle against the schismatics, led by Felicissimus, who contended that the certificates of faithful confessors of the faith should secure readmission to the Church for such as had forsaken the faith in the Decian persecution. The formidable schism of Novatian was in opposition to Cornelius, Bishop of Rome, who was chosen to this office in 251, and was on the side of leniency. Cyprian was induced to favor on the whole the cause of Cornelius. The Novatians made a distinction between forgiveness by God and reception into the communion of the Church. The one might take place without the other. The Church must guard its purity with sedulous care. It must keep its doors shut against those who had been guilty of a mortal sin. This tenet was a direct denial of the doctrine that without the Church there is no salvation. Numerous Novatian churches were formed. They sprung up in almost all parts of the Empire. The broader theory, which laid stress on the truth that the tares must grow with the wheat, and made higher claims for the hierarchy, prevailed. But it was not until after the Donatist controversy, near the end of the fourth and in the beginning of the fifth century, that the catholic and hierarchical view gained a fully decisive victory. The exclusion of the Montanist societies was only one step in the advance towards it. But Montanism left behind a marked influence upon the spirit and polity of the Catholic Church. The clergy were brought under severe rules of discipline from which the laity were exempt. An impetus was given to the tendency to recognize two types of Christian life and character, the lower or merely salvable type and the ascetic type, standing on a higher plane as to sanctity of conduct and the prospect of heavenly rewards.

CHAPTER VII

THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE IN THE ASIA MINOR SCHOOL: IRENÆUS, MELITO OF SARDIS—IN THE NORTH AFRICAN SCHOOL: TERTULLIAN—THE ALEXANDRIAN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY: CLEMENT

IRENÆUS was born in Asia Minor. With the traditions in the churches there he is familiar. His type of thought is not without traces of the Johannine teaching, the influence of which prevailed in the region where he spent his youth. In his appreciation of the truth of redemption through the incarnate Christ, the truth to which is given the central place in his system, he rises above the point of view of the Greek Apologists. Nevertheless, in his writings elements akin to their more rationalizing apprehension of Christian doctrine mingle here and there with more positive and profound interpretations of the Gospel. And side by side with views which are incongruous in their tendency he admits the chiliastic tradition in Eschatology. The antagonist of Gnostic speculation, Irenæus, in the cast of his mind, is intensely practical. We are not to swerve from the plain teaching of the Scriptures and from the rule of faith which embodies it in outline.[1] That is his maxim. What if we cannot discover solutions of all questions? This is no reason for forsaking what is plainly taught. "Such things we ought to leave to God." Nature, too, is full of mysteries. What causes the rise of the Nile and the ebb and flow of the ocean? Instead of prying into things inscrutable pertaining to God, we should seek to rise to Him in love and devotion. Apostolic teaching, attested by Scripture and tradition, is the norm of faith. The divine essence is inconceivable. Our knowledge of God is relative. The language which we utter concerning Him is figurative.[2]

[1] *Adv. Hær.* II. 27, 28.

[2] *Ibid.* II. 13, 3, 4.

God creates the world out of nothing.[1] Sin in men and angels is a free act. Why some fall and others do not is a mystery.[2] Yet Irenæus suggests that in order to train men to avoid evil and cleave to the good, it was necessary for them to have a preliminary experiment of both, God meantime foreknowing what would occur and having in mind His plan of deliverance.[3] Punishment is the necessary consequence of sin. It is provided for, in the foresight that sin would come in.[4] There is no interference with human freedom. The hardening of Pharaoh's heart is not a direct act of God. It is the incidental result of Pharaoh's own character. The same is true of judicial blindness in those who reject the Gospel.[5] Christ is the only-begotten Son of God, the Logos, through whom God reveals Himself. He was forever with the Father.[6] The idea of emanation is rejected. The mode of the generation of the Son is incomprehensible.[7] The Logos is included in the divine Being, but the distinction of the immanent and expressed Word is not admitted. There is no separation between the Son and the Father, yet they are not confounded. That the personal distinction of Father and Son is eternal is not distinctly affirmed, but it is implied.[8] The Holy Spirit is likewise ever with the Father. It is "the Word and Wisdom, Son and Spirit," by whom and in whom God freely does all things.[9] The Holy Spirit, as well as the Son, is included in God. As there is a certain subordination of the Son to the Father, so the Spirit is subordinate to both.[10] But the special offices of the Spirit are left in a measure indefinite. The incarnation had for its end to bring mankind back to fellowship with God. Through sin man is alienated from God and made a prey to corruption and death. The Son of God becomes man in order to reunite God and man. It is not, in truth, until after the fall that the union of man to God is, in and through Christ, fully realized. "It became the Mediator between God and man, through his intimate relationship to both to bring both into friendship and concord, and, while presenting man to God, to make God known to men."[11] In many

[1] *Adv. Hær.* II. 28, 3; 30, 9.
[2] *Ibid.* II. 28, 7.
[3] *Ibid.* IV. 39, 1.
[4] *Ibid.* II. 28, 7.
[5] *Ibid.* IV. 29, 30.
[6] *Ibid.* II. 30, 9; III. 18, 1; II. 25, 3.
[7] *Ibid.* II. 28, 4, 5.
[8] See Duncker, *Des heilig. Iren. Christol.*, p. 50 sq.
[9] Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.* IV. 20, 1.
[10] *Ibid.* I. 3, 5, in the Greek text. See Loofs, p. 127.
[11] *Ibid.* III. 18, 7.

ways the full humanity of Christ is emphasized. If the reality of both the human and the divine nature is not explicitly affirmed, it is clearly implied. When, in insisting on the unity of the person of Christ, it is spoken of as a mixture of the divine and human,[1] such expressions are not to be construed as implying that there was literally a confusion of the two.[2] Christ, the Son incarnate, is the second head of the race. His relation to mankind is designated as a *recapitulatio*.[3] By this it is meant that in Christ there is a restitution and renewal of the race, a taking up anew of the development at the point where it was broken off by sin. The term includes the idea that the incarnation and work of Christ exert their influence backward as well as forward. Mankind in Christ reverse the course which was entered upon at the fall. There is a renewal of allegiance to God, a renewal and consummation of the life in union with Him. "He [Christ] was made that which we are that He might make us completely what He is."[4] This is the supreme end which He has in view. Hence it was necessary for Christ to go through the successive stages of human life, from infancy onward, that He might sanctify them all.[5] In the conception of the work of Christ there are blended, without analytic separation in the author's mind, the two elements of redemption and reconciliation or atonement. He refers to the death of Christ as a substitution for our death. He speaks of the Lord as having redeemed us with His own blood, and given His soul for our souls and His own flesh for our flesh."[6] He gave His life as a "ransom" for those in captivity. His death was the salvation of such as believe in Him.[7] Yet the context of such passages indicates that the perfecting of the union of Christ with mankind, and the communion of man with God which is thus consummated, is the most prominent thought. Christ is said to have done the work of a High Priest, propitiating God, dying that man might come out of condemnation.[8] But this bearing of the Saviour's death is not dwelt upon. It is not carried out in any definite form. The central element in the work of Christ is His obedience, whereby

[1] *Adv. Hær.* IV. 20, 4.

[2] See v. 14, 1; III. 17, 4. Cf. Loofs, DG. p. 94.

[3] On this term and the conception involved, see Duncker, *Des heilig. Iren. Christol.* p. 163 sq.; also Dorner, *Person Christi*, I. 485 sq. For the doctrine of Irenæus, see especially, *Adv. Hær.* III. 16, 6; 18, 1, 7; V. 14, 2; 19, 1; 21, 1.

[4] *Adv. Hær.* V. Pref.

[5] *Ibid.* II. 22, 4.

[6] *Ibid.* V. 1, 2.

[7] *Ibid.* IV. 28, 3.

[8] *Ibid.* IV. 8, 2.

the disobedience of Adam is cancelled. The end attained as regards men is the destruction of sin and its consequences, the imparting of a new spiritual life which carries with it incorruption, salvation from death. The dominion of Satan was not subverted by force, but in a way befitting order and righteousness; that is, by a moral conquest over the souls enslaved by him.[1] The "ransom" is not spoken of as a prize given to Satan. This view comes into theology at a later day. While, therefore, Irenæus appreciates the importance of the death of Christ and conceives it as vicarious, the idea of a penal satisfaction is not prominent. Yet the atonement is objective and has an essential place in the righteous order which sin has invaded.

The view taken of the sacraments in Irenæus is in keeping with his idea of the external Church as the exclusive dwelling-place of the Holy Spirit. Regeneration is inseparably associated with baptism. The same term designates the rite and the new birth itself. "Baptism is our new birth unto God."[2] In Baptism, we are regenerated.[3] In one passage there is some reason to think that the baptism of infants is recognized.[4] In the Lord's Supper, the bread after its consecration "is no longer common bread, but a Eucharist constituted of two things, an earthly and a heavenly."[5] The heavenly element in the bread and wine is the body and blood which the divine Logos mysteriously connects with them. Thus the bread and wine of the sacrament nourish in us a life out of which springs the incorruptible body at the Resurrection. The bread and wine are brought to God as an offering with a prayer of thanks. The act is a symbol that all that the believers have, and not a tenth alone, is to be brought to God.[6] The later idea of a specific offering to God by the hands of a priest is not involved in this teaching. "Observing the law of the dead," Christ descended into Hades, where He abode for three days, and thither His followers likewise descend. Thence they come forth at the resurrection of the body."[7] Irenæus holds the chiliastic doctrine, quoting the statement of Papias

[1] This is probably the sense of "suadelam" (in VI. 1, 1). See Dorner (against Baur), *Person Christi*, I. p. 479 n.

[2] *Adv. Hær.* I. 21, 1.

[3] *Ibid.* III. 17, 1.

[4] *Ibid.* II. 22, 4. See Neander, *Church History*, I. 311.

[5] *Ibid.* IV. 8, 5.

[6] *Ibid.* IV. 18, 2.

[7] *Ibid.* IV. 32, 2.

relating to the vineyard with its colossal grapes.[1] The punishment of the wicked is eternal. The impression that Irenæus teaches the doctrine of the eventual annihilation of the wicked is founded on a misapprehension of the meaning which he attaches to the term 'continuance' and to certain other terms, and is contradicted in not a few unambiguous passages.[2]

The influence of that ethical, as distinguished from evangelical, apprehension of the Gospel, which we have noticed in the Apologists, appears here and there in Irenæus. This is seen in the peculiar guilt attached to sins committed after baptism. It is seen in the conception of faith in [illegible]ce where he says that the eternal reward is given to such [illegible]lieve Christ, "being righteous," — adding, "Now to believe Him is to do His will."[3] Faith is more often the synonym of belief in the truths which are brought together in the rule of faith, or the word is used, in an objective way, to denote these truths collectively considered. "We ought to fear," he says, "lest perchance, after the knowledge of Christ, we do something which is not pleasing to God, and thus have no further remission of sins, but be excluded from His kingdom."[4] There are two phases of doctrine in Irenæus. On the one hand, there is the higher, evangelical conception of the new life through the incarnate Son in whom the grace of the Father is revealed. This conception has gained a lodgment in his mind. On the other hand, there are the traces of the "moralism" of the Apologists, which exalts the teaching element in Christianity and makes everything depend on the free choice of the path of obedience. There is a corresponding dif-

[1] *Adv. Hær.* V. 31, 2.

[2] The opinion that Irenæus accepts the doctrine of "conditional immortality" rests on one passage (II. 34, 1, 2, 3), where "continuance" (perseverantia) and "length of days" are said to be the exclusive reward of the righteous. But "life," "length of days," "perseverance," which the wicked forfeit, is the better life which comes to the regenerate. "Separation from God is death"; it is the rejection of the good things of God. (See V. 27, 2. Cf. V. 4, 3.) The eternity of punishment is taught in various places. See, especially, IV. 28, 1, 2; also, IV. 39, 4; IV. 27, 4; III. 23, 3. In one of the Pfaffian fragments (XL. ed. Stieren, p. 889), it is said that Christ is to come to destroy all evil and to reconcile all things (reconcilianda universa), that there may be an end of all impurities. This suggests, not annihilation, but restoration; but it is a paraphrase of Col. i. 20, and probably means the purification of the righteous. Moreover, the genuineness of the fragment is quite doubtful.

[3] *Adv. Hær.* IV. 6, 5.

[4] *Ibid.* IV. 27, 2.

ference in the explanations given of the relation of the old dispensation to the new. Now the Old Testament is exalted to the place of equality assigned to it by the Apologists, and now its subordinate, preparatory function is pointed out. The source of the contrast so marked in Irenæus would appear to be that, notwithstanding his abundant citations from Paul, the roots of his religious life were not in the distinctive teaching of the Apostle, to the core of which he did not penetrate with a vivid insight. The whole bent of Irenæus was practical. His attention was concentrated upon the defence of Christianity.[1]

One of the most highly esteemed of all the writers of the Asia Minor School was Melito, Bishop of Sardis.[2] His literary activity began about A.D. 150. Unhappily, of his numerous works there remain only a few fragments. But these furnish valuable materials for the History of Doctrine. In one of them, it is said that the works of Christ after His baptism "showed His godhead concealed in the flesh." "He concealed the signs of His godhead" before His baptism, "although He was true God from eternity." "Being perfect God and perfect man, He assured us of His two essences,"[3] His godhead and His manhood. Here is a distinct declaration that in Christ there were two natures, nothing, however, being said of the particular mode of their union. In another fragment, the genuineness of which is extremely probable, Christ is designated "the perfect reason, the Word of God, who was begotten before the light, who was Creator together with the Father," who was "in the Father the Son, in God God," God who is of God, "the Son who is of the Father, Jesus Christ, the King for ever and ever." Melito was one of the principal lights in the group which is characterized by Lightfoot as "The Later School of St. John."[4]

[1] On the two Testaments, see *Adv. Hær.* IV. 9, 2; IV. 32, 2. On the combination of the "apologist-moral" with the "Biblical-realistic" ingredients in Irenæus, see Harnack, DG. (*Grundriss*), 101 sq., and Loofs, DG., p. 95. See especially the important work of Werner, *Der Paulinismus d. Irenæus*, etc., in Gebhardt u. Harnack's *Altchristl. Lit.* VI. 3 (1889).

[2] On Melito and his writings, see Lightfoot, *Essays on Supernatural Religion*, p. 223 sq. The subject of the fragments is fully discussed by Harnack, in Gebhardt and Harnack, *Texte u. Untersuchungen*, etc., p. 240 sq. But see also Harnack in *Altchristl. Literatur*, I. p. 250, where he concludes that the four Syrian fragments belonged to one work, of which Melito was the author.

[3] *οὐσίας.*

[4] *Contemporary Review*, Feb. 1876. Reprinted in *Essays on the Work entitled "Supernatural Religion,"* pp. 217-250.

Tertullian, more than any other, is the founder of Latin theology. He deserves to be called the forerunner of Augustine. He disdains the philosophers, going so far as to call the serenity of Socrates in the presence of death a forced or affected composure. Yet he was not ignorant of the philosophers, and his power as a thinker is not less marked than his extravagance. His genius and eloquence atone for his faults of temperament. He was partly Latin and partly African, and he blends in himself the qualities of his mixed parentage.

Tertullian goes farther than Irenæus in asserting the authority of tradition. He dwells on the insufficiency of the Apostolic Scriptures, which heretics can pervert without stint. It is useless to argue with them on the basis of these writings, which really belong only to those who have, together with them, the "rule of faith." To this the appeal is to be made. Christ chose and sent out the Apostles;[1] these founded churches and made them the depositories of their teaching; in the churches there have been the successions of bishops, the custodians of the tradition.[2] Hence, heretics are met with a *præscriptio* — a demurrer. Their dissent from the doctrine of the churches, the novelty of their teaching, throws them out of court. Tertullian's argument here is an example of his appropriation of legal ideas, a characteristic of his writings.

Tertullian was much influenced by the Asia Minor theology. The influence of Stoicism is also quite apparent in his theological conceptions. In agreement with Stoic doctrine is his materialistic view of the constitution of the soul, which he contends for at length in his treatise *De Anima*.[3] Indeed, his opinion is that nothing exists that is not of a corporeal nature. The soul is of a finer species of matter. It is like the wind or the breath. It was breathed into man by the Creator. We are not to deny even that it has color and form, — its form being like that of the body. Along with the body it is generated.[4] It has a seminal beginning. Tertullian was thus a Traducian, in opposition to the doctrine that each soul originates in a distinct, creative act.

On the subject of the evidence of the being of God, Tertullian, instead of marshalling, as other Christian Apologists of the time were apt to do, the concessions of heathen writers, points to what

[1] *De Præscript.* 20, 21.

[2] See, for example, *de Præscript.* 36.

[3] See e.g., cc. 5, 7.

[4] *De Anima*, 27.

he calls the testimony of "the naturally Christian soul" to the divine existence and unity. He invokes the untutored, unsophisticated soul to give its witness. Its unpremeditated expressions — such as "Which may God grant," "If God will," "May God repay," "God shall judge between us" — spring out of the depths of the heart and are the best attestation to the truth.[1] Tertullian insists, also, on the evidence from design.[2]

As Tertullian is the first to use the word 'Trinity,'[3] so is he the first distinctly to say that tri-personality pertains to the one God as He is in Himself.[4] He plants himself on this ground in antagonism to the Monarchian theory, which rejected the idea of a diversity of persons as immanent in God. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are "*of one substance*"; they are susceptible of number without division.[5] The Son is from the essence of the Father, proceeding from him, not by emanation, as the Gnostics taught, yet by a self-projection or "prolation." The Son or Logos is eternal, since the Logos is the reason and word of God. The Father projected the Son, as the root the tree, and the fountain the river, and the sun the ray. But there is no separation.[6]

While Tertullian insists on the unity of substance and the triplicity of persons, he fails of reaching the full Trinitarian statement. The Logos is represented to be the impersonal reason of God (ratio), and does not become the Word (Sermo), does not emerge into personality, until the work of creation is to begin. Moreover, subordinationism in the Trinity is presented in the crude form of a greater and less participation of the divine substance on the part of the several persons. "The Spirit is third from God and the Son, as the fruit out of the tree is third from the root, and as the branch from the river is third from the fountain, and as the apex of the sunbeam is third from the sun."[7] "The Father and the Son," we are told, "differ from one another in measure."[8] The meaning is made clear in the next sentence: "For the Father is the whole substance, but the Son a derivation

[1] *De Test. An.* 1, 2. [2] *Adv. Marc.* I. 11–13.

[3] *Adv. Prax.* 3. But Theophilus (*ad Autol.* XV.) has Τριάδος.

[4] *Ibid.* 2. [5] *Ibid.* 2.

[6] *Ibid.* 8. 9. An indirect influence of this book of Tertullian on the shaping of the Nicene doctrine will be referred to later. The "unius substantiæ" appears as the Homoousion.

[7] *Ibid.* 8. [8] *Ibid.* 9.

and portion of the whole." But the notion of an actual division of the substance is guarded against, when, for example, Tertullian connects with the illustrations just cited (of the branch, the river, the fountain, etc.) the statement: "Yet nothing is parted (alienatur) from the source from which it derives its properties." Tertullian brings out more definitely than any of the Fathers before him — if we except the fragment of Melito — the full humanity of Christ and the distinction of the two natures, each retaining its own attributes.[1] There is no confusion, but a conjunction of the human and the divine. This conception of Christ as possessed of a rational human spirit is the only one consistent with his psychology, in which there is no possible disjunction of soul and spirit.[2] This teaching must govern the interpretation of looser expressions in which man in Christ is said to be mixed with God. On the importance of the death of Christ in its relation to human salvation, Tertullian is emphatic.[3] But nothing is said of any transaction with Satan for the release of man. Satan was overcome in the temptation of Jesus. Christ was not cursed of God, but by the Jews. Nor is anything said of a satisfaction rendered by Christ to divine justice, although Tertullian conceives of justice as having in it a retributive element. Justice appears even in nature, in the separation of things that differ, as the day from the night.[4] The power of God creates, the justice of God orders and arranges. The "satisfaction" of which Tertullian speaks is that which is required of the penitent Christian who, having grievously sinned, would be reconciled to an offended God. Tertullian is fervent in his exaltation of the mercy of God in its relation even to the wayward believer. Yet a certain legalism pervades his teaching on the whole subject of repentance and God's acceptance of the repenting sinner. He speaks of the "reward" offered to repentance, even the repentance in which the Christian life begins.[5] He speaks of making "satisfaction" unto the Lord, by repentance, for later sins,[6] of release from penalty as "a compensatory exchange for repentance."[6] Satisfaction is made by confession; by repentance "God is appeased."[7] By fasting and other forms of "temporal mortification," the penitent is able "to expunge eternal punishment."[8]

[1] *Adv. Prax.* 27.
[2] *De Anima*, 12.
[3] *Adv. Marc.* III. 8.
[4] *Ibid.* II. 12.
[5] *De Pœnit.* 5.
[6] *Ibid.* 6.
[7] *Ibid.* 7.
[8] *Ibid.* 9.

The expressions of contrition are "a self-chastisement in the matter of food and raiment."[1] Tertullian is cautious about applying the term 'merit' to repentance: "so far as we can merit," is the phrase which he uses.[2]

The freedom of the will is a part of God's image and likeness in man.[3] There is entire freedom in "both directions"—towards the right and towards the wrong. It is a part of Tertullian's Traducianism that evil is propagated in the soul. There is evil in the soul—*malum animæ*—derived from its corrupt origin—*ex originis vitio;* and the evil has become in a sense a second nature. "The corruption of our nature is another nature."[4] Yet this suggestion of an inborn corruption, in which Augustine is anticipated, is qualified and, in some places, virtually excluded. The offspring of one Christian parent is said to be by "the seminal prerogative" not unclean. In arguing for the postponement of baptism, it is asked: Why should this innocent age hasten to procure the remission of sins?[5] It is said that the original good in man is obscured rather than extinguished. "It cannot be extinguished because it is from God." "In the worst men there is something good, and in the best something bad."[6] As regards regeneration, we are told that the grace of God is more potent than the will, which is the faculty within us possessed of autonomy.[7] "The soul in its second birth is taken up by the Holy Spirit."[8] Yet, as on the subject of innate depravity, there are occasional passages which seem to teach that grace is irresistible; but these contravene frequent assertions of a reserved power and a concurrent agency in the will.

Christ, after His death, descends into Hades, the abode where the evil and the good await the resurrection. The martyrs are by themselves in a more exalted place: whether it be within or without the limits of Hades is not quite clear.[9] There is a first and a second resurrection. There is a millennial reign of Christ, but all sensuous, Jewish conceptions of it are repudiated. Tertullian dwells on the spiritual blessings to be enjoyed in that intermediate state. The Holy Land, he says, is not Judea, but rather

[1] *De Pœnit.* 11.
[2] *Ibid.* 6.
[3] *Adv. Marc.* 7.
[4] *De Anima,* 41.
[5] *De Bapt.* 18.
[6] *De Anima,* 41.
[7] *Ibid.* 21.
[8] *Ibid.* 41.
[9] See *Adv. Marc.* IV. 34, v. 17; *De Resurrect.* 17, 25. In *De Anima,* c. 7, the patriarchs and the bosom of Abraham are placed in Hades.

the flesh of the Lord. The friendship of God is the supreme good. Hell, "the treasure-house of eternal fire," is in the interior of the earth, and the flames issuing from the mouths of volcanoes have their source in hell.[1]

When we pass from Tertullian to Clement of Alexandria we find ourselves in a very different atmosphere. We no longer hear invectives against philosophy. "The multitude,"[2] he says, "are frightened at the Hellenic philosophy, as children are at masks, fearing lest it should lead them astray."[3] Clement, the first of the Alexandrian teachers whose writings have come down to us, is full of the thought that the mission of the Christian theologian is to build a bridge between the Gospel and Gentile wisdom, to point out the relations of Christianity to universal knowledge, to give to the religion of Christ a scientific form, to show how the believer may rise to the position of the true "Gnostic." Clement is apart from all contact with the teaching of the West. Irenæus and Tertullian cast their theological thoughts in a polemical form, their aim being to beat back the invasion of error. The Alexandrians undertake a more direct and positive task. It was the work of Origen to fulfil this task of giving to Christian truth the unity of a system. Clement, the precursor of Origen, although copious in suggestions, fails to mould them into a consistent or complete whole.

The sources of knowledge respecting divine things, according to Clement, are Scripture and reason. But, as nothing which would cast dishonor upon God is worthy of belief, a high place of authority is given to reason. Moreover, the method of allegory applied in interpreting Scripture opens a wide door for the intrusion of subjective speculations. Yet the road to insight, the path upward to the plane of the true Gnostic, is the attaining of purity of heart. Thus knowledge and holy character are not put asunder. Clement abounds in passages in which the philosophy of the Greeks is said to have sprung from a partial divine revelation, although he occasionally makes their wisdom a plagiarism from the Hebrew prophets.[4] This is a specimen of the contradictions in his writings. The bond of union between Gentile science and the religion of the Gospel is in the conception of the Logos, which is common to both. Clement follows the Greek masters in repre-

[1] *De Pœnit.* 12.
[2] οἱ πολλοί.
[3] *Stromata*, VI. 10.
[4] E.g. *Ibid.* V. 14, VI. 7.

senting God as incomprehensible, transcendent, above the sphere where distinctions and differences have a place. "Human speech is incapable of uttering God."[1] The Logos is the Revealer, first in the Creation, in which the Logos takes part, by whom wisdom is stamped upon it; again, in the light of reason imparted to mankind; then in special disclosures of divine truth; and, finally, through the Incarnation in Christ. The light derived from the Logos by the Gentiles may serve as the stepping-stone to the height on which shines the full effulgence of the Gospel. "The Greek Philosophy," says Clement, "purges the soul, as it were, and prepares it beforehand for the reception of faith, on which the Truth builds up the edifice of knowledge."[2] The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the "Holy Triad."[3] When we seek to ascertain the relations of the Three to one another, the utterances of Clement lack clearness and harmony with one another. There is an essential unity between the Father and the Son. This unity has existed forever. But the distinction of Father and Son is affirmed.[4] Yet in some passages the personal distinction seems to fade out. But the prevailing view is that of the Son as a distinct hypostasis.[5] The Logos is said to undergo no change, and the distinction of immanent and spoken Logos is rejected.[6] The Logos is conceived of, after the manner of the Stoics, as the seminal reason diffused in all beings to whom reason is given. There is a vagueness on this point as there is in Philo's conception. The Holy Spirit is spoken of as a distinct hypostasis, but how the Spirit is related to the Father and the Son is not made clear. But there is no ambiguity in the assertion of the true divinity and the true humanity of Christ. "He [Christ] became man that man might become God."[7] Christ is our ransom;[8] yet it is not said to whom the ransom is paid. He is our propitiation.[9] But the ordinary representation in Clement is that the obstacle to the salvation of men is in themselves. Pardon is made to include deliverance from ignorance, the source of sin. Redemption is not so much the undoing of the past, as the lifting of man up to a higher state than

[1] *Strom.* VI. 18; cf. V. 11, 12.

[2] *Ibid.* VII. 3.

[3] *Ibid.* V. 14.

[4] *Ibid.* IV. 25.

[5] On this subject, see Dorner, I. p. 443 sq.; especially p. 446; Thomasius, DG. I. 201 sq.; Bigg, p. 67.

[6] *Strom.* V. 1.

[7] *Protr.* 1. For other passages, see the references in Bigg, p. 71.

[8] *Quis Div. Salv.* 37.

[9] *Pæd.* III. 12.

pertained to unfallen man. Man was created upright. The freedom of the will belonged to his nature.[1] In the exercise of it, he sinned. But Adam is the typical example of sin, rather than the foundation whence it is spread through the race. Freedom of choice remains, although the soul depends on the Spirit for its renewal.[2] The regenerated life begins in baptism. It includes the forgiveness of sins. Henceforward there is a twofold possibility. There is a lower stage of Christian character, that of the ordinary believer who attains to holiness under the influence of fear and hope; and there is the higher life, where fear is cast out by love. Simply to be saved is something very different from salvation in the nobler sense.[3] This is the life of knowledge, the life of him to whom divine mysteries are revealed. There is higher truth which may not be communicated even to Christians not inwardly prepared to receive it. This is the doctrine of Reserve. Clement was not a mystic. He goes so far as to appropriate from Stoicism the notion of apathy, and love is depicted as being, in relation to our fellow-men, passionless. The true Gnostic does not desire anything. He is free from all perturbations of spirit.[4] There is but one absolution from mortal sin committed after baptism. Respecting the Eucharist, how vague and indeterminate his explanations are is evident from the circumstance that by some he has been thought to regard it as a mere memorial, while others with even less reason have attributed to him the doctrine of transubstantiation.[5] Justice is divested of the retributive element. The principal design of punishment is the correction of the transgressor. Another object is the restraint of others.[6] After death and until the judgment chastisement continues as a cure for sin. Then probation comes to an end. But Christ, and the Apostles after Him, preached the Gospel in Hades. In some places, the preaching is said to have been addressed to such as simply lacked knowledge, the bent of the heart being right; but the heathen generally are also said to have the offer of salvation presented to them in the intermediate state.[7] It would not be just, it is said, to deprive them of the opportunity to be made acquainted with the way of salvation. At the deluge,

[1] *Strom.* I. 17, II. 15.
[2] *Ibid.* II. 19, IV. 26.
[3] *Ibid.* VI. 14.
[4] *Ibid.* VI. 9.
[5] See Bigg, p. 105 sq.
[6] *Pæd.* I. 8; *Strom.* IV. 24.
[7] For the principal statements on the subject, see *Strom.* VI. 6.

punishment was inflicted on the antediluvians for their correction. Clement rejected the Millenarian theory with antipathy. At the Resurrection it is not a literal body of flesh that is raised, but a spiritual body;[1] but the Writing of Clement on this special subject is lost.

[1] *Pæd.* II. 10.

CHAPTER VIII

MONARCHIANISM — MONARCHIANISM OVERCOME IN THE EAST — THE SYSTEM OF ORIGEN — THEOLOGY AFTER THE DEATH OF ORIGEN — NOVATIAN — DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA AND DIONYSIUS OF ROME — METHODIUS

In answering the first and foremost question, "What think ye of Christ?" Christian theology, beginning with Justin and the Apologists, had taken up the conception of the Logos, blending together the Jewish and the Platonic meanings associated with that term. On the basis of this conception the doctrine of the divinity of Christ was moulded. In Irenæus and Tertullian, the Holy Ghost was so connected with the Father and the Son as to form the Trias. The safeguard set up against dyotheism and tritheism was the idea of subordination and of the precedence of God the Father. But the theological construction which had the Logos for the starting-point did not establish or complete itself without a struggle, and a prolonged struggle, against opposition within the Church. The dissatisfaction with it grew partly out of the feeling that the doctrine of a hypostatic trinity was too metaphysical, and savored of Gnosticism, but chiefly arose from the conviction that this doctrine trenched upon monotheism. To this antagonistic opinion, in its different varieties, was given the name of Monarchianism, a term first used by Tertullian.[1] The opinion held in common by the Monarchians was that God is a single person as well as a single being. But the two principal types of the Monarchian theory were widely distinct from one another. The adherents of the first, the dynamic or adoptionist doctrine, contended that Christ was a mere man, chosen of God

[1] On Monarchianism and its different forms, see Harnack, *Real-Encycl.* VIII. 178 sqq., and DG. I. 604–709; also the elaborate discussion in Dorner, *Person Christi*, I. 497–562, 697–732.

and by Him supernaturally inspired and exalted. He was the Son of God, not in virtue of a metaphysical relationship to the Father, but by adoption. The adherents of the second, on the other hand, maintained that Christ was truly divine, but as divine was indistinguishable from God the Father, being one mode or manifestation of the divine being. These were termed in the West Patripassians. In the East they were usually grouped together under the name of Sabellians. There is no good ground for supposing that the first or humanitarian class was ever numerous in the Church, whether in the East or the West. But the opposite is the fact respecting the Modalists. It is to these that Origen and Tertullian have reference when they speak of the Monarchians as numerous.[1] It is of the Modalist opinion — in contrast with the "œconomy," — that is, with the idea of the trinity as a distinction of persons in the Divine Being Himself in relation to creation and redemption — that Tertullian says: "To be sure, plain people, not to call them ignorant and common — of whom the greater portion of believers is always comprised — inasmuch as the rule of faith withdraws them from the many gods of the [heathen] world to the one and the true God, shrink back from the œconomy. . . . They are constantly throwing out the accusation that we preach two gods and three gods. . . . We hold, they say, the monarchy."[2] When Monarchianism in either of its two forms took its rise, it is impossible to say. Both types seem to have made their appearance first in Asia Minor, where in the second century there was so much discussion and diversity of opinion. But as all ways led to Rome, so all sorts of doctrine were likely to be carried thither. The dynamic or humanitarian theory resembled the Ebionite opinion: Modalism had a docetic tendency; but the former, as far as can be ascertained, had no historic connection with Ebionitism, nor had Modalism with the

[1] Origen, in Johann. T. ii. § 2. Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.* 3. Hase (*Kirchengesch.* p. 99) remarks: "Justinus führt es noch als eine Christliche Meinung an den Herrn für einen blossen Menschen zu halten, und widerwillig bezeugt Tertullian dass es in seiner Umgebung die Volksmeinung war." This is an error respecting Tertullian. As to Justin's words, "Some of our class," etc. (Dial. 48), the reading — 'your' for 'our' — is defended by Bull, Thirlby, and others. It is not rejected by Neander (*Ch. Hist.* I. p. 363). It is not approved by Otto (see his note *ad loc.*), nor in the edition of Justin, in the "Oxford Library of the Fathers," p. 129. But 'your' is found by Harnack to be the correct reading. DG. (3d ed.) I. 282 n.

[2] *Adv. Prax.* 3.

docetism of the Gnostics. That Ebionitism was the doctrine of the early Church, that the Church of Rome in the second century was Ebionite, that Modalism was the fruit of a reaction against that doctrine, that the Logos theology came forward as a mediating and reconciling system, — these propositions, which were involved in Baur's speculative scheme, have at present no foothold among scholars.

In the first class of Monarchians are commonly reckoned the "Alogi."[1] This designation is a nickname which was given to them by Epiphanius.[2] They appeared about A.D. 170, in Asia Minor. They were prompted, by their extreme antipathy to Montanism, its ideas as to prophecy, and its doctrine of the Paraclete, to discard both the Apocalypse and the Gospel of John. The Gospel they ascribed to Cerinthus. It is possible that they rejected the doctrine of the Logos, but it is not clear that they denied the divinity of Christ. They supported their repudiation of the Fourth Gospel by critical objections drawn from a comparison of it with the Synoptics, partly in respect to points of chronology. The brevity and the mildness of the notice of them in Irenæus warrants the inference that their number was small.[3] The leading opponents of Montanism, both in Asia Minor and elsewhere, were not in accord with the opinion of the Alogi as to the Fourth Gospel. If it were not for the lost writing of Hippolytus concerning the Gospel of John and the Apocalypse, and the confutation which Epiphanius borrowed from one or more writings of this Father, we should have no proof that when Hippolytus wrote there was anything left of the opposition of the Alogi to this Gospel.[4]

[1] The Alogi of late have been the subject of much discussion in Germany. The topic is handled by Harnack in his brilliant article on "Monarchianism" in the *Real-Encycl.* (Vol. X.) and in his DG. It is considered at length in the first half of the first volume of Zahn's *History of the New Testament Canon* (1888). This last publication called out a polemical review from Harnack, in which the Alogi forms one of the prominent themes: *Das Neue Test. um das Jahr 200*, etc. (1889). In Zahn's brief pamphlet in reply to Harnack (1889), however, this particular topic is not taken up. The subject is interesting now for its connection with the debate respecting the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. See my Paper in *Papers of Am. Ch. Hist. Soc.* (1890); also, Sanday, *Inspiration* (1893), pp. 14, 15, 64.

[2] *Hær.* 51.

[3] Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.* III. 11, 9.

[4] Among the lost works of Hippolytus was one bearing the title, *Concerning the Gospel according to John and Apocalypse.* According to Eben Jesu

Theodotus, the Currier, came to Rome from Byzantium, and was expelled from the Church by its bishop Victor (about A.D. 195).[1] Theodotus taught that Christ was a mere man. He held to the miraculous conception of Christ and held that at His baptism the "Holy Spirit" descended upon Him in the form of a dove, but that on this account He could not be called God. Caius, the probable author of the "Little Labyrinth" quoted by Eusebius, styles Theodotus the "inventor" of the humanitarian heresy. Whether or not he was directly connected in any way with the Alogi depends on the interpretation of a doubtful phrase in Epiphanius. He accepted the Gospel of John, but interpreted it in his own peculiar way. Epiphanius cites a comment by him on John viii. 40. His doctrine was not tolerated at Rome. One of his disciples was a second Theodotus, the Money Changer, whose followers are said to have taught that the "Holy Spirit" was present in Melchizedek in a higher mode of presence and activity than in Jesus. Hence they were called Melchizedekians. These Monarchians are said to have been students of Aristotle, Theo-

(in Asseman), among the writings of Hippolytus was a defence of the Gospel and the Apocalypse. Probably the title just given was the title of this work. It indicates that there remained some of the Alogi, and adherents to their opinions may have made their way to Rome. The same thing is thought to be implied in what is said of John's Gospel in the Muratorian Canon; but whether the statements there have really an apologetic intent is uncertain.

[1] Euseb. *H. E.* V. 28. Eusebius, as above stated, calls Theodotus "the inventor" of the heresy that Christ was a mere man. What is especially important, Hippolytus, in the *Ref. Omn. Hær.* (X. 23), expressly states it to be the doctrine of Theodotus that, at the baptism of Jesus, Christ descended upon him in the form of a dove,— precisely the doctrine which Hippolytus, shortly before, ascribes also to Cerinthus. In another passage (VII. 36) Hippolytus likens the opinion of Theodotus to that of the Gnostics. In the former passage, however, he speaks of "that Spirit" which descended [and] which proclaims him to be the Christ. Harnack is disposed to think that Hippolytus may have erred in denominating the Spirit which was said by Theodotus to have descended "Christ," and to question whether Theodotus did thus designate the Holy Spirit as "Christ" (Harnack, DG. I. 623, n. 2). This last suggestion is connected with Harnack's interpretation of Hermas (Lib. III., Simil. V.), which makes him identify the Holy Spirit with the Divine in Christ. It may be added that Epiphanius, after connecting Theodotus with the Alogi, adds that he had converse or communication (συγγενόμενος) with other heretics before named and contemporary with them. Harnack's statement that nothing more than contemporaneity is here meant, can hardly be justified.

phrastus and Galen, and to have been addicted to a grammatical exegesis. They made an abortive attempt to set up a separate church. The last representative of the adoptionist creed, who appeared at Rome, was Artemon (about 230 or 240).[1] The Artemonites were fond of Aristotle. Like other Theodotians, they were critical and rationalistic. Their view of the person of Christ may have somewhat differed from that of the Theodotians. The espousal, by the Bishop of Rome, Zephyrinus, of the Modalistic doctrine, which the Artemonites could with reason pronounce an innovation, enabled them to assert with a color of plausibility that their doctrine had prevailed down to the time of Victor; an assertion which was confuted by their opponents. It is clear that Artemon is to be reckoned with the Adoptionists. After the middle of the second century, the Humanitarian opinion has practically no influence in the West. It reappears in the East in the person of Paul of Samosata.

Among the Monarchians of the second class, one of the principal names is Praxeas. He was equally inimical to Montanism and to the doctrine of inherent personal distinctions in God. Tertullian alleges that he was the first to import this heresy into Rome. "He drove out the Paraclete and crucified the Father."[2] He came to Rome from Asia Minor about the end of the second century, and was received with favor by the Roman bishop, Victor. Passing over into Africa, he won a great many adherents. The Modalists were called Patripassianists, for the reason that their doctrine implied that the Father suffered on the cross. This designation belongs preëminently to another leader, Noetus, of Smyrna, who through his followers, Epigonus and Cleomenes, acquired much influence at Rome. Zephyrinus and his successor, Callistus, embraced the Patripassianist opinion. The determined opponent of Callistus was Hippolytus, who advocated the hypostatic doctrine, and refused to accept formulas devised by Callistus for terminating the controversy. Callistus excommunicated his antagonist, perhaps, also, Sabellius; so that there were two dissenting parties, at the head of one of which, as a rival bishop, was Hippolytus. Hippolytus tells us that Callistus combined the notions of the Noetians and the Theodotians.[3] By Praxeas it was not taught directly that the Father suffered. The Father assumed

[1] Eusebius, *H.E.* V. 28. [2] *Adv. Prax.* 1.

[3] *Ref. Omn. Hær.* X. 27.

the flesh of humanity and thus became the Son; but the Spirit in Christ, which is God the Father, did not suffer.[1] Noetus affirmed that the Father himself "was born and suffered and died."[2] He maintained that his doctrine "glorified Christ."

Beryl, Bishop of Bostra in Arabia, rejected the personal preexistence of Christ, and is probably to be considered a Modalist, with some peculiarities which it is difficult accurately to ascertain. He certainly held that Christ did not preëxist as a divine person distinct from God the Father. He was converted from his opinion by Origen, at a Council held at Bostra in 244.[3]

The most famous representative of Modalism was Sabellius.[4] He is often said to have been a Libyan by birth, but of this we are not certain. He spent some time at Rome at the beginning of the third century. Sabellianism underwent various modifications, and as we have only a few fragments of the writings of Sabellius, it is not easy to define precisely his teaching save in a few chief points. He distinguished between the unity of the divine essence and the plurality of its manifestations. He probably advanced upon Noetus in connecting the Holy Spirit with the Father and Son. The three manifestations follow one another in order, like dramatic parts. God as Father is the Creator and Lawgiver; through the incarnation the same God fulfils the office of Redeemer, up to the time of the ascension; and, lastly, as Holy Ghost regenerates and sanctifies. The three persons would be thus equalized, each being a mode of action on a level with each of the others.[5] The Sabellians are said to have compared the triplicity of God to the Sun, the light of the Sun, and its heat. Athanasius ascribes to Sabellius himself the statement that the Father extends or dilates Himself into "Son and Spirit," and hence infers that "the name of the Son and Spirit will of necessity cease when the need of them has been supplied."[6] If Athanasius is correct, a primacy is here attributed to the Father. For the proper human soul of Christ Sabellianism substituted God Himself, in one mode of manifestation, streaming through a human body.

About the year 262, Paul of Samosata was Bishop of Antioch,

[1] Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.* 29.
[2] Hippolyt., *Adv. Noet.* 1.
[3] Eusebius, *H.E.* VI. 33.
[4] For the sources respecting Sabellianism, see Harnack, *Real-Encycl.* X. 208.
[5] See Athanasius, *Adv. Ar.* III. 4.
[6] *Ibid.* IV. 13, 1.

which was then under the rule of Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra.[1] There he exercised an authority almost equivalent to that of a viceroy. He propounded a peculiar form of the dynamic theory. Denying personal distinctions in the Deity, holding that Christ was a man born of the Virgin, he taught that the Logos inspires Him. But the Logos is an impersonal attribute of the Father, and the light that dwells in Christ is not the Logos in its essence.[2] By this divine power there is effected a union of Christ with God, a union of will, not of essence, a union consisting in a love that is carried to perfection. By reason of this ethical union, Christ is exalted by the Father, is clothed with a divine dignity, and may even be called "God." Political influences played an important part in the long controversy occasioned by the promulgation of this novel opinion. Three synods were held at Antioch, by the third of which Paul was declared to be excommunicated and deposed. He continued, however, to retain his position until the conquest of Zenobia by the Romans in 272, when the Emperor Aurelian compelled him to give up the church building.[3]

The decisive blow against Monarchianism was struck by the Alexandrian School, through its great representative, Origen. In his work *De Principiis* — Concerning *First Principles*, or the fundamental truths of Christianity — we have the first example of a positive and rounded system of doctrine.[4] Origen argues against the Gnostics and the Monarchians, and against other parties deemed heretical, but all this is incidental to the end in view, which is to present a direct exposition of the body of Christian doctrine. In this respect he stands apart from the Apologists, and from Irenæus and Tertullian. His refutation of disbelievers and assailants is given in a special treatise, his Confutation of Celsus. Unfortunately we possess the *De Principiis*, with the exception of a few passages, only in the diffuse and inaccurate translation of Rufinus. Yet the general tenor of the treatise, and the other writings of its author, render it possible for the

[1] For the sources on Paul of Samosata, see Harnack, *Real-Encycl.* X. p. 193.

[2] So says Athanasius, *De Decrett.* c. v. 24.

[3] The Letters of the bishops who condemned him (which are found in Eusebius, *H.E.* vii. 27-30), give chiefly the personal, rather than the doctrinal, charges against him. But all the proceedings show clearly the strong opposition of the Church to the humanitarian doctrine. See Hefele, I. b. i. c. 2, § 9.

[4] Baur argues for the other possible meaning of the title, "First Things." DG. I. 276.

most part to check the translator's deviations from the original. When we take up the *De Principiis* of Origen, we seem to find ourselves in the presence of a modern man. The atmosphere is free from prejudice and polemical bitterness. The vocabulary of denunciation is sparingly drawn upon. There is a warm appreciation of the value of all knowledge, and of the possibility and the importance of discerning the relationship of the Gospel to philosophy and science. Not everything in theology is considered to be settled. We are pointed, beyond the borders of ascertained truth, to a broad margin of ground not yet so far explored that differences of opinion are precluded. In reference to problems not yet solved, the author is content to set forth an opinion, freely granting to others the liberty of dissent.[1] Such open questions, for example, are whether the Traducian view or its opposite is true, whether the Deity is absolutely immaterial or not, the doctrine of the Holy Ghost in some important particulars.[2]

But Origen plants himself on the rule of faith. This embodies the justly recognized teaching of the Apostles, preserved by a trustworthy tradition.[3] Although a free-minded student, and naturally of a speculative turn, his position is that nothing is to be received which is contrary to the Scriptures or to legitimate deductions from them. Origen is emphatically a scriptural theologian. He has an astonishing familiarity with the contents of the sacred books, and calls up from all parts of them passages apposite to the subject which he is handling. All Christian truth, he holds, is to be traced to Christ, who spoke through the prophets and Apostles.[4]

Yet the allegorical method of interpretation leaves room for an exegesis based really, although not with conscious intention, on suggestions purely subjective in their origin. This allegorical character of the Bible, Origen supports by appealing to particular interpretations by the Apostle Paul and by other arguments.[5] The Scripture has a threefold meaning, answering to the trichotomy, body, soul, and spirit, in man.[6] As to the first, there are not wanting certain narratives which cannot be taken in their literal sense, since the historical meaning implies something offen-

[1] See, e.g., *De Princip.* I. viii. 4.
[2] *Ibid.* I. i. 5, 9.
[3] *Ibid.* I. i. 1, 2.
[4] *Ibid.* I. i. 1.
[5] *Ibid.* IV. i. 13.
[6] *Ibid.* IV. i. 11.

sive to Christian feeling, or is, for other reasons, wholly improbable.[1] Examples are the story of Lot and his daughters, and the "morning and evening" before the sun was made (Gen. 1). Passages of this class are meant to be "stumbling blocks" to drive us to the discovery of a higher significance in them. Falling under the second head are the psychic interpretations, which relate to the individual soul in this life, to its ethical relations, including its relations to God. It is the third sense, the occult, spiritual intent of Scripture, which embraces in it the riches of the divine word. This profounder meaning is sealed to all save the mature believer.[2] It is dark to others: it is a mine into which he only can descend. It is the wisdom which is open only to "the perfect." This theory furnishes the warrant for the doctrine of Reserve in communicating truth. Pearls are not to be cast before swine. There are aspects of Christian doctrine of which it is true still that believers not yet ripe in faith and purity "cannot bear them now." One example of this esoteric creed was the doctrine of Restorationism, which it would not be expedient to proclaim abroad.[3] The Reserve, which is legitimate within due limits, was of course carried to a wrong extreme when it was used as a warrant for a tacit sanction, and, perhaps a more than silent countenance, of opinions considered by the enlightened class to be erroneous.[4]

God, as He is in Himself, is incomprehensible. Here the New Platonic conception is appropriated. He reveals Himself to us partially in Nature, more fully in Christ. Our knowledge of God being thus relative, it is of course inadequate.[5] Even 'substance' in the literal sense is not to be predicated of Him.[6] Absolute causality belongs to Him. The exercise of His attributes, such as omnipotence and righteousness, is conditioned on the creation. In order to be righteous, in any other than a potential sense, there must be things over which He can righteously rule.[7] Not only must His omnipotence be eternally in exercise; it is in *full* exercise. He has done all that can be done. Yet He can set

[1] *De Princip.* IV. i. 12 sq.
[2] *Ibid.* I. i. 2.
[3] *Adv. Celsum,* VI. 26.
[4] See Bigg's remarks, *The Christ. Platonists of Alexandria,* p. 141 sq.
[5] *Adv. Cels.* VI. lxv.
[6] ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας. *C. Celsum,* VII. 38. Cf. *De Prin.* I. i. 6. Other references in Dorner, *Person Christi,* I. p. 661, n. 22.
[7] *De Princip.* I. ii. 10.

limitations upon the exercise of His attributes. So strenuous is Origen in asserting the freedom of man that he attributes to God a restriction of His own prescience in order to leave unimpaired the liberty of the human will. Creation springs from God's wisdom and benevolence. Inseparable, of course, from Origen's idea of the divine attributes, is his doctrine that creation is eternal. It *is* creation, not a Gnostic emanation; but there was never a time when God existed alone, and when the world of rational beings was not.

The Mediator between God and the world, through whom the world is made, is the Logos. In the Logos are all the ideas which exist in an inscrutable unity in the Father, and are embodied in the creation. In relation to the Logos the Father "is one and simple"; while it is in the Logos that the world finds its unity. The Logos is personal and without beginning.[1] He is generated of the Father, but this generation is eternal.[2] Origen rejects the proposition which afterwards became a watchword of the Arians, — "There was (a time) when He was not."[3] The generation of the Son is, therefore, timeless. It is no momentary act. He is without beginning. God is eternally a Father, — a statement which is fundamental in the later Athanasian theology. The personal Son or Logos is the complete manifestation of the hidden Deity.[4] He is the Wisdom of God, without which He would not be God. How is the Son generated? Origen discards every notion of sensuous emanation, and every notion of division or partition. The Son is likened to the radiance of a torch. The relation of the Son to the Father is compared to the proceeding of the will from the mind in man.[5] He is said, in one place, to be generated from the substance of the Father.[6] There are numerous expressions of this general character which appear to leave nothing wanting to the conception of the true and proper divinity of the Son. Yet, in Origen's idea, the Father is the fountain-head of Deity.[7] The Father, moreover, is God as He is, in and of Himself; the Father is "God" with the article prefixed to

[1] *De Princip.* I. ii. 2.
[2] *De Princip.* I. ii. 4; *In Jerem.* 9, 4.
[3] Fragment in Athanasius, *De Decrett.* 27.
[4] *De Princip.* I. ii. 7, 8. [5] *Ibid.* I. ii. 7.
[6] Frag. of Pamphil. ad Hebr. (See Dorner, *Person Christi*, I. 633): "Ex ipsa Dei substantia generatur."
[7] *In Johann.* II. 5, 6, 18.

the term: whereas the Son is God, with the article omitted.[1] He is "the second God," a kind of repetition or duplicate of God.[2] He is even said to be of another substance or essence.[3] He is from the will of the Father.[4] In one place He is even called "the most ancient of all creatures."[5] It is in such expressions as these that, at a later day, the Arians found satisfaction. Their opponents appealed to the former class of representations. How to reconcile Origen with himself on this subject is a question that has naturally provoked much discussion. It must be remembered that the terms involved had not acquired the precision of meaning which they attained subsequently. It must be remembered, likewise, that Origen, while insisting on the divinity of Christ, is solicitous to fend off the Monarchian inference of the identity of the Father and the Son, as well as Gnostic theories of emanation. This motive it is which moves him to emphasize the difference between Father and Son.

How can the Son be derived from the will of God, and yet be not created, but begotten? It cannot be denied that the two classes of statements in Origen on this subject seem at first to be at hopeless variance with one another. So Baur judges them really to be.[6] But there is a method of reconciliation which is certainly more than plausible. 'Will,' like 'spirit,' 'truth,' is embraced in the transcendent, inscrutable unity of the divine being. In the objectifying of God the Father, or in His mysterious self-revelation, will becomes explicit in the person of the Son.[7] Occasionally, as we have seen, the Father is said to be super-substantial.[8] Even 'substance' when predicated of Him would be a limitation. Hence the Son is spoken of as another in substance. In this way His

[1] *In Johann.* II. 2.

[2] *C. Celsum*, V. 39. In *C. Celsum*, VIII. 12, 13, Origen is concerned only to show that the Father and the Son are one in the harmony of their wills. See Thomasius, DG. p. 203, n. 2.

[3] *De Orat.* I. 15. Others take ὀυσία here in the sense of hypostasis. So Neander, DG. I. 162; Bigg, 163, n. 3; Robertson, *Athanasius*, p. xxxi.

[4] *De Princip.* I. ii. 6.

[5] Hebr. I. 3. Cf. *C. Celsum*, V. 37.

[6] "So vereinigt Origenes die beiden entgegengesetzten Lehrbegriffe, den athanasianischen und den arianischen, im Keime in sich." DG. I. 453.

[7] See Thomasius, DG. I. 202 sq.

[8] Origen says that a discussion about 'substance' and whether God is "*beyond* substance," would be long and difficult. *C. Celsum*, VI. 64.

personal distinction and subordination to the Father are guarded.[1] "The generation," says Harnack, "is an indescribable act, which can be represented only in inadequate similitudes; it is no emanation . . . but is rather to be designated as an internally necessary act of the will, which for this very reason is an effluence of the nature."[2] Two things are plain in the review of Origen's whole teaching on this topic. One is the subordinationism that pervades it. The other is the room left for a diversity of interpretation by the seemingly inharmonious phrases to which we have adverted.

Concerning the incarnate Christ, Origen is at pains to show, against the docetic opinion, that He is possessed of a human soul in inseparable unity with the Logos.[3] This human soul was a pure, unfallen, preëxistent spirit, chosen on account of these qualities. Yet its freedom of choice is exercised, after the incarnation, in its victory over temptation, a victory which is carried to completion. To indicate how the Son incarnate is capable of revealing the Father, he uses the illustration of the statue.[4] There is a colossal statue, so large as to fill the world, which therefore cannot be seen. Yet a small statue precisely like it in form and material would enable us to know what it is. Christ, the express image of the Father, becomes such to us by divesting Himself of His glory. Yet the human nature of Christ is not unaffected by its indissoluble union with the divine Logos,—just as a bar of iron which is in the fire remains iron, although it is different in its effects from what it would be if it were not in the fire. This soul elected to love righteousness, and the holiness which at first depended on the will, was changed by custom into nature.[5] It is perpetually in the Word, in Wisdom, in God.[6]

The Holy Spirit is associated in dignity with the Father and the Son. Whether or not He is created, writes Origen, has not been clearly determined. The Holy Spirit has not that immediate relation to the Father which belongs exclusively to the Son. Yet the Holy Spirit has a direct knowledge of the Father, perceiving

[1] See Dorner, *Person Christi*, p. 661.

[2] Harnack, DG. I. 581. See, also, Denis, *De la Philosophie d'Origêne*, p. 93 sq. In *De Princip.* v. 15, 11, in speaking of Mark x. 18 ("There is none good save one"), Origen says that the Son is, as the Father is, ἀγαθός, but not ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀγαθός. The Father is the aboriginal fountain of goodness. The passage was altered by Rufinus.

[3] *De Princip.* II. vi. 3.

[4] *Ibid.* I. ii. 8.

[5] *Ibid.* II. vi. 5.

[6] *Ibid.* II. vi. 6.

directly the deep things in the mind of God. He does not derive this knowledge from the Son.[1] The Spirit is an object of worship. And if the rendering of Rufinus is here to be trusted, Origen says that he has found no passage in the Scriptures where it is taught that He is a creature.[2] The Holy Spirit is confined in His agency to the souls which He renews and sanctifies.[3] Christians derive existence from the Father, rational existence from the Son, holiness from the Spirit.[4]

In order to understand Origen's ideas relative to man and to the doctrine of sin, we must keep in mind how uniform and strenuous — in opposition to fatalism — is his assertion of freedom.[5] The original creation consisted exclusively of rational spirits. They were co-equal as well as co-eternal. A different view would imply that the creation was defective. It would leave unanswered the question why the creation was partly deferred. Moreover, Origen is led by his general views to the conclusion that all inequalities were due originally to "merits and qualities" pertaining respectively to angelic beings.[6] The preëxistence of men is involved in the theory of creation. This supposition alone meets the objections to the divine justice.[7] The preëxistent fall of men from holiness is not only presupposed in their present character from birth; it is the ground and reason of the existence of the material world.[8] The fallen rational *spirits* become *souls*, and are clothed with bodies. The preëxistent spirits have an innate capacity to be thus incorporated in the flesh, but this potential materiality becomes actual in consequence of their voluntary misdoing. Matter is called into being for the purpose of supplying an abode and a means of discipline and purgation to these fallen spirits. Whether the souls which are supposed to animate the heavenly bodies are tainted with sin, or have special offices to fulfil, not the consequence of any transgression on their part, is not made clear. Thus the world in which we live is made as a theatre of redemption. Its sufferings and sorrows and the ordinance of death, are, to be sure, an

[1] *De Princip.* I. iii. 4.

[2] *Ibid.* I. iii. 3.

[3] *Ibid.* I. iii. 5.

[4] *Ibid.* I. v. 8.

[5] See, e.g., *Ibid.* II. i. 2, III. i. 2 sq. Passages of like purport abound in Origen's writings.

[6] *Ibid.* I. viii. 1 sq.

[7] *Ibid.* III. iii. 5.

[8] καταβολή (Matt. xxiv. 21) is said to mean dejection or fall, which gives rise to the present state of being. *De Princip.* III. v. 34.

infliction of justice, but justice is a form of mercy.[1] The earth is a school for the recovery of the sinful. It is to be observed that, notwithstanding the preëxistent fall, even in this life sin does not begin until reason awakes and there is a voluntary election of evil, with no constraint from within or without. Origen is the earnest foe of the doctrine of unconditional predestination. The end and aim of all divine influence, and of the orderings of Providence, is to bring men back to holiness and blessedness. Origen's interpretations of St. Paul in the seventh of Romans, of what is said in the Bible of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, and of what is said respecting the "judicial blindness" to which the wicked are given over, are in general accord with modern Arminianism.[2] Only Origen goes farther in maintaining that in such examples as that of Pharaoh, the method of the divine cure of sin is like that pursued by physicians in certain physical maladies. It is slow and gradual.[3] It involves at certain stages severity and the infliction of anguish; but these are merciful in their intent and in their ultimate effect.

Respecting the work of Christ, Origen includes the current view of a conquest by Christ over the powers of evil by which men are delivered from their sway. He broaches the doctrine of a deceit practised on Satan, who accepts the soul of Christ as a ransom, not knowing that he could not endure the presence of a sinless soul.[4] But this is far from being the exclusive doctrine of Origen in regard to the significance of the Saviour's death. It is a vicarious death in behalf of the race. It is an offering for sin, typified in the sacrifices of the Old Testament. Under this head, he teaches that for sin an atonement is necessary, the value of which is measured by the value of the blood that is shed. The death of Christ is thus vicarious. In his interpretation of Romans iii. 25, he makes the death of Jesus to be a propitiation.[5]

It is through the Logos that light goes forth upon mankind, not upon a part alone, but upon all. It is first through natural

[1] *De Princip.* II. v. 1.

[2] *Ibid.* III. i. 10 sq.

[3] *Ibid.* III. i. 17. See Origen in Matt. XVI. 8; XII. 28; XIII. 8, 9; Rom. II. 13. For other passages, see the excellent monograph of Thomasius, p. 223, or Redepenning's *Origines*, p. 405 sq. In this conception, Satan fills the place of the demiurge of the Gnostics.

[4] E.g., *C. Celsum*, VII. 17, I. 31.

[5] Cf. In Johann. J. XXVIII. 14.

law, and through the specially revealed law, which is given to one nation by way of preparation for the higher light to come through the Logos incarnate. But the redemptive influence of the Logos extends beyond this life. Pharaoh was overwhelmed in the Red Sea, but was not annihilated.[1] He is still under the divine superintendence. Not only men who have lived on earth and died, but all fallen spirits, not excluding Satan and evil angels, are visited by the redemptive influences. As a part of esoteric doctrine, of the deeper disclosure of the Gospel, vouchsafed to such as are prepared for it, the restitution of all was accepted by Origen.[2] But so far did he carry his idea of the freedom and mutability of the will that he appears to have held to the possibility of renewed falls hereafter, and of worlds to take the place of the present for the recovery, once more, of inconstant souls.[3]

The conception of the Sacraments is spiritualized in Origen. Baptism is the symbol of the cleansing of the soul by the divine Logos. Yet it is the real beginning of gracious influences for believers who are inwardly fitted to receive them. So the Lord's Supper is the symbol of the living word of truth which is the true, heavenly bread given of Christ in like manner to all who are spiritually qualified to receive it. To these, but only to these, is the sanctifying influence which is connected with the bread and wine after their consecration of any benefit.[4]

In discarding Chiliasm, Origen cast aside, also, the crass conception of the nature of the Resurrection. There is a living power, a germ, in the present body, which gives to it shape and form, and will give rise to a spiritual organism conformed to the nature of the particular soul, be it good or evil, that receives it. It is only a small fraction of disciples to whom the door of blessedness in the vision of God is open immediately at death. Generally speaking, the righteous enter into a state where they are still under training, are advanced higher and higher in the scale of knowledge, and are purified from the remains of sin. Finally they reach the culmination of holiness and bliss. The wicked are subjected to a discipline which has the same end in view, but which includes pains of conscience of which fire

[1] *De Princip.* III. 1, 14. [2] E.g., see *Ibid.* I. vi. 1, III. vi. 3.

[3] See Jerome's Letter (CXXIV.) to Avitus. Cf. Thomasius, *Origenes.* p. 259.

[4] See Neander's exposition of Origen's opinion, *Ch. History*, I. 648, 649.

is the symbol, and they may even suffer outward inflictions. For them the goal is remote, but it is eventually reached.

It was far from the intent of Origen to call in question the essentials of the Christian teaching, to which he was profoundly attached. That teaching, to be sure, comes from him, steeped in an infusion of Greek Philosophy, besides being strongly tinctured with certain other elements, the exclusive product of his own speculation. But perhaps what is eccentric in his opinions excites attention somewhat more in a brief sketch of his system than in his own copious expositions. The influence of this great theologian was wide-spread and lasting. One evidence of this fact is the series of attacks upon his opinions and the heated controversies respecting his orthodoxy. How attractive and impressive he was when he taught with the living voice, is described by a pupil, the saintly Gregory Thaumaturgus. He gained a new title to reverence through his sufferings and steadfastness in the Decian persecution. As is true of not a few pioneers in theological inquiry, there lay in his writings the seeds of systems not in accord with one another. So powerful was the stimulus imparted by his genius to religious thought.

In the West, in the last half of the second century, the theology of Origen had no considerable influence. Novatian, who after the election of Cornelius as Bishop of Rome (A.D. 251) led the revolt against the relaxation of discipline in the case of the lapsed, was a man of mark, and is praised for his talents and learning by Cyprian. He wrote a treatise on the Trinity, which, with some deviations, reflects the teaching of Tertullian. He is very decided against Monarchianism. He says that the Son was "always in the Father; else the Father would not always be the Father."[1] The Son, however, may be said to have a beginning, and in a certain sense the Father precedes Him. Yet the Son was begotten and born when the Father willed it, and proceeded from Him of whose will "all things were made."[1] The Son is in all things obedient to the Father from whom He derived His beginning. There is a community of substance between the two.[1] The incarnate Son is God as well as man. But the true and eternal Father is the one God by whom is imparted the divinity of the Son; and the Son at the end remits to the Father "the authority of His divinity." In the incarnation, "the legitimate Son of God" assumes

[1] Novatian, *De Trinitate*, c. 31.

that "Holy Thing," and thus makes the Son of man — what He "was not naturally" — the son of God.[1] It is a proof of the divinity of Christ that the Holy Spirit receives from Him what the Spirit declares, and is thus evidently "less than Christ."[2]

Nowhere was the influence of Origen so great as at Alexandria. One of the most eminent of his pupils was Dionysius, who was bishop there from about 247 to 268. The fragments of his writings that remain show him to have been a man of remarkable abilities. He wrote "Concerning the Promises," in answer to Nepos, an Egyptian bishop, the author of a book defending Chiliasm and opposing the allegorical interpretation of the Apocalypse. The Alexandrian bishop defended the opinions of Origen. He manifested critical ability in the reasons which he assigned for regarding the book of Revelation as not from the pen of the Apostle John, but as, perhaps, the work of another John, "the Presbyter," said to be a contemporary of the Apostle at Ephesus. In a series of letters to certain bishops in the Pentapolis who held Sabellian opinions, which were still prevalent in that district, Dionysius was led by his zeal in behalf of the distinction of persons not only to deny that the Son is coessential (Homoousios) with the Father, but to deny also that He is coeternal. He even said that "the Son is a creature . . . in essence alien from the Father, just as the husbandman is from the vine, or the shipbuilder from the boat; for that, being a creature, He was not before He came to be."[3] The namesake of the Alexandrian Bishop, Dionysius, Bishop of Rome, informed of what he had said, wrote a letter on the subject to Alexandria, and a personal letter to its bishop. By way of response, the latter composed a book, entitled *Refutation and Defence*, which was addressed to the Roman Dionysius. Athanasius, from whom we ascertain the contents of this correspondence, defends the orthodoxy of the bishop who was complained of. This he does in his treatise on the Decrees of the Nicene Council, and in a short special writing on "the Opinion of Dionysius." Dionysius explains to his Roman brother that in the use of the obnoxious expressions, which he admits might have been more carefully chosen, his intent was to guard on the one hand the distinction of the Son from the Father and, on the other hand, to give emphasis to the fact of the genera-

[1] *De Trinitate*, c. 24. [2] *Ibid.* c. 16.

[3] Athanasius, *De Sentent. Dionys.* 4.

tion of the Son from the Father. The term 'made' he had used only in a wide and vague sense,—not in the sense of an artificer, but more as a philosopher is said to be the maker of his own discourse, or as men are said to be "doers of the law," or even as it is applied to inward qualities, such as virtue or vice.[1] At the same time, he had also said that the Word was like "a river from a well, and a shoot from a stock," as "light from light," and "life from life."[2] He did not object to the word 'Homoousios' if it were not understood as confounding the persons.[3] It helps to explain the position of Dionysius to bear in mind that the third synod at Antioch (268), in the case of Paul of Samosata, rejected this term, doubtless for the reason which prompted the objection of Dionysius. How strenuously the Roman bishop protested against all language implying that the Son was made, may be seen in a copious extract given by Athanasius.[4] He calls it blasphemy. The "divine triad" is to be preserved, and at the same time "the holy preaching of the Monarchy."[5] Both the eminent bishops, who seemed at first to be on the edge of a conflict, were united against whatever called itself Sabellianism. The Alexandrian in answer to objections from the Sabellian side, as was natural, magnified subordinationism. The Roman simply held fast to unity and tripersonality, with no philosophy on the subject.

The Asia Minor theology, which was derived from the Apologists and from Irenæus, did not give place at once to the teaching of Origen. That theology was not without its effect as a factor in the subsequent shaping of the orthodox system. The novelties in Origen's teaching could not fail to evoke dissent among some who held him in reverence, and opposition from others who might regard him with less esteem, but whose views in general bore the impress of his influence. Among these partially hostile critics, forerunners of more vehement assailants to arise afterwards, Methodius should be specially mentioned. He was Bishop of Olympus, and then of Patara in Lycia, and later still of Tyre. He died as a martyr in 311. He was a devoted student of the writings of Plato. In several of the writings of Methodius, in particular in his book on "Things Created," and his book on the Resurrection, he attacked certain opinions of Origen. He under-

[1] Athan., *De Sentent.* 20, 21.
[2] *Ibid.* 19.
[3] *Ibid.* 18.
[4] *De Decrett.* VI.
[5] *Ibid.* VI. xxvi.

takes to confute the doctrine of the eternity of the creation, and the conception of the material world as the prison-house of the soul. He combats Origen's spiritualized conception of the Resurrection. He brings forward, also, a doctrine of "recapitulation" allied to the conception of the headship of Christ which was propounded by Irenæus, — a teacher whom Methodius in some other points followed. He presented, moreover, a mystical view of the relation of the Logos to the race, — renewed humanity, as a whole, being looked upon as the second Adam. Within each soul the Logos, coming down once more from Heaven, must effect a mysterious spiritual union with man. As the means of attaining to this mystical union, it is not knowledge that is chiefly valued, but rather asceticism and especially virginity. In the presence of this ideal of self-mortification and inward unity with Christ, His objective work does not, to be sure, disappear, but retires into the background. In one of the fragments of Methodius there is an hypostatic trias not dissimilar to Origen's doctrine. There is the Father Almighty, uncaused and the cause of all, the begotten Son and Word, and the person of the Spirit and His procession. Methodius is far from discarding allegory. In opposing interpretations of Origen, he substitutes one allegory for another.[1] There were others besides Methodius who felt called upon to come out against the peculiar views of Origen which clashed with the traditional beliefs. One was Peter, Archbishop of Alexandria, appointed to this office A.D. 300, who wrote against Origen's opinion relative to the preëxistence of souls. He contended that the body and soul of Adam were contemporaneous in their origin.

A striking proof and illustration of the substantial victory of the theology which grew up in connection with the idea of the Logos, a victory which was owing in a great degree to Origen, is the fact of the introduction into the baptismal creed, in the principal churches of the East, even before the close of the third century, of theological statements respecting Christ as the Logos, and His generation from the Father prior to the creation.[2] This orthodoxy — assent to propositions in theology pertaining to the person of Christ — was made part and parcel of the Christian faith.

[1] Respecting the opinions of Methodius, see Harnack, DG. I. 696–705.

[2] On this point, see Loofs, DG. p. 141 (c).

PERIOD II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATRISTIC THEOLOGY IN THE EAST AND IN THE WEST

In the East, from A.D. 300 to the Death of John of Damascus (c. 754); in the West, to Gregory I (c. A.D. 600)

CHAPTER I

THE CONTROVERSY WITH HEATHENISM — THE DANGER OF DIVISION — THE SEAT OF AUTHORITY — THE CANON, SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION — THE GROUNDS OF THEISTIC BELIEF

The Dioclesian persecution proved that Christianity in the Roman Empire was not to be extirpated by force. The Church was inspired with a consciousness of strength. No doubt this was owing in no inconsiderable degree to the political triumph of the Christian cause. It was felt to be safe under the shield of imperial protection. The result of the reaction under Julian (361–3) plainly showed that heathenism had not vitality enough to enable it to regain its ascendency. Events and changes running through a number of centuries had provided the defenders of the old religion with some new materials for assault, and the Church with some fresh grounds both of attack and defence. This is illustrated in the literary attack of the Emperor Julian and in the refutation of it by Cyril of Alexandria. Julian directs his assault partly against the Old Testament. He charges the narrators of the creation and of the early history of mankind with absurdity. He animadverts upon the Old Testament conception of God as concerned for only one nation, to the exclusion of the rest of mankind, and to the ascription in it of human passions to the Deity. Christians have forsaken the old divinities for Judaism,

the religion of a despicable people. Yet they have abandoned its legally ordained rites and have violated its laws by paying divine honors to a deceased man. It was easy for Cyril to meet these and like reproaches by pointing out the pædagogical nature of the old dispensation. But it was not so easy to dispose of the accusation that Christians had deserted the doctrine of their Master when they persecuted heathen and heretics, worshipped martyrs, and treated as sacred their graves and monuments. The standing accusation of the heathen was that after Christianity had begun to flourish, the Roman Empire had been stripped of its former glory and been afflicted with numberless disasters. At the close of the fourth century this complaint was heard everywhere in the West. It was taken up by Augustine in his great work *De Civitate Dei*, wherein he brings forward the fact that calamities, great and various, had befallen Rome before Christ was born, and the principle that earthly good fortune is not always associated with true virtue. The prosperity which Rome had enjoyed had been bestowed upon her, not by the pagan divinities, but by the only living God. The City of God, the divine State, has been from the beginning the end and aim of God's Providence. This City embraces in it all sincere worshippers of the true God, who will finally attain to everlasting blessedness. In contrast with the City of God is the City of the World, composed of the wicked, who may be possessed of earthly bliss, but are destined to everlasting misery. Early apologetic writers, as Tatian and Tertullian, had not confined themselves to the defensive, but had carried the war into the enemy's camp. They had assailed the doctrines and rites of heathenism. The same is true of the later Apologists. The futility of the attempt to justify the old religion by an allegorical treatment of its mythology, after faith in it had vanished from cultivated minds, was exposed. Eusebius of Cæsarea dwells on the contradictory character of the symbolical explanations. He insists that by them religion is transformed into physics, and that atheism is the logical outcome. Augustine deals in the same way with the heathen allegorists. As to the philosophers, they were charged by Christian writers with having borrowed their best ideas from Moses and the prophets, and with being at swords' points among themselves on fundamental issues. They were reproached with hypocrisy for joining in the popular worship when they knew it to be folly. Porphyry, from the New Platonist School, is said

to have been bitter in his tone, but he was certainly one of the keenest assailants of the Scriptures on the ground of alleged inconsistencies. The prophecy in the book of Daniel, he maintained, was not prophecy, but history, the book being by a later Maccabean author. It is to be regretted that the reply to Porphyry by Eusebius has not been preserved. He was the most learned of the Apologists. The *Præparatio Evangelica* and the *Demonstratio Evangelica* are really two parts of one work. The earlier part is devoted to showing that in renouncing the Greek religion and philosophy and in accepting the Hebrew Scriptures, Christians have not been actuated by blind faith, but by good and sufficient reasons. The later part, which we have in an incomplete form, vindicates them for departing from Judaism, and proves the correspondence of the Christian truths with prophecy. Eusebius shows that the character of Jesus is incompatible with an intention to deceive, and that fraud in the case of the Apostles is out of the question, owing to the injunction to be truthful which Christ had laid upon them, to the circumstance that their testimony brought to them no gain, but only loss, and to the candor with which they record their own faults. The argument from miracles and prophecies continued to be urged by Apologists. A new force was given to the proof from the spread of Christianity in the face of all its adversaries and from its victory, notwithstanding the seeming weakness and insignificance of its founders. Its doctrines were considered foolish; yet even the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, who perished on the cross, had won its way to acceptance.

The Church in the first three centuries had done more than to maintain itself against violence and coercion, and against the weapons of argument and ridicule. It had so far preserved the integrity of its doctrine as to avoid a fusion or compromise with parties whose creeds incorporated a large admixture of heathen speculation. It had rejected from its theology Ebionitism and Sabellianism. Its teaching respecting Christ had been developed on the basis of the conception of the Logos, and of the instrumentality of the Logos in the work of creation and of redemption. The system of Origen and his influence constitute a fact of capital importance in relation to the period of theological history that was now to open. He had distinguished faith from philosophy. He had avowedly left many problems unsolved. Moreover, his positive teaching contained elements which, if not

strictly inharmonious, were capable of leading different interpreters in diverse directions. We shall find that, in the progress of theological discussions and conflicts, his distinction of faith and philosophy vanished, that the neutral ground, if one may so term it, was taken within the enclosure of dogma, that his questionable opinions were set aside, and that finally his orthodoxy was widely impeached, the result being the surrender of that intellectual freedom of which he had been a signal example.

Could the Church be kept in unity in its profession of Christian doctrine, or would it break into antagonistic sects? There were great diversities of mental tendency. The West was not like the East. In the East, where thought was so restless, and controversy apt to be so heated, such divisions in matters of belief might arise as would be fatal to unity of organization. The episcopate was not an adequate safeguard of unity. No single bishop was considered infallible in his doctrinal verdicts. As to the Episcopate, as a whole, how could it be expected to speak with one voice? In truth the episcopate involved possibilities of endless division. The great patriarchates which arose on the basis of Constantine's division of the Empire into dioceses might be, and often were, at hopeless variance with one another. They might become centres of mutually hostile sects. They might foment rather than quell emulation and strife. There were these perils, but there were forces at work to counteract them. The course of events took such a turn that the See of Rome, on the whole, maintained its ascendency, and each of the other principal sees were prevented from subjugating the others. The preservation of unity in doctrine was the effect of a concurrence of causes, among which the agency of Constantine is to be counted among the most important. He was the powerful guardian of the unity of the Church, and this unity involved the profession of a common creed. Another instrument in preventing the perpetuation of dissonant creeds and of keeping Christian theology from taking on a characteristic heathen stamp, was Athanasius, by whom, notwithstanding the fury of the tempest, a final shipwreck was averted. His name, in the relation of a conservator of unity, has not unfitly been coupled with that of Constantine.[1]

Before proceeding to relate the theological history of the period, we have to touch upon those presuppositions in respect

[1] Harnack, *Grundriss d. DG.* p. 142.

to the seat of authority and natural theology, on which interpretations of revealed truth were grafted. What were the postulates, themselves experiencing change from time to time, which were tacitly or explicitly assumed in discussions of doctrine?

We begin with Scripture and tradition. Here the first topic is the Canon. Soon after the death of Origen we find that the Epistles of Peter, John, Jude, and James are received as canonical. They are spoken of as a single group — James being at the head of the list — and bear the name of the "Catholic epistles." As an effect of Origen's influence, the Epistle to the Hebrews is included among the Pauline writings. The book of Revelation is also received as canonical notwithstanding the critical objections of Dionysius of Alexandria. Eusebius leaves undetermined the question whether it belongs among the Homologoumena. The Council of Nicæa did not take up the question of the authoritative sources of doctrine. By the middle of the fourth century the need was felt for fixing the limits of the Canon. As the 60th Canon of the Council of Laodicea (A.D. 363) is of uncertain genuineness, its enumeration of Biblical books is left in doubt. Athanasius gives the name of Apocrypha exclusively to writings of heretics bearing the name of honored men of the Bible. He makes room for a class of books[1] which, although not canonical, may profitably be read in Church assemblies and put into the hands of catechumens. This class includes our Old Testament Apocrypha, from which the twenty-two books of the Hebrew Canon are distinguished. As late as Chrysostom the term 'Canonical' signifies the books which the Church has fenced off from other writings. But soon this term comes to signify the books which are the rule of faith, and the word 'apocryphal' is used to designate books which the Church expressly rejects. In the latter half of the fourth century, the Apocalypse is absent from the lists of Biblical books in Cyril of Jerusalem and Gregory of Nazianzum, and from the Canon of the Council of Laodicea; and no mention of it is made by Chrysostom and Theodoret. Later, it is received by Cyril of Alexandria, by Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, as it had been by Athanasius. In the fifth century, its place in the Canon is no longer doubted, and it stands in the oldest Greek codexes. In the East, at the end of the fourth century, the Canon had acquired definite bounds, with the exception

[1] *ἀναγινωσκόμενα.*

of remaining doubts in respect to the Apocalypse. In the West, the distinction made by Hilary, Rufinus, and Jerome, between the Old Testament Canon and the Apocrypha, had no influence. The Council of Hippo (A.D. 393), and that of Carthage (397), put the Old Testament Apocrypha in the same rank with the books of the Canon. In the lists of both these Councils, the Epistle to the Hebrews is included. It had gradually been introduced among the Western Churches during the fourth century, and its general reception was secured by the powerful influence of Augustine. But on the limits and contents of the Canon, there was in the West no verdict possessed of binding authority on the Church as a body.

The extent to which the legend was credited that the books of Moses were lost during the Exile, and restored by the pen of Ezra, through the Holy Ghost, and the credence given to the notion that the authors of the Septuagint version, even in their deviations from the Hebrew text, were divinely guided in order to accommodate the Scriptures to the heathen — a notion accepted by Augustine — indicate the prevailing idea of Biblical inspiration. Augustine, in his "Harmony of the Gospels," illustrates at once his candor and his faith in scriptural inerrancy. Comparing the accounts given of the denials of Peter, he decides that Peter at the moment was not where Jesus could have looked upon him, and concludes that it was not a glance proceeding from the Lord "with the eyes of the human body," but was a look cast from Heaven.[1] In scholars like Chrysostom and Jerome there are indications of a more critical discernment of the distinction between the human and divine factors in the composition of the Scriptures. It is only in the School of Antioch, however, and especially in Theodore of Mopsuestia, that we are met by more modern views of the progressive nature of the Biblical revelation, and by consequent qualifications of the doctrine of Inspiration.

There was always a conservatism of the past. It was always deemed to be a valid reason for condemning an opinion if it could be shown to be contradictory to what had been handed down. New opinions, when accepted, were regarded as an explication of doctrines held from the beginning. Great writers of the fourth century, Cyril of Jerusalem, Athanasius, Augustine, assert the sufficiency of the Scriptures to acquaint us with whatever is

[1] B. IV. c. vi. I.e., the Lord touched his heart. Cf. V. 1681 c., 558 a.

essential to faith and conduct. There is no underrating of the necessity of having Biblical proof for what we are to believe. All this implies that the contents of the Scriptures and of Catholic tradition are considered to be essentially coincident. This was the general view, despite occasional statements in certain Fathers that tradition is a source of supplementary truth. In the debates on Christology, tradition was appealed to in support of a certain interpretation of passages in Scripture, and this was made a touchstone of orthodoxy. Councils came to be regarded as authorized expounders of the Catholic faith. This was eminently the fact respecting the general councils, through which it was assumed that the voice of the Holy Ghost was heard, speaking through and to the Church. The decisions were held by Augustine to advance with the growing insight of the Church at large, the Christian consciousness. He taught that the declarations of the earlier Councils might be improved by those which are later.[1] The idea of a progress from a less to a more definite explication of doctrine in successive Councils, is set forth by Vincent of Lerins, with whom originates the traditional test of orthodox doctrine; namely, that it must have been believed always, everywhere, and by all. With the rise of general councils, the old appeal to Apostolic succession as securing the transmission of Apostolic teaching, fell into the background.

In this period it was universally considered that the Church is the ark of safety, within which alone salvation is possible. In the East as in the West it was the visible Church to which this distinction was attached. It is remarkable that in the East, while there grew up an immovable orthodoxy resting upon the councils and the Fathers and embodying likewise the whole system of symbolical rites, comparatively little was done to formulate a doctrine respecting the Church. In the West, on the contrary, in the age of Augustine, in connection with contention against antagonistic parties and opinions, the distinction between the ideal and the actual Church, and the criteria of the Church as distinguished from sects, received, as will be hereafter explained, an exposition that became authoritative. The Roman bishops gained an increasing influence as arbiters in doctrinal

[1] *Cont. Donatist.* II. c. 3. 'Emendari' is the term used. It is not safe to infer that he meant anything more than the determination of points left ambiguous or undecided. See Neander, *Ch. Hist.*, Vol. II. p. 210.

disputes. Their supreme judicial authority was distinctly asserted by Leo I.

That a true knowledge of God is attainable only by Revelation, and especially through Christ, was the common opinion. This, however, did not deter the Fathers from bringing forward evidences for the being of God from the light of nature. For example, the proof from design in material nature is sometimes urged,[1] as well as the cosmological argument from the mutable character of the world of things finite. The lack of purity of soul is said by Athanasius to be the hindrance to the perception of God,[2] and the same thing is taught by Gregory of Nazianzum. Theologians — as Augustine — imbued with New Platonism, found the belief in God on an ontological ground. Yet Augustine sees a testimony to God in the heavens and the earth and in all things, by which disbelievers are made inexcusable. Like utterances are frequent in both the Greek and Latin Fathers. Where the conception of the Divine Being was New Platonic, our knowledge of Him was made to be not objective, but relative to our limited apprehension. Creation was a free act of God, through the Logos, the repository of the ideas realized in creation. The end of creation was the manifestation of the divine goodness and the imparting of a share in the divine blessedness. From the end of the third century, angels and demons assume a constantly increasing prominence in the thoughts of Christians. Constantine named a church after Michael, but this was not a dedication of the edifice to him. It only signified that he was believed to appear in it.[3] The Council of Laodicea, about A.D. 360, forbade the worship of angels,[4] but the only check to the practice was found subsequently in efforts to draw a line between that homage which was admissible and the rendering of divine honors, which was prohibited.

[1] E.g. Greg. Naz. *Orat.* XXVIII. 6, XIV. 33. August. *Conf.* X. 6.

[2] *Adv. Gent.* I. 3.

[3] Sozomen. *H.E.* II. 3.

[4] Canon 35. It forbids "a cultus of the angels" and styles it a "hidden idolatry." Hefele contends that this was not intended to exclude "a regulated worship of angels." *Hist. of Councils*, I. p. 317.

CHAPTER II

DOCTRINES CONVERTED INTO DOGMAS — CHURCH AND STATE — THE GREAT CONTROVERSIES — THE ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS, EAST AND WEST

We are now familiar with the fact that during the first three centuries the struggle of the Church in the field of doctrine was with Judaism and Heathenism, and with systems compounded of both or embracing elements deeply antagonistic to Christian truth. In this period of self-defence, carried forward on the basis of a common faith, there were brought forward doctrinal conceptions, interpretations of the Gospel, more or less tentative and differing from one another. Now the Church, except in the short reign of Julian, is neither molested by persecution from without, nor, save in a comparatively small degree, by alien speculations arising beyond its borders. The area of controversy is within the Church. Conflicting tendencies are pushed in different directions. Contests necessarily spring up, which extend far and wide. In the turmoil, while there is much sincerity and honest zeal, human passions inevitably mingle. The grounds of mutual sympathy are frequently forgotten, and intellectual differences, not reaching to the essentials of the Gospel, provoke bitter warfare and division. In this great productive period of doctrinal history, when so many theological leaders expounded the Gospel in a positive form, or crossed swords in debate, certain main doctrines through the action of œcumenical Councils were converted into dogmas. This is one characteristic of the present period in contrast with the era which preceded it.

Another defining characteristic is the interference of the State in doctrinal controversies. The Church was contemplated as a unity. Its unity was one of the main pillars of the unity of the Empire. Even on political grounds uniformity in doctrinal

teaching was considered indispensable. Christian Emperors assume the part of custodians of orthodoxy. More and more, especially in the East, where the Empire continued in the vigorous exercise of authority, they use force for the extermination of heresy. Their authority is often invoked by contending parties. It is by the Emperors that the general councils are called together, and in the doings of these assemblies their will is potent. The tide of battle turns to one side or the other, according as one or another Court faction gets the upper hand. At length the Byzantine rulers undertake practically to exercise a kind of Cæsarian papacy. The humiliation of the Roman bishops in the short interval of active Byzantine supremacy in Italy, after its conquest by the generals of Justinian, shows how much the spiritual power of the See of Rome was indebted for its growth to its isolation as regards secular interference.

The second period comprises, loosely speaking, the second three centuries. But as far as the East is concerned, it properly includes the Monothelite Controversy, the last phase of the debate respecting the two natures of Christ. A not unsuitable terminus is the death of John of Damascus, the last eminent Greek theologian, about 754, although he might be not unfitly classified among the Scholastic authors. In the West, the second period carries us to the death of Gregory I. (A.D. 604). He stands on the line of division between the ancient and the mediæval age.

In Philosophy, while Platonism is still largely in the ascendant in the Church, and exerts a proportionate influence on Church doctrine, there is an advance in the influence of Aristotle. Especially is this true of the dialectics of the Stagyrite, which we find, from the close of the fourth century, more and more called into service in doctrinal definitions and disputes. Late in this period, on the Latin side, Boëthius was a commentator on Aristotle. Occasionally there appeared a kind of religious idealism, derived from a blending of Christian and Platonic elements, as in the writings of Synesius, Bishop of Ptolemais in Egypt, who died in 412 or 413. The writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, composed in Egypt, probably late in the fifth century, are permeated by a peculiar mysticism in which Platonic and Christian teaching, are fused together.

An important fact in the doctrinal history of this period is the appearance and enduring influence of two rival schools in theol-

ogy, the school of Alexandria and that of Antioch in Syria. In this place it is sufficient to say that while the Alexandrians made the most of the divine factor in the person of Christ and in redemption, planting themselves on an uncompromising supernaturalism, the Antiochians attributed to the human factor a larger determining agency.

A noteworthy event in this period is the spread in the Roman Empire of Manichæism, a system originating (245 A.D.) with Mani, a Persian religious teacher. He incorporated in his system notions in religion which were imbibed from the Mandæans or other sects of "Baptisers," whose creed was tinged with Christian elements. Manichæism was rather a distinct religion than a Christian heresy. Its groundwork was the Semitic or Babylonian religion, although Persian beliefs were involved in it. Mani was put to death in 276 for his deviation from the orthodox Parsic religion. He held to dualism, — a kingdom of light and a kingdom of darkness. Through Satan, a product of the kingdom of darkness, both these elements were mingled in human nature. Deliverance is accomplished by a physical process, and is the achievement of a succession of prophets, of whom the celestial Christ — not the Jesus of the Jews — is one. Mani himself was the promised Paraclete. The system was ascetic as well as dualistic. At the head of the sect were twelve apostles. The "elect" were a class above the "auditors" or novices. The Manichæan converts were very numerous in the East as well as the West. The curiosity and hope kindled by its mysteries and its promise of illumination attracted many desponding or skeptical minds. For nine years Augustine was an "auditor." From the time of Diocletian, the Manichæans were under the ban of the civil power. Under Justinian, to be a Manichæan was a capital offence.

The interest in the doctrinal history of this period centres in several great controversies respecting cardinal points in the Christian faith. These are, first, the Arian Controversy, on the relation of Christ to God and on the Trinity; second, the Christological Controversy, on the person of Christ; third, the Pelagian Controversy, on Sin and the function of Grace in man's recovery. Theology, Christology, Anthropology, are the several themes. The "Origenistic Controversies" were of much moment, and covered incidentally a variety of topics, besides the question of

the doctrinal soundness of the great Alexandrian. The course of theological discussion in the East, from the beginning of the fourth century, developed an increasing sense of the importance of orthodoxy in opinion, a growing deference for tradition as dictating what ought to be believed, a narrowing of the space open to speculation and diversity of thought. The idea of progress in theology became more and more repugnant. Some of Origen's opinions, as we have seen, had been avowedly esoteric. Portions of his teaching were taken as the starting-point of movements recognized as heretical. Personal and partisan motives mingled among the causes of the ultimately successful crusade against the theological standing of the Father of Greek Theology, whom Athanasius had held in honor. Like influences were operative with similar results, against the repute of the most eminent leaders of the Antiochian school.

In the East, where Greek tendencies prevailed, it was the more speculative side of Christianity, the subjects of the Trinity and the relation of the two natures in the person of Christ, that were ever in the foreground. In the West, it was rather the doctrine of sin, and the subject of the will in relation to Grace, that especially attracted attention. The West was not an indifferent spectator of the conflicts of the fourth and fifth centuries in the East. It was obliged, especially at important crises, to take some part in them. The position of Rome was not unlike that of a powerful neutral, prone to be steadfast and conservative and able on several great occasions to speak the decisive word. Greek theological writers were introduced by translations and otherwise to the knowledge of Western readers, and perceptibly modified opinion. On the other hand, the great Master of Latin Theology had no influence in the East. The effect of his teaching was confined by Latin boundaries. In speaking of the theological peculiarity of the East, it is necessary to guard against exaggeration. If the Greek teachers emphasized mainly the Incarnation and the fellowship with God thereby brought to mankind, another side of the work of Christ, that which had among the Latins greater prominence, was far from being ignored. "That the work of Christ was his achievement (Leistung)," says Harnack, "that it culminates in his sacrificial death (Todesopfer), that it signifies the vanquishing and efficacy of the guilt of sin, that salvation consequently consists in the forgiveness, the justification, and the

adoption of man, are thoughts which in no Church Father are wholly absent. In some they stand out boldly. In the case of most they make their way into the explication of the dogma of redemption."[1] It must not be overlooked that the best of the Greek Fathers — Athanasius is a striking example — if they seemed to be contending for a metaphysical distinction, had at heart the interest of practical piety, which they judged to be identified with it. Nevertheless, the love of contention on nice speculative points might easily, even in the popular mind, become a malady quite harmful to genuine devoutness and destructive of Christian charity. A graphic picture of "the rage" for doctrinal disputation at Constantinople, during the Arian Controversy, is drawn by Gregory of Nyssa:[2] "Every corner and nook of the city is full of men who discuss incomprehensible subjects; the streets, the markets, the people who sell old clothes, those who sit at the tables of the money-changers, those who deal in provisions. Ask a man how many oboli it comes to, he gives you a specimen of dogmatizing on generated and unregenerated being. Inquire the price of bread, you are answered, 'the Father is greater than the Son and the Son subordinate to the Father.' Ask if the bath is ready, and you are answered, 'the Son of God was created from nothing.'"

We have now to glance at the principal writers in this age, so prolific in authorship. We begin with the Alexandrians. One of the last of the Catechetical Teachers was Didymus, who died in 395. Although he was blind from his childhood, he was one of the most learned men of his time. Of most of his works only fragments remain. Athanasius was bishop from 328 until his death in 373. His principal writings relate to the Trinity. Among these his four Discourses against the Arians is the work of chief importance. As there is a unity of purpose in his life, so is there a singleness of aim in his literary productions. His "immortal name," says Gibbon, "will never be separated from the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, to whose defence he consecrated every moment and every faculty of his being."[3] His writings, which are tainted with no false rhetoric, breathe the earnestness that belonged to his character. Unhappily deficient in the spirit of

[1] DG. II. 50.

[2] *De Deitat. Fil. et Spirit. Sanct.* See Neander, *Ch. Hist.* II. 423 n.

[3] *Decline and Fall*, Vol. III. p. 69 (Smith's ed.).

wisdom and love which characterized the first great foe of the Arians, was the later Alexandrian, the Patriarch Cyril, who died in 444. Among his works, which include a treatise on the Trinity, besides Epistles, Commentaries, etc., the most noteworthy is his polemical production (in five books) against Nestorius. Here we may place a reference to a number of authors who exhibit the tone of the earlier Alexandrian School and illustrate the profound influence of Origen. One of them was Eusebius of Cæsarea, who was bishop there from 315 to 340. He is best known through his Church History and his eulogistic Life of Constantine; although much importance belongs to his apologetic and exegetic writings. Under the same category belong the three Cappadocian Fathers, who, like Origen, were proficients in classical learning, and were likewise imbued with Origen's humane and tolerant temper. Basil, Bishop of Cæsarea, called Basil the Great, is famous as an administrator and as the great patron of the monastic life, and for his instructive Letters, which afford a picture of the times. Yet he was the author of other works — the Hexæmeron, for example, treating of the Six Days of Creation. In the capacity of a defender of the Nicene doctrine, he wrote his book against Eunomius, and his Writing on the Holy Spirit. Gregory of Nazianzum, for a short time Bishop of Constantinople, the intimate friend of Basil, was surnamed, for the ability of his discussions on the Trinity, "the Theologian." He was a brilliant orator. He wrote against Julian, and was the author of numerous orations, essays, letters, and poems. He died in 390. Gregory of Nyssa, the brother of Basil, was more speculative in his dogmatic writings than the two Fathers just named. His leading work is the treatise against Eunomius. His teaching has always been regarded with profound reverence in the Greek Church. In connection with a list of disciples of Origen may be put, by the association of contrast, the name of Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis, in Cyprus, who died at an advanced age in 403. An ecclesiastic of very wide influence, but of an intolerant spirit, and untiring in his hostility to Origen, he left as his principal work his uncritical but invaluable *Panarion*, or Drug-Chest. Here he describes eighty heresies and undertakes to furnish the proper antidotes of sound doctrine. Among the most prominent Syrian teachers were Eusebius of Emisa, who died about 360, an effective defender of the Nicene theology, Cyril, Bishop of Jerusalem

(who died in 386), whose Catechetics exhibits instructively the character of the popular teaching then in vogue, and Ephraïm Syrus, who died about 378, a copious author, by whom Greek theological science was introduced into Syria. There are three foremost representatives of the Antiochian school. The first is Chrysostom, who was born in 347 and died in 407, the most celebrated of the ancient preachers. His theology is to be studied in his exegetical homilies, but with due allowance for the circumstance that they are popular discourses. The second is Theodore, Bishop of Mopsuestia from 393 to 428, a great light in the Antiochian school, whose commentaries, as far as they are extant, exist partly in the original Greek and partly in Oriental translations. They exemplify the grammatical and historical style of exegesis which was characteristic of the Antiochians, in contrast with the Origenistic and Philonian method of allegory. The third of the leading Antiochians is Theodoret, Bishop in Cyrus in Syria (west of the Euphrates) from 423 to his death, about 457. He wrote commentaries on the whole Old Testament, with the exception of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job, a continuation of the Church History of Eusebius from 322 to 428, apologetic and polemical writings, and numerous letters of value. The other continuators of Eusebius are Socrates (from 306–439), Sozomen (323–423), and Evagrius (431–594).

We turn to the Latin Writers of the fourth and fifth centuries. Hilary was bishop in his native place Poictiers, from about 350 to his death in 368. He was a highly cultivated man prior to his conversion to Christianity. A supporter of the Athanasian theology in opposition to Constantine, he was banished and spent a number of years in the Asiatic provinces, where he increased his acquaintance with the Greek language. In his exegetical writings he was influenced in a marked degree by Origen. An able man and independent in his thoughts, he defended in several treatises — as the *de Synodis*, the *de Fide* — the Nicene doctrine against its adversaries. Jerome, who was born on the border between Dalmatia and Pannonia, spent his life partly in the East, and became in a scholarly way a connecting link between the East and the West. Originally a disciple of Origen, he was transformed into a vehement opponent. He served the Church mainly through his extensive learning. By revising the old Latin translations of the New Testament, and rendering the Old Testa-

ment from the Hebrew into the Latin, he became the framer of the Vulgate Version. Rufinus was an Italian by birth. He was born about 340. He rendered important service as a translator of Origen, of whom he was a devoted admirer and defender. His "Exposition of the Apostolic Symbol" furnishes us with valuable information respecting its history. He died in 410. Ambrose, the Archbishop of Milan, was born in 340 and died in 398. As far as his writings relating to doctrine are concerned, he was dependent on Origen, Athanasius, Basil, and others, and in setting forth the duties of the clergy he did not hesitate to refashion the *de Officiis* of Cicero. Yet in his teaching, as in ecclesiastical administration, he displayed the qualities of a strong, self-respecting mind. On the subjects of sin and the relation of the will to divine grace, he deviated from the Greek teachers, and paved the way for Augustine.

Of the characteristics of Augustine and of his influence more will be said hereafter. He was a voluminous author. His mind was in perpetual motion. He was a deep thinker, but was one who wrote mostly in response to practical exigencies. His opinions did not remain unaltered, and his *Retractationes* are a review and partial correction of earlier utterances. He composed works, such as the *Contra Academicos*, relating chiefly to philosophy and specifically to the philosophy of religion. His controversial writings are in opposition to the Manichæans, the Donatists, and the Pelagians. Apart from polemics, he composed books on subjects of doctrinal theology. His great apologetic treatise is the *de Civitate Dei*. Beyond the limits of this classification fall his exegetical homilies and other sermons, his numerous epistles, in which religious themes are handled, his Autobiography under the title of *Confessions*, and so forth. Prosper of Aquitaine was a zealous advocate of Augustine's opinions, in the Pelagian Controversy. The position of Leo I., Bishop of Rome from 440 to 461, and the active part which he took in relation to the doctrinal disputes of the time, render his letters and sermons of theological value.

After the beginning of the sixth century the theological writers in the West and the East are reduced to a small number. Boethius, the trusted counsellor of Theodoric, King of the Ostrogoths, and a victim (in 525) to his false suspicions, was a man of scholarly tastes and profound acquisitions. Through his studies

in Aristotle and his book on the "Consolations of Philosophy" he stimulated thought and was much esteemed in the Middle Ages. Cassiodorus, who died about 560, was first a statesman under Theodoric and his successors, and then a monk. His writings relate to history and theology. John Philoponus, an Aristotelian at Alexandria in the first part of the sixth century, and a Monophysite in his theology, applied his philosophy in such a way to the Trinity as to expose himself to the charge of being a Tritheist. Gregory, Bishop of Tours (573–595), wrote a work on Miracles — the *Miracula* — and an Ecclesiastical History of the Franks. The theology of Gregory I., Bishop of Rome (590–604), is to be learned from his treatise called *Moralia*, founded on the book of Job, and from his homilies and letters.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY TO THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE (A.D. 381)

ARIUS was a presbyter in the Church at Alexandria. He had been a pupil of Lucian, who conducted a school of theology at Antioch, and died as a martyr. Some other leading men who were in sympathy with Arius had also been taught by this exegetical teacher; but his own opinions, probably always, certainly in his closing years, were not in accord with the extreme views which they advocated.[1] He accepted the Origenist doctrine of the Logos. Arius propounded the opinion that in the case of the preëxistent Christ, generation is not to be distinguished from creation.[2] He is the first of created beings, through whom all other things are made. In anticipation of the glory that He was to have finally, He is called the Logos, the Son, the only-begotten. He may be called God, although not God in the full reality implied by the term.[3] He began to be, not strictly speaking in time, but before time,[4] since time begins with the creation; yet He began to be from the non-existent through a momentary act of God's will.[5] Before this, "He was not."[6] It was on account of the foresight of his victory over temptation, that he was chosen of God. It is a victory achieved by the Logos, since in the incar-

[1] Respecting Lucian, see Euseb. *H.E.* viii. 13, and ix. 6, and Theodoret, *H.E.* i. 3 (in the Letter of Alexander), and i. 4 (Letter of Arius to Euseb. of Nic., "his fellow-Lucianist"). See, also, Harnack, DG. II. 184 sq., and Robertson's Athanasius (Nic. and Anti-Nic. Fathers), p. xxvii. But a different view is given of Lucian by Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, p. 18 *et al.* "There is really nothing against him but the leaning of his disciples to Arianism; and this can be otherwise accounted for."

[2] *γεννᾶν* is *ποιεῖν*.

[3] *ἀληθινός θεός*.

[4] *πρὸ χρόνων καὶ αἰώνων*.

[5] *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ*.

[6] *ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν* or *πρὶν γεννηθῇ οὐκ ἦν*.

nate Christ the Logos takes the place of a rational human spirit. The rank assigned to Christ in the Arian theology is really that of a demi-god. The demons, the inferior deities, were styled by the heathen 'gods,' and as such received a homage proportional to their rank.[1] It was not a mistake on the part of the orthodox to look on Arianism as in reality an introduction of a species of polytheism into Christian theology. Arius was possessed of logical acumen, was skilful as a disputant, and his austere life helped to draw to him respect and sympathy. Alexander, the Bishop of Alexandria, met these views with strenuous resistance. In letters to other prominent bishops, he set forth clearly the opposite doctrine of the divinity of Christ, in which the defining characteristics of the system of Arius are denied and denounced.[2] Arius likewise sent out letters to counteract the influence of Alexander and to win support. In 321 or 322, at a large synod at Alexandria, Arius was deposed and excommunicated. He issued a book called *Thalia*, a miscellaneous collection in prose and verse, and songs for sailors, millers, and pilgrims. In this method of propagating his opinions he followed a practice then in vogue. He thus embodied his ideas in a portable and easily remembered form. Eusebius of Nicomedia, who held the same opinion as Arius, wrote a letter to the Bishop of Tyre in his favor. Eusebius of Cæsarea, who was an Origenist and much more conservative in his spirit than the Nicomedian bishop, was in favor of tolerating him. Arianism was really a new doctrine. The springs of it can easily be seen in one class of Origen's statements, taken apart from his teaching as a whole, and in expressions like those of Dionysius of Alexandria. Such was the excitement of the conflict in Egypt, and so wide-spread was the agitation elsewhere, that the Emperor Constantine sent Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, his trusted adviser, to Alexandria, with letters to the contending parties. The disputes were petty, the Emperor said. The disputants were agreed on the doctrine of Divine Providence; let them bear with

[1] For the sources in respect to what is left of the writings of Arius and the history of the Controversy, see Gwatkin, Möller (Art. *Arius and Arianism* in *Real-Encycl.* I. 620 sq.), and Schmid-Hauck, DG., p. 51; also Kölling, *Gsch. d. Ar. Häresie.*

[2] Letter of Alexander to the Bp. of Const., in Theodoret, *H.E.* I. 3. The Letter of Alex. to his fellow-ministers of the Catholic Ch. is in Socrates, *H.E.* I. 6.

one another as concerns minor differences.[1] But the conflict was not to be pacified so easily. Hosius had a deeper understanding of the grave nature of the controversy. At length, in 325, the Emperor convoked a General Council at Nicæa.[2] It consisted of not far from three hundred bishops, almost all from the East, besides a large attendance from lower orders in the ministry. Alexander was there, and with him his archdeacon, Athanasius, who was in full sympathy with him and was destined to be the life-long champion of the anti-Arian doctrine.[3]

The Arians in Council stood for their opinion that the Father alone is without beginning, that the Son did not exist prior to His generation, which was by an act of the Father's will, — "before all ages," to be sure, since time began with the creation. Respecting the person of the incarnate Christ, Arius, as we have said, had espoused the opinion that in Him the Logos takes the place of the rational human spirit.

How far Athanasius was personally influential in the Council it is impossible to determine. The conclusions reached were in full accordance with his convictions, and he was afterwards the most renowned and effective expounder of them. His theology centres in his view of redemption. Unless Christ is truly God, is divine in the literal sense, He is a creature. In this case, in fellowship with Him we are brought no nearer to God; the vital truth of redemption, union to God in virtue of our union, through faith, to Christ, is lost. This is the practical motive which underlies the doctrine of Athanasius. It was the inspiring principle of his undying hostility to the Arian formulas. The Arians discarded Origen's conception of a "timeless" or eternal generation. This Athanasius re-asserted. But the generation of the Son is an internal, and therefore an eternal, act of God. The Arian formula "there was [a time] when He was not," is false. Secondly, the

[1] Constantine's Letter is given in full in Eusebius, *Vita Const.* II. 64–72, and fragments of it in Socrates, *H.E.* I. 7.

[2] The two principal authorities respecting the doings of the Council are Eusebius of Cæsarea, *Vita Const.* III. 6 sq., *Epist.* (in Theodoret *H.E.* I. 11), and Athanasius, *De Decrett. Syn. Nic.*, and *Epist. ad Afros.* Neither of these witnesses is without a bias. For a full statement of the sources, see Hefele, *Conciliengesch.* I. b. ii. c. 2, and Gass's Art. *Nicaenisch. Koncil* (*Real-Encyl.* X. p. 530).

[3] For a highly interesting description of the Council, see Stanley's *Hist. of the Eastern Church*, Lect. II.–VII.

Son is not "from the non-existent," but from the essence of the Father; and thirdly, He is of the same substance — *homoousios* with the Father. God is the Father. Fatherhood is essential to His being, — as truly so as omniscience or omnipotence. But were it not for the Son, He would not be the Father. God the Father could not be that which He is without the Son, just as the Son could not be that which *He* is, without the Father. He is God's son by nature, and not by an act of will.[1] It is the idea of Athanasius that one and the same essence belongs to the Father and the Son. This identity or numerical sameness is set forth through the illustrations of the sun and its radiance, the same light being in both, and of the river and the fountain, the same water being in both. There are direct statements, positive and negative, of the same purport.[2] As to the meaning of generation, the expla-

[1] See, e.g., *Oratt. C. Ar.* III. 60–64.

[2] See *De Decrett. Nic.* 20, *Expos. Fidei*, 1. Or *C. Ar.* IV. 1. In this last passage it is said that while the Father and the Son are two, the Monas of the Deity (θεότητος) is indivisible and inseparable (ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἄσχιστον), and more to the same effect. In *C. Ar.* III. 3, the identity (ταυτότητα) of the Deity (θεότητος) and the oneness of the essence (ἑνότητα τῆς οὐσίας) are distinctly asserted. The term οὐσία (essence), in Aristotle, signified, first, a thing in the concrete, which is a subject and cannot be a predicate, an individual object, the supporter of attributes; and, secondly, a class, be it a species or a larger class, a genus. (Arist. *Categ.* 5, p. 2*a*, *Metaphysic.*, 6, 11, p. 1037.) This double capacity of the word to signify either physical or logical unity made the *Homoousion* a convenient term for the Athanasians to apply to the unity and plurality of the godhead, as the Latins from the same motive employed the word 'consubstantial.' (See Hampden, *The Scholastic Philosophy*, etc., p. 126 sq.) The Sabellians held to a merely logical (or nominal) unity; the Arians, to a merely physical unity; the orthodox, to both. The distinction of Father and Son is one of essential *relations*. The entire Deity is in each. The divine attributes, such as wisdom and power, are not to be spoken of as plural. The whole Deity was "transfused from the Father to the Son." In one place (*Expos. Fidei*, 2) Athanasius distinguishes *Homo*ousion from *Mono*ousion; but this is to exclude the Sabellian idea of the *personal oneness* of the divine being, the exclusive *physical* unity, without the *logical* (Hampden, *Ibid.* p. 127). Aquinas insists on the importance of guarding against the notion of the *singularity* of the divine being. In another passage (*De Synodis*, 51, 53) *men* are said by Athanasius to be coessential. Here the point on which he is insisting is the complete, and not merely generic, likeness of the Son to the Father. The context (51, 52) emphasizes the point that the Father and the Son are not divisible, as the analogies adduced might be thought to imply. It is evident from the course of the Arian controversy that the term 'Homoousion' did not always avail, of itself, to exclude the merely

nations of Athanasius are mostly negative. One aim is to shut out materialistic associations of the term. In its own nature, it is inscrutable. The standing figure to represent the relation of the Son to the Father is the radiance of a luminous body — which would not be a luminous body if it did not shine.

When it came to the shaping of the creed, neither of the parties comprised at the outset more than a minor portion of the members of the Council. There was a great middle party, constituting a majority, who were far from being agreed among themselves on the questions in debate, but were united in opposing the introduction of new terminology. They wanted to frame a statement of belief that would satisfy all, and thus pacify the disputants. They were generally opposed to the Homoousion, — a part from fear of a Sabellian interpretation, and another part because they were Arians from conviction. The middle party found a representative in Eusebius of Cæsarea, whom the Emperor regarded with special honor. He brought forward the programme of a creed which was identical with that of his own Church of Cæsarea. In

generic likeness of Arians, or its antipode, the singularity or solitude of the Sabellians. The safeguard was contained in the idea of 'generation' and in the ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. The safeguard was the idea of the co-inherence of the divine persons (John xiv. 11), called by the Greeks περιχώρησις and by the Latins *circumincessio* (see Ath. *C. Ar.* III. 22, § 3 sq.). Athanasius would not quarrel with those who would shun the word 'Homoousion,' but held to the *absolute* likeness of the Son to the Father, and the co-inherence. (*Tom. ad Antioch.* 6, 8.) In truth, he had no special fondness for that word and seldom uses it.

Instructive remarks on the history of the word ὁμοούσιος, on the influence of Rome and the East in reference to it, and on its probable relation to the "unius substantiæ" of Tertullian (through Hosius), are made in a note of Harnack (DG. II. pp. 228-231). See, also, the references in this note to other passages in Harnack's DG. and to a passage in Bigg, *The Christian Platonists* (p. 164 sq.). The explanation of terms in Hampden, Lect. III., with the Notes in the Appendix, is valuable.

That Athanasius teaches a numerical unity is at present the prevailing opinion of scholars. See Niedner, *Kirchengesch.* p. 355; Thomasius, DG. 228 sq.; Zahn, *Marcellus von Ancyra*, p. 20; Harnack, I. 212 sq. Petavius maintained the opposite interpretation. He is supported by Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (London ed. 1845), Vol. II. 431 sq. The same ground is taken as to the sense of the Nicene Creed (with differences, however, as to the particular conception of Athanasius), by Münscher (in Henke's *Neues Magazin*, Vol. VI. and in his DG. I. § 74, p. 234 sq.); by Meier, *Gsch. d. Trinitäts Lehre*, I. p. 157; by Gieseler, DG. pp. 309, 310; and in an article in *The New World* (Dec. 1894) by L. L. Paine.

it Christ was styled, "the Word of [or from] God," "God of God, Light of Light, Life of Life," "begotten of the Father before all the ages." Eusebius relates that his proposal was well received, but that Constantine — who no doubt followed the suggestions of Hosius and the other Homoousion bishops — recommended certain amendments. These were adopted. They gave a decisively anti-Arian character to the creed. The Son was declared to be "from the substance of the Father," "begotten, not made," "consubstantial (Homoousion) with the Father." Anathemas were appended against those who professed the distinctive Arian formulas, "once He was not," etc., or held that He is of (or from) another substance — "Usia or Hypostasis," the terms being used as synonymous — than that of the Father. Eusebius, not without delay and with reluctance, accepted the creed as thus amended. In his letter to his church,[1] he explained his action by minimizing the significance of the terms to which he had at first objected. He had no better reason to give for assenting to the anathemas than that the phrases proscribed were not in Scripture and engendered controversy. His real opinion was that the Son is a second substance and owed His being to the Father's creative will. But he was sincere, if not logical, in shrinking from the conclusions which the Arians drew from the same premises. Arius, with the Egyptian bishops who stood with him, were banished. Later, Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theognis of Nicæa, who refused to break off communion with Arius, were likewise banished.

The Nicene Creed was carried in the Council by the pressure of imperial influence, against the judgment and inclinations of the major part of the body. Such an act could not terminate the battle. The defeated middle party, who acquired the name of Homœousians, or Eusebians (from Eusebius of Nicomedia), continued to assert that the true predicate to be attached to the preexistent Son is that of likeness to the Father. The Homœousians charged their opponents with Sabellianism; these in turn accused the Homœousians of tritheism.

It only needed a change of mind in Constantine, which was prompted indirectly by his sister, to move him to recall the banished bishops and to decree the restoration of Arius to his office. Athanasius, who succeeded Alexander as bishop in 326, interposed resistance. The prejudice of Constantine against him, which was

[1] This letter, with his proposed creed, is in Theodoret, I. 12.

fomented by false accusations of a political nature, was removed for a time, but only for a time, by a personal interview (332).[1] Being deposed by a Synod at Tyre (335), he was banished by the Emperor to Treves. In the same year Arius, who was then eighty years old, having presented to Constantine a creed, couched in Scriptural language, was to be solemnly received back into the Church; but on the evening before the day appointed for the ceremony, he suddenly died.

In 337 Constantine himself died. Constantius procured the return of Athanasius to his flock. But the new Emperor, swayed by the Eunuchs, the chamberlains at Court, took the side of the Eusebians. Athanasius was at once involved in new contests with his opponents. He was deposed by the Eusebians at a Synod at Antioch in 341, and Gregory, a rough Cappadocian, was put in his place. The Emperor being hostile, Athanasius, although warmly supported by the greater portion of his people, was obliged to take refuge in the West, where Constans was an adherent of the Nicene confession. The Roman bishop, Julius, was of the same mind, invited the exile to Rome, and with a Synod which met there in 342, gave judgment in his favor. The East and the West were now arrayed against each other. Anxious to avoid a rupture between them, the Orientals, at another Antioch Council, issued, one after the other, a series of symbols.[2] These fell in with the Nicene definitions, with two vital exceptions: they asserted the homœousion and the generation of the Son by an act of the Father's will.

The cause of Athanasius was weakened by the approach to Sabellianism of a friend, Marcellus of Ancyra, and by the more radical departure in this direction of Photinus of Sirmium. Marcellus,[3] who had been a determined adversary of Arianism at Nicæa, was anxious to dispose of the Arian objections, while holding fast to the Homoousion. Accordingly he brought forward the opinion that the Logos is immanent and therefore eternal in God,

[1] Of this interview Gibbon, who shows a genuine admiration of the character of Athanasius, says: "The haughty spirit of the Emperor was awed by the courage and eloquence of a bishop who implored his justice and awakened his conscience." *Decline and Fall*, Vol. III. c. xxi.

[2] Hahn, *Biblioth. d. Symb.*, pp. 103–105.

[3] The best exposition of the doctrine of Marcellus is by Zahn, *Marcellus of Ancyra* (1867).

but not begotten and not personal. The divine Energy[1] so named comes forth from the Father to accomplish the work of creation and redemption. Only at the incarnation did the Logos become personal. The incarnation was a union with an impersonal human nature.[2] It is only the incarnate Logos who in Scripture is called the Son of God, and when the Saviour's work ends, the Logos returns to its premundane relation to the Father. A like doctrine was held respecting the Spirit; both the Logos and the Spirit being, in the sense defined, consubstantial with the Father. It is not explained what becomes of the body of Christ when the work of redemption is finished. Photinus regarded Christ as a man, the Son of Mary, conceived of the Holy Ghost and under the influence of the divine Logos, his idea being that the Logos, as was held by Marcellus, was an impersonal power of God. In 336, in a Synod at Constantinople, Marcellus was condemned by the Orientals, and Eusebius of Cæsarea was charged with the task of preparing a confutation of his opinions. But Athanasius and Julius of Rome persisted in recognizing him as within the pale of orthodoxy. Athanasius at a later day controverted his doctrine, but avoided any attack upon him personally.[3]

The Antiochian Synods (341–345), of which mention has been made, having failed to bridge the chasm between the East and the West, the Western Emperor, Constans, prompted by Julius, the Roman Bishop, persuaded his brother Constantius to call a general Synod. In 347 this was ready to assemble, but the two sections of the Church were deterred by mutual suspicion from meeting in one body. The Orientals demanded in vain a recognition of the deposition of Athanasius and Marcellus. Accordingly the Occidentals met at Sardica and the Orientals in a much smaller number at Philippopolis in Thrace. The latter planted themselves on the fourth Antiochian symbol.[4] The former declared for Nicæa and Rome. Julius prevailed on Constans to

[1] *ἐνέργεια δραστική.*

[2] Zahn, p. 164: "Aber diese impersönliche Menschennatur ist nicht ein todtes Werkzeug, sondern Selbstdarstellung des Logos."

[3] It is of the doctrine of Marcellus that Athanasius writes in *C. Ar. Oratt.* iv. 4–24. This passage is discussed by Zahn, p. 198 sq. It had been considered in its relation to Marcellus by two German writers, Rettberg and Kuhn; also by J. H. Newman, *Ath. Treatises*, pp. 497–511. Cf. Gwatkin, p. 82.

[4] Hahn, p. 407. The documents framed by the two Synods are fully discussed by Hefele, Vol. II. B. IV.

procure from his brother, who for political reasons did not wish to offend him, the return of Athanasius to Alexandria (346); but the death of Constans, in 350, exposed the resolute bishop once more to the intrigues of his enemies. In the proceedings relating to Marcellus and Photinus, an occasion was found for all the Anti-Niceans to combine. Photinus was anathematized by the Antiochian Synod of Eusebius in 344. He was condemned afterwards in a series of synods held by the Eusebians and by the orthodox. At the first Sirmian Synod (351) a creed, the first of a series of four, framed at the same place, was adopted.[1] The Sirmian creeds rejected Arian formulas, but avoided the strict definitions of Nicæa. A great effort was made to move Rome and the West to abandon the support of Athanasius. Constantius, after he conquered Magnentius in 353, was sole Emperor until his death in 361. By cunning management and by force he succeeded in bringing the Western bishops into ecclesiastical fellowship with the Eusebians, through the Synods of Arles and of Milan (355). There were a few of the bishops at Milan who could not be deluded or coerced, and these were sent into banishment. Athanasius, thus condemned, found a refuge with faithful monks in Egypt.

In this way the Anti-Nicene party for the time was everywhere triumphant. Its success was the signal for its disruption. Relieved from external pressure, the union of its really discordant parts was broken up. Two of the Anti-Nicene leaders, Ætius of Antioch and Eunomius of Cyzicus in Mysia, denied the Homœousion; that is, asserted that the Son is not like God. There sprung up thus the new faction of Anomœans. And the Eusebians, who opposed them, were further divided among themselves. The "Homœans" would not go a step beyond the affirmation of a "likeness," — meaning a likeness in will and active energy. The bishops at the Court were eager to stave off an open rupture in the Eusebian ranks. Their prescription was to abjure the use of the unbiblical word *usia*, the centre of the contention. In the second Sirmian creed (357), the members of which were Western bishops, it was declared that no more mention should be made of either 'Homoousion' or 'Homœousion.' The spirit of the connected statements was decidedly Arian. A Synod of conservative Semi-Arians at Ancyra in 358 issued a Letter affirming that

[1] For the first two, see Hahn, p. 115 sq.

the term 'Father' implies in itself the Son's likeness in substance. In a third Sirmian Creed, several symbols were put together — one of which was one of the Antiochian Creeds of 341. The term 'Homoousion' was avoided. Liberius, the Roman bishop, was induced to agree to this attempt at compromise. A fourth symbol[1] was composed at Sirmium, in which the Son was pronounced to be like the Father, "according to the Scriptures," — an ambiguous phrase. The Easterns were assembled in a Council at Seleucia and the Westerns at Rimini, by the dictatorial Constantius. The last Sirmian formulary was modified by dropping the phrase "according to the Scriptures."[2] The use of the words 'Homoousion' and 'Homœousian' was renounced, and the Anomœans anathematized. On the accession of Julian, Athanasius returned to his diocese (362). One more banishment he had to endure under Valens, whose wife was an Arian; but Valens was persuaded by Valentinian to desist from persecution. This removed an obstacle to the progress of the Nicene theology. Athanasius, in his latter days, fell in with efforts to unite all the anti-Arians. The spirit of conciliation characterized a Council at Alexandria assembled in 362. He did not repulse advocates of the Homœousion who held to the likeness of the Son to the Father in all respects. There arose a class of moderate Nicæans, of whom Meletius of Antioch was one, who incurred the displeasure of both extreme parties. A "Younger Nicæan Party" appeared, counting in it leaders who "were heirs" — through Eusebius and his influence — of a Homœousion tradition, but "owed to Athanasius and the Nicene Creed a more perfect interpretation of their unaltered belief." They were disciples of the Origenist School. They did much to secure the prevalence of the Nicene doctrine. The principal chiefs were the three eminent Cappadocian bishops, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzum, and Gregory of Nyssa. But their teaching in reality modified the aspect of the Nicene formulas. The term 'hypostasis,' instead of being a synonym of *usia*, was used to designate a person or personal subject, in distinction from substance. This use of the term became current in the East. Personal distinctions in the Trinity were emphasized. The relation of the persons in the godhead was compared by the Gregories to the relation of three men to their common humanity. In the case of

[1] See Hahn, p. 124.

[2] For the Seleucian Symbol, see Hahn, p. 127.

Gregory of Nyssa, beneath this representation there was the Platonic or realistic idea of the unity of human nature. It is by an abuse of language, he tells us, that three human persons are called three men, since as respects humanity — essentially — they are *one*. Inasmuch as the person[1] of the Father is one, "from whom the Son is generated and the Holy Spirit proceeds, for this reason, properly speaking,[2] we say that He who is the one ground or cause[3] of the effects[4] — i.e., the Son and the Spirit — is one God.[5] But in interpreting Gregory, it must be kept in mind that there is in his conception a genetic relation among the persons and a mutual 'inhabitation,'[6] so that neither is conceivable, neither is complete, without the others. In this sense they are together the One God. They constitute an inseparable unity. Hence they are not with strict propriety to be called *three*. They are separated neither in time, nor place, nor will, nor work.[7] Gregory's illustration is the rainbow. In both the sunlight and in the rainbow, the light is one. The colors of the bow remain in unity, and although distinguishable, pass over inperceptibly into one another. Yet by the later Nicæans the mystery was made to lie in the unity of God rather than in the trinity. And the unity, as we see, was secured by a subordinationism carried further than it was carried by Athanasius. Meletius was recognized as the Bishop of Antioch by the younger Nicæans, but was not acknowledged as such at Rome and in the West.

New contention arose on the subject of the Holy Ghost. Arius had held that the Holy Spirit is the first created nature produced by the Son. Athanasius and the Alexandrian Synod of 362 had predicated the Homoousion of the Spirit. The Nicene Creed contained on the subject a single indefinite sentence. In 380, Gregory of Nazianzum writes that concerning the rank of the Holy Spirit and His relation to God there is among theologians a great diversity of opinion, some professing not to know what to think on the matter, the Scriptures not having clearly explained

[1] πρόσωπον.

[2] κυρίως.

[3] αἴτιον.

[4] αἰτιατῶν.

[5] Ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν, T. II. p. 85.

[6] περιχώρησις.

[7] See Dorner, *Person Christi*, II. pp. 919, 920, where the passages from Gregory are given. Bishop Bull cites a passage from Petavius (Lib. IV. c. 16), where he admits that numerical unity may be inferred from 'inhabitation.' Bull, *Defens. Fid. Nic.*, Lib. IV. § 4. Cf. Waterland, *Works* (Oxford ed. 1833), Vol. II. p. 211.

this point.[1] Hilary of Poictiers agreed with this last statement, yet said that nothing could be foreign to God's essence which searches the deep things of God.[2] When Macedonius, Bishop of Constantinople, pronounced the Holy Ghost to be a creature subordinate to the Son, his opinion was generally considered heretical, and his followers, the Macedonians, were given the nickname of "Pneumatomachians." Under the auspices of Theodosius the Great, the finishing stroke was given in establishing the predominance of the Nicene Orthodoxy. Prominent bishops who rejected it were deposed. At Constantinople, Gregory of Nazianzum was put in the place of Demophilus. In 381, the Emperor assembled the General Council of Constantinople. It is a significant fact that Meletius was met by him with a cordial greeting and appointed to preside over the Council. It consisted of about one hundred and fifty bishops, all Oriental. This body declared its approval of the Nicene Creed. It issued, also, an exposition of the Trinity, but of its contents we have no definite knowledge. What is called the Creed of Constantinople, however, did not emanate from the Council.[3] The foundation of the Creed so called was a confession composed by Cyril of Jerusalem, prior to his being made bishop, which was in 350. In the existing form of the Creed, it is almost identical with a baptismal symbol recommended by Epiphanius as early as 374. It is probable that Cyril himself had enlarged this symbol for the benefit of his people by introducing the passages from the Nicene Creed which formed a part of it. A like enrichment of baptismal confessions took place in other churches, the object being to shut out errors which there was special reason to guard against, while at the same time their popular character should be preserved. Thus the Nicene anathemas were left out — although they are retained in the Creed of Epiphanius. The additions relating to the Holy Ghost were added, the phraseology being scriptural and thus consonant with the popular character of the Jerusalem Confession.[4] The East

[1] *Orat.* 31, 5. [2] *De Trinit.* L. XII. c. 55.

[3] As to the origin of the Constantinopolitan Creed, see the thorough discussion of Hort, *Two Dissertations*, etc. (1876), Diss. II. See also the article of Harnack in the *Real-Encycl.* (Vol. VIII. pp. 212–230).

[4] "In der That is das sog. C. Panum nichts anders als das neu redigirte, mit den wichtigsten nicaenischen Formeln und mit einer *regula fidei* betreffs des hl. Geistes ausgestattete Taufbekenntniss der jerusalemischen Kirche." Harnack, *Real-Encycl.* VIII. 222.

and the West were not immediately brought into harmony, owing to the modified spirit of the younger Nicæans. When Meletius of Antioch died, his supporters refused to acknowledge the rival bishop, Paulinus, who was a Nicæan of the stricter cast. But after 451, the Council of Constantinople obtained, alike in the West and East, recognition as an Œcumenical Council. By some means Cyril's Confession, the baptismal symbol of the Church at Jerusalem, came to be regarded as its product. Just how this came to be can only be conjecturally explained. The Constantinopolitan Creed omits these words of the Nicene symbol: "that is, from the substance of the Father." In their place stand the words: "begotten of the Father before all ages." The words "God of God" are also omitted. These are the principal variations from the Nicene text. They did not spring from differences of belief. A striking peculiarity of the Constantinopolitan has been stated, — namely, the addition of the clauses respecting the Holy Spirit, whose attributes are set forth in words of Scripture. It is declared that the Spirit together with the Father and the Son is to be worshipped and glorified. In Churches of the West, the Creed which acquired the name of Constantinopolitan is usually styled the Nicene. In the Anglican Prayer Book, apparently through a mistake of its compilers, the epithet "holy," in one of the four notes of the Church, is omitted. The addition of "filioque" to the Western form of the Creed will soon be referred to.

In the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds, there stands first the confession of one God, the Father Almighty, the Maker of all things. There is a paraphrase of the language of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. viii. 5) where he defines the Christian faith, in contrast with the belief of the heathen "in gods many and lords many." While the Eastern theology likewise insisted on the consubstantiality of the Son, there was always recognized the subordination of the second and third persons. In the Deity the Father is the beginning; it is to Him that primal causality belongs. From the outset the West clung to the unity of substance, fastening attention on this cardinal element in the doctrine. It was through Augustine that in the West subordinationism was eliminated from the Trinitarian conception. Functions and acts, like the theophanies in the Old Testament, which had been ascribed to the Son, were attributed

by Augustine to the whole Trinity.[1] By him the numerical unity of the persons in respect of substance was unequivocally taught. It was in pursuance of this movement of thought that on the conversion of Recared, King of Spain and Gaul, at the third Council of Toledo (589), "filioque" was inserted in the Creed; whereby an immanent procession of the Spirit from the Son, as well as from the Father, was affirmed.[2] In the symbol *quicunque*, or the so-called Athanasian Creed, which was probably composed in Southern Gaul, not earlier than the closing part of the fifth century, and came into use in the age of Charlemagne, the process, if one may so say, of equalizing the persons is seen at the climax. The attributes of Deity are, one by one, affirmed of the three persons severally, and with each affirmation is connected the proposition that there are not three, but one, "eternal," "omnipresent," etc. It is only the epithets "ingenerate," "generated by the Father," and "proceeding," that are connected respectively and exclusively with the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.

[1] De Trinitate, L. II. 9–18. He says of the mission of the Son, of the Incarnation, and the birth from the Virgin, that they were wrought by the Trinity. "Una eademque operatione Patris et Filii inseperabiliter esse factam, non utique inde separato Spiritu Sancto." (§ 9.)

[2] Mansi, IX. 597 sq.; Harduin, III. 467 sq. See Hahn, p. 158 sq.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST TO JOHN OF DAMASCUS

ORIGEN had brought out explicitly the doctrine of two natures in Christ. He is the divine Logos, He is likewise, as to both body and soul, man. Origen had affirmed with emphasis the unity of His person. He had said that the divine Wisdom or Logos had emptied himself, had submitted to a curtailment of knowledge — for example, respecting the time when the advent to judgment would occur. At the same time, however, he had said that the Logos is incapable of increase or diminution, of being humbled or exalted, and that it is humanity alone in Christ that suffers. The transforming power of the Logos in its effect on the human nature, especially on the body of Christ, is carried so far as to lend a docetic tinge to the doctrinal conception.[1] The problem of the mode of union of the two natures still called for a solution. It could not be said to have been clearly or consistently explained by the great Alexandrian teacher. The Arian Controversy gave rise to deeper scrutiny of the subject. The Arian theory was that of a union of the Logos with a human body. To the Logos, therefore, were attributed the sensations of hunger and thirst, the limitation of knowledge, the mental anxiety, which in the Gospels are predicated of Christ. When the Catholics ascribed these experiences to the human nature of Jesus, the Arians charged them with holding to a conflict between the divine and human will in Him, to a division of Christ into two persons. The task was imposed on the defenders of the Nicene theology of meeting this accusation.

One of the foremost and one of the ablest defenders of the Athanasian doctrine had been Apollinaris, the Younger, Bishop of

[1] *Cont. Cels.* III. 41. The mortal body and the human soul by their "union and intermixture" (ἑνώσει καὶ ἀνακράσει) were changed into God.

Laodicea. In the middle of the fourth century he was regarded as one of the pillars of orthodoxy. He was versed in classical learning and he was an acute reasoner. But he struck out a path at variance with the accepted doctrine respecting the person of Christ, and broached a theory which is called the Apollinarian.[1] His main contention was that in Christ the divine Logos fills the place of the rational soul in man. To the spirit or rational soul in men should belong of right supreme control over the animal soul and the body, the two other departments of human nature according to the Platonic trichotomy. But by reason of sin, spirit has lost this control and become enslaved to the lower nature. Hence the need of the incarnation of the Logos. Apollinaris argued that two natures, each with free will, could not subsist together in Christ; that if there be a rational spirit, then there are two sons of God in Him, one natural and the other adopted.[2] Moreover, the man, the adopted Son, would not be without error and sin; He would be mutable as the Arians alleged that He was. The Johannine statement that "the Logos became flesh" is to be literally taken. The second man is "from heaven" (1 Cor. xv. 47). He is in fashion "*as* a man" (Phil. ii. 7). If, as Apollinaris argued, Christ is to be conceived of as a man with the self-directing power of reason, then he is only a man inspired of God,[3] he is not truly divine: but this last is a heresy.

The Apollinarian doctrine met with a general opposition. It is withstood by Athanasius and the Cappadocian theologians, although the treatise against Apollinaris which bears the name of Athanasius is not genuine. Athanasius distinguishes between actions and experiences of Christ which belong to him as God from such as pertain to him as man. The necessity that He should be truly man is inseparable from the idea of redemption, which involves the purification of human nature in its entirety. Yet the phrase "two natures" does not occur in Athanasius, although it is not to be inferred that he took pains to avoid it. He speaks, however, of a physical unifying of the divine and the human.[4] God became man that man might be made God — might be divinized.[5] He does

[1] See Dräseke's elaborate discussion, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, etc. (1892), in Gebhardt u. Harnack's *Texte u. Untersuchungen*, etc. The third part of Dräseke's discussion presents what are left of the dogmatic writings of Apollinaris.

[2] εἷς μὲν φύσει . . . εἷς δὲ θέτος.

[3] ἔνθεος ἄνθρωπος.

[4] ἕνωσις φυσική.

[5] E.g., *De Decretis*, 14; *Ad. Adelph.* 4.

not hesitate to speak of God as having been crucified,[1] and more than once styles Mary "theotokos" — Mother of God. So all-controlling, in his conception of the subject, is the divine factor in the person of Christ. The Gregories are explicit in affirming the two natures. Redemption loses its essential element if Christ was not possessed of a rational soul like that of other men. Christ, says Gregory of Nazianzum, is not *one* and *another* in the personal sense of these terms, but in the impersonal, neuter sense.[2] The Gregories say in words that the natures remain unaltered. Yet they use language — such terms, for example, as 'mixture' and 'compound'[3] — which, were they to be interpreted strictly, would contradict that proposition. The human nature is divinized by its union with the Logos. It is "two natures flowing together into one."[4] Gregory of Nazianzum says that in Christ the Divine is to the human as the sun among the stars, which if not obliterated are yet too obscure to be visible. Gregory of Nyssa says that the human is merged in the sea of the imperishable Deity as a drop of vinegar is lost in the ocean.[5] Separate in itself considered, the flesh when "mixed with the Divine" no longer continues in its own limitations and properties.[6] The full consequences of the Incarnation, however, do not ensue until the glorification of Christ. Then, according to Gregory of Nyssa, the body of Christ loses entirely its human attributes. Then the human nature of Christ becomes ubiquitous. These theologians expressed the general sense of the Church in their protest against the curtailing of the human attributes of Christ, as was done in the Apollinarian theory of His person. But in the view which they substitute for it, the human nature of Christ is taken up as the mere organ of the Logos, as the passive object of a divine, transfiguring agency. The Apollinarian doctrine was condemned, without any mention of its author's name, at Alexandria in the Synod of 362. It was condemned at the Council of Constantinople in 381, as it had been at Rome, under the auspices of its bishop, Damasus, in 377. But there were Apollinarians who continued in a covert way to propagate their opinion, and some of their writings by being mingled

[1] *Ad. Epict.* 10.

[2] ἄλλο μὲν καὶ ἄλλο . . . οὐκ ἄλλος δὲ καὶ ἄλλος.

[3] κρᾶσις, μίξις. Geg. Naz. Orat. 38, 13. He adds κατ' οὐσίαν.

[4] δύο φύσεις εἰς ἓν συνδραμοῦσα. *Orat.* 37, 2.

[5] *Cont. Eunom.* V. p. 708.

[6] *Ibid.* V. p. 693.

with the writings of Athanasius and other Catholic Fathers exerted a modifying influence in orthodox polemics.

The debates occasioned by Apollinaris resolved themselves into a contest between the two schools, the Alexandrian and the Antiochian. The former pursued, and often with less moderation, the way opened by Athanasius and the Cappadocian bishops. On the other hand, although Apollinaris was an Antiochian in his associations, the Antiochian school of divines, of whom Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas were the principal representatives, moved in a diametrically opposite direction. The Antiochians were critics and exegetes; they inherited the scholarly spirit of Origen, while the impulse lent by him to the cultivation of dogmatic theology was specially effective at Alexandria. The Antiochians, however, discarded allegory. Their theology was ethical in its character. In their system, as it is expounded by Theodore, the freedom of the will holds a central place. Character presupposes at the foundation a free exercise of moral choice, and that which is true of men generally must be true equally of the man Christ Jesus. He came not only to be a deliverer of men from sin, but at the same time to raise up man to a higher plane of development than belonged to the first Adam, even before the fall. The union of God and man must be of such a character that to the man is left full liberty of action. God has taken up His abode in a perfect man of the family of David. This union begins at the beginning of His prenatal life. It is not, however, a uniting as to essence or substance;[1] for God as to His essence is present to all. Nor is it a uniting of God as to His active energy,[2] for his Providence, and thus His forth-going energy, is universal. It is, therefore, a moral fellowship and communion.[3] Yet it is not on a level with the union of God with good men — with the prophets and saints. It is such a union with man that he shares in the honor, glory, and dominion which belong to the Logos. Its effects, however, are progressive; they keep pace with the free, ethical advance of Jesus; they are not complete until He is raised from the dead and exalted to His glorified life above.

In the Nestorian Controversy, the difference between the two schools came to a head. Nestorius, who was educated in Antioch, became Bishop of Constantinople in 428. The tendency to pay

[1] *κατ' οὐσίαν.*

[2] *κατ' ἐνέργειαν.*

[3] *κατ' εὐδοκίαν* or *κατὰ χάριν.* It is an *ἕνωσις σχετική*, a *συνάφεια.*

honor to the Virgin Mary was on the increase. It was especially manifest among the monks in the neighborhood of the capital. Nestorius protested against the application to her of the term "theotokos,"[1] Mother of God. She should either be called 'mother of the man'[2] Jesus, or 'mother of Christ.'[3] His objection was to the transference of human attributes to the divine Logos. He emphatically denied that the Logos participated in the sufferings of the human nature of Christ. Cyril of Alexandria, a man of vehement temper and intolerant, but sincere in his opinions, was quite ready to take up the cause of the adversaries of Nestorius. Ecclesiastic rivalship in which the two Eastern Sees and Rome in the West were the several parties, was not without an important effect from the beginning of the widespread and lasting controversy. Cyril succeeded in procuring the support of Cœlestin I., the Roman bishop. A letter of exhortation from Cyril to Nestorius produced no result.[4] Other letters were written by both leaders. At an Alexandrian Synod in 430, Cyril sent forth twelve anathemas against the Christological errors of Nestorius.[5] The response of the latter was twelve counter-anathemas. The position of Nestorius was that there was in Christ a union, but not a union of essence, between God and man. The Divine and the Human entered into a relation of constant co-existence and co-working. The divine Logos took up his abode in the man Jesus. There was a reciprocal connection of the two sets of attributes, a mutual coöperation for the common end, but no communication, no interchange of attributes. Only the smaller fraction of the evangelic affirmations respecting Jesus during His earthly life pertain to Him as at once God and man. Most of them are true of Him either as God exclusively or as man exclusively. As to the former class, the predicates of the God-man, they are true solely on the ground of the connection of the two natures. Cyril, on the contrary, asserted a physical (or metaphysical) uniting of the two natures. God *becomes* man.[6] After the Incarnation, there are two natures abstractly considered, but in the concrete reality but one, — namely, the one incarnated nature

[1] *Μαρία θεοτόκος.* [2] *ἀνθρωποτόκος.* [3] *χριστοτόκος.*

[4] Cyril. Alex. Opp. Epist. IV. See Hahn, p. 235.

[5] The anathemas of Cyril and the correspondence are in Mansi, *Conc. Coll.* Vols. IV. and V., Hahn, p. 238 sq.

[6] *ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος, οὐ συνήφθη ἀνθρώπῳ.*

of the divine Logos.[1] This was thought to be a phrase of Athanasius, but was in the treatise against Apollinaris, which was incorrectly ascribed to him. The idea of Cyril is that the flesh, all the human attributes, have become the attributes of the Logos without the loss of His divine nature. The product is a theanthropic person, not *merely* God, or *merely* man, but throughout both in one. There is thus in Christ incarnate a communion of attributes. There is one subject, with one nature, which is divine-human. In this literal sense the Logos has assumed humanity. Hence it can be said that 'God is born,' that 'God suffered,' if only it be added, 'according to the flesh.'[2] Nestorius argued that such a conception clashes with the distinction between God and man as to essence; that it annuls the immutability of God by imputing to Him a change of nature, or a mixture with another nature, or a change of place in coming into the flesh. But Cyril persistently asserted that the uniting of the natures is not their fusion; that 'to have flesh' is not 'to be flesh.' Nestorius sought to repel the inference that by his doctrine the unity of person was broken up, since there is a constant, harmonious co-working of the human nature in subordination to the divine. The human shares in the dignity of the divine in virtue of its connection with it. Cyril alleged that to render divine honors to one who is not 'by nature God' is man-worship. Each party, that of the Alexandrians and that of the Antiochians, contended that its own theory alone furnished a basis for redemption.

Nestorius had explained his objection to the word 'Theotocos.' It was on the ground of its ambiguity. The anathemas of Cyril called out answers from two eminent Antiochians, Andreas, Bishop of Samosata, and Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus. To appease the strife, Theodosius II. summoned a General Council to meet at Ephesus (431). But Cyril, who was attended by a throng of bishops, a great part of them from Egypt, did not wait for the arrival of the Oriental bishops, but proceeded to organize the Council, and, with Memnon of Ephesus to assist him, pronounced Nestorius, despite the protest of the Emperor's Commissioner, guilty of heresy and deposed. The Orientals, when they arrived, organized separately under John, Bishop of Antioch, and proceeded to depose Cyril and his principal auxiliary, Memnon. Theodosius was incensed at the proceeding

[1] *μίαν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκομένην.*

[2] *κατὰ σάρκα.*

of Cyril, but was won over to his cause by the influence of the monks, and of officers of the Court, who were corrupted by bribes. He had confirmed all three acts of deposition, but he restored Cyril and Memnon, while he left Nestorius in his cloister at Antioch. The rupture between the Orientals proper and other provinces, especially Egypt, led to strenuous efforts to patch up a peace. To promote this purpose, Theodosius exerted his authority in an arbitrary way. Cyril was steadily gaining ground at the Court and in the Capital. In 433, John of Antioch agreed upon terms of peace. Cyril signed a confession that was drawn up by the Antiochians and contained nothing antagonistic to their opinions. John of Antioch had been a conservative supporter of the anti-Cyrillian theology, although he had expostulated with Nestorius for raising a storm about a word which was capable of an innocent interpretation. Now, however, for the sake of peace, and moved by the threatening attitude of the Emperor, he consented to the condemnation of Nestorius and of the doctrinal statements which had been proscribed. Nestorius, a persecuted man, was driven from one place of refuge to another. He died in 440. The theological school at Edessa — where the Persian clergy had long been educated — under the lead of Rabulas, a deserter from the Nestorian party, was thrown into confusion. As the final result it was broken up (489). The Nestorian dissentients fled into Persia and established there a separate Church, in which Theodore and the other Antiochian leaders, to the condemnation of whose writings they had refused to consent, were held in high esteem.

There was wide dissatisfaction with the concessions made by John in the treaty with Cyril. But in Egypt there was a prevalent discontent on the other side, and vehement opposition to the doctrine of two natures. The Cyrillian partisans were accused by the Orientals of Apollinarianism. At this point there begins another stage in the prolonged warfare of opinion. Dioscurus, a violent man, the successor of Cyril, and bishop from 444 to 451, oppressed the Nestorians and compelled, where he could, the renunciation of their doctrine. But the ranks of the Cyrillians were broken through the promulgation by Eutyches, an old Archimandrite of a cloister close by Constantinople, of an extreme opinion, an opinion that went too far for all but the zealots of his party. He held that after the Incarnation there is only one

nature. Christ, he said, is *of* two natures, but not *in* two. Moreover, he held that the body of Christ was not of the same nature (consubstantial) with our human bodies. Prosecuted by Eusebius of Dorylæum, who had been one of his friends, he was condemned and dismissed from his office by a Synod at Constantinople (448) over which Flavianus, his bishop, presided. Leo I., the Bishop of Rome, in a long letter to Flavianus, approved of his course, and set forth the doctrine relative to the person of Christ in which there was a distinct assertion of the two natures.[1] Dioscurus caused a Synod to assemble at Ephesus from which, by means of brutal threats and coercion, a decree in favor of Eutyches was extorted. The date of this Robber Synod, a name given to it by Leo, was 449. Theodosius had exerted his power, in the usual despotic style, in behalf of Eutyches; but the Emperor's death, in 450, left his sister, Pulcheria, with her husband, Marcianus, on the throne — both hostile to the fanatical Alexandrian bishop and in sympathy with Leo. An Œcumenical Council assembled at Chalcedon in 451. Dioscurus was deposed for his crimes. Cyril was pronounced orthodox. Theodoret, who had been deposed by the Robber Synod, but who had been supported and declared to be reinstated by Leo, was now formally restored, but was first driven by the clamor raised in the Council to anathematize not only the doctrine of the "two sons," but, also Nestorius and all others who held it. The antipathy to Nestorius could nowhere be appeased except by a repudiation of him by name. The Council first declared its firm adhesion to the Creed ratified at Nicæa and Constantinople, and the exposition of it by Cyril at Ephesus. It sanctioned Leo's letter to Flavian, and framed, besides, a creed of its own. The Chalcedon Creed affirmed that the Son is consubstantial[2] with the Father as to His godhead, and consubstantial with us as to His humanity, that He is the Son of Mary, the Mother of God, as to His humanity, that He is one person in two natures, united "inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably,"[3] the property of each nature being preserved in the union, with no parting or dividing into two persons.[4] Notwithstanding the deference paid by the Chalcedon Fathers to Cyril's teaching, Nestorius might

[1] Mansi, V. 1366–1390; Hahn, *Biblioth.* p. 256 sq. [2] ὁμοούσιον.

[3] ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως.

[4] For the creed, see Hahn, p. 84. In Mansi (VII. 108 sq.) the reading

have signed the Creed, including the title "Theotocos," as it was qualified by the words appended to it.

Here begin the Monophysite struggles, the name of Monophysites being given to the opponents of the Chalcedon Creed and its affirmation of two natures. Disturbances arose at once in Palestine, in Egypt, and even in Antioch, where Monophysitism was espoused by violent champions. Of these and the subsequent conflicts, which are often acrimonious in the extreme, it is possible to give only a bare sketch. There were armed encounters of rival theological factions. Bishops, some of them learned, and godly up to the measure of their light, were driven into exile to perish from hardship or the cruelty of barbarians. The tyranny, the fickle tyranny, of the Byzantine rulers, inflicted harsh penalties, now on one side and now on the other. When the Emperor Basiliscus gained the throne and took up the cause of the Monophysites, five hundred bishops signed a document which he issued, rejecting the Chalcedon Confession. At Alexandria, an orthodox bishop was slain in the church. In 482, the Emperor Zeno strove to pacify the contending parties by the *Henoticon*, which laid emphasis on the points on which they were agreed, approved of Cyril's twelve anathemas, and was silent or ambiguous on the Chalcedon Creed. While this measure produced in the Greek Empire a temporary quiet, it was openly opposed at Rome and in the West as a surrender to the Monophysites. The position taken by Rome found sympathy in Constantinople, and the theological contest there was mixed up with the political disorder. Justin I. was obliged by the military commander, Vitalian (519), to comply with the demands of Rome, to abolish the *Henoticon*, and formally to accept the creed of Chalcedon. This measure resulted in the separation of the two parties, and in the course of the sixth century, the Monophysites formed sects in Egypt, Syria, and Armenia, which still exist under the names of the Coptic, Æthiopic, Jacobite, and Armenian Churches. All these separatists clung to Cyril's teaching, but disowned Eutyches. The Emperor Justinian set out to bring back the Monophysite separatists. The Monophysites had become divided among themselves. The Severians (followers of Severus, Bishop of Antioch) adhered to Cyril, and complained of the "two natures" of the

should be, not *ἐν δύο φύσεσιν*, but *ἐκ δύο φύσεων*. For the proceedings of the Council before and after it was framed, see Hefele, Vol. II. b. xi.

Chalcedon Creed; but they held that the body of Christ prior to His resurrection was corruptible. The "Julianists," in opposition to "the corrupticolæ," as they were nicknamed, — 'worshippers of the corruptible,' — held that from the Incarnation the Saviour's body was insusceptible of decay. The Julianists were the "Aphthardocetæ." It may be observed here that Hilary of Poictiers, the leading Nicene theologian of the West, had advocated the opinion that it was only by the voluntary consent of Jesus that he suffered physical pain of any sort. There was another movement which looked in the direction of harmony. This was a movement led by Maxentius, whom the Scythian monks followed, and by Leontius of Byzantium, a student of the philosophy of Aristotle, whose aim it was to interpret the Chalcedon Creed in a Cyrillian sense.[1] The question was whether the more moderate Monophysites could be conciliated, and Rome be won over to forms of compromise which should leave the Creed, nominally at least, in full authority. Great efforts were made by the Scythian monks to secure a recognition of the phrase "One of the Holy Trinity was crucified."[2] This was a phrase which, tried by the standard of Chalcedon, was capable of an orthodox interpretation. Justinian caused the proposition that "God was crucified for us," to be embodied in a law (533), and to be sanctioned by an Œcumenical Synod (the 5th) at Constantinople in 553. There, also, was ratified his edict issued 554, "The Three Chapters,"[3] in which were condemned the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, and certain anti-Cyrillian writings of Theodoret and Ibas, his most eminent followers.[4] In these proceedings, the antagonism of Rome and of the Churches of the West was met by despotic, coercive measures. The resistance of Vigilius, Bishop of Rome, was overcome, and likewise the opposition of his successor, Pelagius I. The result was that several important churches in the West broke off communion with Rome, and remained thus separate until unity was restored by Gregory I. Justinian likewise embraced the opinion of the Theopaschites,— the Aphthardocetæ, — and in 564 declared it to be the orthodox doctrine. Nothing but his death in 565 prevented the slavish clergy who were

[1] See Loofs, *Text. u. Untersuch.* von Gebh. u. Harnack, III. 1, 2.

[2] *ἕνα τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος πεπονθέναι σαρκί.*

[3] *τρία κεφάλεια.*

[4] For the fourteen anathemas of the Council, see Mansi, IX. 367–375; Hahn, p. 86 sq.

governed by his decrees from giving their assent to the Cæsarian dogma.

With the death of Justinian, the shield which had been extended over the Monophysites, in great part through the sympathy of Pulcheria, his wife, was withdrawn. For a half century there followed an alternation of favor and persecution in the treatment of them. To reconcile them to the Chalcedon symbol continued to be a part of the imperial policy. In 622, Heraclius, in his expedition against Persia, tarried in Armenia and Syria, and there was told by certain Monophysite bishops that what was especially repugnant in the Chalcedon definitions was the implication of two wills in Christ. Supported by Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, and bent on securing the union of parties, the Emperor declared for the doctrine of one will — the Monothelite view. The great obstacle seemed to be removed when Honorius, the Bishop of Rome, expressed himself in accordance with it.[1] But opposition arose on the orthodox side, Sophronius, a monk of Constantinople, being active in fomenting it. He acquired increased influence when, in 638, he became Patriarch of Jerusalem. It was now the time for efforts to quiet the storm which had been excited. In 638, Heraclius issued a document called the *Ecthesis*, composed by Sergius, which asserted the unity of the person of Christ, the centre of all activities, forbade the teaching of either one or two modes of activity, but declared that in Christ there is only one will, morally speaking, — one "*thelema*." The Monophysites were pleased, although nothing beyond a moral unity of will was affirmed. But Theodore I., the Roman bishop, was not to be won over. He cordially received Paulus, who had been deposed from the See of Constantinople, and at a public disputation at Carthage had been converted from Monothelitism by Maximus, who like him had come over to Africa. Constans II., in 648, issued the *Typos* (Precept), which forbade all controversy on the subject. Martin I., Bishop of Rome, at the first Lateran Synod at Rome, in 649, condemned

[1] This he did in two letters. For his opinion on this question he was denounced as heretical by the Sixth General Council, and anathematized later by Pope Leo II. Down to the eleventh century, every Pope on his election had to ratify the condemnation of Honorius. The question relative to his heterodoxy was warmly debated at the time of the Vatican Council. The points in dispute, with the literature on the subject, are given by Schaff, *Church History*, IV. 500–506.

both the *Ecthesis* and the *Typos*, and their authors. Both he and Maximus were dragged off to Constantinople and perished in exile. Superficial amity ensued between Rome and Constantinople. But the son and successor of Constans II. found it necessary to assemble an Œcumenical Council — the sixth, or First Trullan, Council — at Constantinople (680). As Leo I. had furnished the basis for the Chalcedon definition, so Agatho, now Bishop of Rome, who was determined to stand by the decisions of the Lateran Synod, wrote a letter, the doctrine of which formed the creed of the Council. The will, Agatho said, is a property of the nature, so that as there are two natures, there are two wills; but the human will determines itself ever comformably to the divine and almighty will. The creed was an addition to the Chalcedon symbol and declared of the two wills just what that symbol had asserted of the two natures. Conformably to the accepted psychology of the time, according to which the will was a component attribute of the nature, the conclusion was a logical one. The Dyothelite opinion was thus converted into a dogma. The Monothelite opinion was still cherished by the Maronites, separatists from the Catholic body.[1]

We have now to consider briefly the doctrine of the person of Christ as it is set forth by the most authoritative of the Greek theologians after this time, John of Damascus.[2] The unity of the two natures it is attempted to secure by relegating to the divine Logos the formative and controlling agency. It is not a human individual that the Logos assumes, nor is it humanity, or human nature, in general. It is rather a potential human individual, a nature not yet developed into a person or hypostasis. The hypostasis through which this takes place is the personal Logos through whose union with this potential man, in the womb of Mary, the potential man acquires a concrete reality, an individual existence. He has, therefore, no hypostasis of himself but only in and through the Logos. It is denied that he is *non-hypostatic*;[3] it is affirmed that he is *en-hypostatic*.[4] Two natures may form a

[1] For the sources and the literature pertaining to Monothelitism, see Möller's art., *Monotheliten*, *Real-Encycl.* Vol. X. p. 804.

[2] The Christology of John of Damascus is instructively described by Dorner, *Person Christi*, Vol. II. pp. 258–281, Thomasius, DG. I. pp. 386–392, A. Dorner, *Real-Encycl.* VII. 29 sq.

[3] ἀνυπόστατος.

[4] ἐνυπόστατος.

unity, as the body and soul in man. So man, both soul and body, is brought into unity with the Logos; there being then one hypostasis for both natures. There is a circumincession[1] of the divine and human, an interchange of attributes. There is a communication of divine attributes to the human nature so that the latter is deified,[2] and so that we may say that God has suffered in the flesh. But in this interchange the human nature is merely receptive and passive. The Son of God — the humanity, the flesh, included — is to be worshipped. The will, in accordance with the current psychology, is regarded as a quality of the nature, and it is said that in Christ the human will has become the will of the incarnate God. It is simply the organ of the divine will. While the Damascene makes distinctions which are intended to preserve the reality of the human nature in Christ, the drift of his teaching is in the Monophysite direction.

On the subject of the Trinity, the Damascene lays emphasis upon the unity of persons. The unity is the real,[3] the trinity the logical.[4] The distinction is in the fatherhood, the sonship, and the procession. There is a circumincession, so that neither is conceivable without the others. The Father is the ground and cause of all. But the three are one in knowing, willing, and acting.

[1] περιχώρησις.

[2] θέωσις τῆς σαρκός.

[3] τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἓν πράγματι.

[4] ἐπινοίᾳ.

CHAPTER V

THE DOCTRINES NOT DEFINED IN THE ŒCUMENICAL COUNCILS

Beyond the group of doctrines which formed the subject of conciliar verdicts and were thus converted into dogmas, we find no close agreement among the Greek Fathers who were reputed orthodox, nor do we observe in any single author a very near approach to consistency with himself. We have in mind the great productive period, the fourth and fifth centuries. Beginning with the work of Christ, we should greatly err if we referred the absorption in the questions relating to the Divinity of Christ and the constitution of His person to a Greek fondness for subtle metaphysical discussion, as its chief source. There was a deep practical motive connected with these inquiries. They borrowed their interest from the underlying conviction that the work of Christ as a Saviour is inseparably involved in them. One striking phenomenon in the Greek theology is the quite subordinate place allotted to the Atonement, in comparison with the relation of Christ to the deliverance of man from the power and the subjective consequences of sin. The same is true of the Latin Fathers, even of Augustine, although not in so great a degree. This peculiarity of the Fathers, especially of the Greek Church, is due to the weakness of the feeling of *guilt* in connection with sin, when compared with the sense of its power, or baleful spiritual effects. It is another ruling idea in the Greek theology that one essential need of the soul is enlightenment, a regaining and increase of our *knowledge* of God, which sin has obscured. Bearing these things in mind, we are less surprised to find Gregory of Nazianzum putting the sufferings of Christ in a list along with matter, the soul, the resurrection, the judgment, retribution, and other subjects,—themes on which it is considered that one may philosophize profitably, and respecting which there is no danger of going astray.[1]

[1] Orat. XXVII. 10 (*καὶ τὸ διαμαρτάνειν ἀκίνδυνον*).

The one pervading thought of the Greek Fathers concerning the redemptive work of Christ is that men are thereby brought into unity with God. They do not hesitate to designate this unity as a deification. It is an apotheosis. They dwell on the idea that we "become partakers of the divine nature."[1] To this end the death and resurrection of Jesus were requisite. They were requisite to the full deliverance and perfection of humanity. Connected with this prevalent thought, however, there is still found in leading Fathers the old notion of a ransom paid to Satan for man's release. Nor is there absent the conception of an endurance by Christ of the curse in response to a demand in the divine character and administration. But the great effect to be wrought, the great blessing to be bestowed, is "incorruption."[2]

In Athanasius, the relation of the work of Christ to Satan retires into the background. In his treatise on the Incarnation he sets forth the grounds of the need of the Incarnation and of the death of Jesus.[3] The veracity of God would not have been maintained had the law which threatened death not been carried out. Moreover, He would have failed in his purpose in creating man. In this sense, He would have failed in "goodness."[4] It would not have been "becoming" in God to leave his creature to perish. The difficulty was removed by the death of Jesus. Moreover, if men had repented they might have fallen again had not more been done than merely to pardon them. If a king had built a city, and, owing to the negligence of the citizens, it is seized by robbers, he will not forsake it, but will do what is "becoming to him"[5] to protect and defend it. So the Word of God, the all-good Father, did not leave the race of men to go down to corruption, but He obliterated death, by the offering of His own body, and "set right their negligence by His teaching, setting right all things pertaining to man by His virtue and power."[6] Just as an Emperor by taking up his abode in one house in a city, deters enemies from attacking it, so that it is made safe by his simple presence, so the Son of God has come into our region, and taken up His abode in one of our bodies, with the effect that all enemies, even the "corruption of death," have vanished.[7] These parables

[1] 2 Peter i. 4. [2] ἀφθαρσία. [3] *De Incarnat.* 6–10.

[4] ἀγαθότης. Yet the "compassion" of God is not wholly left out. See § 12, § 14. The love (φιλανθρωπία) of Jesus is more often brought in.

[5] εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πρέπον. [6] § 10. [7] § 9.

are left without a definite interpretation. At a later date in the Arian Controversy, Athanasius handles the same theme in a similar vein.[1] It would not have been either fitting or profitable to men for God "to undo the curse" by a bare decree. If He had done so, man might have become worse. Man must remain mortal unless "he is joined to God." Christ offers to death His own body, so that all may be freed from sin and the curse. "Man joined to a thing made would not have been made God, unless the Son were very God. . . . We should not have been delivered from sin and the curse had not the flesh (which the Logos assumed) been by nature human." Through the whole discussion the idea of the necessity of being "joined to God" is uppermost.

The conception of a ransom paid by Christ to Satan is set forth by Gregory of Nyssa. God would take away from Satan all ground for the complaint of injustice in dealing with Him. He would not, therefore, wrest from the Evil One the captives whom he held in his power through their own self-surrender. Hence the plan to deliver them by purchase. Satan, attracted by a view of the power to work miracles and by other qualities of Christ, was willing to part with his hold on men in exchange for Him. By His being veiled in human form, Satan was deceived; for he could not have endured the unveiled manifestation of Deity. In this plan the wisdom of God was exerted, as well as His goodness and His power. Gregory of Nazianzum protests against the opinion that Satan, an unrighteous usurper of power, is entitled to a ransom. It is given to God, not because he demanded or needed a price, but because through the Incarnation, man could be purified and made holy. It was a part of the method of salvation. Yet Gregory finds a place for the deceiving of Satan, who, on account of the human form of the Saviour, imagined that his contest was only with an ordinary man.

As to redemption subjectively considered, the Greek Fathers hold that grace and human agency are coöperative. But this topic is best considered in connection with their views of Anthropology.

After the beginning of the fifth century, Creationism — the doctrine of the creation of souls individually — prevailed in the West: but the Greek Fathers were not united in this opinion. The Traducian view was favored by Gregory of Nyssa. Origen's doctrine

[1] *Adv. Ar. Orat.* II. § 66 sq.

of preëxistence was more and more proscribed and at length deemed to be heterodox (553). With Origen, immortality was generally thought to be a natural property of the soul. In the analysis of human nature, some — of whom Gregory of Nyssa was one — adhered to the Platonic trichotomy, while others — including Athanasius — were dichotomists. By some of the Greek Fathers, the distinction was made between the image and the similitude of God. The image of God denoted man's natural powers of reason and will, and included the dominion given to him over the lower creation. Gregory of Nyssa makes the similitude to consist in the qualities of the Christian produced by the Holy Spirit. A defining characteristic of the Greek Anthropology is the uniformity and emphasis with which the freedom of the will, and its continued liberty after the incoming of sin, is asserted. The Fathers are agreed in tracing the sinfulness of mankind to the voluntary transgression of Adam. They agree in teaching that this transgression brought the race of mankind under the dominion of Satan. The discernment of God and of divine things became clouded. Sensual propensities gained an augmented force. Nature and the revealed law were ineffectual for man's recovery. This is achieved only through the incarnate Logos, the source of man's original endowment of reason and spiritual perception. The baneful effect of sin in the individual goes forward gradually, from one degree of depravation to another. This is the declaration of Athanasius. The sum of the consequences of Adam's fall is made to consist in the dominion of Satan, in mortality, and the increased exposure to the seductions of evil. Yet by the Greek Fathers the reign of sin in mankind is depicted in strong colors. This is true, for example, of Athanasius; and there are passages in Gregory of Nyssa which, were they all that this author says on the subject, might lead us to infer that he held to an inherited sinful depravity, involving guilt. But such was not the fact. When Athanasius says that as man can turn to things good, so he can turn away from the same,[1] and when Methodius says that "sin is an act of personal freedom, without which there is neither sin nor virtue, neither reward nor punishment," they express the common conviction of the Greek theologians. The sharp distinction between nature and will is drawn out by Athanasius in a passage having direct reference to the generation of the Logos.[2] Chrysostom, commenting on the 51st Psalm, says that

[1] *Cont. Gent.* 4.

[2] *C. Ar.* III. 66.

with the first sin a path was opened for the progress of sin over the whole race. Adam and Eve have generated children who are mortal, and subject to the influence of passion and appetite. The reason is obliged to war against these, and wins glory by victory or shame by defeat. In reference to Romans v. 19, Chrysostom says that a man would not deserve punishment, "if it were not from his own self that he became a sinner." When the posterity of Adam are called sinners, it means that they share in Adam's punishment by being condemned to death. If the question is asked, how is this just, the answer is given that death and the calamities akin to it are a benefit to us, for we get from them "numberless grounds" for being good. The present life is a "sort of school," and made such by the discipline of suffering. Cyril of Jerusalem says explicitly, "we come sinless into this world; we sin now voluntarily."[1] Athanasius goes so far as to say that there have been many saints who have been free from all sin. Jeremiah and John the Baptist are mentioned as examples. Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzum, Basil, and Chrysostom pronounce new-born children free from sin. It may seem difficult to reconcile passages like these just referred to with other utterances found in the same teachers. In passages of a different tenor, however, they have in mind a corruption that does not involve guilt. Nevertheless, it is vain to attempt to reduce the teaching of the Greek Fathers, even the most eminent of them, to entire logical consistency.

As might be expected, the renewal of the soul is made to be the result of the factors, divine grace and the exertion of man's free-will. As a rule, the exertion of free-will, human efforts in a right direction, precede the divine aid, and render men worthy of it. It is a doctrine of synergism. God and man coöperate. The lack of a distinct and self-consistent separation of that which is natural, and that which is an added supernatural gift, in the soul, leads in some cases to a seeming reduction of the agency of the divine factor in regeneration. This remark applies to Athanasius.[2] In harmony with the foregoing views as to human freedom and responsibility, conditional predestination is the doctrine inculcated by the Greek Fathers. Election is a pre-ordination of blessings or rewards for such as are foreseen to be, up to a certain measure, worthy of them. As an illustration, we may

[1] *Cat.* IV. 19; see also 21.

[2] See the remarks of Harnack, DG. II. 146 sq.

refer to Chrysostom's interpretation of the ninth chapter of Romans.[1] The choice of Jacob instead of Esau is accounted for by a perception by God, beforehand, of merits in the elect one. The reference to the potter and the clay is not intended to deny merit or freedom of choice, but is a rebuke of presumption on the part of those who cannot see all that God sees, — of those who "will not allow Him to know who is worthy and who is not so."

The Greek Fathers have much to say of the necessity and value of faith in the process of salvation. Passages which are truly Evangelical and Pauline are frequently to be met with in their writings. Yet, as a rule, they fail to discern that genetic relation of faith to works which is an essential feature of the Apostle Paul's teaching. Hence we find in them Pauline statements mingled with expressions of a different tenor. Good works are coördinated with faith, as a condition of salvation. As this is true of Justin, Iræneus, and Origen, so is it of their successors. For example, Cyril of Jerusalem says that the way of godliness consists of these two things, pious doctrines and virtuous practices,[2] and in another place he says that the ways of finding eternal life are many. Among them, along with faith are enumerated martyrdom and confession in Christ's name, the preference of Christ to kindred or riches, departing from evil works, etc. "For the Lord has opened not one or two only, but many doors, to eternal life."[3] Chrysostom, while he frequently approaches near to the Pauline conception, yet here and there makes good works supplementary to faith rather than its fruit. The separation of faith from works naturally led to another conception of faith which resolved it into the reception of doctrines, the mind's assent to the creed. The transition, moreover, was easy to the idea that almsgiving, fasting, prayers, and the like, were included in good works as a part of the required complement of faith. In general it may be said that while it would be an exaggeration to allege that the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith suffered an eclipse, yet in a very perceptible degree it was obscured.

What the Latins called 'sacraments,' the Greeks called 'mysteries.' The Latin Versions of the New Testament rendered the term 'mystery' by 'sacrament.'[4] The doctrine of the Latins in

[1] *Homilies*, XVI.
[2] *Cat.* IV. 2.
[3] *Ibid.* XVIII. 31, 30.
[4] Eph. v. 32.

this period on the sacraments was connected with the term not in its classic, but its etymologic sense, in which it designated something holy or consecrated. How far the ideas and rites which gradually associated themselves in the ancient Church, East and West, with the sacraments or mysteries, were moulded or modified by the heathen mysteries and by other cults with which the converts to Christianity were conversant, is a subject that would require a searching and elaborate investigation. That the Greek theology in process of time became permeated with beliefs and sentiments that gathered about the Christian "mysteries," is a fact beyond question. In the patristic usage, the word 'mystery' was applied to whatever was at once mysterious and sacred, and especially to objects or transactions of a symbolical character, where an occult reality was conceived to be hidden beneath their material aspect. Hence the term had no definite limit in its application. Pseudo-Dionysius, in a passage where it is not clear that he is giving an exhaustive list, enumerates six sacraments, viz., baptism, the Lord's Supper, unction — meaning, perhaps, confirmation — the consecration[1] of priests, the consecration of monks, and the rites of burial. In this period it is Baptism and the Lord's Supper which are accounted the principal sacraments.

Baptism was regarded as the Sacrament of Regeneration, and is not unfrequently so styled. More specifically it brings the pardon of sins in the past, and the gift of the Holy Ghost. The Cappadocian Fathers add other blessings. The Greeks adhered to the earlier prevalent view that the soul in baptism is cleansed from sin itself as well as from its guilt. When we inquire into the mode in which the effects of the Sacrament are communicated, we find that it is never considered as exclusively a symbol. The spiritual blessings are held to be bestowed with the application of the baptismal water, either concurrently but independently, or through the action of a power imparted to the water itself. It is not always easy to distinguish which of these views is meant to be expressed. The Gregories appear to teach merely the simultaneous action of the water and of the spirit, the one being simply the type of the other. But Cyril of Jerusalem goes farther when he exhorts his readers to "regard not the Laver as mere water,"[2] adding that the water after the invocation acquires a new power of holiness. More explicit and more extreme is Cyril of Alexandria.

[1] τελείωσις.

[2] λιτὸν ὕδωρ: *Cat.* III. 3, 4.

"By the Holy Ghost," he says, "the water perceived by the senses is metamorphosed[1] into a certain divine and ineffable power."[2] Notwithstanding the use of these strong expressions, the actual conversion of the water into a different substance, as is shown by other passages in the same authors, is not meant.

In the investigation of the history of the doctrine respecting the Lord's Supper, two points are to be considered, viz., the view of it as an offering, and the view taken of it as a sacrament in the stricter sense.

In the Church at the outset, the bread and wine brought as gifts for the Agape and for sacramental use, together with the prayers and thanksgivings, constituted the oblation, the centre and soul of which was the pure heart.[3] Thanks were offered for earthly blessings as well as for redemption through Christ. The idea of a repetition in the Eucharist of the atoning sacrifice of Christ, and hence of a propitiatory value attached to the rite, is first broached, although even then in not a very clear way, by Cyprian. It is in keeping with his definite sacerdotal idea of the ministry. Much later, through Gregory I., it takes the form of a distinct doctrine.

Peculiar difficulties arise when we seek to get at a precise meaning in what the Fathers say relative to the Lord's Supper as a sacrament, — the relation of the bread and wine to the body and blood of Christ. Are they speaking literally or in a figure? Are they defining doctrine, or repeating the phraseology of the liturgy? What is said in homiletical or catechetical writings may not accord with what is said in writings of a different description. Moreover, 'symbol' is not used with the intent to exclude a reality inseparable from it. The main inquiry is, what is that reality? Origen may be designated a symbolist, or a spiritualist, for the reason that the reality denoted by the elements is made to be the teaching of Christ. He compares them to the showbread which is exhibited in the temple, which has the character of a propitiatory commemoration. Eusebius of Cæsarea is more definite in propounding this last interpretation of the sacrament. The Alexandrians generally exhibit in a marked way a like tendency. This is, on the whole, the position of Athanasius, notwithstanding forms

[1] μεταστοιχειοῦται.

[2] See the comments, with the citations, in F. Nitzsch, DG. p. 389.

[3] According to Malachi, i. 11.

of expression which, taken by themselves, might lead to an opposite conclusion. There is still more doubt respecting the opinion of Basil, who has often been ranked with the "Symbolists." Origen was aware that he was setting forth a more spiritual view than that adopted by Christians generally. After the middle of the fourth century, the tendency towards a more literal interpretation of the words of the Lord in instituting the Supper prevailed. This is apparent, along with inconsistencies of statement, in Cyril of Jerusalem. In Gregory of Nyssa and Chrysostom, and in John of Damascus, the doctrine is presented of a transformation of the elements in connection with the prayer of consecration. Gregory says of bread that it was potentially the body of Christ, for after it was eaten by him it became assimilated, entering into his body. As such it became imperishable. So the bread in the sacrament is made, upon its consecration, the body of the divine Logos. There is the qualification that it is not the body which was crucified and rose from the dead, but the Eucharistic body. This limitation does not appear in the pulpit teaching of Chrysostom. In one of his homilies it is declared to be the actual body of Christ. "This body," he says, "He hath given us both to hold and to eat."[1] John of Damascus teaches that as Christ once assumed the body which was born of the Virgin, so now in the sacrament He assumes the bread and the wine. The body which He had on earth is now in Heaven, yet for this body and the Eucharistic body there is but one and the same hypostasis or subject. Yet these Fathers, the "Realists," do not teach the later Roman doctrine of transubstantiation. They — for example, Cyril of Alexandria and Chrysostom — use the same terms to express the change in the baptismal water which they employ respecting the bread and wine of the sacrament. They held to no literal transubstantiation of the water. Gregory of Nyssa and others, holding against the Monophysites that the two natures in Christ are unmixed and unchanged, appeal to the analogy afforded by the union of the Logos with the bread and wine.

By Gregory of Nyssa, the union of Christ with the elements in the Lord's Supper is presented as a carrying forward, a continuance, so to speak, of the Incarnation. This conception is a vital peculiarity in the doctrine of the Fathers who follow him. As to the effects of the Lord's Supper upon the communicant,

[1] *Homily in Ep. I. ad Cor.* 2.

they are variously described. The new life that begins in baptism is nourished and sustained. But Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria, among others, attribute to the consecrated bread and wine a mysterious, physical effect, the result of which is the formation of an immortal body like that of the risen and glorified Christ. They compare the body of Christ received in the sacrament to a leaven which enters into our mortal bodies and transforms them. Both body and soul are saved from perishing and endued with immortal life.

In the East, from the beginning of the fourth century the opinion of Origen that the souls of the good are not detained in Hades until the resurrection prevailed. But their joy was thought to be a foretaste of the perfect bliss of the heavenly state. Hades thus remained only as a place of suffering. The influence of Origen and his school availed to banish chiliasm. So, for a time, his more spiritual idea of the resurrection was accepted in the East; but with the growth of the opposition to him as a teacher, in the course of the fourth century, his opinion on this subject began to be more and more rejected, and at length came to be considered heretical. The same fate befell his doctrine of universal restoration, which was adopted by Gregory of Nyssa, who presents various arguments in support of it; also, by the Antiochian theologians, Diodorus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. It was favored by Gregory of Nazianzum, although not in his public teaching. Chrysostom, commenting on 1 Cor. xv. 28, remarks that "some" infer from it the universal abolition of sin and iniquity, but he himself expresses here no opinion on the subject.[1]

The controversies pertaining to the orthodoxy of Origen fill a large space in the polemics of this era.[2] In the period immediately following his death his influence in Alexandria continued to be predominant. Methodius, Bishop of Patara, was the first of the noted assailants of his theology. Origen did not lack devoted champions. About 306, Pamphilus and Eusebius of Cæsarea published a copious defence of his teaching. Some time after the beginning of the Arian controversy the attack was renewed upon him by prominent adversaries of Arius. Athanasius, while professing to differ from Origen on important points, vindi-

[1] *Hom.* XXXIX. 11.

[2] For a lucid narrative of them in detail, see Mr. A. W. W. Dale's art., *Dict. of Christ. Biogr.* Vol. IV. p. 142 sq.

cated his orthodoxy on the subject of the Trinity and spoke of him with reverence and admiration. Basil and Gregory of Nazianzum shared in these feelings and published the *Philocalia*, selections from his writings. With them stood Gregory of Nyssa, and Didymus, the teacher of Jerome. Jerome, who had lauded Origen and translated some of his treatises, was won over to the ranks of his denouncers, at the head of whom was Epiphanius. He had been anticipated in his crusade by Pachomius, the founder of Egyptian monasticism. After 394, Jerome joined hands with the enemies of the great Alexandrian Teacher. His course involved a rupture of friendship with Rufinus, the disciple and translator of Origen. Passing over intermediate events, we have to notice briefly the last stage in this protracted conflict. After a long interval of comparative quiet, the crusade was renewed under the auspices of Justinian, in whose Epistle to Mennas, the primate of Constantinople, there is an enumeration of Origen's alleged heresies. Whether he was anathematized by name by the Fifth General Council, in 553, is a question which cannot be confidently decided. Hefele judges that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant us in expunging his name from the list of heretics given in the 11th Canon.

The conversion of Constantine, if it brought peace to the Church, was followed by a weakening of that antagonism to heathen rites and customs which had prevailed during the centuries of persecution. In the fourth and fifth centuries a multitude of heathen professed Christianity, and brought within its pale habits of thought imbibed from polytheism, and cravings which demanded a surrogate for the heathen cults which they had given up. These tempers of mind, natural to the uneducated mass of converts, must be regarded as the main source of manifold practices which Protestants generally unite in pronouncing superstitious. Thus there arose a degenerate Christianity, a partially debased type of religion, — what has been called a Christianity of the "second rank" or grade. All along we meet with a resistance on the part of enlightened teachers to the encroachments of this paganized Christianity. This protest, however, is often mixed with concessions which go far to deprive it of its effect, and more and more gives way to what seems to be an irresistible tide. The Council of Elvira in Spain (306), in its 36th Canon, forbids pictures in churches, lest the objects of worship and adoration should be

depicted on their walls. Eusebius of Cæsarea declares all portraitures of Christ to be offensive to the Christian conscience. Epiphanius tore apart the curtain of a church in Palestine which had on it the embroidered picture of a saint. But as time went on, in defiance of earlier restrictions, now become obsolete, the costly churches that were erected were furnished with mural paintings. Amulets were prized, and supposed fragments of the true cross were peculiarly precious. Homage was paid to martyrs, supplications were addressed to them, their intercessions were sought. More and more their bones, even their wearing apparel and everything that was associated with their persons when living, shared in this religious reverence. It was not long before saints, persons of distinguished sanctity, were raised nearly or quite to the level of the martyrs. Especially the worship of Mary, whose perpetual virginity came to be generally accepted,— although it had not been held by so eminent a teacher as Basil,— was carried to a great height, in particular after the beginning of the Nestorian controversy. The office of angels was magnified in a proportional degree. They were recipients of religious honors, as the guardians of towns and cities, as well as of nations, the protectors against danger and calamity. The individual had his guardian angel, replacing the genius of the old religion. Thus there arose a Christian Pantheon. When Vigilantius, a Presbyter from the West, came out in opposition to the worship of martyrs and their relics, he was denounced by Jerome. Monasticism, with its holy class, whose function it was to live according to a sublimated ideal of morality, might easily lead Christians generally to content themselves with a standard in an equal degree too low. On this subject, also, Jerome was equally zealous in combating Vigilantius, and Augustine contended against Jovinian. As concerns the worship accorded to saints and angels, the theologians distinguished — whatever confusion might exist in the popular mind — between the qualified homage offered to created beings and the worship of God. As to the use of pictures in worship, it was sometimes said that the prohibition of the decalogue had reference to symbolical representations of heathen divinities. Their advantage as giving pictorial lessons to the ignorant was also dwelt upon. It deserves to be remembered that in the Sacrament the sole reference of the offering was to God.

The influence of the example of the heathen mysteries, of the

symbolism that characterized them, and of their supposed effect on the initiated, insensibly affected Christian ideas and spread itself over the Christian cultus. In the rites or worship it was increasingly the aim to realize through sensuous representations divine realities, and to gain a foretaste of heavenly good. Hence a sacredness was attached to every feature of the ritual. The entire cultus was enveloped in an atmosphere of mysticism. In the East, in the domain of Greek Christianity, there was thus established a punctilious ritualism like that of the Romans under the heathen system. This all-pervading, sacred symbolism linked itself to the doctrine of the Incarnation, the manifestation of God in visible humanity. The consequence in the Greek world was a petrifaction both in doctrine and the ceremonies of worship. Not a syllable in the creed could be changed, not a rite could be touched.

The mystagogy which had entered into the life of the Church in the East appeared full blown, in the closing part of the fifth century, in the Writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. They are, as regards the conception of God and the conception of religion as the union of the soul to God, permeated with a New Platonic mysticism, which thus gained a long-continued influence, reaching to the mediæval schoolmen. God is transcendent. He is exalted above the positive qualities ascribed to Him in the "cataphatic" theology and the denials of them in the negatives of the "apophatic." All that is is good; evil is negative, the absence of the good. Communion with God is not through reflection, not through a process of the intellect, but by illumination and purification. This is by means of the heavenly hierarchy, consisting, after God, of the three generic ranks of angels, to which correspond the three orders of the hierarchy on earth. The transition from the hierarchy above to the hierarchy below is through the Incarnation. The whole ceremonial of the Church is symbolical. It is by this complexity of symbols, as upon ladders, that the soul climbs to a direct union with God. The system of Dionysius had a zealous disciple and advocate in Maximus, the Confessor, who mingled, however, with its mysticism an ethical element in the conception of the freedom of the will.

The strong hold which heathenism in its Christian guise had gained is shown by the ineffectual struggles of the Iconoclasts in the Greek Empire. The first great leader in the attack on the

use of images in worship was the rough soldier, but vigorous ruler, the Emperor Leo the Isaurian (716–741). He was partly stimulated to his onset on what he considered paganism in the Church by the abhorrence of it felt by the Mohammedans. Having put down a revolt in the Cyclades, caused by his repressive measures, he commanded all portable images to be taken out of the churches and ordered the frescoes that could not be removed to be painted over. The Roman Bishops, Gregory I. and Gregory II., took sides with his opponents. John of Damascus, who, living in a cloister near Jerusalem, was safe under the protection of the Caliph, defended the obnoxious practice, seeking a justification for it in the analogon of the Incarnation. The son of Leo, Constantine Croponymos, pursued the same course as his father. A fierce contest arose everywhere between the Iconoclasts, both clergy and laity, who undertook to carry out the imperial decrees, and the people, especially the monks, who resisted them. It was not until the accession of Irene (780) that the image-worshippers began to acquire the ascendency. Their triumph was secured at the (second) Council of Nicæa in 787, which commanded the restoration of the images to the places from which they had been dislodged. The Council set up a distinction between the religious Veneration[1] — which included lights and the burning of incense — to be offered to images, and the adoration,[2] in the strict sense, which was due to God alone. Once more, for a time, the Iconoclasts got the upper hand under Leo V., the Armenian, who had the army at his back, which ascribed the disasters of the Empire to image-worship; but in 842 the Iconodulists celebrated their final victory. In this conflict, which had raged, with intervals of cessation, for upwards of a century, the party of Iconoclasts was actuated by mixed motives, in which civil policy, political subserviency, and religious indifferentism had a large share, while their opponents, however superstitious, waged the contest with deep sincerity. Its issue secured to the heathen elements which had become incorporated in the Christianity of the East an immovable place.

John of Damascus, the final expositor of the Greek theology in the ancient period, was much influenced by Aristotle, and in the turn of his mind was a scholastic theologian, in the technical sense. On the Trinity and the Person of Christ he follows in the path

[1] ἀσπασμός; τιμητικὴ προσκύνησις. [2] λατρεία.

opened by Leontius and Maximus the Confessor. In Anthropology, he is a dichotomist. He distinguishes between the "image" and the "similitude" of God in man. In Eschatology, he ignores the speculations of Origen, and is orthodox. On the Atonement, he holds that the death of Christ is a sacrifice offered to God and not a price to Satan. The "mysteries," the entire ritual, are made an integral part of the orthodox system. The worship of images is defended on the ground of unwritten tradition.

CHAPTER VI

THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF AUGUSTINE — THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY

Augustine is the most influential of all the teachers of the Church since the Apostolic age. Preëminent in the West, as Origen was among the theologians of the East, his sway was not like that of Origen, disputed and broken. It was of far longer continuance. This unrivalled influence grew out of the depth and variety of his powers, and the sincerity, energy, and fervor of his religious character. In him the dialectical and mystical elements coalesced. He was at once a philosopher and a saint. At the same time he was a man of letters and an orator. His *Confessions* are an outpouring of his heart in the form of a converse of his soul with God. Yet among devotional expressions full of ardor we find him interweaving distinctions respecting the divine attributes. The subtilty of his genius and his dialectical turn, together with his doctrine respecting faith and knowledge, not to speak now of other parts of his teaching, made him the founder of the mediæval theology. However it might swerve from his opinions, there was no explicit revolt against them. Through the Middle Ages, his word was counted to be law. His ideas respecting the Church and its institutions were embodied in the Roman Catholic system of hierarchical rule and sacramental grace. His teaching on another side, and the type of his religious experience, were a great source and warrant of the Protestant Reformation. Luther had learned, as he says, more from him than from any other non-biblical author. Calvin quotes him, as he says, "more frequently than any other as the best and most faithful Writer of Antiquity."[1] The variety in the effects thus traceable to Augustine, while it indicates the presence in his

[1] *Institut.* IV. xiv. 26.

teaching of unreconciled elements, testifies also to the wealth of its contents. Were there space here to review the course of his mental and religious life, we should dwell on his early training, which included whatever belonged to the liberal education of the time, a training which made him conversant with the Latin poets as well as other Latin authors, although his knowledge of Greek, owing, as he confesses, to his own negligence, was always imperfect; to his awakening, after giving way to sensual temptation, to higher thoughts and aspirations, through a passage in the *Hortensius* of Cicero; to his long novitiate in connection with the Manichæans, from whom he vainly hoped for a solution of the perplexities that distressed his mind, an appeasing of his thirst for knowledge; the interval of skepticism and despondency that ensued; the refreshing and stimulating influence of New Platonism which impressed on him the reality of spiritual things, and opened his spirit to Christian influences; his conversion through the influence of the study of the writings of the Apostle Paul and the sermons of Ambrose. He appreciated at once the value and the insufficiency of the "Platonic books." Acquainting himself with them before he entered into the meaning of the Scriptures, he could distinguish between "those who saw whither they were to go, yet saw not the way, a way that leadeth not merely to behold the beatific country, but to dwell in it."[1] Augustine had studied in his youth the dialectics of Aristotle; but his philosophy continued to be that of the New Platonists. Two fundamental factors concurred in giving to his interpretation of Christianity its distinctive form. The first was the writings of the Apostle Paul, or the Pauline teaching realized in his own inward experience. The second was the existing ecclesiastical system, — the Catholic Church, its authority, its traditions, its sacraments. According to the view of Protestant Christians, the second factor partially neutralized the proper action of the first. Thus there were mingled in his intellectual life the seeds of two discordant systems.

In Augustine's theology, faith precedes knowledge and is the key to knowledge. The first truth is that of the soul's own existence, which, like Descartes, Augustine holds to be involved in every conscious thought, even in every conscious doubt. Besides our sensations and our knowledge of our sensations, there is reason

[1] *Conf.* B. VIII. xx. 26.

which seeks after knowledge, and judges either correctly or erroneously. In these activities of reason we postulate a norm of judgment, a truth higher than ourselves, which is unchangeable. This unchangeable truth is a reality; it is God. To know ourselves as real is to know God as real. In God, or the Wisdom of God, are the rational grounds of all things. Thus in faith, the free acknowledgment of self and of God, all knowledge is founded. That material things exist is only an object of faith. It is only another recognition of the principle of authority when we accept the Scriptures and the traditions of the Church. Here faith assumes an ethical and religious character. But thought and inquiry are legitimate, for we are destined for knowledge, and "knowledge is the reward of faith."[1] The connecting link between God and the World is the Logos, in whom, as the Wisdom of God, are the invisible grounds of all things created. But creation is the free act of God, not the moulding of any previously existing materials. As concerns the attributes of God, they are relative to our apprehension. "He is good without quality, great without quantity," etc. He is even super-substantial, and it is more proper to speak of His 'essence' than of His 'substance.' In Him substance and attribute, like the attributes themselves, are indistinguishable. Here our best science is nescience. Respecting the Trinity, Augustine insists on the divine unity. His mode of presenting this doctrine is in contrast with that of Gregory of Nyssa and the later Nicæans, and is akin to that adopted by Athanasius. The distinction of persons is limited to their relation to one another. There is but one substance or essence, and when we speak of "three persons," it is only because we lack words to express the distinction between the Father and the Son, and between the Holy Ghost and the Father and the Son. "Certainly there are Three . . . Yet when it is asked, what Three, human language labors from great poverty of speech. We say 'three persons,' not that it may be so said, but that we may not keep silence."[2] We say of each person that He is omnipotent, "but there are not three omnipotents.[3] The expressions of Augustine evidently were at the basis of the so-called Athanasian Creed. In the conception of the person of Christ, his humanity comes to its rights more nearly than is true of the Eastern champions of orthodoxy. The

[1] *Ev. Johann. Tract.* 29, § 6. *Letters,* 120.
[2] *De Trin.* V. c. 9. [3] *Ibid.* c. 8.

voluntary humiliation of Christ in becoming incarnate is an aspect of the doctrine on which Augustine delights to dwell.

When we seek to determine where Augustine placed the seat of authority, we meet with statements not easily reconcilable. He is most deeply impressed with the evidences of divine inspiration in the Scriptures. "To the canonical Scriptures alone I owe agreement without any dissent."[1] Yet we find also numerous statements of the same general tenor as the following: "I should not believe the Gospel, did not the authority of the Catholic Church move me thereto."[2] Moreover, he professes his faith in many things which are not found in the Scriptures, but only in the traditions accepted by the Church. On questions pertaining to the Canon itself the decisions of the Church are with him decisive. At least a partial explanation of this inconsistency is suggested when we look at the circumstance of his conversion. When, in listening to the preaching of Ambrose, his heart began to be deeply stirred, he was surprised by the disclosure to his soul of truth in the Scriptures which was far more profound than his superficial interpretations had before discovered to him. It was under the auspices of the Church, from the lips of its authorized and anointed teachers, that he was thus lifted up to a new discernment and appropriation of Biblical teaching. Apart from this special influence, and along with it, the impression made by the Church, spread as it was over the world, and stretching back to the days of the Apostles, with its martyrs and saints, its miracles, its intrepid condemnation of the world, its extending conquests, was such as to excite belief in its claims to authority. In the prosecution of the contest with the Donatists, Augustine was led to develop and define his conception of the Church. The notes of the Church are unity, holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity. The Church is the organization which is connected by the Apostolic Sees, among which Rome is preëminent, with the Apostles. Ecclesiastical discipline is a duty, but ideal perfection is not possible here on earth. The tares must be left to grow with the wheat. Not all who are within the fold of the Church are heirs of salvation. On the great disputed questions of the validity of baptism by heretics, and of ordination by traditors, he maintained the affirmative, with the qualification that rites thus performed require, not to be repeated, but to be supplemented

[1] *Nat. et Grat.* 61. [2] *Cont. Epist. Manich.* 5.

by the public admission of the recipients into the Church Catholic. This position was conformed to the ordinances of the Synod of Arles in 314. The proposition, which had been previously vindicated by Optatus of Milevis, that the sacraments are to this extent valid, independently of the personal character of the administrators, was established. Augustine connected his view with the general ground that while love, the essential of salvation, is a grace to be acquired only within the Church, faith and hope, its proper, but not necessary, precursors, are possible without its pale.

At this point, it is convenient to call attention to Augustine's doctrine concerning the relation of faith to personal salvation. The student of Augustine will subscribe to the remark of Harnack, that "whoever looks away from the formulas to the spirit will find everywhere in the Writings of Augustine a stream of Pauline faith."[1] Yet in his dogmatic expositions, the Pauline conception is modified in such a way that the organic relation of faith to works, or its necessary relation, does not appear. The faith that justifies is faith to which love is united. The solution which he offers of the seeming contradiction of Paul and James is this: their common doctrine is that faith is the first in order, but James is interested to emphasize the point that it does not avail unless it is followed by works.[2] Augustine retains the doctrine of merits, as taught by his predecessors, only he magnifies grace by pronouncing all our merits to be God's gifts.[3] Since it is held that baptism effaces guilt for the past, and from the general turn of Augustine's teaching, it would appear, that although his sense of the *guilt* of sin is keen, it is less intense than his sense of the tyranny of sin and of the corruption entailed by it.

Augustine reproduces the theory of a relation of the death of Christ to Satan. Satan's dominion, after man's surrender, existed of right; but by inflicting death on one who was sinless, he justly forfeited that dominion. Augustine, however, does not confine himself to this view of the Atonement. The righteousness of God is the motive of the infliction of punishment. There was a double ground for the Incarnation of Christ, first that by suffering all things in behalf of us He might deliver us from the bonds of sin, and secondly, that He might set us free from its power.[4] "He took on himself, being without guilt, our punishment, that he

[1] DG. III. 71. [2] *De Fide et Oper.* 14. [3] *Conf.* IX. 34.
[4] *De Vera Relig.* I. 16. See Baur, DG. I. (2), 382.

might put away our guilt and put an end to our punishment."[1] There are passages of like import in Hilary and Ambrose.[2]

The symbolical nature of Sacraments is very frequently set forth by Augustine. Sacraments are said to be "visible words." "In a sacrament, one thing is seen, another is understood." A sacrament is "the visible form of an invisible grace." Yet it is far from his conception that the Sacraments are bare symbols. They are the concomitants, and in a sense the vehicles, of the grace which they figure to the senses. The water of baptism shows outwardly "the *sacrament* of grace"; the Spirit working inwardly "the *benefit* of grace."[3] It brings the forgiveness of sin; it weakens its power within us. The literal interpretation of John vi. 33 is repudiated. The passage means that we are to participate in the sufferings of our Lord, and remember meetly and to our profit His death for us.[4] We are not to confound signs with the thing signified.[5] The body of Christ which was on earth is now in heaven.[6] Yet those who are in "the unity of Christ's body" — in the Church Catholic — "are truly said to eat the body and drink the blood of Christ."[7] "He that dwelleth not in Christ, and in whom Christ dwelleth not, neither eateth his flesh nor drinketh his blood.[8] But the Sacrament is a sacrifice, the life and soul of which is the spiritual self-devotion of its recipients to God; nevertheless a sacrifice bringing benefit to the departed.

An essential element in Augustine's theodicy is the doctrine that as God's plan is universal, His purpose and His will are completely carried out. The goal that is aimed at in the creation is attained. The Being who has not left "even the entrails of the smallest and most insignificant animal, or the feather of a bird, or the little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, without a harmony, and, as it were, a mutual peace among all its parts, — that God can never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside of the laws of his Providence."[9] Evil exists, but evil, even moral evil, is a negation; it is the absence, or the privation, of good. It is therefore not

[1] *C. Faust. Manich.* XIV. 1. In Sermo 137, he apostrophizes Christ — "sustinens poenam, ut et culpam solvas et poenam."

[2] See Thomasius, DG. I. 409, 410.

[3] *Ep.* 98, 2.

[4] *De Christ. Doctr.* III. 16.

[5] *Ibid.* 9.

[6] *Ep.* 205, 1.

[7] *De Civ. Dei*, XXI. 25.

[8] *In Johann. Tract.* 26, 18.

[9] *De Civ. Dei*, V. 11.

an object of creation. God is not its author. Moreover, God's will is never defeated. The will of the creature when it opposes the will of the Creator, He uses to carry out His will. He turns evil into good. He accomplishes some of his purposes through the evil desires of wicked men. When evil exists, God permits it and wills to permit it.[1] Augustine does not shrink from the paradoxical saying, "it is good that evil exists." In the *Civitas Dei*, the attempt is made to vindicate God's character in the ordering of the course of history. The author was led to write it by complaints uttered against Christianity by the heathen after the capture of Rome by the Goths. There are two communities whose origin is traced back six thousand years to the beginnings of the race. One is the city of God, the other is the city of the world. . . . The former begins with Abel; the latter with Cain, of whom it is significantly said that he "built a city." The one is composed of the people of God, led forward from age to age, through the old dispensation, and under the new, and destined to attain to everlasting blessedness. The other is composed of the wicked, consisting both of the flagrantly bad, but, also, of the virtuous according to a human estimate, such as patriots, heroes and sages, who are nevertheless without love to God. The end of the members of the *civitas mundi* is eternal misery. During the three ages of mankind, the period antecedent to Israel, the Old Testament period, and the Christian — which are also subdivided so as to made six in all — useful inventions, arts, and sciences arise, kingdoms and empires are built up, — all subserving a divine plan, and productive of much good. But secular society, the institutions of human government, are in their origin tainted with evil. Their necessity and their use are conditioned on the introduction and spread of sin. Under this pre-supposition, human government, the government of the Roman Empire, has a rightful existence, and is ordained of God. But the Church is the *civitas Dei*, which the State is bound to protect and uphold, even to the extent of exercising coercion against heretics and assailants of its legitimate authority. The end of the world is a final conflagration which is followed by a new world, the abode of the righteous, the heirs of salvation.

Augustine adopts a literal view of the mode of the resurrection, and meets objections by fanciful hypotheses relative to the com-

[1] *Enchiridion*, c. 101.

position and the stature of the bodies of the redeemed. He holds fast to the prevalent doctrine of everlasting punishment, which he tells us that "very many" disbelieve.[1] It may be that the pains of the condemned are at certain intervals mitigated. It may be that "some believers" pass through a "kind of purgatorial fire" after death. "It is a matter that may be inquired into or left doubtful."[2] But Augustine distinctly avers that the sacraments and alms of the faithful on earth are of service to that middle class who are neither too good to need such a benefit, nor too bad to have it granted to them. It accrues to none save those who on earth have earned such merit that such services can help them.[3]

In expounding the opinions of Augustine on Sin and Grace, the most distinctive part of his theology, we are brought to the Pelagian Controversy, in which his opinions in their mature form were set forth and defended. Pelagius, a British monk, came to Rome about the beginning of the fifth century. The ablest supporters of his teaching were Cœlestius, who had been a Roman lawyer, but became a monk, and later, Julian, Bishop of Eclanum, a man of striking ability and an acute polemic. The external events of the controversy, which involved a crisis of importance parallel with that produced by the Arian Controversy in the East, will be touched upon hereafter. There were really two systems at war with one another. Their main points can be here best exhibited by placing them in contrast, without reference to the chronological course of the discussion.

Pelagius was a monk, strict if not austere in his morality. Augustine himself testifies to the high esteem in which he was held for the purity of his life.[4] He had passed through no arduous inward struggle with propensities to evil, approached the subjects of debate from an ethical point of view. Human responsibility and its necessary conditions were the matter uppermost in his thoughts. Before the contest began, he had found fault with Augustine's sentence in the *Confessions:* "Give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt." His habits of mind, in connection with his personal experience, naturally led him to extreme views concerning obedience as a constitutive element in religion and human power as commensurate with obligation. A rationalistic

[1] *Enchirid.* 112. [2] *Ibid.* c. 66. [3] *Ibid.* 110.

[4] *Ep.* 186, *ad Paul. De Pecc. Merit.* III. 1, 3. See Wiggers, *Augustinism and Pelagianism*, p. 42 sq.

tendency in the interpretation of the Gospel, a certain "moralism," were the natural accompaniments of this tendency. Augustine, on the other hand, was most deeply impressed with the fact of man's dependence. With him, human sin and human need were the realities apart from which the salvation through the Gospel had no meaning, or was emptied of its essential character. His point of view was predominantly religious. In the first place, the world itself, instead of being launched into being and left to a self-development, is forever dependent on God's co-working energy. In the second place, man is not himself the author of goodness; he has no goodness save in communion with God, and this is impossible — impossible for unfallen man or for any creature — without God's indwelling, inspiring grace.[1] Pelagius's opinion of unfallen man was the very opposite. He is qualified for right or for wrong action through a complete, inherent capacity.[2] In the third place, while Pelagius considered the freedom of the will to be the power of alternate choice, — an inalienable power of contrary choice, — with Augustine freedom in the true sense is the soul's actual superiority to the lower propensities, subjection to which is servitude. Freedom thus coalesces with necessity, a necessity, however, which is not constraint.[3] In the case of God and of perfected saints, it is a blessed necessity. Augustine cannot be said to be strictly a determinist in his theory of the will; for, in the first place, he held to a power of contrary choice in civil or worldly concerns, and secondly, he held to the existence, as a temporary possession, of the same power in Adam, in the sphere of morals and religion. It was in him a part of the apparatus of personal responsibility,[4] but was destined to merge on one side or the other, in a state of the will, permanent, and if evil, by his own act irrevocable. But practically, after the moral decision was made, determinism comes into play.

According to Augustine, Adam, through the grace given him, was able to remain upright, in communion with God. By his own act, the reverse of which was possible to him, he brought on

[1] "His free-will would not have sufficed for his continuance in righteousness, unless God had assisted it by imparting a portion of his unchangeable goodness." *Enchirid.* 106.

[2] See, e.g., *Ep. ad Demetr.* c. 2, 3, 13, 14, and, in Augustin. *De Grat. Christ.* 4, *De Nat. et Grat.* 47. See, also, Julian (in August. *Op. Imp.* VI. 9, I. 91).

[3] See, e.g., *C. Duas Epp. Pel.* I. 18.

[4] "Man in Paradise was able of his own will, simply by abandoning righteousness, to destroy himself." *Enchirid.* 106.

himself, justly, physical death, moral guilt, and an enslavement of the will to sin. These consequences, likewise justly, appear in his descendants from their birth.[1]

Augustine's theory rests on the idea that human nature as a whole was deposited in the first man. This nature, as it came from the hands of God, was pure. The long battle which he had fought with Manichæan philosophy, both in his own soul and after his conversion, made him sedulous to avoid their peculiar tenet. But human nature, existing in its totality in Adam, was corrupted in the first act of transgression, and as such is transmitted to his descendants. The instrument of this transmission is the sexual appetite. This appetite is itself the fruit of the first sin, as well as the means whereby the sinful nature is communicated from father to son. The race was embodied in its first representative, and, when the race is unfolded or developed, the qualities which it acquired in his act, which was both generic and individual, appear as the personal possession of each individual at birth. As a personal act, the first sin was not our act but the act of another; yet it was truly the common act of mankind in their collective or undistributed form of existence. For the consequences of this act all are therefore responsible; and as soon as they exist as individuals, they exhibit in themselves the same corruption of nature, — the same inordinate appetites (concupiscence), and slavery of the will to sin, — which resulted to Adam. "This theory would easily blend with Augustine's speculative form of thought, as he had appropriated to himself the Platonico-Aristotelian Realism in the doctrine of general conceptions, and conceived of general conceptions as the original types of the kind realized in individual things."[2] It may be remarked here that Realism either in the extreme Platonic form or in the more moderate Aristotelian type, prevailed from Augustine down through the Middle Ages, being embraced by the orthodox schoolmen, and ruling both the great schools during the productive, golden era of scholastic theology. That the realistic mode of thought extensively influenced Protestant theology at the Reformation and afterwards, admits of no question. But since it is far from being true that all Augustinians have been avowed, much less, self-consistent, Realists, it is better when we speak of them as a class, to say that they are swayed by a realistic mode

[1] See, e.g., *De Corrept. et Grat.* 10.

[2] Neander, *Ch. History*, II. 609.

of thought than that they are the advocates of an explicit Realism. It should be added that Realism, as far as it affected Augustine, was rather a prop than a source of his doctrine. The fact of innate sin was so deeply lodged in his convictions that he was not averse to any plausible support or defense of it that lay within his reach.

In relation to the doctrine of a generic sin in Adam, we observe that after he became established in this opinion, and through all of his numerous treatises relating to the Pelagian Controversy, there is a great uniformity in his expressions. The same set of propositions and arguments appears and reappears. In that great sin of the first man our nature was deteriorated, and not only became sinful, but generates sinners.[1] We were all in Adam and sinned when he sinned. In his interpretation of Romans v. 12, he first sets aside the supposition that the *in quo* of the Vulgate refers to "sin" or to "death," and infers that it must refer to Adam himself. "Nothing remains," he says, "but to conclude that in the first man all are understood to have sinned, because all were in him when he sinned; whereby sin is brought in with birth and not removed save by the new birth." He then quotes approvingly the sentence ascribed to Hilary, the Roman deacon: "it is manifest that in Adam all sinned, so to speak, *en masse*."[2] By that sin we became a corrupt mass — *massa perditionis*.[3]

So important was this hypothesis in his view, that his defence of the doctrine of Original Sin turned upon it. Without it, he knew of no refuge against the sharp and merciless logic of his adversaries. Pelagius himself was a man of no mean ability; but Augustine found in Julian his peer in dialectic skill, which he owed partly to his Aristotelian training. Julian was a sharp and vigorous, as well as a fearless antagonist. He seized on the vulnerable points in Augustine's theory, and pursued him with questions and objections, which the latter was quite unable to parry except by his Realistic hypothesis. This is strikingly shown in the *Opus Imperfectum* or Rejoinder to the Second Response of Julian. The Pelagian makes his appeal to the sense of justice

[1] *De Nupt. et Concup.* II. xxxiv.

[2] *Cont. duas Epp. Pelag.* IV. 7, cf. *Op. Imp.* II. lxiii., *De Pec. Mer. et Remis.* III. vii.

[3] *De Pecc. Orig.* 31, *De Corrept. et Grat.* 7.

which God has implanted in every human breast, and which utters a firm and indignant protest against the doctrine that we are blamed, condemned, and punished for what we could not have prevented. He lays hold of passages in favor of the voluntariness of sin, which Augustine had written, whilst he was bent on controverting the Manichæans. To all this Augustine could only reply that sin began in an act of the human will — the will of Adam; that in him was the very nature with which we are born; that we thus participated in that act, and justly partake of the corruption that ensued upon it. He constantly falls back, first on the authority of Paul, in the fifth of Romans, and hardly less often on the authority of Ambrose, whose assertion of our community of being with Adam and agency in his transgression, had the greatest weight with his admiring and reverential pupil.

But how vital the hypothesis of sinning in Adam was in Augustine's theology is perhaps most manifest in the way in which he treats the litigated question of the origin of souls. We may say here that a great mistake is made by those who imagine that Creationists — that is, those who believe that each soul is separately created — cannot be Realists. Whether they can be consistent and logical Realists may, to be sure, be doubted. At the present day traducianism — the theory that souls result from procreation — is accepted by theologians who believe, with Augustine, that we literally sinned in Adam. But this is very far from being the uniform fact in the past. Even Anselm, like the Schoolmen generally, was a Creationist. He, with a host of theologians before and after him, held firmly to our real, responsible participation in Adam's fall and to the corruption of our nature in that act, and yet refused to count himself among the traducians. We must take history as it is and not seek to read into it our reasonings and inferences. If we do not find philosophers self-consistent, we must let them remain self-inconsistent, instead of altering their systems to suit our ideas of logical harmony.

In respect to the question of the origin of souls, the letter of Augustine to Jerome is a most interesting document, and one the importance of which has seldom been duly recognized.[1] He had previously expressed himself as doubtful on the question, though obviously leaning towards the traducian side.[2] But the fear of materialistic notions, enhanced as it was by the opposition of the

[1] *Epistol. Classis,* III. clxvi. [2] *De Gen. ad loc.* L. x.

Church to the refined materialism of Tertullian, deterred Augustine then, as always, from espousing the traducian theory. This fear, it may be here observed, together with the feeling that this theory gives too much agency to second causes in the production of the soul, operated in subsequent times to dissuade theologians from giving sanction to the same hypothesis. The letter to Jerome is a candid and memorable expression of the difficulties in which Augustine found himself involved on the subject to which it relates. To Jerome he resorts for light. He begins by saying that he has prayed and still prays God to grant that his application may be successful. The question of the origin of souls is one of deep concern to him. Of the soul's immortality he has no doubt, though it be not immortal as if it were a part of God, and in the same mode in which He is immortal. Of the immateriality of the soul, he is equally certain; and his arguments to show the absurdity of supposing the soul to occupy space are convincingly stated. He is certain, moreover, that the soul is fallen into sin by no necessity, whether imposed by its own nature or by God. Yet the soul is sinful and without baptism will perish. How can this be? He entreats Jerome to solve the problem. "Where did the soul contract the guilt by which it is brought into condemnation?" In his book *De Libero Arbitrio*, he had made mention of four opinions in regard to the origin of souls, first, that souls are propagated, the soul of Adam alone having been created; secondly, that for every individual a new soul is created; thirdly, that the soul preëxists in each case, and is sent by God into the body at birth; fourthly, that the soul preëxists, but comes into the body of its own will. A fifth supposition that the soul is a part of Deity, he had not had occasion to consider. But he had gained no satisfactory answer to the problem. Beset by inquirers, he had been unable to solve their queries. Neither by prayer, reading, reflection, or reasoning, had he been able to find his way out of his perplexity.[1]

"Teach me, therefore, I beg you, what I should teach, what I should hold; and tell me, if it be true that souls are made now and separately with each separate birth, where in little children they sin, that they should need in the sacrament of Christ the remission of sin"; "or if they do not sin, with what justice they

[1] *Epist.* III. LXV. c. iv. 9. "Et ea neque orando, neque legendo, neque cogitando et ratiocinando invenire potuimus."

are so bound by another's sin, when they are inserted in the mortal, propagated members, that damnation follows them, unless it is prevented by the Church (through baptism); since it is not in their power to cause the grace of baptism to be brought to them. So many thousands of souls, then, which depart from their bodies without having received Christian baptism, — with what justice are they condemned, in case they are newly created, with no preceding sin, but, on the contrary, by the will of the Creator, each of these souls was given to each new-born child, for animating whom He created and gave it, — by the will of the Creator, who knew that each of them, through no fault of his own, would go out of the body without Christian baptism? Since, then, we can neither say of God that He compels souls to become sinful, or punishes the innocent, and since likewise it is not right to assert that those who depart from the body without the sacrament, even little children, escape from damnation; *I beseech you to say how this opinion is defended which assumes that souls come into being, not all from that one soul of the first man, but for every man a separate soul, like that one for Adam?*"

Other objections to creationism Augustine feels competent easily to meet; but when it comes to the penalties inflicted on little children, he begs Jerome to believe that he is in a strait and knows not what to think or to say.[1] He confesses that what he had written in his book on Free-Will of the imaginary benefits of suffering, even to infants, will not suffice to explain even the sufferings of the unbaptized in this life. "I require, therefore, the ground of this condemnation of little children, *because, in case souls are separately created, I do not see that any of them sin at that age, nor do I believe that any one is condemned by God, whom He sees to have no sin.*" He repeats again and again this pressing inquiry. "Something perfectly strong and invincible is required, which will not force us to believe that God condemns any soul without any fault." He fervently desires from Jerome the means of escaping from this great perplexity; he would prefer to embrace the Creationist theory; but on this theory, he sees no possible mode in which native, inherent depravity and the destruction of the unbaptized can be held, consistently with the justice of God.

[1] "Magnis, mihi, crede, coarctor angustiis, nec quid respondeam prorsus invenio."

Such was the theology of Augustine. If there is no real participation in Adam's transgression on our part, he can see no justice in making us partakers of its penalty, or in attributing to us a sinful nature from birth.

"Persona corrumpit naturam; natura corrumpit personam." So the doctrine was summarily stated. In Adam human nature, by his act, was vitiated. That corrupted nature is transmitted, through physical generation, to his descendants. They acted in him — in another — and are, therefore, truly counted sinners, being sinfully corrupt from the beginning of individual life. Concupiscence, the principle of sin, includes the baser proclivities of human nature, but it is the sexual passion which Augustine most frequently has in mind in connection with the term. The sexual instinct, he holds, was, in Paradise, void of lust and unattended by shame.

In the system of Pelagius men were made mortal.[1] They did not become such by Adam's sin. As far as they are sinners it is by doing as Adam did. All good or evil is something "done by us, for we are capable of either."[2] There is at our birth nothing within us but what God placed there.[3] The supposition of sin in infants before the exercise of reason, prior to the "election" of evil, is monstrous. Pelagius makes room in his theory for the increase and spread of sin among mankind, which renders it more difficult to do right; but the liberty of election is never subverted.[4]

Augustine's idea of character was *qualitative*. Everything depends on the single, underlying principle. If this be the love of God, man is righteous. If the love of God is absent, his virtues are at best *splendida vitia*. The idea of the unity or simplicity of character has no place in the system of Pelagius. His conception of character is atomistic. In keeping with this difference, while

[1] We have the extant writings of Pelagius himself: the *Expositiones in Epist. Paul, Epist. ad Demetr.*, and the *Libell. Fidei et Innocent.* (both included among Jerome's works, the latter in Hahn, 2d ed. p. 213 sq.). Other writings of Pelagius remain only fragments, in Augustine and other opponents. We have fragments of Coelestius in quotations in Augustine. For fragments of his Confession of Faith, see Hahn, p. 218. Copious extracts from Julian are in Augustine (*Opus Imperfect.* etc., and elsewhere), and in Marius Mercator. Julian's Confession of Faith is in Hahn, p. 219 sq.

[2] Pelagius, *De lib. arbitr.* (in Augustin., *De Pecc. Orig.* 14)

[3] See Aug. *De Pecc. Orig.* 13.

[4] *Ep. ad Demetr.* c. 8: "Longa consuetudo vitiorum," etc.

Augustine believed in the universality of sin (with the possible exception of the Virgin Mary), Pelagius held that some — for example, Abel, John the Baptist — had lived without sin.

In reply to Augustine's argument from the practise of infant baptism, the Pelagians brought forward a distinction between "life eternal," to which the unbaptized may attain, and the "kingdom of heaven," a state of higher blessedness, which is open only to the baptized. Baptized persons, said Augustine, are not free from original sin. It is only the guilt that is washed away in baptism; the concupiscence, although weakened, is entailed and remains.

Respecting the condition of the human will since the fall, Augustine affirms that the will is not eradicated; it continues in full activity.[1] Yet there is a bondage of the will, with no power of self-deliverance. "We are not liberated from righteousness save by the choice of the will; we are not liberated from sin save by the grace of the Redeemer."

To Pelagius the grace of God consisted in the revelations made of His will and of the trurth, first as sin began to increase, in the Law, and then through the life and teaching of Christ.[2] To these gifts of grace are added the discipline of trials and the like. Grace facilitates the right action of the will, but this action under the Gospel is from man himself, accepting and obeying when he has full power to refuse and disobey. Liberty continues, which Julian concisely defines as the possibility in the will of either admitting or avoiding sin, it being exempt from a constraining necessity. Whatever aids of grace are specially bestowed on Christians are procured by their own merits. According to Augustine, all external provisions designed to move the heart are ineffectual as a means of conversion, apart from the Grace of the Spirit operating within the soul. By this inward power from above, the will, in the case of all true believers, is not only enabled to believe, but is effectually moved to believe. There is bestowed not only, as the Pelagians taught, the *esse* and the *posse*, but also the *velle*, — the right choice, the new heart.

From the sinfulness and impotency of all men, Augustine deduced the doctrine of unconditional predestination. They who believe in the Gospel with a saving faith are not merely elected to be the recipients of the heavenly reward; they are elected to be

[1] *C. duas Epp. Pelag.* II. 9.

[2] See in Augustine, *De Grat. Christ.*

the recipients of faith.[1] Faith itself is the gift of God. All others are left in their sins — left to perish. They are not predestinated to sin, but rather to the punishment which sin deserves, from which they are not saved by electing grace. The number of the elect is fixed.[2] It is predetermined in the plan of God. But not all believers are of the elect. Perseverance in the new, holy life is the gift of God, and is bestowed on that portion of believers to whom God in His inscrutable wisdom chooses to grant it.

The doctrines which are sketched above were not the opinions of Augustine in the earlier period subsequent to his conversion. It was the period in which he controverted the Manichæans. At that time he held, not to absolute, but to conditional, predestination, and to a reserved power in the will, notwithstanding our need of divine succor. Man, he held, can exercise faith by his own power, and thereby obtain the gift of converting grace. In 394, when he wrote his commentary on the Romans, he contrasted an election on the ground of works with election conditioned on faith, and ascribed to the elect hidden merits — *occultissima merita* — that is, certain dispositions of heart which are the ground and reason of their being elected. Further reflection on his own spiritual experience and later study of the Scriptures convinced him that election is unconditional, that the contrast in the Epistle to the Romans is not between an election on the ground of works and an election on the ground of faith, but between a work springing wholly from God, and man's doings of whatever sort. The election of a man is not a judgment in his favor, in comparison with other men, but an act of sovereign grace. In the Apostle's assertion (1 Tim. ii. 1–4): "Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth," Augustine makes "all men" denote "every sort of men." That is, the gift of salvation is not restricted to any one nation or class. But we cannot believe that "the omnipotent God has willed anything to be done which was not done."[3]

A study of Augustine's Writings reveals to us two discordant veins of thought. There are two currents and they flow in opposite directions. On the one hand, there is the common Catholic

[1] *De Praedest. Sanctorum*, 37, c. 18.
[2] *De Corrept. et Grat.* 39, c. 13.
[3] *Enchirid.* 103.

ecclesiasticism, in which he lived and moved, and which as a rule shapes his doctrinal statements. On the other hand, there is the great idea of the church spiritual and invisible, composed of the saints elect. This church is included within the ecclesiastical body. The latter is a *corpus permixtum*. Election does not cleave to the sacraments. They have no saving efficacy for the non-elect. Augustine wrote no full and elaborate system. When his mind is turned to that spiritual body to which alone future blessedness belongs, we find him no longer insisting on the indispensableness of baptism and of the other sacraments. There were men who were not Israelites, who yet belonged to "the spiritual Jerusalem." That "holy and wonderful man Job" was undeniably one of these. This instance of Job is given us in Scripture that we might infer the existence of a larger, spiritual Israel, embracing men of other nations.[1] The Cumæan Sybil is referred to by Augustine as another like example.[2] More general, and, as we may say, more generous, are statements in a letter to Deogratias.[3] "From the beginning of the human race," it is said, "whosoever believed in Him"—that is in Christ, who prefigured in different ways the manifestation of Himself in the flesh—"and in any way knew him, and lived in a pious and just manner according to his precepts, was undoubtedly saved by him, in whatever time and place he may have lived." Attention to much that Augustine says relative to the hierarchy and ordination discovers the same bent as that here illustrated. The *Enchiridion*, which is the only summary view of theology that he composed, connects the development of doctrine with the three Christian virtues, Faith, Hope, and Love.[4]

[1] *De Civ. Dei*, XVIII. 47. [2] *Ibid.* 23. [3] Let. CII. 12.

[4] The antithesis in Augustine between the "vulgar-Katholisch" line of thought and teaching and the spiritual, non-ecclesiastical, as well as other antitheses in Augustine's teaching, are lucidly and thoroughly described by H. Reuter, in his *Augustinische Studien* (1887). See especially the excellent summaries, pp. 100–105, 150–152, 355–358. See, also, Harnack's very able exposition of Augustine (DG. Vol. III.).

CHAPTER VII

PELAGIANISM AND THE THEOLOGY OF THE EAST ON THE CONTROVERTED TOPICS — SEMI-PELAGIANISM — GREGORY I.

In 411, Pelagius and Cœlestius went over to Africa, where Pelagius met Augustine. Pelagius soon betook himself to the East. In 412, the Presbyter Pauliniis, from Milan, charged Cœlestius with heresy, before a synod at Carthage, imputing to him six heretical propositions.[1] Cœlestius was excluded from the fellowship of the Church, and repaired to the East. There Jerome, with no clear understanding of the points of the controversy, and swayed by his hostility to Rufinus, who was a friend of Pelagius, entered with heat into the warfare against his doctrines. In 415, Orosius, a young Spanish presbyter who was on a visit to Jerome, made an accusation against Pelagius before an assembly of Jerusalem presbyters under their bishop John, who, on hearing the explanation of the accused, declined to pronounce against him. As Pelagius was of the Latin Church, he said, it belonged to the Roman bishop to take cognizance of the matter. In the same year, at a Synod at Diospolis in Palestine, presided over by Eulogius, Bishop of Cæsarea, Pelagius was again charged with heresy by the Western bishops, but was acquitted, owing, Augustine alleges, to a lack of candor in his disavowals.[2] The Synods of Carthage and Mileve and Augustine personally, in 416, made a successful effort to procure a condemnation of Pelagius and Cœlestius, from Innocent I. But his successor, Zosimus, on receiving a confession of faith which Pelagius had sent to Innocent, and certain declarations from Cœlestius, publicly testified to the orthodoxy of both. The African bishops, assembled at Carthage, at the end of 417 or

[1] Mercator, *Comm.* II. p. 133. See Münscher, DG. I. 374, N. 1.

[2] For accounts of this Synod, see Mansi, IV. pp. 315 sq. See Hefele, *History of Councils*, II. B. VIII. § 118.

the beginning of 418, declared their adherence to the decision of Innocent. At a general council of the North African bishops in 418, eight or nine Canons were passed, asserting the Augustinian, and rejecting the Pelagian, opinions.[1] The Emperor Honorius was induced to issue a threatening Rescript against the adherents of the new heresy. There were other imperial edicts promulgated later of the same character. Zosimus, after a second and then a general African Council at Carthage, although he had previously begun to waver, changed his position. At a Roman Synod, Pelagius and Cœlestius were condemned, and a circular epistle — tractoria — was issued by Zosimus, sanctioning in full the action of the North African Church. All bishops in the West were required to assent to the letter of Zosimus on pain of deposition. Eighteen bishops, of whom Julian of Eclanam was the most eminent, refused compliance. Many of them took refuge in the East. Julian was received by Theodore of Mopsuestia, who did not agree with all his opinions, but rejected the doctrine of innate sin. Their connection with Nestorius and his followers brought upon some of the Pelagians a share of their unpopularity. Marius Mercator, a layman from the West, made great exertions to convince the Emperor Theodosius II. of the heterodoxy of the Pelagians. As a result of these complications, the Council of Ephesus in 431, which condemned Nestorius, condemned also Cœlestius and his adherents, but without specifying their errors. It is obvious in all these transactions that the real convictions of the Eastern Church were midway between Augustine and Pelagius, and that the East, especially the Antiochian theologians, apart from influences from without and from accidental causes, were disposed to tolerate the obnoxious leaders. These leaders always affirmed that their opinions contained no *dogmas*, had received no authoritative condemnation from the Church, but related to questions where debate and difference of judgment were permissible.

The support which Augustine received in the West, as concerns the doctrines of absolute inability, irresistible grace, and unconditional predestination, was far from being unanimous. The General Council of Carthage had gone no farther than to declare that it was the fall of Adam that brought in death, that infants are to be baptized for the remission of sin derived from Adam, that

[1] Mansi, III. 810–823. See Hefele (as above), § 119.

grace operates within the soul, giving the requisite aid to avoid sin, that sinless perfection is unattainable in this life. In 426 or 427, it was reported to Augustine that the monks in the cloister of Adrumetum in North Africa were in some cases driven to despair, in other cases moved to careless self-indulgence, by his teaching as to man's helplessness and as to irresistible grace. He addressed to them two Writings to correct these evils.[1] Even Jerome, the champion of the Augustinian cause, did not give up his belief in a remaining freedom in the will, nor did he really adopt the tenets of absolute election and irresistible grace. It is a remarkable fact in Doctrinal History that it was by way of indirect opposition to these opinions of Augustine that Vincent of Lerins wrote his (first) Commonitory (434), in which he set forth the criteria of catholic doctrine. These are declared to be antiquity, universality. This is equivalent to saying that that only is of the faith, is catholic or orthodox doctrine, which is accepted always, everywhere, and by all — *semper, ubique et ab omnibus*. Among the mild and moderate dissenters from Augustine's doctrine of predestination was Hilary, Bishop of Arles, who had lived in the cloister at Lerins. But the most conspicuous of these dissenters was John Cassianus. He had been educated in the East, and was the founder and guide of the Cloister at Marseilles. His name is associated with the type of theology designated by the Schoolmen "Semi-Pelagian," but which, it has been said, might as well be termed "Semi-Augustinian." He held to a proclivity of the heart to sin, and to the need of an inward operation of grace, man being of himself insufficient. But he did not consider this inborn propensity to evil to be in the proper sense guilty, he asserted a remaining power and a coöperative agency of the human will in conversion, and, therefore, a conditional predestination. Made acquainted with these movements by Prosper of Aquitania and another Hilary, a layman, Augustine wrote two treatises in defence of his views.[2] These friends wrote on the same side, and continued the controversy after Augustine's death. Prosper set forth Augustine's opinion on predestination with a studious moderation. In the same spirit was written an anonymous work on the Calling of the Gentiles,[3] in which a distinction

[1] *De Grat. et lib. Arbitr.* and *De Corrept. et Grat.*

[2] *De Predest. Sanctorum and De Dono Perseverantiæ.*

[3] *De Vocat. Gentilium.*

was made between general and special grace, — the last alone being effectual. Another anonymous work entitled *Predestinatus*, in which the doctrine was presented in the baldest form, was, perhaps, composed by a Semi-Pelagian as a caricature and weapon of assault. In the last half of the fifth century, Faustus, Bishop of Rhegium, was an able advocate of the Semi-Pelagian doctrine. One of his opponents, a presbyter, Lucidus by name, an extreme defender of predestination, retracted his opinion at a Council at Arles in 475. The treatise[1] written by Faustus combated alike Pelagius, who was characterized as "pestiferous" and the "error" of the advocates of predestination.

Through a peculiar conjunction of circumstances, in the sixth century, the Semi-Pelagian Controversy broke out afresh. In Sardinia and Corsica there were certain banished North African bishops, among them Fulgentius of Numidia. In 519, Possessor, an African bishop, in a contest with the Scythian monks respecting their theopaschite formula, referred to Faustus as an authority on his side of the question. The monks sought for a verdict against the orthodoxy of his work, and not obtaining satisfaction from Hormisdas, Bishop of Rome (514–553), they turned to the exiled bishops. Fulgentius was thus led to compose a series of books in defence of Augustinian predestination. Others appeared on the same side in South Gaul, including Cæsarius, Bishop of Arles, although the Synod of Valence in 529 did not antagonize the Semi-Pelagian opinion. On the occasion of the consecration of a church in 529 at Orange, in the province of Arles, a Synod composed of fourteen bishops, including Cæsarius, accepted a collection of statements quoted from Augustine and Prosper, and adopted an additional creed. The Council asserted the necessity of prevenient grace, and the necessity of grace at every stage of the soul's renewal, and affirmed that unmerited grace precedes meritorious works, that all good, including love to God, is God's gift, that even unfallen man is in need of grace. But not only is predestination to sin denied, but there is no affirmation of unconditional election or irresistible grace. Moreover, free-will is said to be "weakened" in Adam, and restored through the grace of baptism. The creed is anti-Pelagian, but the tenets of Semi-Pelagianism are only in part explicitly condemned. It was sanctioned by the Roman Bishop, Boniface II.

[1] *De Grat. Dei et human. Mentis lib. arbitr.*

In Gregory I., a great leader and administrator, but having no eminence as a theological thinker, the patristic period in the West is brought to a close. In him Augustinian beliefs were intermingled with Semi-Pelagian ideas. Insisting on the doctrine of prevenient grace, he drops the idea of a grace that is irresistible and a freedom that is totally lost. Sin is forgiven in baptism, but salvation is a personal achievement through penitence and meritorious works, with grace within as an auxiliary. If perdition is the penalty of mortal sins, of mortal offences for which satisfaction through penances here has not been rendered, sins of a lower grade may be atoned for and the soul purified in the fires of purgatory. So the conjecture of Augustine is raised to the rank of definite, positive teaching. The Lord's Supper is regarded as a literal sacrifice, of avail not only for the benefit of the living, but also for sufferers in purgatory. If the Church is not identified with the community of saints, it is through the Church, its ordinances and its sacraments, that these are provided with the means of salvation. A main ground of hope is the intercession of perfected saints and angels. In sympathy with Augustine, the Word of God and the Spirit attending the dispensation of the Word are prized. At the same time, those ceremonies and other practices which the Church had taken up in its passage through heathen society — which made up the Christianity of "the second grade," the common Catholicism which was accepted by Augustine, but which, however inconsistently, his deeper, spiritual thoughts broke through at so many points — all these were cherished in the system of Gregory, and this combination of tenets was handed down to the next following centuries.

PART II

MEDIÆVAL THEOLOGY

PERIOD III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND ITS REDUCTION TO A SYSTEMATIC FORM

CHAPTER I

FROM GREGORY I TO CHARLEMAGNE — THE WORK OF MEDIÆVAL THEOLOGY — THEOLOGY IN THE EASTERN CHURCH — THEOLOGY AND EDUCATION IN THE WEST — JOHN SCOTUS

As far as the West is concerned, Gregory the First is the connecting link between the ancient and the mediæval period. In him the patristic age comes to an end. The Church now enters in earnest upon the work of converting and training the nations of Germanic origin. They were taught its doctrines, and its institutions were planted among them. In general it was no longer a question what these doctrines are. They were transmitted as an inheritance from the Church of the Fathers to the succeeding ages. It was a sacred tradition, attested by ecclesiastical authority, the validity of which it was impious to doubt. Its living guardians were the Roman hierarchy. Should doubts arise as to its import, it was their function, and more and more, as time went on, the recognized prerogative of the Popes, to define it. But of this tradition there existed no full or exact, no lucid and consistent exposition. It was comprised to a great extent in the

writings of Augustine and of the Fathers generally. Moreover — and this is a point not to be overlooked — it was embodied, in no small part, only by implication in those liturgical practices and other customs of the Church which had grown up in the course of centuries. Thus there was a field open, albeit with prescribed limits, for theological inquiry and discussion. This was the undertaking of the mediæval theologians — to give precision and harmony to the accepted beliefs, written and unwritten, and to defend them. It would prove to be impossible to confine religious thought strictly within the barriers set, but such was the design. It was not a voyage for the discovery of new lands. Theology was like an estate which is left to an heir with the liberty to run fences across it and to connect its parts by roads and bridges, but not to widen or contract its boundaries, to drain a marsh, or to fell a single tree.

In the East, a petrified creed and ritual and the despotism of secular rulers chilled intellectual activity. The Eastern Empire appeared to be strong for a while, under Justinian, but it was strong only in appearance. The fairest parts of Italy were soon wrested from it by the Lombards, and there was left to the Byzantine rulers only a nominal sovereignity, limited to the coast. In the sixth and beginning of the seventh century, the Persians ravaged the Asiatic provinces and carried their arms almost to the gates of Constantinople. A few years after the victories of Heraclius the Mohammedans began the career of conquest which tore from the Empire the provinces that embraced the three patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. Elsewhere the Slavonic tribes, which were to the Eastern Empire what the Teutonic invaders were in the West, were pushing their incursions and founding their settlements. The Empire was like a tree centuries old, its branches broken off and its vigor departed, yet still standing with a tenacity of life that yields, inch by inch, to the process of decay. The Church clung to the minutiæ of the cultus. The Second Trullan Council (692) prescribed the manner in which a layman should hold his hands in receiving the communion. The Second Nicene Council (787) ordained that no Church should be consecrated unless it were provided with relics. The Second Trullan Council asserted the authority of the first six œcumenical councils, at the same time that it condemned the Roman Bishop, Honorius; it specified the authoritative sources

with regard to Church discipline, and laid down the law relative to the marriage of the clergy, — presbyters and deacons, if they are married before ordination, being permitted to continue in the married state. The same Council reaffirmed the Canon of Chalcedon on the rank of the Bishop of Constantinople, and declared against the use of pictures of the Lamb, enjoining the use of pictures of Christ himself instead of these typical representations. Pope Sergius I. forbade the publication of the decrees of the Council in the West. The spirit of piety in the East was chiefly kept alive in the monasteries. From these the bishops were generally taken. All through the Middle Ages there were scholarship and learning in the Eastern Church, but after John of Damascus their fruits appeared in antiquarian researches, not in original production. After the controversy respecting images, which was disastrous in its influence, intellectual life was chiefly manifest in the contests with the Western Church, which from time to time broke out afresh. They were aggravated by the growing pretensions and extending power of the Popes. After the coronation of Charlemagne, they were still further promoted by political jealousy. The displacement of Ignatius from the patriarchate of Constantinople (857) and the elevation of Photius in his place brought on a conflict with Pope Nicholas I., in the course of which Photius issued an encyclical letter (866) in which he declared the Latin Church to be heretical on account of its rule of celibacy, its interpolation of the creeds, and various ritual practices. In 863 Nicholas had excommunicated him. In 867, a synod at Constantinople excommunicated the Pope. After various turns of fortune in the combat between Photius and his enemies, and a temporary restoring of amity with Rome, Nicholas (in 882) renewed the ban against him and it was not again recalled. In the middle of the eleventh century, the rupture between the Churches of the East and the West was completed. In a heated controversy between Michael Cærularius, Patriarch of Constantinople, and Pope Leo IX., there were mutual allegations of heresy. The Latins, in addition to the customary accusations, were censured for using unleavened bread in the sacrament and for eating things strangled. The Patriarch broke off all intercourse with the Papal legates at Constantinople, and on July 16th, 1054, the legates laid on the altar of St. Sophia the Pope's bull, excommunicating him and charging him with all sorts of

heresies. Repeated efforts at reunion, which were kept up after the time of the Latin rule in Constantinople, proved abortive. The same result befell the negotiations at the Council at Florence (1439). The agreement there, couched in terms not free from ambiguity, led to no practical effect and was formally and solemnly revoked at a synod in Constantinople in 1472.

In the eighth and ninth centuries, a number of the Emperors of the Macedonian dynasty lent a cordial encouragement to studies in classical as well as ecclesiastical literature. Leo VI. (886–912) was himself an author. The most conspicuous writer in this period was Photius. His Myriobiblion[1] is made up of excerpts, with summaries, abridgments and occasional critical estimates, from two hundred and seventy-nine authors, heathen and Christian. Not less than eighty of them are otherwise not known to us. This is the principal work of Photius, although his polemical and other writings are not without value.

Dualism was revived and propagated in the sect of the Paulicians, who arose about the middle of the seventh century. They were called Manichæans by the church writers, but their creed was more allied to the principles of Marcion. In Mananalis,[2] near Samosata, where there was probably a Marcionite society, one Constantine, a member of it, blended teachings of St. Paul, in which he was deeply interested, with his own previous tenets, and became the leader of the new sect. The Paulicians held that the Demiurge, the Evil Being, is the lord of the present world, that Christ is sent from the Heavenly Father to deliver man from the body and the world of sense. The Sacraments were discarded. The Paulicians were ascetic, but did not abjure marriage. It is not certain that they received any Gospels except Luke or any Epistles except those of St. Paul,[3] together with an Epistle to the Laodiceans, which they professed to have. Although victims of severe persecution, they still became numerous, and continued long to make proselytes. The Paulicians divided into different branches, each having peculiar opinions of its own. Their influence in the formation of European sects may have been exaggerated.[4] In the eleventh century, in Thrace there was a numerous

[1] Or βιβλιοθήκη.

[2] The correctness of this designation of place is doubted by Ter. Mkrttschian, *Die Paulikianer* etc. (1893), p. 124.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 108.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 127.

sect called the Euchites, who were enthusiasts like the ancient monastic sect of that name, but also Dualists. Akin to them in their opinions were the Bogomiles, a name signifying "Friends of God." At the beginning of the twelfth century, their leader, Basilius, a physician, was burned to death, in the Hippodrome, at Constantinople.

The conversion of the Franks to orthodox Christianity, their ascendency over the other Arian peoples, and the spread of their dominion, their alliance with the Papacy, the organization of Empire in the West under Charlemagne, and the check put upon anarchy and illiteracy — which was of great moment, even though it was partial and was followed by the influence of reactionary forces — these are facts of capital importance in European history.

In the early portion of the Middle Ages, in the absence of original authorship, compilations were made from the Fathers. For a time there was more theological life in Spain than elsewhere. The *Sentences* of Isidore of Seville (who died in 636) were composed mostly of extracts from Augustine and Gregory the Great. This work retained its popularity in the mediæval period. In the eighth century there was more culture in England than in any other country except Italy. Theodore of Tarsus, the first Archbishop of Canterbury (668–690), in connection with the Abbot Hadrian, established schools in which Greek was taught. From the cloister of Yarrow went forth the venerable Bede, who wrote on all the subjects then studied. He was famous for his learning throughout the West. Bede composed an Ecclesiastical History of the English. In 782, Alcuin, an Englishman, who had been educated at York, became the head of the domestic school of Charlemagne which followed his migratory court. Alcuin was well read in the classical poets, was an effective promoter of learning, and an influential writer. Great credit belongs to him for his agency in founding the cathedral and cloister schools. In them was imparted the learning of the age, which was all comprised in the seven sciences, the trivium and quadrivium. The spirit of the Frankish theologians was comparatively free and enlightened. They opposed the use of pictures save for purposes of decoration and instruction. Agobard, Bishop of Lyons (who died in 841), was prominent in the defence of this position. He also contended against a rigid theory of verbal inspiration. Among

his writings is a polemical book against Judaism. Judaism and Mohammedanism were objects of attack in this period, they being the two forms of false doctrine outside of the Church. Under Charles the Bald, Rabanus Maurus, Paschasius Radbert, Ratramnus and Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, were conspicuous theologians. To these is to be added the name of John Scotus called "Erigena," which means probably "born in the Isle of Saints," a frequent designation of Ireland, which was also often called Major Scotia. The system of Scotus was unique in its character. It is an episode in the theological records of his time, where his very existence almost seems an anachronism.

Shortly before the middle of the ninth century, Scotus took up his abode at the court of Charles the Bald. The New Platonism in Augustine's writings had its influence upon him, and still more the works of Maximus the confessor, and those of Pseudo-Dionysius, which he translated from the Greek. He reproduced in a free way speculations which were Pantheistic in their essential character. So peculiar were they that, although he incurred suspicion and some opposition, their real import was not discerned until long after his death. Like Pseudo-Dionysius, he drew a line between popular and scientific theology. True Philosophy — *vera philosophia* — and true Theology — *vera theologia* — are identical. Faith, which rests on authority, belongs to the earlier stage of the intellectual life. Reason discerns things in their necessary grounds and relations. The universe is the unfolding of the absolute God. Respecting Him all our affirmations are the language of appearance.[1] They are unavoidable, yet are accommodated to human weakness. Even love is to be predicated of God in only a symbolical way. All existence is only a theophany. God reaches self-consciousness in man. In his principal work on the *Division of Nature*, His scheme of the Universe is set forth. The Absolute is made to run through a cycle: Archetypal ideas are embodied in visible existences, and there follows a reversion to the original essence. In truth, conceptions are the things themselves —"*ipsæ res*." Material things have only a semblance of reality. In the character of his mind, as well as the drift of his system, Scotus anticipates modern thinkers whose creed is an ideal Pantheism.

[1] The nature of God is "superessentialis." See, e.g., *De Div. Nat.* L. I. 76. (Migne, p. 522.)

CHAPTER II

FROM CHARLEMAGNE TO THE BEGINNINGS OF SCHOLASTICISM — THE ADOPTION CONTROVERSY — GOTTSCHALK'S DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION — RADBERT'S DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER — THE PENITENTIAL SYSTEM — THE TENTH CENTURY — CONTROVERSY OF BERENGARIUS AND LANFRANC ON THE LORD'S SUPPER

THE revived theological activity and culture in the age of Charlemagne were manifest in several theological controversies. The first was the Adoption Controversy. About the year 780, Elipandus, Bishop of Toledo, in Spain, was attacked for teaching that, as man, Christ was the adopted Son of God.[1] He was defended by Felix, Bishop of Urgellis. The language of the Adoptionists did not depart essentially from that of Augustine. The same thing was said even in the Mozarabic Liturgy. The Cyrillian interpretation of the Chalcedon creed, which had been set forth under Justinian by the Fifth General Council, although the decision of the Sixth General Council on the Monothelite question was of an opposite tenor, was prevalent in the Spanish Kingdom in consequence of its union with Rome. Leading Frankish theologians, of whom Alcuin was the most conspicuous, combated Adoptionism, which they identified with Nestorian doctrine.[2] It was condemned in three Frankish synods, the first at Regensburg in 792, the second at Frankfort in 794, and the third at Aix in 799.

The doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from the Father *and the Son* was defended by Alcuin and others, and as early as the beginning of the eleventh century was included in the form of

[1] "Jesum Christum adoptivum humanitate et nequaquam adoptivum divinitate" — Symbol of Elipandus, in *Epist. ad Elipand.* (Migne, 96, p. 917.)

[2] "Sicut Nestoriana impietas in duas Christi personas dividit," etc. Alcuin *adv. Felic.* I. 11. (Migne, 101, p. 136.)

the Nicene Symbol in use at Rome. Still more was the Western Church distinguished by its use of the Apostles' Creed and the Athanasian Creed, both of which were unknown in the East.

A second controversy related to a central point of Augustinism. In opposition to Semi-Pelagian opinions, Gottschalk, a pious and learned monk of Orbais, in the province of Rheims, propounded the Augustinian doctrine. His principal adversaries were Rabanus Maurus and Archbishop Hincmar. Gottschalk's doctrine, as defined by himself, did not go beyond that of Augustine; for, while he taught a double predestination,[1] the predestination of the wicked was not to sin, as he was erroneously charged with holding, but to punishment.[2] Augustine had designated the wicked as *reprobi*. The opponents of Gottschalk founded the election of the saved on the divine prescience of their right use of the gifts of grace, although in the Second Council of Chiersy, in 853, they affirmed inconsistently that "in the first man we lost our freedom of will." It is evident that for the sake of maintaining the efficacy of the sacraments they preferred to modify in a Semi-Pelagian way the Augustinian doctrine of unconditional election, without appreciating, perhaps, the extent of their deviation from it. It is evident, also, that the inference of Gottschalk that Christ died only for the elect, was specially repugnant to their views. They affirmed in the "Four Chapters" adopted at Chiersy, that "Christ died for all men" and that God desires all men, without exception to be saved.[3] They referred in support of this opinion to 1 Tim. ii. 4, a passage to which Augustine himself attached a different and restricted meaning. At the first Synod of Chiersy in 849, Gottschalk was condemned and, after being cruelly scourged, was imprisoned for life in a cloister. Among those who took ground against him was John Scotus, whose arguments, however, rested on the Pantheistic ideas at the root of his theology. The very term '*pre*destination,' Scotus said, was a part of the language of appearance, having in

[1] "gemina predestinatio."

[2] Of reprobate man, his language in his first confession composed in prison, is: "propter præscita certissime ipsorum propria futura mala merita prædestinasse pariter per justissimum judicium suum in mortem merito sempiternam." (Migne, 121, p. 347.)

[3] "Deus omnes homines sine exceptione vult salvos fieri." (Mansi, XIV. p. 921.) The sentence ends: "licet non omnes salventur." As Christ assumed the nature of every man, there is no man for whom He did not die. (*Ibid.* IV.)

its literal sense no reality.[1] Against Hincmar there arose many defenders of the Augustinian teaching, including Prudentius of Troyes, Ratramnus, monk at Corbie, Servatus Lupus, Abbot at Ferrieres, and Remigius of Lyons. Political causes had their influence in bringing to pass a union of bishops in a compromise at the two synods of Savonières (in 859) and Toucy (in 860).[2] To hold fast the efficacy of the sacrament of Baptism was the intent of all. Practically the victory was on the side of Hincmar, for the Semi-Pelagian principle had a prevailing acceptance, despite the consentaneous profession of loyalty to the teaching of Augustine.

A discussion respecting the Lord's Supper began in 844, when Paschasius Radbert propounded the bald doctrine of transubstantiation. He taught that the bread and the wine, as far as color and taste are concerned, remain. If they did not, there would be no room for faith. But within they are changed, as to their substance, into the body and blood of Christ, — even the same body in which He suffered and was crucified.[3] Dissent from the views of Radbert was expressed by Rabanus Maurus and by Ratramnus. The latter wrote on the subject in reply to the question of Charles the Bald whether the body and blood of the Lord are actually received or not, in the mouth of believing communicants. The answer of Ratramnus is not in all respects lucid. He distinctly denies that the body and blood which are in the sacrament after the consecration are identical with the slain and risen Jesus.[4] Rather is the body that is received the memorial of that body. It is the spiritual body and spiritual blood which exists under the veil of the material bread and the material wine.[5] The Spirit of Christ, the power of the divine Word or Logos "is the invisible bread." The leading idea appears, therefore, to be that of Augustine; and

[1] Neither prescience nor predestination can be predicated of God, "cui nihil futurum, quia nihil expectat, nihil præteritum, quia nihil ei transeat." *De Div. Prædest.* (Migne, 122, p. 392.)

[2] Mansi, XV. 563 sq.

[3] *De Corp. et Sanguin. Domini*, 7. 2. "Substantia panis et vini in Christi carnem et sanguinem efficaciter interius commutatur." 8. 2. (Migne, 120, p. 1287.)

[4] *Ibid.* c. 71. (Migne, 121, p. 156.)

[5] "quoniam sub velamento corporei panis et vini spiritüaliter corpus et sanguis Christi existunt." c. 16, p. 134.

the divine element in the Sacrament is compared to that which is imparted to the baptismal water. Yet Ratramnus uses language drawn from the liturgy, which, taken by itself, would imply a more radical objective transformation, and what precisely is received by the non-believer in taking the Sacrament is not satisfactorily defined. Thenceforward, more and more the impression made by the constant repetition of the mass, the central act of worship, established in the minds of the people the belief in the literal, objective miracle. This was confirmed by alleged miracles of the host transformed into a lamb — an argument which Radbert brought forward. Hence the Sacrament was regarded as the renewal of the sacrifice on the cross. A doctrinal basis was furnished for masses when no communicants were present, and for masses, said in private, for the benefit of departed souls.

The course of Christian teaching cannot be understood without attention to the elaborate penitential system which grew up, and advanced from one stage to another, in the Western Church. A network of law came by degrees to be stretched, not only over the conduct, but, also, over the inward thoughts and purposes of the people, all of whom, from the youngest to the oldest and from the highest to the lowest, were subject to ecclesiastical rule and supervision. A code of penalties, first for outward transgression, then for sins of the heart as well, was administered by the priesthood, with the coöperation, when it was needed, of secular authority. In the Sends in the Frankish Church, the visitations of the Bishops, private confession came to be associated with the public acknowledgment of grave offences. That personal dealing with the conscience and allotting of penances which were customary in the monasteries spread beyond their walls and into dealings with the laity. Disciplinary penalties were appointed for the sins reckoned as mortal. The origin of rules in detail for the penal treatment of penitents was attributed to the Irish Cloisters and to Theodore, the Saxon Archbishop of Canterbury. Among the Teutonic nations respect was necessarily had to their ingrained feelings and legal customs. Penances had to be modified. The Germanic peoples were accustomed to the payment of money as a composition for even the gravest crimes. Certain exceptional cases were, therefore, recognized, in which the usual penance could be commuted to a pecuniary fine. Out of this simple beginning grew the system of indulgences. Substitutionary en-

durance of penance had likewise its familiar analogies in German law, although it likewise had support in the vicarious offices assigned of old to the Saints. If the penitential system which grew up among the new nations under the tutelage of the Church was adapted to impress the conscience with the guilt of sin, it was at the same time fitted to foster as a dominant feeling the desire to be set free from its penalties. Side by side with the government of the state was a spiritual government, weighing the merits and demerits of all, and as the agent of the Almighty, meting out punishments or dispensations of grace. The very word "penitence" (*pœnitentia*) was translated by a word (Busse) which meant a compensation or a fine. The equivalent for "to repent" (*pœnitere*) in the penitential rules was "to fast" (*jejunare*).

The tenth century was the dark age in mediæval history. The early portion of the eleventh century was of a piece with it. Together they made up a period of barbarism. The light that had been kindled under the auspices of Charlemagne was well-nigh extinguished. This was owing to a combination of causes: to the breaking-up of the Carolingian Empire, and the tumults and anarchy that ensued, and the utter demoralization of the papacy through the conflicts of unbridled Italian factions, the disappearance of the Latin from the speech of the people and the interval that elapsed prior to the reduction of the new Romanic tongues to unity, and the utter decay of the schools where alone Latin could be learned. In the eleventh century, the skies gradually became more propitious. The Hildebrandian movement of reform, as it grew in strength, by restoring order and discipline in the Church, aided the cause of learning. Intercourse with the Greek Empire, where learning was still cherished, was reopened. Intercourse sprang up with the Arabians in Spain, among whom the sciences were cultivated. The Arabs, having been initiated in the knowledge of Greek learning by Christians in Syria, established in the East celebrated schools, especially at Bagdad and Damascus. In Spain, in 980, they founded a college at Cordova. The favorite studies were mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. A lively interest grew up in the Spanish Arabian schools in the study of Aristotle and in philosophical inquiries to which it led. In the middle of the tenth century, Gerbert, who became Archbishop of Rheims and then Pope (Sylvester II.), is said to have brought back from Seville and Cordova scientific acquisitions which excited

astonishment. By him the school at Rheims had a new spirit infused into it, and made its influence widely felt in other similar schools. The school at Chartres became quite famous through the exertions of Bishop Fulbert (who died in 1028). A zeal for the study of jurisprudence was awakened in the cities of Lombardy. One sign of the revival of intellectual activity was the renewal of the controversies with the Greek Church. In the first half of the eleventh century the schools of Rheims and Chartres stood in the front rank. Later in the century, the school at Tours and the school in the cloister of Bec in Normandy rose to great celebrity. Bec had for its prior Lanfranc, an Italian of noble birth, who had turned from legal studies to theology and eventually became Archbishop of Canterbury. At the head of the school of Tours was Berengarius, a man of uncommon parts. He had been a pupil of Fulbert of Chartres. In 1050, in a controversy on the Lord's Supper, these theologians employed the Aristotelian dialectic. This circumstance serves as a landmark for the beginning of the scholastic era.

Berengarius in a letter to Lanfranc opposed the doctrine of a literal change of the elements into the body and blood of Christ. This view, together with the idea of such a change of substance as does not affect the qualities or accidents he combated with logical weapons. The opinion which he constantly maintained, except when he was coerced into a denial of it, was that the change in the elements is dynamic, and of such a character that Christ is actually received only by the believer. He went even farther than Ratramnus in the direction of a spiritual conception of the Sacrament. Lanfranc contended for the doctrine of Radbert. In 1050, Berengarius was condemned, unheard, by Pope Leo IX., and, also, by a Synod at Vercelli. In 1059, at Rome, he was driven to retract his opinion, and to subscribe to statements drawn up by Cardinal Humbert, that the body and blood of Christ, after the consecration, are in the hands of the priest, and are eaten with the teeth of the faithful.[1] But he afterwards reasserted his real opinion, and Gregory VII., by whom he had been shielded and who regarded him at least with personal favor, could not stand in the way of his condemnation once more at a Synod at Rome at Easter in 1079. Lanfranc had gone beyond Radbert in distinctly affirming that the real flesh and blood of Christ are received, although without beneficial effect,

[1] In Lanfranc, *De Corp. et Sanguine Dom.* (Migne, 150, p. 411.)

by unbelievers and the unworthy. Others, especially Guitmund von Aversa, modified the traditional view by teaching that the entire Christ, and not merely a part of Him, is in every portion of the bread and wine.[1] Anselm added that the whole Christ, God and man, is received when the bread is received and likewise when the wine is received.[2] The first known use of the word "transubstantiate" was by Hildebert, Archbishop of Tours (who died in 1134).

[1] It is like the manna which fell from heaven: "Tota hostia est corpus Christi, ut nihilominus unaquæque particula separata sit totum corpus Christi." Guitmund, *De Corp. et Sanguin. Christ.* (Migne, 149, p. 1434.)

[2] Yet "non tamen bis sed semel Christum accipimus." Anselm, *Epp.* L. IV. 107. (Migne, 159, p. 255.) Cf. Loofs, *Leitfaden*, p. 270.

CHAPTER III

CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOLASTICISM — THE SCHOLASTIC MAXIM — PHILOSOPHY: NOMINALISM AND REALISM — SCHOLASTICISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES — THE METHOD OF SCHOLASTICISM

Scholasticism was an application of reason to theology, not in order to revise the creed or to explore for new truth, but to systematize and prove the existing traditional beliefs. It differed thus, in having a larger aim, from theology in the pre-scholastic period. In the patristic age, the authority of tradition and of the Church was recognized. But the area of dogma was more contracted. There was a larger margin for original inquiry. If in the Middle Ages there were no teachers to equal in breadth and in their contributions to the stock of religious thought Origen and Augustine, yet within their restricted bounds no abler men have ever cultivated theology than Anselm, Aquinas and some other mediæval doctors.

The Schoolmen followed Augustine in their maxim that faith is to seek for knowledge: "*fides quœrit intellectum.*" There is an innate and laudable desire of the understanding to justify to itself what the heart immediately appropriates through its own experience and on the ground of authority. The fundamental maxim was received generally, even by the boldest thinkers, such as Abelard, who distinguished faith from science, and recognized the differences of natural capacity in relation to science. The Schoolmen, great as were their achievements in their own chosen path, were impeded by their habit of including in the domain of faith the whole field of the Church's teaching. Then there was always the question how far reason could possibly advance in its task of showing the rationality of the whole sum of religious beliefs. In striving to reach the goal, there was a temptation to cast aside doctrines which could not be directly verified at the bar of reason, to get rid

of irreducible material by a rationalizing process. As far as a failure had to be confessed, either skepticism would be likely to ensue, or a refuge be sought in the arms of authority and under the veil of mystery. In either case, Scholasticism would undermine itself. This proved to be the ultimate fact. All along we notice two rival tendencies, two classes of theologians, the one disposed to magnify the ability and exalt the function of the intellect and to make less of the indispensableness of authority; the other to curb reason and to insist on intuition and feeling rather than logic and on the voice of the Church as the basis of certitude. The theory, as expressed by Anselm, was that philosophy is the handmaid (*ancilla*) of theology. But the servant will sometimes gain an ascendency over the mistress, or the mistress dominate the servant to such an extent as to repress all freedom of action.

As regards philosophical doctrine, the empire in the Scholastic period was divided between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle came to be enthroned in the seat of authority, but Plato, through the writings of Augustine and the works of Pseudo-Dionysius, had a larger share than is commonly supposed in shaping theological thought. Aristotle was first known through the translations of Boethius; later through Latin versions of Arabian translations, and finally through his original writings brought from the East. For a long time the influence of the Stagyrite was formal, through his logic. Afterwards it affected the matter of theology and ethics. The Schoolmen of the thirteenth century had to combat a subtle form of Pantheism, springing ultimately from New Platonism, a type of opinion of which Amalric of Bena and David of Dinanto, teachers at Paris, were representatives. But Pantheism in a more captivating shape was involved in the writings of Arabic philosophers, of whom the ablest was Averroes, who died in 1198. A skeptical spirit infected certain Jewish authors in Spain who emulated their Arabic neighbors in the study of Aristotle and in rationalistic speculations. Moses Maimonides (1135–1204) was the most famous of these writers.

The great philosophical problem of the Middle Ages was that of Nominalism and Realism. It is an exaggeration, however, when Cousin says of the Schoolmen that, apart from theology, their "philosophy is all embraced" in this dispute. Some of the leading Schoolmen paid but little attention to this question. The incentive to the discussion came from a passage in Boethius's

Latin translation of a passage in Porphyry's "Introduction" to Aristotle, where the question is stated without being solved. Under each of the two theories, there were various shades of opinion; according to John of Salisbury not less than thirteen.[1] The two main forms were the Platonic tenet of the existence of universals, or concepts, prior to the concrete things in which they are embodied, or *ante rem*. That is, the genus is real and is identical in all the individuals comprising it. Such was the contention of William of Champeaux. The other main form of Realism was the Aristotelian tenet of existence *in re*, which made the genus inherent in the individuals, but not existing prior to them or independently of them and not numerically the same in them. Nominalism was the Stoic doctrine that universals are abstractions of the understanding, with no objective reality, being merely common names attached to individuals having like qualities. The intermediate doctrine of Conceptualism was the creed of some, of whom Abelard was one. There were questions of vital moment closely connected with this controversy, such as the objective reality of human thought and knowledge, the relative claims of Empiricism and Idealism. It had an important bearing on theological doctrines, such as the doctrine of original sin, the doctrine of the Trinity.

The spread of the Scholastic theology was greatly promoted by the inculcation of it in the universities. About the beginning of the twelfth century, persons began to teach dialectics and theology in the vicinity of the cloister schools in Paris, who gradually formed a connection with one another and with the teachers of the liberal arts. The diversifying and expansion of the curriculum of the schools went on, and in the course of the century, the university grew up to its full proportions, and was the precursor of the other educational establishments of the same character in England and on the Continent. Oxford stood next in rank to Paris. To the universities where the new theology was taught there streamed students, inspired with ardent curiosity, from all the countries of Europe. Their number has been sometimes exaggerated, but it was no doubt very large.

The most eminent of the Schoolmen belonged to one or the other of the two mendicant orders, the Dominicans and the Franciscans, each of whom, not without strenuous resistance,

[1] See Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik*, II. 118.

which was kept up, or renewed, from time to time, secured a chair in the University of Paris. There, and at the other seats of mediæval learning, the lectures of renowned representatives of these orders were attended by throngs of eager pupils.

The instrument of exposition, the weapon of assault and defence, was the syllogism. The ordinary method of discussion, which is exemplified in the principal Scholastic treatises, was to state general subjects, which are resolved into subordinate topics, and the ramification is carried forward until it is considered complete. Under each head, questions are proposed, each question being pluralized by analysis, and its branches severally handled. First, the grounds negative of the thesis are set down in order, including passages from Augustine, Aristotle, and other authors. Then follow the grounds in the affirmative, and, in the last place, the writer sums up, answering the objections and reconciling seeming contradictions. This decision or opinion was termed by the editors of Aquinas the "Conclusion." "There is no conception," says Baur, "so subtle, no problem so difficult, that the Schoolmen would not have ventured to take it up, with confidence in the omnipotence of dialectics." Everything which had any connection with dogma is brought in and scrutinized, and with most fondness those aspects of doctrine which are of the most interest to the speculative thinker, — the being, nature, attributes of God, the relations between the persons of the Holy Trinity, the relation of God to the World, of the finite to the infinite, of freedom to contingency, and so forth. The whole ethical material is likewise worked in. It is the great drawback to the value of these wonderful feats of intellectual acumen that it is abstractions and logical relations that are dealt with, so that Christianity appears to lose, so to speak, its flesh and blood, and to be resolved into a lifeless structure of metaphysics.

CHAPTER IV

SUBDIVISIONS OF THE SCHOLASTIC ERA — THE FIRST SECTION: ANSELM; ABELARD; BERNARD; THE SCHOOL OF ST. VICTOR — THE BOOKS OF SENTENCES — PETER LOMBARD

THE Scholastic era by a natural division falls into three sections. The first is the introductory period of the rise of Scholasticism, and may be said to terminate with Alexander of Hales, the first of the Schoolmen to work out a complete system or "Sum of Theology," making use not only of the Logic, but also of the other works — the Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics — of Aristotle. The second section, which covers pretty nearly the thirteenth century, was the flourishing period of Scholasticism, in which appeared almost all of its most famous representatives, who were generally of one or the other of the great mendicant orders. In it Nominalism, which had prevailed after Anselm, was superseded by Realism. The closing section, ending at the Reformation, witnessed the revival and renewed sway of Nominalism, and is marked by the decadence of Scholasticism, by its own slow suicide and by the appearance of movements in the direction of theological as well as ecclesiastical reform.

In the first section, the principal names are Anselm, Abelard, and Bernard. If Scholasticism was introduced by Lanfranc and Berengarius, Anselm, more than any other, is entitled to be called its father. In him the two elements, the devout and mystical on the one hand, and the scientific and speculative on the other, are evenly balanced. He is steadfast in adhering to his maxim, "Credo ut intelligam."[1] "I desire," he says, "to understand Thy truth which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe that I may understand. For even this I believe, that if I did not believe, I should

[1] *Proslogium.* (Migne, 158, p. 227.)

not understand." Anselm addressed himself to the discussion of the profoundest questions of theology. Roscellin, a canon at Compiègne, was an advocate of Nominalism. The issue of the application of his doctrine to the Trinity was Tritheism; the three divine persons being held to be one generically and in name only. He was confuted by Anselm and recanted at the Council of Soissons in 1092. The principal productions of Anselm are his *a priori* argument for the being of God in his Monologium and in the Proslogium, and an epoch-making treatise on the Atonement, the *Cur Deus Homo*. Anselm's attempted demonstration of theism in the Monologium is not materially different from the reasoning of Augustine. All specific predicates, even existence, presuppose an absolute being in whom all excellent qualities in their generic, absolute perfection are embraced. In the Proslogium, the argument was reduced to a simpler form. We necessarily conceive of something a greater than which cannot be thought,[1] i.e., God. Thus even the fool who says that there is no God has the idea of God. But the existence of the idea carries in it the existence of the reality; otherwise, a greater than the greatest conceivable could be thought. A God *in intellectu* is less than a God who is likewise *in re*.[2] To the objection of the monk Gaunilo — who replied in behalf of the fool — that by parallel reasoning, if we conceive of a lost island, the most beautiful that can be conceived, we must infer that it exists, Anselm answers that his reasoning applies only to that which is *necessarily* conceived, or the absolute, and not to arbitrary notions. As was said of Augustine's argument, the argument of Anselm rests on the presupposition of Realism.

In his treatise On Original Sin, which forms a kind of sequel to the *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm says, in agreement with the Augustinian doctrine, that when Adam and Eve sinned, "The whole, which they were, was debilitated and corrupted": not only the body, but through the body, the soul; and "because the whole human nature was in them, and outside of them there was nothing of it, the whole was weakened and corrupted. There remained, therefore, in that nature the debt of complete justice" — that is, the obligation to be perfectly righteous — "which it received, and

[1] "Aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest." c. 2. (Migne, 158, p. 227.)

[2] "Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re: quod majus est." c. 2. (Migne, *Ibid.* p. 228.)

the obligation to make satisfaction, because it forsook this justice, together with the very corruption which sin induced. Hence, as in case it had not sinned, it would be propagated just as it was made by God; so, after sin, it would be propagated just as it made itself by sinning." Thus it follows "that this nature is born in infants with the obligation upon it to satisfy for the first sin, which it always could have avoided, and with the obligation upon it to have original righteousness, which it always was able to preserve. Nor does impotence excuse it" — that is, this nature — "even in infants, since in them it does not render what it owes, and inasmuch as it made itself what it is, by forsaking righteousness in the first parents, in whom it was as a whole — *in quibus tota erat* — and it is always bound to have power which it received to the end that it might continually preserve its righteousness."[1]

That sin pertains exclusively to the rational will is a proposition which Anselm clearly defines and maintains; and on this branch of the subject he gives to the Augustinian theology a precision which it had not previously attained. Augustine holds that native concupiscence, or the disorder and inordinate excitableness of the lower appetites, is sinful; but he also holds it to be voluntary, in the large sense of the term. In the regenerate, the guilt (*reatus*) of concupiscence is pardoned; but the principle is not extirpated. It does not bring new guilt, however, upon the soul, unless its impulses are complied with, or consented to, by the will. To these opinions the strict Augustinians in the Catholic Church have adhered; but, laying hold of that distinction between concupiscence and the voluntary consent to it, which Augustine assumes in respect to the baptized, the Semi-Pelagians, as they have been generally styled by their opponents, have affirmed that *native* concupiscence is not itself sinful, but only becomes such by the will's compliance with it. At the first view, it would seem as if Anselm adopted this theory, and so far deviated from Augustine. Anselm declares that as sin belongs to the will, and to the will alone, no individual is a sinner until he is possessed of a will, and with it inwardly consents to the evil desire. "The appetites themselves," he says, "are neither just nor unjust in themselves

[1] *De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pec.* c. ii. (Migne, 158, p. 435.) Hence Anselm held to the universal damnation of unbaptized infants: *Peccatum originale* belongs equally to them all. The inference is that "omnes qui in illo solo moriuntur, æqualiter damnari." c. 27.

considered. They do not make a man just or unjust, simply because he feels them within him; but just or unjust, only as he consents to them with the will, when he ought not." The animals have these appetites, but are rendered neither holy nor unholy on account of them. "Wherefore there is no injustice (or unrighteousness) in their essence, but in the rational will following them."[1] This certainly sounds like an altered theology. But we find that Anselm holds fully to the propagation of sin through seminal or spermatic corruption, after the manner of Augustine. He asserts, as we have seen, the existence of a properly sinful nature which is transmitted from generation to generation. His real theory would appear to be, that a wrongly determined will, or a will already determined to evil, is a part of our inheritance. But he sticks to his sharply defined proposition that sin is predicable of the will alone; and hence he denies that spermatic corruption is sinful. Sin is not *in semine*, but simply the necessity that there shall be sin when the individual comes to exist and to be possessed of a rational soul.[2] This whole theory turns upon the distinction of nature and person. The descendants of Adam were not in him as individuals; yet what he did as a person he did not do *sine natura;* and this nature is ours as well as his.[3] Thus, no man is condemned except for his own sin. "Therefore when the infant is condemned for original sin, he is condemned not for the sin of Adam, but for his own. For if he had not sin of his own, he would not be condemned." This sin originated in Adam, "but this ground which lay in Adam why infants are born sinners, is not in other parents, since in them human nature has not the power that righteous children should be propagated from it."[4] This matter was decided, and irreversibly so far as more immediate parents are concerned, in Adam. It is Anselm's opinion, we may add, that original sin in infants is less guilty than if they had *personally* committed the first sin, as Adam did. The quantity of guilt in them is less. In this he does not differ from Augustine, who thought that the perdition of infants would be milder and easier to bear than that of adult sinners.

In the *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm makes the need of an Atonement for sin the ground of the Incarnation. As obedience is the honor which man owes to God, disobedience both takes from

[1] *De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pec.* c. iv. (Migne, *Ibid.* pp. 437, 438.)
[2] c. 7. [3] c. 23. [4] c. 26.

God what belongs to Him and dishonors Him.[1] The sinner owes not merely a restoration of what was taken, but also satisfaction on account of this "contumely." Punishment would be satisfaction. "God would be acting unjustly if he let the sinner go unpunished."[2] Punishment both takes in turn from the transgressor what was his, and proves that he and his are subject to God. The disobedient one himself cannot render adequate satisfaction. He cannot do this by means of contrition, or by any other or all forms of obedience; for obedience he owes for the present. It does not make good the past. If he possessed the whole world it would not, if offered to God, counterbalance a single sin; for even to gain the whole world one ought not to commit the least sin. Yet it must be man, he being the transgressor, who makes satisfaction. Here is the paradox: man *must*, man *cannot*.[3] Hence the necessity for the Deus Homo, the God-man. Obedience, it is true, is a debt which Christ owes for Himself, but to the giving of His life, since He is sinless, He is not bound. Being almighty, He *can* deliver Himself; being guiltless, He has a right to. Now His life outweighs the evil of all sin; for one would choose rather to commit all other sins than to do Him the slightest injury.[4] As to the sin of putting Him to death, it is not excluded from the possibility of pardon, for it was a sin of ignorance (Luke xxiii. 34). But how can Christ's gift of His life to God conduce to our advantage? It is *necessary* that He who makes such a gift to God should be rewarded. But all things that are the Father's are already His, and He owes no debt that might be remitted. He *must* have a reward, but *cannot*. The escape from the dilemma is the giving of the reward to those for whose salvation He became man, to his kindred who are so burdened with debt. "Nothing more rational, more sweet, more desirable could the world hear." Certain fanciful speculations are added, such as the need of making up the number of fallen

[1] "Honorem debitum, qui Deo non reddit, aufert Deo, quod suum est, et Deum exhonorat; et hoc est peccare." (Migne, 158, p. 376.)

[2] "Si non decet Deum aliquid injuste aut inordinate facere, non pertinet ad ejus libertatem aut benignitatem aut voluntatem, peccantem, qui non solvit Deo quod abstulit, impunitum dimittere." *Ibid.* p. 378.

[3] "quam (satisfactionem) nec potest facere nisi Deus, nec debet nisi homo: necesse est, ut eam faciat Deus Homo." II. 6. (Migne, p. 404.)

[4] "vita ista plus est amabilis, quam sunt peccata odibilia." II. 14. (Migne, p. 415.)

angels, an idea drawn from Augustine, and the reasons for the Son instead of the Father becoming the man.

Anselm's view is that a debt is due to God, that amends must be made for the dishonor to Him. This satisfaction is not said to be the vicarious endurance of the penalty of sin. No stress is laid on the sufferings of Christ. It is not His passive obedience that satisfies.[1] Nor is it the active obedience of Christ, *simply considered*. It is the supererogatory gift of His life. It was an act of obedience, but a supererogatory act of obedience. Therein lies its merit, its moral value, its capacity to procure forgiveness for the ill-deserving.

The question has been debated whether Anselm's theory was framed on the conceptions of Roman or of German law. It unquestionably involves those ideas of merit which were in the Church anterior to the influence of the Teutonic codes and customs, and bears the traces of the Roman jural system. The influence of the associations of German law, however, is perceptible. It appears in the prominence of the ideas of personal dishonor and reparation.[2]

Peter Abelard was first established as a teacher in Paris in 1115, which was six years after the death of Anselm. In Abelard the balance was lost between the devotional and the logical elements. In him the inquisitive spirit and the dialectic passion had the decided ascendency. As an expert dialectician, he surpassed all his contemporaries. Wherever he lectured and whatever he wrote, a ferment was sure to arise. His bold and restless intellect was ever broaching new problems or suggesting new solutions of old questions. It is doubtless true, as Ritter observes, that a certain rashness, rather than free-thinking, was characteristic of him; for he did not renounce the fundamental Scholastic principle of the precedence of faith. Yet he pushed his innovations as far as was compatible with the principle of authority. The intellect, he taught, can only develop the contents

[1] Anselm is rightly interpreted in this particular by Thomasius, DGM. 3. 1. p. 136 n.; Neander, *Ch. Hist.* II. 103; Baur, *Gesch. d. Versöhnungslehre*, pp. 183, 184; Philippi, DGM. 4. 2. p. 87.

[2] The Germanic source of the Anselmic theory is maintained by Cremer, *Stud. u. Kritik.* 1880, p. 759, with whom coincides Ritschl, *Rechtfertigungslehre*, I. 2, p. 40 n. See, also, Thomasius, DG. II. 123. On the other side, see the criticism of Loofs, DG. p. 273 n., and Harnack, DG. III. 342, n. 2. Cremer's Reply is in *Stud. u. Kritik.* (1893) pp. 316 sqq.

of faith. But faith without a knowledge of its grounds lacks stability; it is easily shaken. Moreover, Abelard has a sublime, if it were not a presumptuous, confidence in the capacity of reason to probe to the foundations of religious truth, to comprehend the Gospel from centre to circumference. Face-to-face knowledge, direct, empirical knowledge (*cognoscere*) is the reward to be expected in the future life, but rational understanding (*intelligere*) is possible here. Concerning the Trinity, for example, we can discern why it is to be believed, and why the three persons stand to each other in the relation in which they do, and in no other. No wonder that his *Introduction*, which presented these ideas without the least attempt at disguise, kindled an immense excitement. In his *Yes and No — Sic et Non* — he brought forward clashing opinions of the Fathers on one hundred and fifty-eight points of theology. His object he declares to be to stimulate inquiry, for "by inquiring we arrive at the truth." He will cultivate the acuteness of his readers.[1] He can have no other design in this procedure than to bring in more freedom in doctrinal discussion by showing that to rest upon authority alone, as was the fashion, is to lean upon a broken reed. Naturally he was disposed to minimize the distance between uninspired philosophy and Christianity. Since the precepts of the Gospel are an improved republication (*reformatio*) of the laws of Nature, and since the Christian estimate of conduct is according to the intention of the mind, there is no dissonance between heathen philosophy and Christianity, "*save perhaps* in those things which pertain to the mysteries of the incarnation or the resurrection." Respecting the inspiration of the Bible, Abelard says that the prophets were not always under the influence of the Spirit and sometimes uttered errors. Peter and Paul could differ in regard to the observance of the law, and one could correct the other. But if Apostles and prophets could err, how much more the Fathers![2] On the subject of Original Sin, Abelard sees not how to avoid the difficulties of the orthodox doctrine — how infants can be guilty or deserve perdition. He is inclined to interpret Rom. v. 12 as meaning that the sin of Adam is the cause of eternal condemnation to his descendants, in the sense in which we say that "a tyrant lives on in his children."

[1] "ad maximum inquirendæ veritatis exercitium provocent et acutiores ex inquisitione reddant." *Prolog.* (Migne, 178, p. 1349.)

[2] Prolog. to *Sic et Non*. *Ibid.* p. 1341.

Abelard may be considered the founder of what it is becoming customary to call the moral view of reconciliation to God through Christ. The traditional view of the relation of the death of Christ to Satan he rejects. Satan has no just claims — no more than one who has seduced a slave to run away from his rightful master and keeps possession of him.[1] He scouts the idea that God should be placated by the slaying of His innocent Son.[2] The work of Christ, including His sufferings and death, is a manifestation of divine love to the unworthy which is adapted to kindle gratitude in their minds and to win them back to obedience to God. It is this aspect or interpretation of the office of Christ by which Abelard is deeply impressed. He connects with it, however, another view which is the nearest approach that he makes to the conception of an objective atonement. The love of Christ has in it merit. And this love, with its meritorious quality in the sight of God, is the basis of effectual intercession on his part in behalf of sinful men.[3] It can hardly be said that this representation is developed in such a way as to involve the idea of a change effected in the relation of an offended God to mankind.

So far as particular doctrines are concerned, Abelard gave offence principally by his utterances on the Trinity. God as the absolutely perfect combines in Himself absolute Might, Wisdom, Love, and these constitute his threefold personality. Another illustration was that of a seal, the material answering to the Father, the figure carved in it to the Son, the seal impressing its stamp (*sigillum*) to the Spirit. On the ground of sayings of this character, he was charged with Modalism. In 1121 he was compelled — as he asserts, without discussion — at a council at Soissons to cast his writing on the Trinity into the fire, and was confined for a while in a cloister.[4] In 1141, at the Council of Sens, which was guided by Bernard, his teachings were condemned.[5] The verdict was sanctioned by Innocent II., who adjudged him to perpetual confinement in a cloister. Falling sick on the way to Rome, he was received by Peter, Abbot of Cluny, and died in 1142.

[1] "convinci videtur quod Diabolus in hominem quem seduxit nullum jus seducendo acquisierit." *Ep. ad Rom.* L. II. (Migne, 178, p. 834, D.)

[2] "Quam vero crudele et iniquum videtur ut sanguinem innocentis in pretium," etc. — "nedum Deus tam acceptam filii sui mortem habuerit, ut per ipsam universo reconciliatus sit mundo." (Migne, *Ibid.* p. 833.)

[3] *Ibid.* p. 865. [4] Mansi, XXI. 265–266 sq. [5] Mansi, *Ibid.* 559–560 sq.

There is nothing to subtract from the foregoing remarks. But in justice to Abelard something more should be said.[1] His critical turn was not a veil for a secret unbelief. He can be quoted even against the over-estimate of the powers of the human mind, whether by the dialectician or by the mystic. On various topics he pursued ways which Augustine had really, but less definitely, opened. In withstanding the Platonic realism, he resisted a popular current, and his own opinion, which was nearer to that of Aristotle, enabled him to emphasize the transcendence, as well as the immanence of God, and to avoid giving way to a Pantheistic tendency easily allied to the Platonic extreme. He brought ethics within the domain of theology, and was a champion of the ethical interest. Striking characteristics of Abelard's teaching were taken up by the orthodox Schoolmen of the following century, although drawn by them from Aristotle rather than from him. The odium of which Abelard was the later object was partly owing to the atmosphere of the period, which later was materially modified. This is indicated by the fact that others, notably Peter Lombard, were likewise subject temporarily to a like sort of censorship and attack, which passed by with the lapse of time.

The great antagonist of Abelard was Bernard of Clairvaux. The two men, as to mental peculiarities and character, are in the strongest contrast to one another. If we look for the secret of the overpowering eloquence of Bernard and of his unequalled influence as an ecclesiastical leader, as a promoter of the crusades, a guide and monitor of Popes, we shall find it in the depth and ardor of his piety. And that type of piety of which he was so impressive an example was productive of effects, in the realm of theological thought, which in him and in those after him are historically in a high degree important. His fervor of sensibility appears in yearnings heavenward, in aspirations for communion with the Christ who is no longer enshrined in the flesh — feelings which have a precedent in the devotional outpourings of Augustine. But there are peculiarities in Bernard's piety. In his allegorizing of the Canticles, his highest aspiration, the goal of his hope, is to kiss the heavenly bridegroom upon the lips. His expressions descriptive of his love to the Lord are borrowed from the language of nuptial affection. From this source similes are directly drawn. But what is specially

[1] See Deutsch's Monograph upon Abelard, and Harnack's spirited apology, DG. III. 326 sq.

to be observed is Bernard's intense interest in the self-abasement and suffering of the incarnate Jesus, and his absorbing contemplation of the Saviour in this character. From this point of view, he occasionally utters thoughts truly evangelical in their tenor, one of which brought comfort to Luther when he was chafing under the fetters of legalism. Here and there he inculcates the truth of a free and gratuitous pardon to the believer. Yet severe, ascetic self-chastisement is essential in his conception of the religious life. He remains a monk in theory and in practice.

Pervaded with reverence and awe for divine things, Bernard was deeply aggrieved by Abelard's essays to explain them as if they were every-day matters. He complains that through Abelard's influence all minds were unsettled; that it had come to pass in France that the Trinity was almost a theme of disputation for boys in the street, and that the sacred and mysterious truths of religion were turned into a mere gymnastic for the understanding. He points out three conceivable ways of grasping divine truth.[1] The first is by the intellect, which apprehends them in their rationality; but this is not possible in the present life. The second is opinion, which is something void of certainty. The third is faith, which is an embracing by the heart and will, anticipatory of rational insight.[2] There are possible ecstasies of feeling — *raptus* — when the soul is illuminated and catches a glimpse of heavenly things, beyond any perceptions open to the intellect. Bernard was not a foe to learning and science, but his power was exerted in the direction of laying a curb upon reason and exalting piety as the door to knowledge. On the subject of the Atonement, Bernard earnestly opposes the theory of Abelard respecting the bearing of the work of Christ upon the sway of Satan. The right of Satan over mankind, he contends, is not based on any obligation to him, but the bondage to Satan, however iniquitously it was secured, is righteously permitted as a just retribution for sin.[3] He is the executioner of the divine justice. This brings out a principle latent in the old conception relative to deliverance from Satanic control.

[1] *De Consideratione*, V. 3. (Migne, 182, p. 790.)

[2] "Fides est voluntaria quædam et certa prælibatio necdum propalatæ veritatis." "Nil autem malumus scire quam quæ fide jam scimus." *Ibid.* 3. (Migne, 182, p. 791.)

[3] "jus, etsi non jure acquisitum, sed nequiter usurpatum; juste tamen permissum." *Ep. CXC. seu Tract. ad Inn. II.* (1140) c. 5. (Migne, 182, p. 1065.)

Christ made this deliverance to harmonize with the justice of God, who has ordained the servitude under the Evil One as a penalty for man's transgression.

Akin to Abelard in spirit was Gilbert, Bishop of Poictiers — Gilbert Porretanus (who died in 1154). From the point of view of a moderate Realism of the Aristotelian type, he distinguished "God" from "Deity" or the Divine Essence. The latter is the universal, as humanity is related to individual men.[1] Father, Son, and Spirit *are* one, but we may not say that God *is* Father, and Son, and Spirit. We cannot say that the *Deity* became flesh. At the great Council of Rheims in 1148, Bernard's accusation of heresy was brought forward; but Gilbert, aided by his powerful friends and by the jealousy occasioned by the overshadowing influence of his accuser, went away unharmed. Pope Eugene III. declared against the opinion which he had held.

In the school of St. Victor near Paris were eminent theologians who struck a middle path between the intellectual daring of Abelard and an extreme conservatism. To this moderate school belonged William of Champeaux, a friend and in some sense a guide of St. Bernard, Hugo of St. Victor, the ablest representative of the school, and Richard of St. Victor, of the particulars of whose life not much is known. The merit of faith, Hugo teaches, lies in the circumstance that our conviction is determined by the affections when no adequate knowledge is yet present. By faith we make ourselves worthy of knowledge, as perfect knowledge is the ultimate reward of faith in the life above. On the Atonement, Hugo teaches that through the sufferings and death of Christ an adequate satisfaction is offered to God for man's sin.[2] Thereby, and on account of the bringing to Him of a perfect obedience, God is reconciled and His displeasure removed. There is an objective Atonement, comprising in it a *quasi* penal element. This view is opposed to that of Abelard and contains an element not expressed in Anselm's theory.

The effect of the conservative reaction illustrated in the treatment of Abelard and Gilbert was to inspire the Schoolmen of the

[1] "Quod divina natura quæ Divinitas dicitur, Deus non sit, sed forma qua Deus est, quemadmodum humanitas homo non est, sed forma qua est homo." "Sunt tres æternæ." Mansi, XXI. Col. 711.

[2] "Christus . . . debitum hominis patri solvit, et moriendo reatum hominis expiavit." *De Sacram.* I. 8, c. 4. (Migne, 176, p. 309.)

time with greater caution. A *via media* between the two tendencies, the dialectic and the churchly, was adopted by the authors of the books of *Sentences*. Propositions were sustained by extracts from the Fathers. There were two principal writers of this class. One was Robert Pulleyn, an Englishman, who died in 1150. By far the most celebrated of these authors was Peter Lombard, who was born at Novara in Italy, taught theology at Paris, became bishop there in 1159, and died in 1164. He set forth the doctrines of the Church in a systematic form, explained them, and argued for them, but everywhere supported his opinions by citations from the Fathers, especially from Augustine. He was a pupil of Abelard and was obviously much affected by his teachings. He lays much stress on the deliverance from sin through the love that is awakened in the human heart by the manifestation of God's love in the mission and death of Christ.[1] But he connects with this representation the doctrine of man's release from the hands of Satan, regarded as an executioner. Here he agrees with Bernard. "By his death, one most real sacrifice, whatever of faults there were for enduring the punishment of which Satan held us in his power, Christ extinguished." He "merited for us." His consummate humility atoned for Adam's pride.[2] He even says that Christ took on himself the punishment of sin, — a distinct step in advance of Anselm.[3] But the Lombard protests earnestly against the notion that God was an enemy and did not begin to love us until we were reconciled by the blood of Christ. Rather is it true that He loved us before the world was, and this love was the motive of the atonement. Peter Lombard did not escape suspicion and accusation. Among his adverse critics were Walter of St. Victor, and Joachim of Floris, a mystic. It was said that some of his statements respecting the Trinity were unsound. Joachim attributed to him the idea of a quaternity in the divine being, on the ground of the statement that the Father as personal principle in the divine being generates the Son. The divine essence, it was said, is thus made a fourth. But the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215, decided for the Lombard. The Father is declared to be the active principle in the generation of

[1] *Sent.* L. III. *Dist.* XIX. 1. (Migne, 192, p. 795.)

[2] *Dist.* XVIII. 5. (Migne, 192, p. 794.)

[3] "Non sufficeret illa pœna, qua pœnitentes ligat ecclesia, nisi pœna Christi cooperetur, qui pro nobis solvit." *Ibid.* XIX. 4. (Migne, 192, p. 797.)

the Son, not separable from the essence, but communicating it to the Son. Respecting the Incarnation, the Lombard taught that the divine person which had been simple and existing in one nature, became the person of a man by assuming human nature, thus becoming one divine person in two natures.[1] Thus adoptionism was avoided.

Adverse criticism ceased as time went on, and the book of *Sentences* became the current text-book in theology, on which numberless lectures were delivered and commentaries written. The dialecticians were too strong for the mystics to cast them into discredit. The most noted of the critics of Scholasticism on the ground of its logical fanaticism and neglect of ancient learning was John of Salisbury, a Humanist in his studies and tastes. In his closing years he was Bishop of Chartres. He died in 1180.

[1] L. III. 6. 6.

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND SECTION OF THE SCHOLASTIC ERA — ST. FRANCIS AND THE FRANCISCAN PIETY — MYSTICISM — AQUINAS AND SCOTUS

THE transition to the second division of the Scholastic period was made by Alexander of Hales — who was trained in the cloister of Hales in Gloucestershire, studied at Oxford and Paris, and in 1222 became the first Franciscan teacher of theology at Paris. By this "irrefragable doctor," as he was styled, the writings of Aristotle, as well as those of his Arabic commentators, were freely used. The approval by the Pope of this teacher's own commentaries on Aristotle left theologians free from the restraint relative to the use of the philosopher's writings, which had been imposed by Gregory IX. in 1215. The reverence for him grew. It came to pass that he was not only cited in lectures and treatises in connection with the Fathers of the Church, but that he was considered to have exhausted the powers of human reason in the ascertainment of ethical and religious truth, as well as in physics and psychology. Yet the influence of Aristotle in shaping Christian doctrine was mainly in the directions in which the Church of itself had adopted kindred opinions or points of view. Much importance, even as regards the history of theology, belongs to that great religious movement of the thirteenth century, which is connected in a preëminent degree with the work and example of St. Francis of Assisi and with both the mendicant orders. It was from the Franciscans that Dominic borrowed, and he enjoined upon the order that he founded the rule of poverty. The type of piety which sprung up under the auspices of the Saint of Assisi had its precursor in St. Bernard, but was further developed in a like direction, and exerted a vastly increased power and influence. The idea that filled the mind of St. Francis was that of the reproduction of the "life and the poverty of Jesus." The contem-

plation of Jesus, especially in his self-renunciation and sufferings, was ever a fountain of joy and entered largely into the Franciscan ideal of the religious life. But with this spirit, which is termed the "mystical" side, there was united an inextinguishable ardor in doing good, in which preaching and the care of souls formed an essential part. In all this activity, the privilege of hearing confessions and other prerogatives granted to the mendicant friars by the Popes, great as was the hostility thus engendered among the bishops and local priests, were an invaluable aid. There is not space here to enter into details on these topics, but two characteristics of the great Franciscan revival require to be distinctly mentioned. The first is that in its origin and continuance the laity were largely concerned, although, from the first, obedience to the hierarchy, to the Pope especially, was a cardinal rule, and, as time went on, the lay element more and more gave place to priestly membership and control. The second point is the fact that there was opened, on a large scale, personal religious effort for the conversion and the religious guidance and comfort of individuals. The love of Christ was a glowing, absorbing passion. To dwell on His humility, His self-denial, His death on the cross, was the main source of comfort and inspiration. It is remarkable that while the Scholastic doctrine respecting Christ, as a whole, leaned towards a monophysite view, or a view in which His human nature was eclipsed by His divinity, there should prevail to such an extent a loving contemplation of His human traits and experiences.

If we give the name of Mysticism to the self-surrender, amounting at times to the self-extinguishment, of the soul, in the glow of emotion, and to a rapturous insight sought through this channel, it is in the declining period of Scholasticism that Mysticism assumes a peculiar prominence. But in its essential character it is a marked phenomenon in the preceding age. Mysticism and Scholasticism were not antagonists. Among the theological leaders, the great mystics were Scholastics, and the most eminent Schoolmen, who are not classified with the Mystics, exemplified Mysticism in their own experience and found a place for it in their teaching. But in certain of the Schoolmen, Mysticism is elaborately explained and wrought into an articulated system. Such are the "Victorines," Hugo and Richard. Such is Bonaventura — John of Fidanza — "doctor seraphicus" — a pupil of Alexander of

Hales, his successor at Paris, and in 1256 made General of the Franciscan order. He put the highest value upon spiritual illumination. He preferred the Platonic teaching to that of Aristotle. Yet he was Scholastic in his method. In the mystical system the approach to direct communion with God, the goal of human aspiration, is partly intellectual, but also, keeping pace with it, ethical and practical. Above the empirical apprehension, above the rational understanding, of the world, is the ascent of the soul, if purified and enlightened by divine grace, to the enraptured perception, the ecstatic enjoyment, of the realities of faith. On this height, above the plane of sense-perception and of logic, there are discerned the allegorical import of nature and the allegorical sense of Scripture.

No theologian of German birth in the Middle Ages stands higher in merit than Albert the Great, styled from the extent of his acquisitions, which embraced an acquaintance with natural science, "doctor universalis." Distinguished for his expositions of Aristotle, he was affected also by Platonic and New Platonic doctrine, and by the mystical speculations of the Areopagite. General ideas, he held, are in the mind of God, but are realized in individual things. A versatile and prolific writer, he still left unfinished his *Summa* and his *Commentary* on the Lombard. But Albert is in a measure overshadowed by the commanding distinction of his renowned pupil, Thomas Aquinas, who, like his master, was a Dominican, and the great light of that order. With his personal friend Bonaventura, he maintained the claim of the mendicant orders to chairs in the University of Paris. In Thomas there reappears that just balance between the philosophical tendency and the religious which was so marked in Anselm. In Thomas, wonderful acumen blends with clearness. He is the most profound and luminous of the Scholastic writers. He was, like Albert, an Aristotelian Realist. In general, more than any other, he labored to harmonize the principles of Aristotle with the teachings of the Church, of whose authority, including the supreme authority of the Popes, he was a devoted champion. His *Summa Theologiæ* covers the field of Ethics as well as of Theology. It was not completed by its author, but stopped in the midst of the discussion of the doctrine of Penance. It is carried to the end, however, by means of extracts from his other writings. The generic subject is God, and the work is cast into three principal parts, each breaking into

divisions and subdivisions. The first part treats of God, including the nature of God, the Trinity, the relation of God to the World. The second treats of Man, or the "Motion of the Creature towards God," where are discussed Sin and Law, the Virtues, natural and Christian or theological, and the contemplative or blessed life, which is the end and aim of man's being, to be realized in the world above. The third part deals with the Person and Work of Christ, the Sacraments, and with Eschatology. Christ is to us the way of returning to God. Thus with God theology begins and ends. The trend of Aquinas is decidedly Augustinian. In his apologetic Work, Christianity is defended against heathen, Mohammedans, and skeptics, the first part being upon the truths of natural religion and the fourth or concluding book upon the truths of revelation.

Associated with the name of Aquinas is that of the Scholastic teacher who, as to the type of his theology, was at variance with him, John Duns Scotus. He belongs to a generation later, was a member of the Franciscan order, and died in 1308. Scotus was appropriately named "doctor mirabilis." So far did he push the process of hair-splitting analysis that he was driven to invent many new terms. His style, compared with that of his Scholastic predecessors, is marked by its barbarous latinity. A sincere Christian believer, and standing in his own day within the lines of admissible orthodoxy, he yet lacks the religious depth of Aquinas. In philosophy, he did not stop with Aristotle, but was more Platonic in his Realism. In his theology, he was Semi-Pelagian. The effect of the teaching of Scotus was to begin the work of undermining the Scholasticism of which he was so famous a leader. This effect was produced, partly by his critical treatment of the arguments drawn from reason for the propositions of the creed. Very little space was conceded to possible demonstration. Many arguments which had been deemed sufficient to foreclose all objections were reduced to a higher or lower degree of probability. Then essential parts of the divine administration and of the procedure of God in redemption were represented as inexplicable, or as sufficiently explained by the reference of them to God's will. In these ways the sphere of authority was enlarged, and the verdict of the Church left as the sole verification of important doctrines. So far as this ground was taken, the vocation of Scholasticism was gone.

Aquinas and Scotus were the founders of the two great conflicting schools. The dissent of Scotus related to numerous points. A radical difference, which affected the entire complexion of the rival systems, was their diversity on the subject of Grace and Free-will.

It is in the third section of the Scholastic Period that the disintegrating work of Scotus, which tended to divorce philosophy from theology, and to bring discredit upon the whole undertaking of the Schoolmen, was carried out. Durandus de St. Pourcain, a Dominican, at first a Thomist, broke away from his adhesion to the school of Aquinas, and maintained that we have no clear knowledge save of individual things. He subjected the dominant Realism to a hostile criticism. Durandus died as Bishop of Meaux in 1334. But it was chiefly William of Occam, a pupil of Scotus, who regained for Nominalism its long lost standing. He was for a time a teacher at Paris. He was a champion of the Franciscan order in its contests against the Popes in behalf of the rule of poverty. He stood by Louis of Bavaria in his resistance to the political interference of the Avignonese Pontiffs. All our knowledge, Occam asserted, is of phenomena. Individuals, things in the concrete, alone exist. Common names, like algebraic signs, are to designate them. Demonstrations in religion are out of the question. Logic when applied to the truths of Christianity lands us in contradictions. These truths are revealed directly by God either in the Bible or to the Church. Occam's assaults upon papal infallibility and the power of the Pope over Kings and in temporal affairs, his assertion that even a general council might err, even that faith might depart save from the souls of a few devout women, are interesting parts of his teaching. What concerns us just now is his thesis that even transubstantiation is logically indefensible, and is to be accepted as a revelation made to the Church. In the latter part of the fifteenth century, Gabriel Biel, teacher of theology at Tübingen, who has been sometimes styled the last of the Schoolmen, was prominent as an expounder of Nominalism and a disciple of Occam. He died in 1495. After Occam appeared, there were three, instead of two, contending schools, the Thomists, the Scotists, and the Occamists. Nominalism was in the ascendant.

CHAPTER VI

THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINES: NATURAL THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES — THE TRINITY AND THE INCARNATION — DIVINE AND HUMAN AGENCY — ORIGINAL SIN

In presenting the opinions of the Schoolmen on specific doctrines, chief attention will be given to the topics in connection with which their teaching was something more than the bare reproduction of patristic theology. Such topics are the Church and the Sacraments, respecting which it was sought to interpret and justify the existing practices; the doctrine of sin and of the operation of grace, where there were important deviations from the Augustinian teaching, and the Atonement, — a subject on which discussion was not fettered by any established dogma. Special attention will naturally be given to the antithesis of the Thomist and the Scotist opinions.

Aquinas endeavors to indicate the necessity of revelation against the objection that if man were not furnished with all the powers requisite for attaining the end of his being, he would be behind all other creatures, who in this respect are sufficient of themselves. The answer is that for the very reason that man has a higher end, a loftier destiny, which is nothing less than a participation in the divine glory, he needs supernatural light and aid. Thomas distinguishes two classes of truths from one another.[1] There are the truths above reason, — for example, the Trinity. There are truths accessible to reason, — for example, the truth that there is a God. But even truths of the second order need to be confirmed by the testimony of revelation, since practically the knowledge of God is attainable by only a few, through long effort, and not without an admixture of error. That there should be truths which are the object of faith is advantageous, as attracting the mind towards

[1] *Summa Cathol. Fidei c. Gentiles*, P. I. qu. 1, art. 1.

a higher realm of knowledge,[1] kindling aspirations after a more exalted state, and fostering humility. As related to the truths of faith, we are capable of discerning analogies — *veras similitudines* — which, although without demonstrative force, and not sufficient to convince adversaries, are yet a mental exercise and solace for the faithful, and show that these truths do not clash with reason. In their defences of Christianity, the Schoolmen were necessarily cut off from the use of arguments which involve historical and critical learning. It is not until the close of the Scholastic period and the rise of Humanism that, through the work of Marsilius Ficinus, the Florentine Platonist, the historical evidence of Christianity is presented with any fulness of knowledge.[2] The Schoolmen drew a line of demarcation between natural and revealed religion. Their apologies were often cogent, if they were not erudite, and had the merit of accuracy in definitions. Aquinas explains a miracle to be an event beyond the order of nature, not of any particular department of nature, but of nature in its totality.[3] It is an event, therefore, which God alone can accomplish. As regards the divine origin of the Scriptures, Scotus was the first to treat this topic elaborately. He presents eight considerations, nearly all of which are internal proofs.

Aquinas, in his doctrine concerning God, describes Him as endowed with thought and will. With Aristotle he says of Him that He is *actus purus*, i.e., energy fully realized, instead of being potential. God sets before Himself an end. This must necessarily have reference to Himself, must be Himself. In pursuance of this end the world was made. The world as being thus related to God is an object of His love. But connected with these views is the conception of God — which is derived from the Areopagite — as a being of whom nothing positive can be predicated.[4]

As to particular proofs of the divine existence, Aquinas remarks of the Anselmic argument that it assumes, what an Atheist will not concede, that the term 'God' denotes the highest

[1] "Oportuit mentem evocari in aliquid altius quam ratia nostra in præsenti possit pertingere."

[2] *De Relig. Christ. et Fidei Pietate* (1475).

[3] *Summa Theol.* P. I. qu. 110, art. 4 — "sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat præter ordinem naturæ alicujus particularis . . . aliquid dicitur esse miraculum, quod fit præter ordinem totius naturæ creatæ, hoc autem non potest facere nisi Deus," etc.

[4] *Ibid.* P. III. qu. 1, art. 2; cf. P. I. qu. 46, art. 1.

conceivable, and, if it does, that what exists in name exists objectively.[1] In agreement with Richard of St. Victor, he collects five modes of proof, viz., from a first principle of motion (Aristotle being here followed), from the necessity of a first efficient cause, from the presupposition of an existence which is *per se* necessary, from the supposition of the perfect as implied in the scale of things imperfect, from design in nature.[2] The first three suggestions form the cosmological proof. But Aquinas holds that prior to all reasoning, a knowledge of God is inherent "in a confused way" in all men.

Scotus sets aside the ontological argument for the being of God. The argument from effect to cause he does not reject. But as a ground of theistic belief he calls in the aid of Revelation.[3] Emphasizing the attribute of freedom in man, he likewise makes will the predominant element in the conception of God. But this autonomy is made so absolute that no reason is required for the actions of God beyond or behind His bare will. While, therefore, the personality of God is asserted in a more stringent way then by Aquinas, a foundation is laid by Scotus for a series of very questionable propositions in Christian doctrine.

Can man know God as He is in Himself, or, as the Schoolmen express it, has he "a quidditative" cognition of God? Thomas replies in the negative; all our knowledge is relative. Scotus answers in the affirmative. Finally a middle ground was reached by contending parties, — the position, namely, that some of the essential attributes can be known as they are, and others cannot.

The Scholastic discussions respecting the significance of the several divine attributes are examples of subtle and often not unprofitable discrimination. Omnipotence, says Aquinas, is the power to do whatever does not involve a contradiction. But of this last it is more true to say that it cannot be done than that God cannot do it. In relation to God's omnipresence, the Thomist doctrine was that God is in all things, not as a part of their essence, nor yet as an accident or attribute, but as an agent is present to that on which it acts. "Everything must be conjoined to that on which it immediately acts." In opposition to this "virtual" presence of God, which had been taught before by Alexander of Hales, the

[1] *Summa Theol.* P. I. qu. 2, art. 1.

[2] *Ibid.* qu. 2, art. 3.

[3] For a full exposition of Scotus's view, see A. Dorner's art., *Real Encycl.* Vol. III. p. 739 sq.

Scotists asserted an "ideal" presence. Dependent existences are conditioned only by their presence, or the presence of the ideal exemplars of which they partake, in the divine mind.

There was a vast outlay of ingenuity among the Schoolmen in the exposition of the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation. The conceptions of Aquinas were as clear and exact as the nature of the questions permits, and in the main they ruled opinion. Respecting persons in God, it is taught that the activity in which they originate is immanent. They are related to knowing and willing in the divine being. In the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, the divine knowledge and the divine love find an immanent realization. We can say that there are three wise, three eternal, etc., when we speak of divine persons; but, using the terms as substantives, we must say, One Wise, One Eternal, etc.[1] We must avoid opposite errors and steer between them. To shun the Arian error, we must avoid the terms 'diversity' and 'difference' and use the word 'distinction.' To preserve the simplicity of the divine nature, we must avoid the terms 'separation' and 'division,' as if the whole were divided into parts. To avoid the loss of equality, the term 'disparity' must be shunned. To preserve similitude, 'alien' and 'discrepant' must be avoided. To escape Sabellianism, 'singularity' must be avoided, and the word 'single' (*unicus*), lest the number of persons be destroyed. The same is to be said of the term 'solitary,' in order that the society (*consortium*) of persons may not be done away with.[2]

In treating of the Incarnation, Aquinas insisted that the human nature of Christ is individual, not the nature of mankind generally. Yet it was no human *person*, it was personal only as belonging to a more exalted person, and as having the capacity and destination to be personal.[3]

In contrast with the Pantheistic ideas of John Scotus, creation was considered by the Schoolmen to be an act of the divine will. The narrative in Genesis was commonly taken in both a literal and allegorical sense. The spiritual expositions, says Aquinas, must be framed on the basis of the literal meaning, which is first to be accepted.

[1] Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* P. I. qu. 36, art. 4.

[2] *Ibid.* P. I. qu. 31, art. 2.

[3] *Ibid.* P. III. qu. 2, art. 2. See Schwane, *DG. d. mittleren Zeit.* p. 269.

In keeping with the whole tendency of his system, Aquinas regarded the preservation of the world as a continuous act of creation, an opinion which Scotus and his followers rejected. The end of creation was said by Aquinas to be the communication of God's own perfection, "which is His goodness."[1] "God acts not for His own advantage, but solely by reason of His own goodness." The radical difference between the Thomist and Scotist schools appears in respect to the question of the divine agency in its relation to the activity of the human will, or divine Providence as concerned with the choices of man. Aquinas, like his preceptor, Albert, held to determinism. There are second causes, but God is the prime mover, acting upon them, and, in the case of the will, so to speak, within them. The will is not *necessitated* when it is moved by God to act in a particular direction, since there is no external constraint. That which is produced is the inward inclination itself. "God in moving the will does not coerce it, since He gives to it its own inclination. To be moved by the will is to be moved by one's self, that is, by an internal principle; but that intrinsic principle may be from another extrinsic principle; and thus to be moved of one's self is not inconsistent with being moved by another."[2] In this way, "God is the cause of all the acts of agents," whatever may be their nature. Yet Thomas denies that God is the author of moral evil. He follows Augustine in maintaining that moral evil is purely negative, the absence in man of what should be. Being negative, it cannot be the object of a creative act. As to his theodicy, Aquinas maintains that the defect of one thing may redound to the good of another. Hence a defect in one particular part or place is permitted to be. "There were not the life of the lion, if there were not the slaying of animals" on which he feeds, "nor would there be the patience of martyrs, if it were not for the persecution of tyrants."[3] It is

[1] "(Deus) intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quæ est ejus bonitas." Acting from no sense of need, He is "maxime liberalis." *Sum. Theol.* P. I. qu. 44, art. 4.

[2] "Deus movendo voluntatem non cogit ipsam, quia dat et ejus propriam inclinationem. Moveri voluntate est moveri ex se, id est, a principio intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco," etc. *Ibid.* P. I. qu. 105, art. 4.

[3] It belongs to the Providence of God to permit "quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne impediatur bonum universi perfectum. Si enim omnia mala impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo. Non enim esset

desirable that there should be beings, "the order of the universe requires that there should be some beings, who can depart from goodness and sometimes do thus depart." In instituting the order of the universe, which is good, God "by consequence, and, as it were, by accident," causes that which is corrupt in it.[1] Sin is thus made to be the necessary means of the greatest good. Respecting divine precepts which forbid moral evil, the distinction had been previously made between the secret or decretive, and the revealed or preceptive will of God. "Those things," says Peter Lombard, "which God has commended or prohibited to all, He has willed to be done or avoided by some but not by all."[2] The distinction was adopted by Alexander of Hales and is thus set forth by Aquinas: "God can be said metaphorically to will that which He does not will in the proper sense. The exertion of His agency is always in accord with the will in the sense of His good pleasure," i.e., the decretive will, "but this is not the case with regard to his precepts or counsels."[3] That this world is the best possible, the best within the power of God to produce, was taught by Anselm and Abelard. But Aquinas (and with him Durandus) held that while no beneficial change *within* the system is conceivable, since the effect of such a change would be to break up the perfection of the parts in their natural relation, like the stretching of a single chord of a harp, yet there might have been, had God so willed, without any disaster, an enlargement of the system by additions. From the determinism of Aquinas, Scotus dissented, and hence, also, from not a few of the inferences drawn from it.

The Schoolmen were Creationists. Aquinas distinguished between the sensitive or animal soul which man has in common with the brutes, and the intellective soul. The former is propagated physically, the latter is immediately created.[4] Aquinas argues for the immortality of the soul from its simple and indivisible nature and from its power of cognizing realities independent of time and space.[5] Scotus denied the validity of the proofs of immortality

vita leonis," etc. *Ibid.* P. I. qu. 22, art. 2. See Baur's exposition, *Die Christl. Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, etc. Vol. II. p. 736.

[1] *Ibid.* P. I. qu. 48, art. 2.

[2] *Sent.* I. *Dist.* 45 F.

[3] "Operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem præceptum vel consilium." *Sum. Theol.* P. I. qu. 19, art. 11, 12.

[4] "impossibile est quod virtus quæ est in semine sit productiva intellectivi principii." *Ibid.* P. I. qu. 118, art. 2.

[5] "Sensus non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc; sed intellectus apprehen-

which were drawn from reason. The question whether the soul is naturally immortal was long debated, and was at last decided in the affirmative by the Council of the Lateran, under Pope Leo. X., in 1513.

The distinction in man between the image and the similitude of God was thus defined by Peter Lombard: "the image consists in the cognition of truth; the similitude in the love of virtue."[1] With some differences of statement, the Schoolmen adhered essentially to this distinction. They followed Augustine in ascribing to man the *pura naturalia*, the natural powers of reason and will, and the *supernatural gift*, the gift, superadded of God's grace, — spiritual excellence or righteousness. On the one hand, man was adapted through the physical and mental powers which were inseparable from his nature to this mundane existence. On the other hand, he received a further endowment whereby he was brought into communion with God. But when and on what terms was the superadded righteousness communicated? In answering this question the two schools parted company. According to Aquinas it was a gift outright, bestowed on man simultaneously with his creation.[2] According to Scotus, time elapsed during which he was in a state of nature.[3] Moreover, there was a movement of will, a concurrence, a receptive act on the part of man. Peter Lombard had likened the acquisition of the supernatural gift to the marriage of the soul to God, there being a prior consent on the part of Adam. From this difference, important corollaries followed.

Through the fall of Adam it was the common doctrine that the *gratia gratum faciens* — original righteousness — was forfeited and lost. Man was left in the state of nature — *in statu purorum naturalium*. But as to the extent of the effect wrought, the Thomist and the Scotist were again divided. Aquinas taught that there is introduced a disorder in the powers of the soul; wounds are inflicted.[4] There is ignorance of God, aversion to the true good, a great weakening of the powers of moral resistance,

dit esse absolute et secundum omne tempus." Hence the natural desire "esse semper." But this desire "non potest esse inane." *Ibid.* P. I. qu. 76, art. 6.

[1] *Sent.* Lib. II. *Dist.* 16 D.

[2] *Ibid.* P. I. qu. 95, art. 1.

[3] *Ibid.* II. *distinct.* 39.

[4] "Hæc autem originalis justitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis . . . et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturæ dicitur." *Sum. Theol.* P. II. 1, qu. 85, art. 3.

a vehement propensity for sensuous gratification. Prior to the fall, so Aquinas taught, man had a natural power to fulfil the divine law, not, however, from the motive of love to God, for which the gift of supernatural grace was required. After the fall, even that power vanished. The principle of sin was designated by the Schoolmen as "concupiscence," which included inordinate desires in general, the sexual passion being the prominent element. By the fall, Aquinas held, man lost his freedom and was reduced to a state of helplessness as regards spiritual excellence. The transmission of sin was explained by the unity of the race and the possession of a common nature which is transmitted from the parent of the race. Scotus contended that by the loss of original righteousness, the natural powers of man are not directly affected, but become inordinate for want of the check derived from divine grace. Concupiscence as a native desire is not sinful. It brings guilt only through the consent of the will which by the fall is not wholly deprived of freedom.

Of course the problem of the responsible connection of the race with Adam and of the method of the transmission of sin from him to his posterity is discussed by Aquinas. We have already seen how it was handled by Anselm. Before reviewing the solution of Aquinas, a few words may be said on the way in which it was dealt with by the "Master of Sentences," the author of that text-book of theology in the Middle Ages which held its place for centuries in the European universities. Peter Lombard presents the doctrine of Augustine in its essential parts, with abundant citations from his writings. Sin did not spread in the world, he affirms, by imitation of a bad example, but by propagation, and appears in every one at birth.[1] Original sin is not mere liability to punishment for the first sin, but involves sin and guilt. That first sin not only ruined Adam, but the whole race likewise; since from him we derive at once condemnation and sin. That original sin in us is concupiscence. Our nature was vitiated in Adam; "since all were that one man; that is, were in him *materialiter*." We were in him *materialiter*, *casualiter*, or seminally. The body is wholly derived from him. It is the doctrine of the Lombard that each soul is created by itself, but is corrupted by contact with the material part which is vitiated in Adam.[2] He gives this explicit

[1] *Sent.* II., Lib. II. *Dist.* XXX. (Ed. Cologne, 1576.)

[2] *Ibid.* Lib. II. *Dist.* XXXI. XXXII.

answer to the problem which Augustine declines to solve. The law of propagation, says Peter Lombard, is not suspended in consequence of the entrance of sin into the world; and the corruption of the soul in each case is an inevitable result of its conjunction with the body. Augustine, in the *Encheiridion*, had admitted that the sins of more immediate parents, as far back as the third or fourth generation, *may* be imputed to the child, but had not positively sanctioned this view. The Lombard argues that he could not have entertained it without inconsistency, since it would be incompatible with his doctrine that the sin and punishment of infants are comparatively light.[1] He does not deny the position of Anselm that sin belongs to the will;[2] yet he is careful to say that the soul on uniting with the body becomes *ipso facto* corrupt; since if an act of self-determination be supposed to intervene, it would be actual, and not original, sin. On the whole, his representations accord with what we have explained to be the idea of Anselm.

We turn now to the discussion of the subject by Aquinas. This most acute and profound writer manifests caution in handling so difficult a theme; but his conclusions, as might be expected, coincide with the dogma of Augustine. Aquinas says that "although the soul is not transmitted, since the *virtus seminis* cannot cause a rational soul," yet by this means "human nature is transmitted from parent to offspring, and with it, at the same time, the infection of nature."[3] Hence the new-born child is made partaker of the sin of the first parent, since from him he received his nature through the agency of the generative function. No man is punished except for his own sin. We are punished for the sins of near ancestors only so far as we follow them in their transgressions.[4] The main point in the explication of original sin is the nature of our union with Adam. This Aquinas sets forth by an analogy. The will, by an imperative volition, bids a limb, or member of the body, commit a sin. Now an act of homicide is not imputed to the hand considered as distinct from the body, but is imputed to it as far as it belongs to the man as part of him, and is moved by the first principle of the motion in him, — that is, the will. Being thus related, the hand, *were it possessed of a nature capable of sin*, would be guilty. So all who are born of Adam are

[1] *Sent.* Lib. II. *Dist.* XXXIII.

[2] *Ibid.* *Dist.* XLII.

[3] *Sum. Theol.* P. II. qu. 81, art. 1.

[4] *Ibid.* II. qu. 81, art. 2.

to be considered as one man. They are as the many members of one body.

"Thus the disorder (*inordinatio*) which is in that man who sprang from Adam, is not voluntary by the act of his own will, but by the will of the first parent, who moves '*motione generationis*,' all who derive their origin from him, just as the soul's will moves all the limbs to an act; whence the sin which is derived from the first parent to his posterity, is called original: in the same way that the sin which is derived from the soul to the members of the body is called actual; and as the actual sin which is committed by a bodily member is the sin of that member, only so far as that member pertains to the man himself—*est aliquid ipsius hominis*—so original sin belongs to an individual, only so far as he receives his nature from the first parent."[1] It may be remarked that that among others, Cajetan, the renowned commentator of Aquinas, in the sixteenth century undertakes to explain and defend the analogy. The descendant of Adam belongs to Adam, as a hand to the body; and from Adam, through natural generation, he at once receives his nature and becomes a partaker of sin.

The realistic character of Aquinas's doctrine appears strongly in the argument by which he attempts to prove that no sins but the first sin of the first man are imputed to us.[2] He sharply distinguishes between nature and person. Those things which directly pertain to an individual, like personal acts, are not transmitted by natural generation. The grammarian does not thus communicate to his offspring the science of grammar. Accidental properties of the individual may, indeed, in some cases, descend from father to son, as, for example, swiftness of body. But qualities which are purely personal are not propagated. As the person has his own native properties and the qualities given by grace, so the nature has both. Original righteousness was a gracious gift to the nature at the outset, and was lost in Adam in the first sin. "Just as original righteousness would have been transmitted to his posterity at the same time with the nature, so also is the opposite disorder (*inordinatio*). But other actual sins of the first parent, or of other later parents, do not corrupt the nature, as concerns its qualities (*quantum ad id quod naturæ est*), but only as concerns the qualities of the person."

Original righteousness was principally and primarily in the sub-

[1] *Sum. Theol.* II. qu. 81, art. 1.

[2] *Ibid.* art. 2.

jection of the will to God. From the alienation of the will from God, disorder has arisen in all the other powers of the soul. Hence the deprivation of original righteousness, through which the will was subject to God, is the first or *formal* element in original sin, while concupiscence or "*inordinatio*" is the second, or *material* element. Thus original sin affects the will, in the first instance. Its first effect is the wrong bent of the will. Aquinas's analysis of native, inherent depravity is substantially accordant with that of Anselm.

The doctrine of the immaculate conception of Mary was denied by Anselm, and when a festival in her honor was established at Lyons (1140) by those who espoused this opinion, it was combated by Bernard of Clairvaux, who nevertheless held to her perfect ante-natal sanctification. It was even rejected by Bonaventura,[1] as well as by Aquinas; but it was pronounced a probable truth by Scotus.[2] It became more and more a tenet of the Franciscans, a tenet against which the Dominicans protested. But despite this difference, there was a prevailing impulse to glorify the Virgin as a mediator with her son, and fitted to be such through her spotless innocence procured through grace by the retrospective effect of the Redeemer's work. A kind of worship was accorded to her even by Thomas, intermediate between strictly divine honors which were due to God alone and the type of homage offered to the saints.

[1] "Teneamus secundum quod communis opinio tenet, Virginis sanctificationem fuisse post originalis peccati contractum." Lib. III. *Dist.* 3, art. 1.

[2] *Summa*, P. III. qu. 27, art. 2.

CHAPTER VII

SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINES: THE ATONEMENT — CONVERSION AND SANCTIFICATION — JUSTIFICATION — THE CHURCH AND THE PAPACY

Aquinas retains the fundamental idea of Anselm's theory of the Atonement, — the idea of a full, objective satisfaction for sin. Yet such is his conception of God as an absolute being that he denies the strict necessity of the death of Christ as a means of redemption. He even says that God is at full liberty to pardon sins outright, as a man may forgive the injuries done to himself. This is a point in which Aquinas departs from Anselm's view. Yet Aquinas holds to a certain necessity in this case, since the mode of redemption chosen of God is the best and the most adapted to the end in view.[1] The Creator cannot satisfy for sins, on account of God's infinite majesty, the infinite good — even God — of which sin deprives man, and by reason of the possible repetition of Adam's sin in an endless series of individuals.[2] The sufferings and death of Christ are manifestations of the greatness of God's love which are suited to awaken a reciprocal love in men, and to furnish to them an example of holy obedience. Besides, Satan who deceived man is by man overcome, and is displaced from a dominion over men to which he had no right, yet under which God had righteously left them. Christ in His humanity has voluntarily endured every variety of suffering, including the pain which springs from sympathy with sinful men. All this He has endured of His own free will, in a spirit of obedience to God. By this means, satisfaction is made for sin. He satisfies who renders to an offended party that which he loves more than he hates the offence. God ever loves us for the nature which He has created, yet He ever hates us as far as we are sinners. By reason of the exceed-

[1] *Sum. Theol.* P. III. qu. 46, art. 2.

[2] *Ibid.* P. III. qu. 46, art. 3. *Ibid.* art. 4.

ing love of Christ, the extent and manifoldness of His sufferings, the value of His life, Christ has in this way made satisfaction for the sins of men not excepting the sins of those who put him to death. In this satisfaction is included His universal obedience, his fulfilment of the ceremonial law, He being the offering therein typified, and of the moral law, to which he was obedient unto death. He has rendered an equivalent for the dishonor which God has suffered. It is a complete compensation. Thereby He is placated as regards all the offences of those who are joined to Christ. How is the atoning work of Christ available for the salvation of men? It is through his merit which redounds to their benefit. Just as he who arrogates to himself more than belongs to him justly suffers a forfeiture of things to which he has a right, so he who relinquishes freely in a righteous spirit that which he justly possesses, is entitled to a reward. The explanation of the transfer of merit is in the conception of the mystical union of Christ with His members.[1] When two persons become one through love, the one can satisfy for the other. It is just as if the hand were to atone by a meritorious act for a sin which had been committed by the foot. Christ is the head, mankind are the members; His followers actually, the whole race potentially. A full satisfaction for sin and guilt has been rendered by the social body, taken as a whole, through its head. Yet Aquinas does not adhere with strict consistency to the conception of the Atonement as objective. One condition of our obtaining forgiveness of sins is love on our part, excited in us by the love of Christ. For sins after baptism we, like Christ, must endure pain and punishment. The Passion of Christ is said to be the cause of remission of sins in three ways, first as calling out love in us, secondly, by the mode of redemption, the whole Church being, in connection with its head, reckoned as one person, and third, as the flesh in which He endured suffering is an efficient instrument whereby "His passions and actions operate through a divine power for the expulsion of sin." In one point, and that a very important one, Aquinas is in full accord with Anselm. The satisfaction of Christ is pronounced to be not only a sufficient, but a "superabundant" satisfaction for the sins of the world.

[1] "Caput et membra sunt quasi una persona mystica, et ideo satisfactio Christi ad omnes fideles pertinet" . . . *Sum. Theol.* P. III. qu. 48, art. 2. He is united to the race. *Ibid.* art. 3; cf. Schwane, *DG. d. mittl. Zeit*, p. 323.

The theory of the Atonement advocated by Scotus is founded on a radical difference in his philosophy from that of Anselm and Aquinas. It is true that Aquinas says that it would be possible for God to forgive without an Atonement, but this is said merely in deference to the New Platonic idea of the Absolute which enters into his conception of God. His exposition of the Atonement carries this concession no farther. Scotus denies the fundamental principles of Anselm. The fundamental principle of Scotus is the absoluteness of the divine will. The cause and ground of all merit is "the divine acceptance," the divine will to affix this or that estimate to whatever is done or suffered. There is no objective criterion of value inhering in the thing itself. A thing is good because God loves it. It is the reverse of the proposition that He loves it because it is good. Had God pleased, man might have been redeemed by acts of love done by Adam or by an angel.[1] Scotus maintains that the merits of Christ are finite, for He does not merit as God, but as man. Hence, weighed by their intrinsic value they cannot be accounted infinite, or as standing in the room of that which is infinite. But in the circumstances and the dignity of Him who merits, there is an extrinsic reason for *accepting* his merit as infinite, for counting it as being what it really is not.[2] The merit of Christ thus derives the value attached to it from the divine acceptance. It is a merit of "congruity" and not of "condignity." That is to say, there is that in it which is *suitable* for a sort or amount of recompense to which its real desert bears no actual proportion. If it were a merit of *condignity* it would carry in it a title to the complete benefit awarded to it. Scotus says that it were possible for an angel or a mere man, begotten without sin, to redeem mankind, but God has chosen this way as a means of exciting love in us. He decides to *consider* the merits of Christ a full atonement, to accept them for more than their inherent value, independently of this acceptance.

Thenceforward, we have in the course of Christian theology two general views of the Atonement. The first, which is often called the Anselmic, and not infrequently the judicial, theory, makes the atoning work of Christ the absolute, objective equivalent of the punishment deserved by sin, and something required of divine justice in the administration of the world. It embodied itself in

[1] *Oxon.* L. 3, *Dist.* 20, qu. 1, schol. 3; cf. Schwane, DG. etc., p. 330.

[2] *Ibid.* L. 3, *Dist.* 19, qu. unica; cf. Schwane, p. 330.

the formula that Christ endured the penalty. The second or the Scotist view rejects this proposition, and brings in the divine will to supply a deficiency, to eke out that substitution which of itself falls short of being an equivalent. If we look at the principal, although not the exclusive, thought of Scotus in his attempt to solve the problem, we find in him the moral view, which makes the value of the sufferings and death of Christ to be the direct impression, which they are adapted to make, of the forbearance and compassionate love of God.

On the subject of the divine agency in the conversion and sanctification of the soul, the Schoolmen distinguish between prevenient and coöperative grace. It is this distinction, in connection with the adoption by Aquinas of the terms descriptive of human merit which were enshrined in the current orthodoxy, that raises the question whether he holds fast to the Augustinian view. The "prevenient" grace of God is said to act upon the will, enabling and moving it to turn to God. This effect being produced, there follows the "subsequent" or coöperative grace, whereby the divine work in the soul is carried forward and the soul is qualified to perform good works. The question is whether a real agency is attributed to the will in the reception of the prevenient grace — of the *prima gratia* — and in conjunction with the continued influences of grace after this initiative. As to the first point, grace being at the outset the sole efficient, no merit belongs to its recipient. But in respect to what follows upon the first effect of grace, the position of Aquinas is not quite so clear. We cannot attribute to him the opinion that the will is a coefficient merely on account of the statement that the *bondage* of the will is not the *destruction* of the will; for herein he is in accord with Augustine. Aquinas says that "infused virtüe is produced in us without ourselves *acting*, but not without ourselves *consenting*." But this language is possible to a believer in philosophical determinism. Aquinas does not affirm the existence of a power of contrary choice in the recipient of saving grace, even if he does not explicitly deny it. If we are governed in our interpretation by his exposition of his deterministic creed respecting the will, we must pronounce him a strict Augustinian.[1] But it is a fair question

[1] Even Augustine, as we have seen, was not a determinist as concerns the *unfallen* will. See *supra*, p. 184.

whether he always consistently adhered to it. Merit is ascribed to man. So far forth as his new life springs from his own will, it is a merit of congruity alone, since the blessing or reward that is bestowed is so vastly disproportioned to his action. But so far as it springs from the agency of the Spirit of God, it is a merit of condignity. Perseverance does not fall under the head of merit, since it is a gift outright to whomsoever it is granted. Alexander of Hales deviated from Augustinianism in attributing to men good works antecedent to the infusion of grace. Bonaventura was of the same mind. The Semi-Pelagian opinion was definitely set forth by Duns Scotus. Man in the use of his natural powers, which original sin has left unimpaired, can produce within himself such dispositions of heart as to prepare himself to receive and to merit, by the merit of congruity, the divine grace. This grace he receives, but can resist, and he can fall from grace. The powers of the human will, apart from grace, were described by Occam as sufficient for man's self-renewal, so far as reason enables us to judge. It is only revelation that convinces us of the contrary.

Justification is an act of God imparting righteousness, and being a divine act it is momentary. The analysis of the elements of Justification which is presented by Aquinas gives the successive steps, not according to the order of time, but in the order of nature.[1] There is, first, the infusion of grace in the soul; second, the motion of the will towards God; third, the inward turning away from sin; and, fourth, forgiveness. Thus right feelings, incipient love, are the condition precedent of the bestowal of pardon. The Schoolmen teach that it is faith that justifies. The best of them present profound and spiritual ideas respecting faith, yet its saving quality is defined by them to consist in the *love* that enters into it. It is "Faith formed by love." The credence given to the doctrines of the Church, when the animating principle of love is included in it — this is that which brings salvation. Hence faith is set forth by Aquinas as a virtue, and in the order of Christian virtues stands first. In truth, a subtle legalism pervades the Scholastic theory concerning what is required in the Gospel as the condition of forgiveness. This characteristic is manifest in the use that was made of the distinction between implicit and explicit faith. Explicit faith is clearly conscious of its object, namely, the articles of the creed. Implicit faith, as described by

[1] *Sum. Theol.* P. II. i. qu. 113, art. 1.

Aquinas, is the preparation of the mind "to believe what divine Scripture contains." By him bounds are set to implicit or undeveloped faith, but by later Schoolmen, and still more in the practical apprehension of the people, implicit faith was resolved into a readiness to receive whatever the Church, the authoritative teacher, might inculcate. Thus, very easily, and very commonly, an unthinking docility was allowed to be substituted for enlightened Christian perceptions of truth. The spirit of legalism is manifest in the place given in the system of doctrine to the distinction between the "precepts" of the Gospel and the "counsels," in the observance of which, Aquinas teaches, eternal life is attained better and with greater facility.[1] From the old doctrine of works of supererogation, works surpassing the limit of imperative requirements, there was developed by Alexander of Hales the idea of a "treasury" of merits derived from them, and of a basis thus laid for the doctrine of indulgences.

Under the Scholastic conception of Justification and of the nature of faith, no foundation for assurance, for a sure and established confidence in one's Christian standing, could exist. According to Aquinas, the only means open for attaining an assured hope are certain signs or indications which, however, afford no certainty, and an immediate revelation from God which is sometimes given to individuals as a special privilege.

The virtues are classified by Aquinas on the principle that man is capable of a twofold blessedness. There is a blessedness which is correlated to human nature in itself considered, and a blessedness which surpasses this limit. The one is attainable by natural principles; the other only by divine power. The last is a certain participation of the divine nature. Thus we have the natural virtues, wisdom, justice, fortitude, temperance; and the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity.

The nominalistic theology as it was set forth by Scotus and Occam was within the recognized pale of orthodoxy. There flowed from it important results in the domain of practical religion. An Augustinian reaction, of which Bradwardine, a contemporary of Occam, was a representative, was of little avail to stem the tide. In connection with the nominalistic theology, and as a part of it, there were propagated such views on the Sacraments as fomented the prevailing tendency to make the means of salvation to be the

[1] *Sum. Theol.* P. II. i. qu. 108, art. 4.

performance of meritorious works, coupled with a faith of which the essence was an unquestioning submission to the Church as the vehicle of revelation, and reliance on the Sacraments as the channels of grace.

The influence of the idea of the Church as the community of the faithful, of the elect children of God, an idea which retained a degree of power in the thoughts of Augustine, continually waned. More and more the Church came to be identified with the visible, hierarchical organization. Patristic authority, running back to Cyprian, and even farther, could be appealed to in support of this principle at the root of the mediæval conception; but in the carrying out of this principle there was a wide gulf between the earlier and the later period. The exaltation of the hierarchy, the absolute dependence of the laity upon the priesthood, existed to an extent unknown in the patristic age. The privileges still left to the laity in the concerns of the soul are so scanty as to be the exception that proves the rule. Significant of the state of thought that had long existed is the language of Philip the Fair in his indignant answer to the haughty rebuke of Boniface VIII.: "Holy Mother Church, the Spouse of Christ, is composed not only of clergymen, but also of laymen."

The conversion of the Church into an ecclesiastical monarchy, with almost absolute power in the Regent at Rome, was not the work of theologians. Nor was its success in building up a world-wide monarchy, to which nations and kings should be subject, owing, as a main cause, to their craft or their ambition. The Schoolmen came forward with formulas and arguments in behalf of the result of an ecclesiastical development which had grown out of tendencies long rife in the Church, and out of the conditions of European society. The attempt to trace the growth of hierarchical prerogatives and of the papacy would take us into the field of jurisprudence. The subject belongs more to a record of the rise and progress of canon law than to the history of doctrine. In the alterations and accretions which that system experienced from time to time, forgeries, of which the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals were far from being the exclusive example — a fraud which nobody, at that time, was competent to detect and expose — were an auxiliary cause. But the structure, as a whole, arose from circumstances involved in the relation of the Church to the semi-

civilized nations, and from the judaistic elements mingled in its faith and its ceremonies. The compilation of Gratian in the middle of the twelfth century was succeeded by the rapid growth of a system of canon law. Enlarged collections, each outdoing its precursor in exalting priestly and papal authority, appeared in the next following centuries. Under such Popes as Alexander III. and Innocent III., new decrees of councils and ordinances of Popes carried the pretensions of the papal see to the highest point short of an apotheosis of the sovereign pontiffs. The process went on through the reign of Boniface VIII.

1. The old theory of the equality of bishops as regards the essential basis of their office was given up. The Pope was not only Vicar of St. Peter and universal bishop, but became the Vicar of Christ, or of God, and under Christ, the fountain of Episcopal authority, which from him is distributed among His fellow-bishops. They are all His vicars. Their relation to the Pope was compared by Aquinas to that of a Proconsul to an Emperor. The Pope having this station, supreme legislative power was more and more attributed to him, and along with it a co-extensive judicial authority. To him was ascribed the exclusive right to depose bishops as well as to confirm their appointment, to summon general councils, and to ratify, or to veto, their doings, to dispose of benefices and to tax the churches, to grant absolution in all cases which he chose to reserve to himself, and to decree canonization.

2. The personal infallibility of the Pope respecting Christian doctrine remained a subject on which there were opposite opinions. Yet papal infallibility is approved by Aquinas on the ground of the prayer of Christ for Peter that his faith might not fail (Luke xxii. 32). But much stress is laid on *a priori* reasoning, and on the injunction, 'Feed my sheep' (John xxi. 16, 17).[1] The Thomist opinion on this point was espoused generally by the Dominicans.

3. The claims of the Popes to a superior authority in relation to kings and princes were explained and asserted by Aquinas. The doctrine was that the two swords, emblems of temporal and spiritual authority, were given to Peter, but that the wielding of the temporal sword is delegated to the Civil Power, which, however, is answerable for the use of it to the successors of the Apostle. To the Church was given the power to bind and to loose, and

[1] *Sententt.* iv. *distinct.* 24, qu. 3, art. 2, ad. 1.

this stretches over princes as well as subjects. The sentence in the bull of Boniface VIII. (1302), the *Unam sanctam*, which declares that every human being is subject to the Roman pontiff, occurs in Aquinas. If the priesthood, according to the current doctrine and practice, were raised far above the laity, the Popes were exalted to a corresponding height above all other holders of the priestly office.

CHAPTER VIII

SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINES: THE SACRAMENTS

THE channels through which the grace of Christ is conveyed by the clergy are the Sacraments. The general theory on this subject was framed upon the basis of Augustine's definition that a sacrament is "the visible sign of an invisible grace." To this conception there were added, by Hugo of St. Victor, and Peter Lombard, the additional elements that the Sacrament is instituted by Christ, is the visible image of the grace which it denotes, and confers this very grace on the recipient. Aquinas gives a systematic form to the statements of the earlier Schoolmen. There is a sanctifying efficacy in the Sacraments. The cause of the sanctification flowing thence is Christ, all grace being ultimately due to His sacrifice; holiness and virtue are its *form*, its immediate product; eternal life is its end. "In the new covenant, through the form they have their sanctifying power, while in the matter they have their sign."[1] Since grace is invisible, the sign — the *significatio* — of the Sacrament is by means of things visible. It must be divinely instituted since it is God who is the Sanctifier.

The need of Sacraments is founded by Aquinas on that peculiarity of our nature by which we are led up to spiritual and intelligible things by means of things corporeal and sensible, on the effect of sin in rendering us more subject to things material, and on the fact that our activity here has to do with corporeal existences. Aquinas conceded that had man remained in a state of innocence the Sacraments would not have been necessary.

The number of the Sacraments remained quite unsettled until the middle of the eleventh century. Abelard and Hugo of St. Victor had made five to be the number. Peter Lombard em-

[1] Schwane, *DG. d. mittl. Zeit*, p. 589.

braced seven in his list, orders and extreme unction being added to the five. This number of seven was accepted by the leading Schoolmen of the thirteenth century, but was not sanctioned by an ecclesiastical decision until the Council of Florence in 1439.[1] It comprises Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Orders, and Marriage. Baptism and the Eucharist were usually pronounced the principal Sacraments. The highest rank in the catalogue is assigned by Aquinas to the Eucharist. He undertakes to point out the necessity of the seven Sacraments, and their connection with one another.[2] In Baptism is the birth to spiritual life; advance to mature strength is through Confirmation; the nourishing of this inward life is through the Eucharist. Were man sound in body and soul, free from sin and evil, these three Sacraments would suffice. But for the cure of his maladies, he needs Penance and Extreme Unction. Moreover, a spiritual consecration in reference to this life is requisite, which, as regards clerical duty, is imparted by ordination, and, as regards the preservation of offspring, by marriage. Of the Sacraments there are three which are not to be repeated. These are Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders. They stamp upon the soul a certain "indelible character," but the precise nature of this effect of grace it was found to be not easy to make clear. Such an effect is said by Duns Scotus not to be ascribed to them in Scripture, nor by the Fathers, but to be established on the authority of the Roman Church. Durandus calls in question the fact of such an internal character being imprinted. But the doctrine of Aquinas prevailed.

The transcendant importance of the Sacraments in the Scholastic system is realized when we are told by Aquinas that it is by them, through the hierarchy who administer them, that we are made the recipients of that grace which renders us participants of the divine nature. At the root of his philosophy in its bearing on the subject is the idea of the mystical unity of the Church in one body, having Christ for its head. In some way — it is not explained exactly how — through the Sacraments the benefits of the passion of Christ are applied to men.[3] The effect of the Sacrament is *ex*

[1] For details as to the question of the number, see Schwane, p. 584 sq.

[2] P. III. qu. 65, art. 1. See, also, P. III. 62, 5, where Baptism and the Lord's Supper are said to be "potissima sacramenta."

[3] The varieties of opinion are clearly set forth by Schwane, p. 592 sq.

opere operato.[1] That is to say, it is not dependent on the personal character of the officiating priest. All that is requisite on his part is the intention — the intention to carry out the purpose of Christ and the Church as regards the Sacrament which he administers. What is required of the recipient in order to get the benefit implied in the Sacrament is a question of vital moment. The Sacrament was held to be not dependent for its efficacious power upon the exercise of faith on his part. This is a distinction between the Sacraments of the Old Covenant and the New. Aquinas reiterates the statement of Augustine that where there is no faith the blessing veiled in the Sacrament is not received. But the subjective qualification was gradually reduced to a minimum. It was made to consist, provided one is not in the state of mortal sin, merely in the mental posture of non-resistance to the operation of the Sacramental act, although its effect might be enhanced by a pious disposition. So far was the theory of a *quasi* magical operation of the Sacrament extended. Among the later Schoolmen, from Scotus onward, in connection with the Sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction, a certain low measure of subjective qualification, to which there was attributed a merit of congruity, was made the sole prerequisite for the attainment of the full benefit.

1. The *form* of Baptism is the use of the words used in the institution of the rite.[2] Its effect is sanctification and forgiveness, — that is, Justification, which is received by the infant as well as by the adult. The general opinion was that concupiscence as a principle is not destroyed but weakened so that it does not longer reign without our consent.[3] In this opinion Aquinas substantially concurs with Peter Lombard. The sense in which "regeneration" was predicated of the subject of Baptism was not clearly explained. There are no exceptions to the necessity of Baptism, save in the case of martyrs and where the intention to receive the rite exists, but is prevented from being fulfilled without fault on the part of the subject. The faith of sponsors is in lieu of the faith of children.

2. Confirmation in the Latin Church could be imparted only by the Bishops, since it was held that they alone may anoint with holy-oil, and chrism being the *matter* of the Sacrament. It confers

[1] Aquinas, *Sentent.* iv. *distinct.* iii. qu. 64, art. 8.

[2] The questions relative to the form are most fully considered by Alexander of Hales. See Schwane, p. 606.

[3] *Sum. Theol.* P. II. i. qu. 81, art. 3.

strength for growth in the divine life. Witnesses are necessary by whom, as Aquinas teaches, the candidate, being, "as it were, heretofore, weak and a child," is sustained. A spiritual relationship is established between them and the candidate — as between the baptized person and the sponsors — which precludes intermarriage.

3. The Eucharist was not, like Baptism, held to be indispensable to salvation. It sufficed to have the desire and the intention to receive it, but the fulfilment of the purpose must not be wilfully neglected. In the twelfth century, the custom of admitting children to the communion was abolished, the primary motive being the increased veneration for the elements, and the danger of dropping the bread and wine in the distribution of them. The same motive led, at the outset, to the withholding of the cup from the laity. Alexander of Hales is the first to speak of this custom as common in the Church. Albert the Great was opposed to it. It was advocated by Bonaventura and Aquinas. By the latter the doctrine of concomitance was brought forward, — the doctrine that in virtue of a natural accompaniment, the blood of Christ is in the consecrated bread.[1] It is enough that the priest alone receives the cup. This view was taken up by both of the great orders, and prevailed. It added a new dignity to the priesthood.

The term 'transubstantiation' first received an authoritative sanction at the fourth Lateran Council, under Innocent III., in 1215. In the act of transubstantiation, it was the doctrine that the whole Christ is in every part of the elements. There was an abundance of subtle speculation in the effort to show that while these occupy space, their parts, through the exercise of divine power, do not. The miracle was asserted by Aquinas to be, not an annihilation of the substance of the elements, but a conversion of it into the substance of the Lord.[2] The doctrine of Peter Lombard was accepted, that through an exercise of omnipotence, the accidents — the attributes — of the elements are kept in being when their substance is gone from them.[3] But Scotus held that the substance of the elements is annihilated. By Occam there was brought forward a doctrine of impanation or consubstantiality, which had a resemblance to the later Lutheran conception. After the eleventh century, an earlier Greek custom of elevating the

[1] *Sum. Theol.* P. III. qu. 76, art. 2. [2] *Ibid.* III. qu. 75, art. 3.
[3] *Ibid.* qu. 77, art. 1.

host, originally a merely symbolical act, spread among the Latins. Attended by the ringing of a bell, it came to be the sign to the people of the simultaneous occurrence of the miracle, and the signal for them to fall on their knees. A festival of the adoration of the host, which was introduced in 1259, was ordained for the whole Church by Urban IV., in 1264. After debate it was decided, in accordance with the teaching of Aquinas, that the transubstantiated elements continue to be such, even if a mouse may chance to eat of the converted bread. The doctrine was inherited from the former period that the mass is a real offering, renewing and repeating the sacrifice of Christ on the cross, and giving peculiar efficacy to the prayers for the living and for the dead which were offered up in connection with it. The efficacy in averting evils and procuring blessings that was supposed to inhere in masses, led to a common practice of private masses, the priest alone being present. At the same time, as it was only venial sins that obtained pardon through this Sacrament, the reception of it came to have a diminished importance in the eyes of the generality of people. This prompted Innocent III., in 1215, to ordain that every layman should confess and partake of the communion at least once in the year. Penance — the Sacrament of Confession and Absolution — from the benefits attainable through it, assumed in the popular mind the highest importance. But among the Mystics, in the cloisters, frequent communion was prized as the means of spiritual union with the Lord.

4. In respect to Penance there took place in the Middle Ages the most important changes in doctrine and practice. As early as the eighth and ninth centuries, absolution began to be pronounced in anticipation of the satisfaction or temporal penalties to follow upon repentance and confession. For a long period the form of absolution was deprecatory. It was a prayer for the forgiveness of the penitent. The three elements in the Sacrament were the contrition of the heart, the confession of the mouth, and satisfaction by the offender — *satisfactio operis*. But as late as the twelfth century, confession to a priest was not generally considered indispensable to the obtaining of forgiveness, and if a priest was not at hand confession might be made to a layman. In the thirteenth century the doctrine assumed the definite form that while mortal sins committed after baptism incur the penalty of eternal death, by repentance and confession this is commuted into temporal pen-

alties, or satisfaction, to be adjudged by the priest. These penalties are both vindicative and medicinal. The priest pronounces absolution in the character of a judge administering the divine law. This is the power of the keys. Thereafter the priest speaks in the first person: "*Ego absolvo te.*" To confess at least once a year was made a law by Innocent III.[1] If there are no mortal sins to confess, Aquinas holds that there must be a confession of venial sins, an opinion from which Scotus dissented. With the crusades there was introduced the practice of granting plenary indulgences. As a basis for the doctrine of indulgences, or the remission of temporal penalties imposed in connection with absolution, Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great brought forward the doctrine of the treasury of supererogatory merits, amassed by Christ and the Saints, — merits which may be set to the account of the needy, to discharge the debt of satisfaction due from them. Aquinas endeavors to show the reasonableness of this idea on the ground of the mystical union, binding the Church together and to its head. It is committed to the Pope, and to those to whom he may delegate his prerogative, to dispense these merits by which temporal penalties are cancelled.[2]

This power of the Church through the Pope extends — "indirectly," says Aquinas — to Purgatory. This was one of the five abodes in the invisible world. These are: 1. Hell, a place of eternal suffering, the abode of those who die in mortal sin, without absolution. The Schoolmen unite in affirming torment by eternal fire. 2. The *limbus* of infants dying unbaptized — *limbus* signifying literally a border, as, for instance, the bank of a river. In this abode the inmates are cut off from the vision of God, but, it was generally held, are not subject to positive inflictions of pain. 3. The *limbus patrum* — the abode of the Old Testament Saints, now, since the advent of Christ, turned into a place of rest. 4. Purgatory, for souls not under condemnation for mortal sin, yet doomed to temporal, terminable punishments. These served the double purpose of an atonement and of a means of purification. 5. Heaven, the abode of the souls

[1] Lateran Council IV. c. 21.

[2] This power of the Pope is exercised, as far as release from Purgatory is concerned, not *per modum judicii*, but *per modum suffragii*, i.e., through supplication to God. It is connected with the Pope's infallibility by Albert and Aquinas. See Schwane, pp. 674, 548, 543.

which at death need no purification and of souls cleansed in the fires of Purgatory. Dante, as to his theology, was a disciple of Thomas Aquinas, and his description of these several regions is in the spirit of the orthodox doctrine.

The extension of the benefit of indulgences into the domain of Purgatory for the sake of abridging the duration of its pains was one of the baleful innovations in connection with the Sacrament of Penance. Another modification, equally, if not more mischievous in its practical effects, was the reduction of the "contrition," the first condition for the obtaining of absolution, to a lower form of repentance. This doctrine was introduced by Alexander of Hales[1] and Bonaventura, who taught that "attrition," the "servile fear" of one who deplores sin from the dread of hell, is a sufficient preparation to receive the Sacrament, which operates to make good the deficiency. This doctrine does not gain a place in the teaching of Aquinas, but it is prominent in the theology of Scotus, who goes so far as to ascribe to this attrition a merit of congruity. It is a disposition of heart whereby the sinner merits the grace of the Sacrament, by which the work thus begun attains to completion.

5. After the ninth century, the ancient custom of anointing the sick — which rested on James v. 14 (and Mark vi. 13) — was lifted to the rank of a Sacrament. Thomas Aquinas, differing from the Schoolmen before him, taught that it was instituted, not by the Apostles, but by Christ himself.[2] Scotus adopted this opinion, which was sanctioned by the Council of Trent. The spiritual effect came to be regarded as the chief benefit. The physical advantage was secondary. It was to be applied, not to the sick generally as of old, but only to those whose lives were in peril. Its matter, as Aquinas explains, is the "oil blessed by the bishop." It was to be put upon the eyes, the ears, the nostrils, the lips, the hands, the feet, the thighs. The minister of the Sacrament is the priest, the effect is the "healing of the mind" and, it might be, of the body also. It is only venial sins that are remitted in this Sacrament. The remainders of sin are cleansed away. The soul is strengthened for the struggle of death. There is a marked indefiniteness in the descriptions of Extreme Unction, and of its relation to the two great Sacraments of the Eucharist and

[1] *Sum. Theol.* P. III. qu. 60, art. 3. See Schwane, p. 666.

[2] *Suppl.* qu. 29, art. 3.

Penance. If the patient partially recovers, Unction may be repeated, provided there is a relapse and renewal of danger.

6. The number of orders, according to Aquinas, is seven. Since the thirteenth century, all orders except bishops, priests, and deacons have been termed "minor orders." Ordination communicates to the priesthood sacerdotal authority and the grace for the exercise of it. The priest is thus empowered and qualified to dispense the Sacraments. It leaves an indelible character, and therefore is not to be repeated. What the matter of this Sacrament is, it was not found easy to determine. Aquinas confesses that while the efficacy of the other Sacraments resides in the matter, here it rests in the person of the administrator and from him passes to the person to be ordained. The outward acts are the blessing, the laying-on of hands, and the anointing. The minister of ordination is the bishop. The question whether ordination by heretical bishops is valid or not, was answered in the negative by Peter Lombard. Aquinas teaches that the Sacrament in such a case is not inefficacious, but fails to confer grace on account of the sin of receiving ordination against the prohibition of the Church. As to the relation of priests to bishops, it was the view of Aquinas, which became prevalent, that they are of the same order, and differ only in office. But the attempt was made to vindicate for bishops a right of jurisdiction, a superiority of office, through the appointment of Christ. Scotus favored the view that the consecration of bishops is a special Sacrament.[1]

7. Marriage was pronounced a Sacrament. Yet it was a Sacrament of which the priest was deprived, and the unmarried state was regarded as higher than the married. To point out the sacramental virtue of such a rite was attended with no small difficulty. Aquinas taught that it received the character of a Sacrament from Christ, since it became the symbol of His relation to the Church (Eph. v. 32), and by Aquinas its indissoluble character was reaffirmed. He taught that the form of the Sacrament is the consent of the persons entering into the marriage relation. The contracting parties are the ministers of the Sacrament; yet Aquinas makes the benediction of the priest to be "something sacramental," although not the Sacrament itself.[2] By many, fol-

[1] For the passages, see Schwane, pp. 679, 680.

[2] Aquinas, *Suppl.* qu. 42, art. 1, qu. 45, art. 1, 2. Schwane, p. 688.

lowing Augustine, a benefit of the Sacrament since the fall is the check imparted to carnal appetite.[1] The common view was that there is likewise imparted a positive gift of grace, having reference to the procreation and training of children, and the mutual fellowship of man and wife.

The great Schoolmen, and foremost among them, Thomas Aquinas, undertook the herculean task of harmonizing the existing opinions and practices of the Church with the teaching of Augustine. They virtually attempted — and here Aquinas is the principal figure — to take up Aristotle into the company of the Apostles, and to establish a concord in the circle thus constituted. The task was an impossible one. As to the problems just stated, certainly as to the first of them, Aquinas was the nearest to success, for he kept nearer to the teaching of the prince of the Latin Fathers. Augustine inconsistently admitted "merits" into his system, calling them, however, gifts of God. The determinism of Aquinas, his doctrine of the sole efficiency of prevenient grace and of the grace which confers perseverance, are Augustinian elements. But an ambiguity, to say the least, cleaved to the theory of coöperative grace, and to the description of the kinds and degrees of merit which pertain to the several types and stages of regenerated character. By Scotus, the Augustinian point of view was really superseded by the Semi-Pelagian. The system took on an ethical character. But the nominalistic philosophy and the acknowledged impossibility of explaining rationally the articles of faith compelled theology to fall back on the will of God as the ground, and miraculous revelation as the only verification, of the realities of redemption as interpreted by the Church. This tendency culminated in Occam, by whom, concerning the gravity of the first sin — which seemed to be less than it was revealed to be — concerning the Eucharist, and so concerning other articles of faith, what seemed to be rational views were set in contrast with the authoritative teaching of the Church, a teaching, nevertheless, which Occam sincerely accepted. So far as practical religion is concerned, it cannot be questioned that the widespread influence of the nominalistic theology, with its lower conception of the need of grace and its exaggeration of the efficacy of the Sacrament of Penance, had a demoralizing effect upon the popular mind.

[1] *Suppl.* qu. 42, art. 2.

CHAPTER IX

THE CATHARISTS — THE WALDENSIANS — THE MYSTICS — WESEL; WESSEL; SAVONAROLA — THE DOCTRINES OF WYCLIF — HUSS — THE RENAISSANCE AND ITS INFLUENCE — ERASMUS

A VALUABLE book by Ullman bears the title, "Reformers before the Reformation," — a title which, as Ritschl has pointed out, is somewhat misleading. It is true, not of all, but of most of the movements and persons described in this work, that they did not overstep the pale of Catholic doctrine, or break away from admissible and sanctioned types of Catholic piety. The Catharists in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, of whom the Albigenses were a branch, revolted against the hierarchy and mingled in their opinions a dualism which was caught up from Eastern sects whose influence spread into the West. They were in general loosely and incorrectly styled Manichæans. The Catharists have no place, except as a striking phenomenon, in the history of doctrine. Even the Waldensians, in their attachment to the Scriptures and in their interest in engaging the laity in the work of preaching, were chargeable with no heresy.[1] They accepted the Sacraments of the Church. In their ideal of poverty they were far from standing alone. In this particular and in their evangelistic labors they anticipated the Franciscans. The Waldensians sought for the recognition of the Church and the Pope. It is true, however, that they discarded the doctrine of Purgatory and of Indulgences. And the Waldenses of Lombardy, when the persecution of them set in, went farther, rejecting the worship of images, of saints, and of Mary. But in respect to the method of salvation, the Wal-

[1] For the true history of the early Waldenses, see the works of Dieckhoff and Herzog, Müller, *Die Waldenser* u. ihre einzel. Gruppen bis z. 14 ten. Jahr. (1886), and Comba, *Hist. d. Vaudois d' Ital.* (1887), and his art. *Waldenser* (*Real-Encycl.* XVI. 610 sq. See, also, Harnack, DG. III. 366 sq.).

denses, generally speaking, did not forsake the accredited theology in any essential particulars. They had no perceptible influence in giving rise to the Protestant movement. The Gallican leaders who were so conspicuous in the Reforming Councils of the fifteenth century, contended for the supreme authority of the collective Episcopate, and this was affirmed at Constance. A General Council they held, as far as it represents the universal Church, is infallible. But they were outdone by none in their zeal for Church authority, they were unshaken in their faith in a mediatorial priesthood, and they clung to the Catholic dogmatic system.

The Mystics of the fourteenth century and their disciples, especially the German school of Mystics, did pave the way for the Reformation by inculcating, by precept and example, the inwardness of true religion, and by making the value of the doctrines to consist in their relation to practical piety. Among the most eminent of the later Mystics are Master Eckart, Henry Suso, John Tauler, Ruysbroek, Thomas à Kempis, and the anonymous author of the little work which Luther prized so highly, *The German Theology.* It is a mistake to think that the Mystics intended to depart, or that any of them in a marked degree did depart, from Catholic teaching or from approved types of Catholic piety. Most of them were Dominicans, imbued with deep respect for the writings of Thomas Aquinas, and developing their theological statements from portions of his teaching. Some of them, it is true, especially Master Eckart, propounded speculations on the being of God and His relation to the soul, which, literally taken, are Pantheistic, and called out censure. But in this procedure they were pressing with emphasis a conception of God, the basis of which was in Augustine and Aquinas, and in the Areopagite. Eckart in his deep, practical convictions was a theist. The Mystics did not undervalue an active life of duty, a life of faithful labor in one's vocation. Along with it they placed the contemplative life, the blissful communion with God, as the supreme object of aspiration. The path to this experience was through purification, inward illumination, and union to God. By these means the veil is withdrawn from the eyes and one becomes a new creature. As Suso explains the steps of this experience, one must emancipate himself from love to created things and from the hope of peace through them. In accomplishing this, the Sacraments — the Lord's Supper and Penance — are an

essential aid, and, with these, absorbing reflection upon the love of God to sinners. Then follows the partaking of Christ by the sympathetic contemplation of His sufferings. Their atoning efficacy by which we are delivered from wrath is recognized, but the stress is laid on the love therein manifested, and on the Lord's example of purity and patience. The cross is to be taken up and self-seeking eradicated. Lastly, there is "the birth of God" in the soul, and the entering of the divine being into the inmost depths of the spirit. The soul comes into an ineffable union with Him. The language of Suso is Pantheistic, but this is not its real intent. God and man are still held to be essentially distinct. The mystical piety had in Germany numerous circles of votaries. It did not carry with it a departure from the Catholic idea of grace and of faith. Yet not by faith, but by love and adoring self-renunciation, comes salvation. Regeneration, not justification, was the engrossing idea.

There were individuals who are often counted as forerunners of Luther, and who gave utterance to evangelical thoughts, but who, nevertheless, did not, at least consistently, teach a doctrine wholly at variance with Catholic precedents. Such are Wesel and Wessel, who attacked abuses connected with indulgences. But the same thing was done by many, and the blows of these teachers were not aimed at the root of the tree. When they dwelt on the Church as a spiritual body, they could quote in behalf of their fundamental idea Augustine and Aquinas; yet they used expressions which broke through the restrictions of Scholastic theology and the claims of the rulers of the Church to a divinely given jurisdiction. Savonarola was a preacher of righteousness and an assailant of ecclesiastical corruption. His tract, written in prison, on the fifty-first Psalm, spoke of justification in a strain that called forth an encomium from Luther. Yet the Florentine Reformer was a Thomist in his theology.

It was Wyclif who carried his warfare, which began in opposition to offensive practices in the Church, to the length of an explicit antagonism to important articles in its creed. In this course, he was followed, but with slower steps, by his more conservative disciple, John Huss. Wyclif was a Realist and an Augustinian, and followed Bradwardine in the advocacy of determinism. In the earlier portion of his career, or prior to 1366, it is true that he strongly asserted the normal authority of Scripture, and de-

fined the Church as consisting of the body of the elect; but for these statements he could cite Augustine, and he did not propound negative inferences destructive of the deference paid to tradition and to the hierarchy. Even after he fairly engaged in the struggle in behalf of the rights of the civil power, and against hierarchical domination, he had no quarrel with the Franciscan type of piety, and spoke approvingly of St. Francis and his order. He declared excommunication, even when pronounced by the Pope, not to be necessarily valid or harmful. After 1377, and during the Papal Schism, he sharpened his weapons and advanced in his opinions so far as to express doubts as to the doctrine of transubstantiation. After his theses on this subject were condemned at Oxford, his dissent from Roman tenets became more definite and extended. He affirmed that the Roman Church might err in doctrine. He distinctly rejected transubstantiation, and presented a view of the Eucharist not dissimilar from that of Augustine. In his last and principal work, the *Trialogus*, his reformatory views pertaining both to doctrines and rites are fully exhibited in their mature form.[1] Papal decrees are asserted to have no validity except so far as they rest on Scripture. He opposes transubstantiation, ascribing the acceptance of it to the substitution of faith in Papal decisions for faith in the Scriptures. He asserts that meddling with civil affairs should be interdicted to the clergy. It is doubtful whether there is a Scriptural foundation for Confirmation. There is no necessity for auricular confession, and no Scriptural authority for Extreme Unction, or for Unction in connection with baptism and confirmation. There is no ground for the multiplied ranks of the clergy, — popes, cardinals, patriarchs, monks, canons, etc. The doctrine of indulgences and of supererogatory merits is discarded. Begging, as practised by the mendicant monks, is not a Christian virtue. Included in the rites and practices which are condemned by Wyclif are Church music, Church asylums for criminals, canonization, pilgrimages, celibacy of the clergy, etc. In the light of such statements, one might be led to consider him not only a Protestant, but even a Protestant of the Puritan type. Nevertheless, his conception of faith and of its part in the process of Justification was essentially Catholic, and the same is the fact respecting his radical view of the office and operation of the Sacraments. Huss

[1] For copious extracts, see Gieseler, *Kirchengesch.* III. iv. i. 8 n. 21.

was strongly influenced by the teachings of Wyclif, but he was not led to renounce the doctrine of transubstantiation, while he insisted that the cup should be given to the laity. The later Bohemian brethren were moved by the intervening conflicts to depart more widely from the traditional creed, and were prepared to receive with sympathy the doctrine of Luther.

The development of the new languages and the rise of a national literature in the European countries were early signs of a weakening of the control of mediævalism. Many of the writings which appeared in Italy, France, Germany, and England in the vernacular tongues, chastised the vices of the clergy and the corruptions of the Church. But in such writings as the *Vision of Piers Ploughman* by Longland, the poems of Chaucer, the works of Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, there was no thought of a crusade against the principle of sacerdotal authority or the spiritual supremacy of the Popes.

From the Revival of Learning — from that new culture and intellectual tone which are designated as Humanism — there went forth a mighty influence which was felt within the sphere of theological doctrine. The centre of this movement was Italy. Dante had found the voice of Virgil hoarse from long disuse, but the Roman authors, and after them the Greek writers, were more and more read with delight. Petrarch inspired his countrymen with a passion for the classic productions of antiquity. The monasteries of the West were ransacked for manuscripts of the ancient poets, philosophers, and orators. Scholars came from the East to Florence and other cities. Before and after the fall of Constantinople, in 1453, the treasures of Greek learning were conveyed to the West. The new art of printing lent its aid to the diffusion of copies of the ancient authors, together with dictionaries and grammars, versions and commentaries. From Italy the new light spread abroad in the countries north of the Alps.

Scholasticism lost its vital power through the reign of Nominalism, but its fall was hastened by the newly awakened literary taste, and the disdain engendered for the comparative illiteracy, the wiredrawn subtlety, and endless wrangling of the Scholastic teachers. The ascendency of the clergy was diminished in proportion as they ceased to be exclusively the educated class,

or, at least, the sole almoners of learning, and as knowledge and cultivation were diffused among the laity. The effect of Humanism was to produce in some cases skepticism and indifference in matters of religion, and, in other cases, an earnest search for its fundamental truths. But the writings of the Fathers were compared with their Scholastic interpreters and with the creed of the Church. Better than all, the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament were studied in the original languages. In the academies of Italy, a skeptical spirit mingled to a hurtful extent with a blind adulation of antiquity. The Council of the Lateran (1512–1517) felt itself called upon to affirm the immortality and individuality of the soul. A service was rendered to the cause of truth by the exposure of historical mistakes and of forgeries, as in the case of the Donation of Constantine, which Laurentius Valla proved to be a fiction. In Germany, the new learning was cultivated in a religious spirit. Earnest inquirers examined the Fathers and the Scriptures with critical zeal, but without any taint of irreverence. Of these Reuchlin, an untiring but devout scholar, the leader of the foes of obscurantism, was a typical example. In England, Colet, whose expository lectures on the Epistles of St. Paul were listened to by an eager throng of hearers, and Thomas More, were advocates of the new learning. With Colet and More there was associated for a time the prince of the Humanists, Erasmus. The *Praise of Folly* was written at More's house. It can be said truly of Erasmus that his great purpose through life was to deliver the minds of men from superstition and dogmatism, and to bring in a reign of culture and liberality, of a simpler and purer Christianity. Besides the blows which he struck at what he considered "the Pharisaic Kingdom" by his humorous and satirical writings, he rendered a great service of a positive nature by his edition of the Greek Testament, with a Latin translation, by his editions and translations of the Fathers, by his Commentaries and his treatise on preaching. In his writings we see everywhere the evidences of the arrival of the modern, as distinguished from the mediæval, age. He has been called "the precursor and introducer of the modern spirit." But not even Erasmus was disposed to reject any of the articles of the creed as defined by the authority of the Church or to disown that authority. More lived to be the champion and martyr of the traditional faith.

PART III

MODERN THEOLOGY

PERIOD IV

THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF PROTESTANT THEOLOGY — THE AGE OF POLEMICS — THE CRYSTALLIZING OF PARTIES AND CREEDS

CHAPTER I

THE THEOLOGY OF LUTHER

NONE who are acquainted with the history of Luther need to be told that he did not start upon his career as a Reformer, either from the point of view of a theological critic, or as an assailant of the authority of the Church or of the Pope. His simple motive was to put an end to certain practical abuses which, as he deeply felt, were working dire mischief both to religion and morality. The development of new theological opinions in his mind was closely connected with the progress of his religious experience. It kept pace with his gradual deliverance from the thraldom of fear and the attainment of freedom and peace, through the clear perception of the distinction between law and Gospel. In the cloister he had been a student of Augustine, and of Occam, D'Ailly, and other nominalistic Schoolmen. He was affected by Mystics, who partook of the spirit of St. Bernard, and by such writings as the sermons of Tauler, and that devout little treatise, which he edited in 1516, the "German Theology." But his strong, ethical feeling, his vivid sense of personality in God and man, and of personal responsi-

bility, kept him from embracing Mysticism in its peculiar character as a system of devotion. It is possible to trace the progress of Luther's mind, step by step, from the year 1513, until he reached a distinct perception and firm grasp of the doctrine that salvation, from beginning to end, is an absolutely free gift of God's grace.[1] The vestiges of a notion of merit, which was inherited from Augustine and the Schoolmen, ceased at length to mingle in his enunciation of this profound conviction. As early as 1516, he propounds the statement that faith is our *justitia interior* — inward righteousness; that yet it is the gift of God, and the source, not the consequence, of good works.[2] But utterances like these were simply a reflex of his religious life; they were not set forth in the way of opposition to the reigning orthodoxy. In 1517, in the 95 Theses, he affirmed that the Pope can remit no penalties which he has not the power to impose;[3] that he has no more power in relation to purgatory than any other bishop, or even any other curate has within his own precinct;[4] that true contrition seeks and loves punishment;[5] that the true treasure of the Church is the Holy Gospel of the glory and grace of God.[6] "At that time, so far was he from any thought of breaking with the Church or rebelling against Rome, that he describes himself as having been then a monk and a mad Papist."[7] Inconsistent expressions respecting the Pope and his authority, signs of a vacillation of feeling on this topic, which continued for a considerable period, indicate not insincerity, but simply that he was feeling his way on a dimly lighted path. He tells us that he was of the number, of whom Augustine said that he was one, who advance gradually, by writing and teaching.[8] The Disputation at Leipsic, in July, 1519, was the occasion of calling out from him the avowal of a conviction to which he had now arrived, that the Church could exist without a Pope — a fact, he said, of which the Greek Church furnished an example — and that not even a General Council is infallible. It was during the last half of the year 1520, that there were issued from his pen three publications of great historic significance, both

[1] A catena of illustrative passages is given by Loofs, DG. p. 346 sq.

[2] Weimar, ed. I. 118, 25–30; Loofs, p. 351.

[3] *Theses*, 5, 20.

[4] *Ibid.* 25.

[5] *Ibid.* 40.

[6] *Ibid.* 62.

[7] *Præf. Oper.* (1545). In a letter to Leo X. (May 30, 1518) he calls the Pope's will the "voice of Christ." De Wette, *Briefe*, etc., I. 122.

[8] *Præf. Oper.* (1545).

from the effect produced by them and as exhibiting his now ripened beliefs. In his Address to the German Noblesse, he struck a blow at the root of the entire hierarchical system by declaring that the priest is not distinguished from the layman, save that the priest exercises, at the bidding of the Church as its representative, a ministerial office. All disciples are priests. If an exigency should exist where consecration by bishops could not be obtained, it might be dispensed with. The choice of the brethren would be sufficient.

In the "Babylonian Captivity of the Church," he takes up the subject of the sacraments. There is a threefold bondage, he declares, under which Christians have been placed. First, there is the withholding of the cup in the sacrament. Secondly, there is the theory of transubstantiation, against which he argues, although he says that any one who will may accept it. He preaches the doctrine that the bread and wine are not changed as to their substance, but that in and with them the body and blood of Christ are imparted and received. Thirdly, there is the false doctrine that the sacrament is an *opus operatum* — is effective for good independently of faith — and that it is a sacrifice. Without faith, sacraments are declared to be useless. As to infants, the faith is that of those who bring them to baptism. Afterwards Luther taught that there might be a nascent faith imparted in baptism to infants themselves.[1] Private confession is profitable, but it may be made to a lay brother. All baptized persons are, in reality, priests. The ordained priest may even remit his office and become a layman. However sacred and exalted may be the works of priests and of the religious orders, "they differ not at all in the sight of God from the works of a husbandman laboring in his field or a woman attending to her household affairs." "Of the sacrament of orders, the Church of Christ knows nothing; it was invented by the Church of the Pope."

In the little treatise on "Christian Liberty," Luther rises above the level of polemics into a more serene atmosphere. He presents a glowing picture of the freedom which belongs to the soul united by a living faith to God and Christ. Precepts "show us what we ought to do, but do not give us the power to do it." Taught that he is impotent, a man finds in himself no means of salvation and justification. Then come the promises of God, words

[1] The subject is discussed at length in his *Larger Catechism*.

of holiness, truth, righteousness, and peace. The soul cleaves to them with a firm faith, is penetrated by them, absorbed by them. It receives from Christ all that are His — grace, life, salvation. Such a man will not be careless or lead a bad life, but will feel no need of works as a ground of justification. "It is not from works that we are set free by the faith of Christ, but from the belief in works, that is, from foolishly presuming to seek justification through works." "Repentance comes from the law of God, but faith and grace from the promises of God."

In 1521, Melanchthon published the *Loci Communes*, the first of the Protestant works in systematic theology. He was at this time but twenty-four years of age, having been born in 1497. Luther was born in 1483 and was, therefore, about fourteen years older. Melanchthon was a remarkable instance of precocity in youth, the promise of which was nobly fulfilled in maturer years. His Commentary on the Romans was issued in 1522, so that he was the pioneer among Protestants in exegesis as well as in dogmatics. Of his modifications of opinion we shall speak later. Erasmus was pleased with the first movements of the Saxon Reformers, but more and more stood aloof from them as the combat thickened, and it became evident that it would lead to a rupture in the Church. He dreaded the effect of the controversy on the cause of learning. He shrunk from participating in a doctrinal conflict, all the more when his sympathy with neither party was undivided. His preference was to maintain a position of neutrality, at least of silence; but he was too prominent a person for this to be possible. Urged in many quarters to come out on the side of the Church, he at length ventured to take the field in an assault upon Luther's teaching, at a point where it seemed especially vulnerable and where an opponent might count upon extensive support.[1] In 1524, he published his book *De Servo Arbitrio*, in which he defended the Semi-Pelagian doctrine. Luther, moved by the purpose to magnify grace and to destroy every possible basis of merit, had asserted the Augustinian doctrine of the Will, carrying it beyond the limit set by Augustine himself. In his reply to Erasmus, he reiterated with vehemence his propositions relative to human impotence and the absolute control of God within the sphere of man's voluntary action.

[1] Details respecting the relations of Luther and Erasmus, with illustrative extracts, are given in my *History of the Reformation*, p. 127 sq.

Far more serious than the debate with Erasmus was the great Sacramentarian controversy with the Zwinglians, which began about the same time. The Conference at Marburg in 1529 failed to establish fellowship between the contending parties. At the Diet in 1530, the Augsburg Confession, the authoritative exposition of the Lutheran theology, and the most influential of all the Protestant creeds, was presented by Melanchthon, its author, after it had previously been approved by Luther. The copious Apology for the Confession was likewise written by Melanchthon. In 1537, the Smalcald Articles were signed by the members of the League of Smalcald. They were composed by Luther, to be laid before a General Council which was expected to be held under the auspices of Pope Paul III. The small and the larger Catechisms of Luther, owing to their extensive use, may be counted among the authoritative symbols of Lutheranism.

From the religious experience of Luther there emerged two principles, which were not only the defining characteristics of his theology, but were likewise the essential principles of Protestantism everywhere. At present we confine our attention to Luther's teaching and to the Lutheran system. The first, the "material," principle, is justification by faith alone. The second is the normative authority of the Bible.

How shall a sinful man, conscious of his sins and self-condemned, acquire that standing before God who abhors sin, that consciousness of his love and favor, which belongs of right to one who has been perfectly obedient to the Divine law? The answer is, by nothing that he can do, by no merit of his own, but by faith alone, on account of Christ. And what is justifying faith? It is, in the words of Luther, "a certain sure confidence of heart and firm assent by which Christ is apprehended, so that Christ is the object of faith, nay, not the object, but, so to speak, in faith itself Christ is present."[1] The believer is "cemented" to Christ, so that the two are made, as it were, one person, inseparably united, so that the believer can say, 'I am Christ, that is, the righteousness, victory, life, etc., are mine'; and in turn Christ can say, 'I am that sinner, because he cleaves to me and I to him, for we are joined by faith as members of His body, of His flesh, and His bones' (Eph. v. 30).[2] This close fellowship with Christ is part and par-

[1] Ad. Gal. ii. 16 (*Works*, Erlangen ed. I. 191).

[2] Gal. ii. 20 (*Works*, I. 246).

cel of justifying faith. The believer "is not thereby justified fully and actually, but in hope. He has begun to be justified and healed," so that what is left of sin, "by reason of Christ," is not imputed to him.[1] There is remission of sins, reconciliation to God; but the foundation of the entire blessing is the atoning work of Christ. It is the "apprehensive" quality of faith, not any love, not any moral excellence of any sort, that is involved in it, that gives to faith its justifying quality.[2] Melanchthon, in the Apology, says: "We teach that rewards have been offered and promised to the works of believers. We teach that good works are meritorious, not for the remission of sins, for grace or justification (for these we obtain only by faith), but for other rewards," according to 1 Cor. iii. 8. "There will be different rewards, according to different labors."[3]

The Reformers — and this remark applies to Calvin as well as to Luther and his associates — make personal Assurance a part of saving faith. It is included in the definition of faith in the Augsburg Confession (Art. IV.), and in the Apology. The same is true of several other Lutheran Confessions of an early date. The happy release which the Reformers personally gained from the bondage of fear, imposed by the mediæval doctrine of merit, naturally led to exaggeration on this topic. "The knowledge of the faith," says the Apology, "brings sure and firm consolation to pious minds."[4] In various ways — for example, in dealing with Christians afflicted with distrust — the early Reformers did not adhere consistently to the position thus taken. It was long, however, before it was explicitly abandoned.[5]

Such is the nature of faith that good works, such as the law requires, are its necessary fruit. The law is powerless either to give peace of conscience, or to engender righteous conduct. But

[1] Ad. Gal. ii. 17 sq.

[2] "If faith receive the remission of sins on account of love, the remission of sins will always be uncertain because we never love as much as we ought." *Apol.* p. 107. (The pages refer to Müller's *Symbolischen Bücher*. I have frequently used, with slight revision, Jacobs's *The Symbol. Books of the Evangel. Luth. Ch.*, Vol. I. Philadelphia, 1882.)

[3] *Apol.* p. 121.

[4] *Ibid.* 117.

[5] The Confession of the Westminster Assembly denies that Assurance is "of the essence of saving faith." As to the creeds as related to this subject, see Cunningham's *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, Essay III. pp. 124, 125.

faith is efficacious for this last effect, as well as for the first. It is so, not through any legal spur, but because right conduct is as the free and natural product of a penitent soul, pardoned and brought nigh to God, through Christ, and laying hold of the promises of mercy in the Gospel. "Believers," says Luther, "are a new creature, a new tree. Therefore all those modes of speech, which are customary in the law, belong not here, as: 'a believer *should* [or is bound to] do good works.' As it is not proper to say: 'the sun *should* shine,' but it does this of itself, unbidden; for it is made for this; so a good tree of itself brings forth good fruits; three and seven *are* ten already, they are not first bound to be ten. To say of a sun that it *ought* to shine, of a believer that he *must* do good, is ridiculous."[1]

No unprejudiced student, whose mind is not of too prosaic a cast to be capable of interpreting a writer so full of force and imagination, a writer whose natural ardor breaks out in hyperbole, and whose vehemence and humor are alike irrepressible, will think of charging Luther with a lax sense of moral obligation or a weak apprehension of the guilt of sin. His writings, not to speak of his own religious experience, abound in contradictions to such a reproach. An exhortation like "pecca fortiter" — "sin on bravely" — is addressed to Melanchthon, one of the most conscientious of men, to overcome his distrust in the amplitude of God's forgiving mercy. It is an extravagant mode of setting forth the Pauline declaration that where sin abounds, grace much more abounds.[2] When the Saxon Reformers, Luther especially, use language that might seem to undervalue "the law," they are speaking of law as the ground of justification. The Apostle Paul had to guard himself against a censorious criticism not unlike that to which they have been subject.

Justification then, according to Luther and his followers, was forensic. Its prime element is the remission of sins. The proposition was that faith is imputed for righteousness, on account of the union of the believer with the Righteous One. The same theory, later especially, was expressed in the statement that the

[1] Luther's *Works* (Halle ed.), xxii. 717.

[2] Dean Church is more just to Luther than are many of the same school as himself. See his remarks on the misinterpretation of the "pecca fortiter," as if it were "a provocation to sin or an excuse for it." *The Oxford Movement*, p. 307, note.

righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer. That is to say, he is dealt with as if the righteousness of the Saviour were literally his own achievement. The distinct separation of the active obedience of Christ from his passive obedience, or endurance of suffering, and the doctrine of the imputation of both, belongs to the later form of Lutheran theology.

When Luther refers to the Atonement, he often dwells on the conquest by Christ of sin and death and Satan. But he uses the strongest language in describing the vicarious endurance by Christ of the curse denounced against sinners in the law. "Christ took all our sins upon him, and for them died upon the cross: therefore it behoved that he should become a transgressor, and, as Isaiah the prophet saith, 'be reckoned and accounted among transgressors and trespassers.'" "Christ is innocent as concerning his own person, and therefore he ought not to have been hanged on a tree. . . . But Christ sustained the person of a sinner and a thief, not of me, but of all sinners and thieves."[1] The divinity of Christ is evident from the work which he accomplished; for to overcome sin and death, the curse and divine wrath itself, he "must needs be truly and naturally God."

It is not in the Commentary on the Galatians alone that Luther fervently insists on the truth of Christ's unification of Himself with us, and of the unification of ourselves with Him through faith. In all his writings which pertain to the subject, the same thought is prominent.[2] The soul of the Reformer entered deeply into the crushing feeling of *guilt*, as distinguished from that of misery or finite weakness. In this feeling, we first appreciate our unworthiness, but at the same time understand the value of our personality in the eyes of God. The longing for expiation or atonement involves the first pure ethical impulse. Conscious of our helplessness, our inability to make an atonement ourselves, we are met by the joyful tidings of a Mediator, sent from God, and of a righteousness in Him, which corresponds to the divine righteousness. This righteousness, although, in the first instance, it is His, may also become ours through faith; faith being the personal assent and affirmation which we give to that Love on His part which takes our place, to its righteousness, holiness, and power. This

[1] Gal. iii. 13.

[2] Luther's ideas on this theme are clearly presented by Dorner, *Person Christi*, II. 513 sq.

substitution on His part carries in it so high a respect for us as individuals, for our personality, that it does not aim to do away with it, or to absorb it. The aim is, rather, to present it as righteous before God in a substitution which shall act upon it, recognizing it all the time as a separate personality, while the individual, on his side, gives himself up to Christ in faith, to be moulded by His plastic influence into the divine image, to be transformed into a child of God — a child in whom, reconciled and made holy, the righteousness of God attains to a personal manifestation. By faith we are drawn into the spiritual death of penitence, through the consciousness of being condemned in Him, but not without at the same time becoming aware of the divine will to save us — save our personal being itself — as reconciled in Christ. Luther states that before the Evangelical doctrine was brought out, preachers aimed to depict to their hearers the sufferings of Christ for the purpose of exciting their pity, and to make them weep. This, he says, is wrong. We make the right use of Christ's sufferings, when we are led, by seeing Christ so sorrowful on our account, to sorrow for ourselves, for the sins that made Him mourn and suffer. We are to mourn over ourselves, and not over Him. His contrition in our behalf should make us contrite. Christ is to Luther the Child of God, who offers Himself to our faith that we may be clothed upon with divine sonship. God gives to us His Son, and tells us that He is well pleased with all that Christ says and does for us. "Thinkest thou not that if a human heart truly felt that good-pleasure which God has in Christ when He thus serves us, it would for very joy burst into a hundred thousand pieces? For then it would see into the abyss of the fatherly heart, yea into the fathomless and eternal goodness and love of God, which He feels towards us, and has felt from eternity?"[1] "God's good-pleasure and His whole heart thou seest in Christ, in all His words and works;" and in turn Christ is in God's heart, and an object of His good-pleasure. Since Christ is thine and mine, we, too, are in the same good-pleasure of God, and as deep in His heart as Christ Himself. "We must first be in Christ, with all our nature, sin, death, and weakness, and know that we are freed therefrom, and redeemed, and pronounced blessed by this Christ. We must swing above ourselves and beyond ourselves over upon Him, yea be utterly incorporated in Him, and be His own." Then sin, and

[1] Festpostill, *von der Taufe Christi.*

fear, and death are gone: "I know of no death or hell. For I know that as Christ is in the Father, I am, also, in Christ." "In fine, by the word we become incorporated in Christ, so that all that He has is ours, and we can take Him on, as our own body. He in turn must take on Himself all that which befalls us, so that neither the world, the devil, nor any calamity can hurt or overcome us." "One must teach of faith correctly — even thus — that by it you become bound and united with Christ, so that out of Him and you there arises, as it were, one person, which does not suffer the two to be parted or sundered from one another, but where you evermore hang on Christ, and can say with joy and comfort — 'I am Christ; not personally; but Christ's righteousness, victory, life, and everything which He has, is my own;' and so that Christ can say — 'I am this poor sinner, that is all his sin and death are my sins and my death, since he hangs on me by faith, I on him,' — therefore, St. Paul says, 'we are members of Christ's body, of His flesh and His bones.' Wherefore when you in this affair separate your person and that of Christ from one another, you are under the law and live not in Christ." Christ has taken on our flesh, which is full of sin, and has felt all woe and calamity, has demeaned Himself not otherwise before God, His Father, than if He had Himself done all the sin which we have done, and "as if He had deserved all that which we have deserved."[1]

The doctrine of Luther is that the uncreated Son of God has entered into human nature, has become man, has thus closely united Himself to us, has, in the fulness of His love and sympathy, taken upon His heart the whole burden of man as a sinner, has taken us up into His heart, making our case absolutely His own, has bewailed our sins before God, and died as if He had been Himself a sinner; that the end of all is to fashion us like Himself, into the image of God as His children; that in all this love to us and service in our behalf, the Father is well pleased, and receives us in Christ, provided we accept Him, cordially recognize the meaning of His grief, and giving up, as it were, our isolated individuality, surrender ourselves to Him to be moulded into the likeness of His Sonship. All things that belong to God are His, and all things that are His are ours. What Christ becomes and does for us, as our representative, is eventually reproduced through Him within us.

[1] Festpostill in *der Frühchristmess.*

As early as 1525, the second, or *formal* principle, that of the exclusive authority of the Scriptures, was definitely associated with the first, with the doctrine of Justification. It was implied in all the denials by Luther of the authority of the Pope, taken in connection with his avowal at the Leipsic Disputation that Councils might err, with the same declaration at the Diet of Worms, in the presence of the representatives of the German Empire, and with numerous expressions elsewhere of the same general tenor. Respecting the Canon, the Protestants, instructed by Jerome and Origen, universally denied the right of the Old Testament apocrypha to rank with normative Scriptures. The principle of "the analogy of faith" was introduced; that is, the principle that the central doctrines which are perspicuously set forth in the Bible, are to govern the interpretation of passages which are more or less obscure.

At first view it seems difficult to harmonize critical statements of Luther relative to canonical books and to the inspiration of Biblical writers, with the principle that the Bible is the rule of faith.[1] No one could speak with more reverence for Holy Writ than Luther often speaks. Yet many of the statements of the kind just referred to are found in the Preface of his translation of the New Testament, — put there for all the world to read. He ascribes to the several books different degrees of doctrinal value and of insight into the essence of the Gospel. "St. John's Gospel," he says, "and his first Epistle, St. Paul's Epistles, especially those to the Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, and St. Peter's First Epistle, — these are the books which show to thee Christ, and teach everything that it is necessary and blessed for thee to know, even if you were never to see or hear any other book or doctrine. Therefore St. James's Epistle is a perfect straw-epistle compared with them, for it has in it nothing of an evangelic kind." It must be observed that he did not question the genuineness of this to his mind (comparatively) valueless epistle. The prophets, he says, studied Moses, and the later prophets the earlier, and have written their thoughts down which were given by the Holy Ghost. But "if sometimes there mingled in hay, straw, wood, and not

[1] *Vorrede auf das N. T.* (1524). Like criticisms, but less severe, are in the *Leipsic Theses* (1519) and in the *Babylonian Captivity* (1520). He had an unfavorable opinion, varying somewhat from time to time, on Jude, Hebrews, and the Apocalypse.

solely silver, gold, and precious stones, nevertheless, the foundation abides while the fire consumes the rest."[1] That the contents rather than the author of the book is the point of chief importance is implied in what he says of Genesis: "What matter if Moses did not write it?" Luther ascribes an error to Stephen in Acts vii. 2 (compare Gen. xii. 1–4). How are observations of which the foregoing are prominent examples, compatible with the recognition of an objective seat of authority? Luther's religious history furnishes the clew to the answer. It was the truth of Christ as the Saviour from condemnation under law, the truth of salvation by grace alone, which came home to him with such power as to be its own attestation. Those Scriptures in which the truth, considered to be the substance of the Gospel, had the central place, furnished the criterion for gauging the relative value and the degree of inspiration to be attributed to the other sacred writings. The doctrine of Justification by Faith served as a standard for a species of criticism which otherwise might seem to be purely subjective, if not arbitrary.

"The 'Word of God' is a phrase which signifies to Luther the Gospel of God's grace, whether it be proclaimed orally or in Scripture. This Gospel is to be believed because it is God's Word, and because it verifies itself within the soul. Yet the identity of the Holy Scriptures with the Word of God is generally assumed by Luther, and is occasionally expressed in explicit language.

The Word and the Sacraments were affirmed to be the means of grace. Through these and in connection with them, the agency of the Spirit is exerted. Carlstadt and the enthusiasts with him whose disturbances at Wittenberg moved Luther against the remonstrance of the Elector to leave his asylum in the Wartburg, sought to magnify the influence of the Spirit by making it independent of the Word. On the ground of the alleged instigation of the Spirit, they disparaged knowledge and study, besides hurrying forward to introduce sweeping changes in the rites of worship. Against this species of subjectivism, Luther resolutely and successfully contended. The Apology for the Augsburg Confession, like the "Babylonian Captivity," associated Absolution as a sacrament, along with Baptism and the Lord's Supper. But in the Smalcald Articles, Absolution is not reckoned among the sacraments, and it

1. *Tischreden.*

ceased to be so regarded by the Lutherans. Of the sacraments in general the Augsburg Confession teaches that they "were ordained not only as marks of profession amongst men, but still more as signs and testimonies of the will of God towards us, set forth for the purpose of exciting faith in such as use them. Wherefore sacraments are to be used so that there may be joined faith that believes the promises, which through the sacraments are exhibited and shown."[1] It is the word and promise of God which gives to the ceremony the character of a sacrament. The effect of Baptism is briefly set forth in the Large Catechism of Luther. "Every Christian has enough in Baptism to learn and to practise all his life. For he has always enough to do to believe firmly what Baptism promises and brings, viz., victory over death and the devil, forgiveness of sin, the grace of God, the entire Christ and the Holy Ghost with his gifts."[2] Denying that any change is wrought in the water and that any magical operation belongs to this or to any other sacrament, Luther and his followers still insisted on the great importance of baptism. "What God does and works in us, He proposes to work through such external institutions."[3] In the Augsburg Confession, Baptism is affirmed to be essential to salvation. As to the Lord's Supper, while the nature of the bread and wine remains unaltered, yet the body and blood are so inseparable from them, that, to quote Luther in the Smalcald Articles,[4] at the same time that "the sophistical subtlety concerning transubstantiation" is discarded, "the bread and wine in the Supper are the true body and blood of Christ, and are given and received not only by the godly, but also by wicked Christians."

Inseparable from this idea of the Real Presence of Christ in such a sense that all partakers of the sacrament receive His body and blood, is the doctrine of the Saxon Reformers respecting the person of Christ. It is the doctrine of the interchange of the human and divine attributes of the Saviour. Through this communication of qualities, divine attributes are imparted to the human nature, whereby there follows the omnipresence of Christ as a man.

The Church is not the hierarchy, not the organized institution, but is really and primarily "the communion of saints." Luther

[1] Art. XIII.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 471, 491.
[3] *Larger Catechism*, p. 489.
[4] Art. VI.

interprets this phrase in the Apostles' Creed as synonymous with the "holy Catholic Church." It is the society of true believers, and as such it is invisible. Otherwise, it would not be, as the creed declares it to be, an object of faith. Yet, as Melanchthon avers in the *Loci*, it is not a Platonic state. It is not a dream of Utopia; but exists in a concrete form, and has definite marks of its reality. It is "the congregation of saints in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the sacraments rightly administered."[1] It is not necessary that "traditions, rites, or ceremonies" of human institution "should be alike everywhere." There is another clause in the article which was not so consistently carried out practically: "Unto the unity of the Church, it is sufficient to agree concerning the doctrine of the Gospel and the administration of the sacraments." Melanchthon argues earnestly against the theory that virtuous heathen, men who had no knowledge of Christ, can be considered to have been members of the Church or in a salvable condition.[2] The clergy are neither infallible interpreters of Scriptures, nor mediators between the congregation and God; for through Christ the way of access is opened for all. The clergy are ministers of the flock, commissioned to offer no sacrifice, as if the sacrifice of Christ required a supplement; and the power of the keys, embracing the power to exclude the unworthy from ecclesiastical fellowship, was given to the congregation as a body.[3] To this body belongs the right to choose and to induct into office its ministers. These ministers are on a footing of equality. All distinctions of rank among them are of human origin. Christ is the head of the Church; the headship of the Pope is in violation of the Gospel.

In their conception of original sin, of its guilt and power, the Lutheran Reformers went beyond the teaching of the most conservative of the Schoolmen. It was the native sinfulness of men on which they chiefly dwelt. Nothing is said of the imputation of Adam's sin, in the Augsburg Confession or in the Apology. Melanchthon says that by reason of our native corruption, consequent on the fall of Adam, we are born guilty (or exposed to punishment), and 'children of wrath'; that is, condemned of God.

[1] *Augsb. Confession*, VII.

[2] *Loci* (ed. Erlangen, 1828), p. 287. "Intuecamur cœtum vocatorum, qui est ecclesia visibilis, nec alibi electos ullos esse somniemus, nisi in hoc ipso." P. 283.

[3] *Smalcald Articles*, VII.

"If any one chooses to add that men are guilty, also, for the fall of Adam, I do not stand in the way."[1] But, he goes on to say, the prophets and apostles, with whom Augustine, Hugo, Bonaventura, are in agreement, teach that original sin is not imputation alone, but our depraved nature. The foundation of our guilt (*reatus* — "fundamentum hujus relationis" — is "ipsum vitium nobiscum nascens."[2] It is propagated corruption that is referred to when the Apostle (Rom. v. 12) says, for that all have sinned — "quia omnes peccaverunt." We will guard against the idea that men are condemned for Adam's sin alone.[2] In the Lutheran Creed, concupiscence is asserted to be not only a seeking for the pleasure of the body, but also carnal wisdom and righteousness, hatred of God's judgment, flight from God, anger towards Him, confidence "in present things," — that is, in earthly good. So the Apology teaches.[3] In the later Form of Concord, we read that original sin "is so deep a corruption of human nature that nothing healthy or incorrupt in a man's body or soul, in inner or outward powers," is left.[4] The consequences of inborn sin are positive as well as negative. The effect is a total inability of will as far as all actions holy or pleasing to God are concerned.

The boldness of Luther, his defiance of ecclesiastical decrees against him, his vehement and often contemptuous denunciation of many traditional opinions, might give the impression that he was a radical in the general character of his theology. So far from this being true, his movement is rather to be styled the conservative branch of the Reformation. In the retention of rites and customs he did not require an explicit authorization from Scripture. Enough that they were not forbidden, and are expedient and useful. His aversion to breaking loose from the essentials of Latin Christianity in matters of doctrine is equally manifest. The Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed are adopted in the Augsburg Confession, in the Apology, and in the Smalcald Articles. Luther's respect for the teaching of the Church, notwithstanding his protest against corruptions, was so impassioned, that unreconciled utterances concerning doctrine are left in his writings, — instances of disharmony between the old point of view and the new.[5] On matters of doctrine, he declares, the

[1] "non impedio." *Loci* (ed. Hase), p. 86.
[2] *Loci* (ed. Hase), p. 92. [3] *Apology*, 78. [4] *Form. Conc.* p. 494.
[5] On this topic see the citations in Loofs, DG. p. 370 sq.

view of the whole world for a thousand years is not to be regarded. Yet, when arguing for his views of the Real Presence, he says that "the testimony of the entire holy Christian Church, even without any other proof, should be sufficient, . . . for it is perilous and terrible to hear or believe anything against the united testimony, faith, and doctrine of the entire holy Christian Church . . . for now over fifteen hundred years." This, he says, would be to nullify the promise of Christ, to be with His Church. We have already spoken of the use of the phrase 'Word of God,' now as denoting the central truth of the Gospel, and now as covering the entire Scriptures. Luther's doctrine of absolute predestination, even sin being attributed to the causative agency of God, was not wholly the fruit of a zeal to shut out everything that might be perverted into a Pelagian philosophy. It was partly an acceptance of the Scotist and Nominalistic notion of God's will and sovereignty as the ultimate basis of whatever he commands or decrees.

CHAPTER II

THE THEOLOGY OF ZWINGLI — THE EUCHARISTIC CONTROVERSY — PARTIES IN THE LUTHERAN CHURCH TO THE FORM OF CONCORD (1580)

ZWINGLI was born on the 1st of January, 1484, and thus was only seven weeks younger than Luther, who was born on the 10th of the preceding November. The two Protestant leaders were quite unlike in temperament, cast of mind, and culture. Luther was a Humanist. The only two books which he carried into the cloister were Vergil and Plautus. He was a champion of the new learning, to foster which was one motive in the founding of the University of Wittenberg. But with him the interest of literature sank out of sight in comparison with the cause of religion and the claims of theology. With Zwingli, the influence of Humanism went deeper and modified the texture of his theological system. He had met Erasmus and exchanged letters with him. His doctrine of the Sacrament was first suggested to him by Erasmus, although its source was in the teaching of John Wesel. On fundamental points, Zwingli differed from Erasmus, for he was of too robust a nature to be a servile adherent. He renounced the teachings of Rome gradually, as the result of the study of the Bible and of reflection, without passing through any such spiritual struggles — any such distress from a sense of condemnation — as Luther experienced. It cost him no spiritual conflict to throw off the yoke of ecclesiastical authority, which had rested somewhat lightly upon him. Hence, while holding clearly and firmly to the doctrine of Justification by grace without merit, it did not assume all that overshadowing importance which it had in the eyes of Luther. The starting-point in Zwingli's construction of theology is predestination or the divine purposes. Even this doctrine was quite as much a theoretic postulate as a practical, urgent truth. Quite

different was the conception of it in Calvin. As Zwingli did not share in the Saxon Reformer's inbred reverence for the past, and was not affected, as Luther was, by the mingling of imagination in his temper of feeling, he felt no reluctance to cast aside rites and customs not enjoined, even if they were not forbidden, in Scripture, nor did he hesitate to reject any interpretation that, in his opinion, could not stand the cool scrutiny of the understanding. There was a curious blending in his spirit of the tone of the Renaissance and that of the Protestant Reform. There is another respect in which there was a marked contrast between Luther and Zwingli. Luther was a man of the people, conversant with their wants and ways, and, although hostile to revolutionary movements and measures, was not wanting in sympathy with all classes. But Zwingli was a social reformer, as well as a religious leader. He felt that an ethical renovation was called for, and that the recovery of the State from debasement was necessarily involved in securing the proper effect of the Gospel upon individuals. Joining as a chaplain those who took up arms in a righteous cause, he fell in battle.

In 1518, Zwingli preached at Einsiedeln against the traffic in indulgences. This brought on no breach with the authorities of the Church. He continued to receive a pension from the Pope until 1520. In 1519, he entered upon his labors at Zurich. He was fully resolved to follow the Scriptures fearlessly. His sermons were expositions of the books of the New Testament. In 1522, a discourse in which it was asserted that there was no biblical ground for prohibiting the eating of meat in Lent brought him into conflict with the Bishop of Constance. In the same year he was married secretly, his marriage not being publicly made known for two years. After the sermon relating to Lent, the question was whether the municipal government of Zurich — the burgomaster and the two councils — would sustain him in his rejection of the ceremonies ordained by the Church. There followed, under order of the government, three public Disputations, in which Zwingli defended his own position and assailed that of his opponents. In preparation for the first, he drew up (in 1523) sixty-seven Articles of belief. In these he makes foremost the assertion of the sufficiency of the Saviour's atoning death, and his place as the "one, eternal, and supreme priest" (14), the declaration that the mass is not a sacrifice, but a com-

memoration of the always valid sacrifice of Christ, and, as it were, "a seal of our redemption" (18), that no other mediator is necessary (20), that a Christian is bound to keep no rules relating to meats and drinks which Christ has not established (24), that the same is true of ordinances respecting times and places (25), that Christians are to call no one "Father" on earth, all of them being brethren (27), that marriage ought not to be forbidden to the clergy (29), that confession to one's priest or one's neighbor should be only to obtain advice, not for the remission of sins (52, 53), that the imposing of penance is a human tradition and is of no value (53), that the Scriptures know nothing of a purgatory (57), and that, although prayers that grace may be given to the departed are not excluded, no limit of time is to be set up for the offering of them and no gain to be sought through them (60). The second of the three Disputations was chiefly on the Mass, and at the conclusion of the third the magistrates decided against its continuance in the churches. The complete abolition of the Roman worship soon followed. All relics and pictures and crucifixes were removed from the churches, pictures from the walls were effaced, altars and candles taken away, and the bones of the saints buried. Zwingli delighted in music, but the organs were finally excluded from the places of worship. In 1525, the crucifixes, the chalices, and other vessels and ornaments of gold and silver were melted or otherwise disposed of, and the robes of the clergy sold or given away. This crusade against all that was thought to be idolatry or to savor of it was a defining characteristic of the Swiss as distinguished from the German Reformation. In 1529, Zwingli published his first theological work, the "Commentary on True and False Religion." A creed, the "*Ratio Fidei*," was presented by him at the Diet of Augsburg in 1530. Another confession from his pen, written shortly before his death, and addressed to Francis I., King of France, was published in 1536, by Bullinger, his successor at Zurich.

Zwingli taught, as did the Lutherans, that the Bible is the rule of faith. He accepted as canonical all the books, except the Apocalypse. Of this he said at the Disputation at Berne in 1529, "it is not a biblical book." There was no serious difference with Luther on the doctrine of Predestination. Zwingli extends the efficient decrees and the agency of Providence over the first sin as well

as over all others, and sets forth this opinion in the baldest terms.[1] He differs from the Saxon Reformers in holding that the elect are not confined to the number of the baptized, or even to those to whom Christ is preached. All children of Christian parents, who die in infancy, are saved, and we are not to despair of the salvation of the infant children of the heathen. Moreover, all true and virtuous men, all the good and faithful, will be found in heaven. He includes among them Socrates, Aristides, Numa, the Catos, the Scipios, and the mythical heroes, Theseus and Hercules.[2] On the subject of original sin, we find in Zwingli a like latitude of opinion. Original sin in the descendants of Adam does not involve guilt. It is a disorder simply: "Morbus est et conditio." We are in the situation of the servants or children of one taken captive in war. In these two articles, the drift of Zwingli's thought and the influence of the tone of the Renaissance is apparent. But the great point of diversity from Luther was in relation to the Eucharist. In 1524, Carlstadt, a leader of the Radicals and Enthusiasts at Wittenberg, proposed the absurd interpretation that on uttering the words "*this* is my body," Jesus by a gesture pointed to His own body. From this time Luther assumed an attitude of hostility to every figurative view of the words of the institution, and maintained the literal exposition. Zwingli set forth his opinion in 1525, and in 1526 the polemical dicussion between the German and the Swiss Reformer had its beginning. The doctrine of Luther, the suggestion of which came from nominalistic sources, was that the human body of Christ is inseparably joined with the elements in the Supper. The union is not an "impanation," or inclusion of one of the substances with the other, or the mixture of the two, the result of which would be something different from both. It is not a union that is continued after the administration of the sacrament. But the union, which is mysterious in its nature, is such that believers and disbelievers alike, who receive the bread and wine, receive simultaneously the body and blood. The entire Christ is received by each communicant. Luther occasionally described in crass terms the real manducation of the body of Christ, but such an idea of a "capernaitic" manducation is contrary to his more sober representation, and is repudiated by the earlier and later representatives of Lutheranism. The contention

[1] *De Providentia Dei*, p. 113; cf. Schaff, *Ch. Hist.* VII. p. 92 sq.

[2] *Exposit. Chr. Fid.* XII. (in Niemeyer's *Coll. Confess.*, etc., p. 61).

of Zwingli was that in the Supper Christ is present in "the contemplation of faith." The Eucharist is a memorial, with the further idea that it is a pledge, as a ring is a pledge, of the grace of Christ. The chief thought in connection with the Supper is that of a memorial. The elements are merely symbols.

The standing objection of Zwingli and the Zwinglians to the teaching of Luther on this subject was that the human body of Christ, since the Ascension, is in heaven and not on earth. The answer of Luther was the assertion of the communication of the attributes of one nature to another, and the consequent ubiquity of the human nature. Christ is at the right hand of God, which means that He is everywhere. Wherever Christ is, there His humanity is present. He brought forward the scholastic distinction of the threefold mode of presence, the local or circumscriptive, a presence in one place and not elsewhere, the definitive, and the repletive. The last is equivalent to ubiquity. The second means that one is present whenever he wills to be. The union of the two explains the presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. It might seem strange that Luther should habitually stigmatize the Sacramentarians, as the Zwinglians were called, as visionaries and enthusiasts, "Schwärmer," since from his point of view they would be styled, one would think, frigid rationalizers. But, apart from the consideration that Carlstadt was a coryphæus of a class more properly styled enthusiasts, Luther's hostility to the Sacramentarians was rooted in the feeling that they were assailants of the objective reality of the means of grace. They were introducing a species of subjectivism in the apprehension of the Christian religion. He resisted everything that seemed to him to threaten the *objective* nature, whether of the Word or of the sacraments.[1] Just as the truth in the Word enters into the ear of the hearers, good or bad, so is Christ in the sacramental elements, whatever the belief or feelings of the recipient, and the recipient partakes of Christ.

There is not room here for a detailed record of the series of efforts made to bring the two parties into an agreement, or at least into a relation of mutual toleration and fellowship. The most memorable of these attempts was through the Conference of Marburg in 1529. It was unsuccessful. On fourteen Articles they were agreed, but on the question whether "the real body and

[1] See my *History of the Reformation*, p. 150.

blood of Christ are present in the bread and wine," they differed, and they could only promise "to cherish Christian charity for one another, so far as the conscience of each will permit," and to pray for the enlightenment of the Spirit.[1] Luther declined to extend the hand of fellowship to Zwingli, although at parting the contestants on both sides shook hands as a token of friendship. At the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, Zwingli inserted in his *Ratio Fidei* a clear exposition of his idea of the sacraments as testimonies or signs of divine grace, and classifies with the "Papists," as far as this subject is concerned, "those who look back to the fleshpots of Egypt."[2] Zwingli was no rival of Luther in the use of vituperative language. Luther's vocabulary of abusive nicknames and epithets was copious. But the Swiss leader had at times an exasperating manner, and his utterances were sometimes in keeping with it. Luther had not the temper of a peacemaker, as Melanchthon had in an eminent degree. But it is not to Luther's discredit that he had no relish for the ambiguities of compromise; and Zwingli was not the man to veil his opinions or to keep silence under assaults upon what he considered the truth. Both men were true to their convictions. Zwingli died in 1531. "The Wittenberg Concord" was the result of an undertaking to reconcile the discordant groups of ministers and churches. The most prominent intermediary was Martin Bucer, preacher in Strassburg, who was a Zwinglian, but after the Marburg Conference, in which he took part, he regarded with less disfavor the Lutheran opinion. He was not inexpert in composing formulas as little offensive as possible to either party. The four imperial cities of Southern Germany had presented at Augsburg a confession much more moderate in its terms than the creed of Zwingli. Later, in 1532, they had consented to the Augsburg Confession. After a conference in Cassel, in 1535, between Melanchthon and Bucer, there met in the following year at Wittenberg a company of distinguished theologians of upper Germany. Luther and his associates agreed with them in the adoption of a statement on the points in dispute, in which the Lutheran opinion on the sacrament was apparently adopted, while Bucer's distinction between the "unworthy" and "disbelievers," which Luther allowed to stand in the document, helped the representatives of the cities to

[1] See Schaff's narrative, *Ch. Hist.* VII. p. 646.

[2] See Niemeyer, *Coll. Conf.* p. 26 sq.

escape from a real and full assent to his doctrine. The "Concord" was accepted by their constituents in upper Germany, but was unacceptable to the Swiss.

There were two subjects on which the opinions of Melanchthon came to differ from those of Luther. This dissent was gradual in its origin. One of these points of difference had respect to human agency as related to divine agency in conversion. The other was the so much litigated question of the Real Presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. For a long time Melanchthon was fully agreed with the doctrine of Luther. He was always averse to the Zwinglian theory. As long as Luther's view was the only alternative Protestant explanation, he received it; but at length, when a middle theory was brought forward, which retained that which he practically valued in the sacrament, he altered his opinion. His own reflections, the influence of Bucer, and further study of the Fathers, to which he was led by a writing of the learned Zwinglian, Œcolampadius, moved him to give up the idea of an oral manducation of the elements, and a reception of the body and blood by such as are without a living faith. When the middle view concerning the sacrament was developed by Calvin, and brought forward by him in a guarded way, Melanchthon was confirmed in his altered conviction. Intercourse, especially by correspondence, with Calvin was not without a marked effect. Calvin, while he rejected the doctrine of the ubiquity of the body of Christ and its objective presence in and under the elements, still held that Christ is received spiritually by the believing partaker of them, and that, through the Holy Spirit, even the body of Christ communicates a power to the believing recipient. A central idea in Calvin's doctrine is that of a real communion with Christ which the sacrament, received in faith, operates to increase. At the same time, there is received, in connection with the elements, through the power of the Spirit, the mysterious source of a spiritual body to appear at the resurrection. Melanchthon's old belief was shaken as early as the Wittenberg Concord of 1536. The change is indicated in the amendment of the tenth Article of the Augsburg Confession, in the edition of it which he published in 1540. Melanchthon believed that the points of difference between the Lutheran and the intermediate theory were not essential, and that the controversy was both needless and mischievous in the extreme. This is expressed by him

freely in his confidential letters to friends.[1] Yet he so deprecated contention, that he could not be moved by the urgency of Calvin to break silence and avow his real judgment in the matter. That he approached near to Calvin on this subject is manifest from his correspondence. When it is remembered how Luther abhorred everything that subtracted an iota from his definitions of the Real Presence, and how in his later years his health was broken and his increased intolerance of dissent was aggravated by partisan supporters of a temper even more unsparing than his own, — when all this is borne in mind, in connection with the reserve of Melanchthon, and his withdrawal within himself, out of natural timidity and dread of an uproar, it is not strange that for a long period their relations were strained, and the open cordiality of their personal intercourse damped. Rather is it strange that Luther refrained from all attacks upon Melanchthon, and that the mutual love of the two men, once so closely united, was never uprooted.

The Calvinists made prominent the points of agreement between the Lutheran doctrine and their own. Their opinion spread in the southwest of Germany, in the Palatinate, and in other places, including Wittenberg, among the pupils of Melanchthon. At length the Lutherans were awakened to a clearer perception of the difference between the two opinions, and were roused to withstand the progress of Calvinism. Joachim Westphal, a preacher in Hamburg, took the field, to whom Calvin replied. The Elector Palatine, Frederic III., adopted Melanchthon's advice to stop at the words of the Apostle Paul on the Sacrament in 1 Cor. x. 16. In 1560, he established the Reformed Church in his land. In 1562, the Heidelberg Catechism by his direction was framed by two professors at Heidelberg, Ursinus and Olevianus. In 1560, in the midst of these scenes of strife, Melanchthon died, not unwilling to be delivered from the "fury of theologians," and to go to the light where he could comprehend the mysteries which he had not been able to understand on earth.

In his battle with Erasmus, Luther affirmed in almost reckless language the impotence of the human will. God's agency was

[1] See Schaff, *Ch. Hist.* VII. 664 sq., VI. 656; Fisher, *Hist. of the Reformation*, p. 160; Hase, *Libri Symbol.* p. xvi. See, also, Galle's *Charakteristik Melanchthons*, etc., especially the *Zweiter Abschnitt.*, and Thomasius, DG. 543 sq.

asserted to be the universal cause. His will was declared to be subject to no law, but to be the foundation of right. Predestination was declared to be unconditional and to include as its objects the lost as well as the saved. "By this thunderbolt," he said, "free-will is laid low and thoroughly crushed." Melanchthon, in this point, as in others, was in accord with him. But from about the time of the controversy of Luther with Erasmus, Melanchthon began to part with this opinion. He began to look at these matters more from the ethical point of view, and was concerned to find room for human freedom and a basis for human responsibility. In the Augsburg Confession (VII.) man's will was said to have "some liberty to work a civil righteousness, and to choose such things as reason can reach to." In successive editions of the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, and the *Loci*, we can trace the steps which he took to the clear propounding of *synergism*, or the doctrine that in conversion the human will takes a part, although it be a minor part, along with the Word and God's Spirit. In the adoption of these new views he was not molested by Luther. Luther had, however inconsistently, affirmed with all emphasis that God from eternity desires the salvation of all men, and that if they are not saved it is because they spurn his earnest offer. That salvation is by divine grace, without merit, is the one truth which was near to Luther's heart. The extravagant propositions which reach the limit of fatalism were taken up from another quarter than his own religious thoughts and experience, and used to batter down the doctrine of merit. Hence, although to the last the book on the Servitude of the Will was one of the few writings of his compositions to which he attached much value, it was not on account of the extreme theory of the will which was advocated in it, but on account of the doctrine of grace of which it served as a weapon of defence.

The ethical feeling of Melanchthon and the fear of antinomian perversions of the doctrine of gratuitous justification, led him to set forth views respecting the obligations of the law, which excited distrust and opposition. In the edition of the *Loci* in 1535, he affirms "the necessity of good works for eternal life," adding, however, that they necessarily follow reconciliation. He says, moreover, that "good works *merit* material and spiritual rewards." Such statements he always explained as not affecting the truth of the remission of sins or the condition of faith in divine mercy through Christ.

The death of Luther released Melanchthon from the almost servile anxiety under which he had long suffered. It made him the head of the Wittenberg Faculty and the principal theological leader among Lutheran Protestants. But, at the same time, it took away the ægis which Luther had really stretched over him, and left to his adversaries a better prospect in their antagonism to him and his teachings. More than this, it took away the restraint which Luther's presence had excited upon the tendency in Melanchthon's own mind to go farther than was meet in the direction of concessions to the Roman Catholics and of measures of pacification. He was a Humanist, and as such a lover of learning, who deserved the title of "The Preceptor of Germany." By nature he hated extremes, hated angry disputes on verbal distinctions, prized unity and peace. He was not personally estranged from Erasmus on account of Luther's heated contest with him. He had the courage to qualify his subscription to the Smalcald Articles by adding, in the face of Luther's statements in this creed, that if the Pope would allow the Gospel, he would, for the sake of peace, concede to him *jure humano* superiority over bishops, of which he was actually possessed. Such were the traits of Melanchthon, that, in the circumstances of the times after the death of Luther, in connection with the theological parties into which the Lutherans divided, he must inevitably become the occasion of division and a target of assault. A condensed notice of these controversies is here in place.

1. There were controversies bearing on the relation of morals to religion. In 1527, John Agricola came forward with the denial that the preaching of the law should precede the preaching of the Gospel. Luther stood by Melanchthon; and ten years later, when Agricola contended that repentance as well as faith must proceed from the influence of the Gospel alone, Luther vigorously opposed him. In 1552, George Major avowed that good works are necessary to salvation, not meaning that they are meritorious, or intending to deny that in faith they originate. Nicholas von Amsdorf met Major with the offensive assertion that not only are good works not necessary to salvation, but in relation to that end are positively harmful. The design was utterly to reject the idea that the law has any relation to believers. It was a fanatical proclamation of the all-sufficiency of faith.

2. In order to fill out what he considered to be a defect in

Melanchthon's limiting of the office of justifying faith to the forgiveness of sin, and to relieve the doctrine of merely forensic justification of its barrenness, Andrew Osiander in 1552 brought forward the doctrine of the actual appropriation by the believer of the righteousness of Christ, who is received in faith and really imparts His own essential, divine righteousness to the soul. Luther had regarded faith as the reception of the entire Christ as the living Saviour and the source of inward life. Osiander considered himself to be an expounder of Luther's ideas. He held to the expiatory work of Christ, as the ground of forgiveness, but the stress was laid on the mystical union with Christ, and the actual partaking of His divine quality of righteousness. But Osiander was resisted not only by Melanchthon, on the ground that he made forgiveness of small account, but also by Matthias Flacius and other strenuous Lutherans. After Osiander's death the controversy was long continued.

The adiaphoristic Majoristic and Osiandrian controversies were closely related to the preceding differences. They were connected with the Leipsic Interim. After the defeat of the Protestants Melanchthon and theologians in sympathy with him, in 1548, lent their countenance and help to Maurice of Saxony in the framing of the Interim for the ordering of religious affairs within his domain. The concessions to Roman Catholicism, both in respect to doctrinal statements and as to ceremonies, went altogether beyond a reasonable sacrifice for the sake of peace and union. This Melanchthon himself afterwards frankly admitted. In this dark and troublous period, the strenuous Lutherans, such as Flacius and Amsdorf, in their antagonism to the Interim, did not spare Melanchthon, who was held responsible for its obnoxious provisions. They constituted the "Gnesio-Lutherans," as they were styled, — persistent adversaries of Melanchthon's opinions. The adiaphoristic controversy was waged on the question whether the Roman Catholic ceremonies — formerly interdicted, but recognized, on grounds of expediency, in the Interim — were or were not unlawful, or if not in themselves wrong, were not made so under the circumstances. This debate, violent on the part of the more rigid Lutherans, ended upon the overthrow of Charles V. by Maurice and the Peace of Augsburg (1555), when the question ceased to be practical.

The Philippists, as the followers of Melanchthon were called by

their opponents, were, until 1574, dominant at Wittenberg and Leipsic. The rigid Lutherans had their stronghold first at Magdeburg, and then at Jena. In 1555, the synergistic controversy entered upon a new stadium by a publication of Pfeffinger of Jena, which was followed, after an interval of several years, by publications on the other side by Amsdorf and Flacius. The most prominent champion of the Philippists was Strigel, Professor at Jena. He maintained that will in the natural man is weakened and crippled so that it is incapable of originating anything spiritually good, but when moved upon by the Holy Spirit, it can coöperate in the work of conversion. This ascription of a concurrent power to the will met with great opposition. But the position of the champion of the strict Lutherans, Flacius, that the will is spiritually dead, and has no capacity except perpetually to resist the influences of grace, were also repugnant to the more moderate class of Strigel's opponents. A middle class then arose, of which Chemnitz and Andreæ were members, who strove to mediate between the two extremes. The difference centred in the idea of conversion, the initial step in the Christian life. The moderate party attributed the concurrence and consent of the creaturely will, not to the use of an inherent power, but rather to the will when healed or invigorated by a prior influence of the Holy Spirit. Flavius stirred up a general dissent when he advanced the doctrine that original sin has affected the very substance of the soul, a proposition presupposed in his theory of the will as being dead so far as holy preferences are concerned. In order to bring to an end the contests that prevailed, the Form of Concord, after years of labor upon it, was completed in 1580. The theologians of the school of Melanchthon, Chemnitz, and others, refrained from insisting on statements which they would have preferred to make. The result of all the conferences and negotiations was the creed in two parts, the briefer Epitome, and the larger Solid Repetition and Declaration. The Form of Concord condemns the Flavian notion about Original Sin. It asserts (Art. II.) in the strongest possible language the helplessness of the human will. Man's acceptance of the Gospel is exclusively the effect of grace. Yet, in the eleventh Article, it is declared that "God is not willing that any should perish," that His offers of grace are to all men, that Christ "is anxious that all men should come unto Him and permit Him to help them," that the reason why any sin-

ners are lost is that they wilfully despise God's grace, "close their ears and harden their hearts," so that the Holy Ghost cannot do His work upon them and within them. It is the denial that grace is irresistible. Some of the ablest Lutheran divines grant that a path of reconciliation between these two Articles is difficult to be found.

CHAPTER III

THE THEOLOGY OF CALVIN

Calvin in his intellectual qualities differed widely from Zwingli, but he gave to the Swiss or Reformed theology its mature form, and completed a work which his forerunner had commenced. Nevertheless, he had little sympathy with the personal traits of Zwingli, and Dorner is right in saying that there was, all things considered, more affinity between him and Luther and the Lutheran exposition of the Gospel, than there was with Zwingli and with the Zwinglian theology taken as a whole. The religious experience of Calvin corresponded essentially to that of Luther. Distress of conscience and a sense of helplessness were followed by peace of mind, through trust in the wholly undeserved grace of the Gospel.[1] The first edition of his *Institutes of Theology* was printed in Latin at Basle in 1536. The work grew in compass in the successive editions, without any modification of its doctrines. From its form, as issued in 1559, the later editions have been printed. It is rather a fervid discourse than a dry, scholastic disquisition. In its four books it follows the order of the Apostles' Creed, as did Luther in the doctrinal part of his Catechisms. The continuity of teaching in the Church was thus implied. Calvin's genius as a commentator fully equals his capacity as a dogmatic teacher. To get a full view of his thoughts it is necessary to consult his observations on special passages of Scripture, as well as his treatises; for in the former we meet with distinctions and qualifications which in the latter are not always found.

In respect to the relation of the formal principle, the authority of the Bible, to the material principle, Justification by faith, Calvin

[1] One of the most interesting statements of Calvin respecting himself is in his *Letter to Sadolet.*

stands between Luther and Zwingli. He makes the former more dependent on the latter for its origin than Zwingli; yet he makes the formal principle more controlling in the construction of doctrine than Luther. For example, he holds that the constitution of the Church is to a greater extent determined by the Scriptures. But when it comes to the evidences of the divine origin of the Bible, he rejects the opinion that the first place belongs to external proofs, and spurns the idea that for our conviction on this subject we depend upon the authority of the Church. Our conviction on this point is based on the "testimony of the Holy Spirit," the testimony within us of the same Spirit that inspired the sacred writers. The Bible by its power and elevation speaks directly to the soul, but speaks with convincing effect only to the soul which has been drawn to accept Christ with a living faith. On the subject of the canon and of inspiration, Calvin does not (save in discarding the apocrypha) deviate from traditional opinion as Luther does. Yet it accords with his manliness as an interpreter that he resorts to no petty devices to escape a difficulty; for example, to dispose of minor discrepancies. The "different phrases," 'coat and cloak' in Matt. v. 40, and 'cloak and coat' in Luke vi. 29, "do not alter the sense." Comparing the variation of Heb. xi. 21 from Gen. xlvii. 31, he remarks that in this matter "the apostles have not been so very scrupulous; in substance (*in re ipsa*) there is little difference." How 'Jeremiah' got into Matt. xxvii. 9, instead of 'Zachariah,' he does not know, nor will he worry himself about it.[1] Like Luther, he has no fancy for allegorical interpretation.

There is a full agreement with Luther in Calvin's description of the nature and function of faith. It brings the believer into union with Christ so that Christ imparts to him all that is His. We are saved by the imputation of His righteousness, not on the ground of anything, not even faith, in ourselves. And faith includes in it Assurance — the *certitudo salutis*. Still Calvin allows for the imperfection of faith, for the struggle with remaining sin, and the consequent occasional or partial chilling of the believer's confidence. Justification, the remission of sins, is distinct from Sanctification, but they are never disjoined.

Although Calvin is not less sweeping in his assertions of divine predestination and control than Luther, certainly than Luther in his

[1] "nec anxie laboro."

earlier statements, he differs from the Saxon leader, and is in accord with Zwingli, in placing in the forefront of his system God and His universal control. Calvin and Calvinism emphasize not only the freedom, the unmerited character, of grace, but equally the *sovereignty* of God in the bestowal of it. The idea is that apart from this sovereignty in the selection of the subjects of it, grace would not be grace. This doctrine of God's sovereignty, and the use made of it, is one thing that differentiates Calvinism from Lutheranism, and increasingly the more in the Lutheran system election retreats into the background. The second point of difference relates to the Lord's Supper, — a topic which has already been explained.

The peculiarity of Calvin's doctrine of predestination is that it includes in it the decree of reprobation. This the Lutheran confessions exclude. According to Calvin,[1] God has determined by an eternal decree "what He would have to become of every individual of mankind." Eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal damnation for others. "Every one is created for one or the other of these ends." God has once for all determined "whom He would admit to salvation and whom He would condemn to destruction."[2] Prescience does not explain the hardening of heart, which includes an intervention of God, beyond mere foreknowledge. It takes place, first, by the withdrawal of God's Spirit, and secondly by the employment of Satan, the minister of His wrath, to influence their mind and their efforts.[3] To inquire into the reasons of the divine will is idle; for there is nothing "greater or higher than the will of God." It is "the cause of everything that exists."[4]

Notwithstanding these assertions, it is not altogether clear whether Calvin was a supralapsarian or an infralapsarian. These terms, it should be remarked, did not come into vogue until a later day. The distinction pertains to the relation of predestination to the fall of man — to the first sin. This was held by extreme Calvinists to be the object of an efficient decree, while the more moderate Calvinists made the decree relate to the fall, and to be only permissive. The supralapsarians, when they worked out their philosophy, made the final cause or end of the divine administration to be the manifestation of God's attributes, — of His justice in punishing, and of His mercy in saving. To accomplish this end creation is

[1] *Inst.* III. xxi. 5.
[2] *Ibid.* III. xxi. 7.
[3] *Ibid.* II. iv. 3.
[4] *Ibid.* III. xxiii. 2.

decreed, the fall after it, the election of part of mankind as objects of mercy, of another part as objects of punitive righteousness. This is the order of the divine purposes. This philosophy is crowned by the assumption that the privilege of the divine government needs no other defence than the bare fact of the divine decree, the will of God being the foundation, as well as the evidence or criterion, of righteousness. The infralapsarians, on the contrary, made election to be from those fallen by their own act into sin and condemnation, an act of theirs in no degree necessitated by causes referable to God's power.

If we had nothing to guide us but the *Institutes*, we should say without hesitation that Calvin was a supralapsarian. He asserts that the foreknowledge of God is dependent upon His decrees; that God not only foresaw "the fall of the first man and in him the ruin of his posterity, but arranged all by the determination of His own will."[1] It is absurd to think, he says, that God did not choose what should be the condition of the principal of His creatures. The first man fell because God judged that it was expedient that he should fall. Why not, he argues, object to the decree that his posterity should be included in perdition by his fall? Yet such is the fact. Of the composite purpose, including the sin of Adam and the ruin of his posterity, he says: "It is a terrible decree, I acknowledge."[2] There is more in the *Institutes* of the same purport. But elsewhere in the *Agreement by the Genoese Pastors*, he speaks more guardedly, and does not overstep the picture of Augustine, from whom he quotes with approbation. He asserts merely a permissive decree — a volitive permission — in the case of the first sin. Moreover, Calvin explicitly asserts that for every decree of the Almighty, however mysterious it might be to us, there is a good and sufficient reason;[3] that is to say, he founds will upon right, not right upon will. It is probable that we have here his opinion, literally stated, while in the passage quoted above, which appears to imply that God's will is the fountain, as well as the evidence of right, we have an over-statement, due to the fervor of his polemic.

Calvin's language on the decree relating to sin is intimately connected with his conviction that sin exists and is evil, yet

[1] *Inst.* III. xxiii. 7. To say that God determined to treat Adam as he might deserve is a "frigidum commentum."

[2] *Ibid.* III. xxiii. 7.

[3] *Opera* (Amst. ed.), Vol. VIII. p. 638.

because it exists under God's government it must be good that it should exist.[1] It would not be permitted to be were it not desirable that it should be. Hence the existence of evil, whenever and wherever it exists, is in accord with the divine will. It is in accord with a mysterious, inevitable appointment of God's will, notwithstanding His declared commandment against it. God does not permit sin to be *nolens*, but *volens*. In this particular, Calvin reproduces the doctrine of Augustine and Aquinas, that the system as a whole is better with evil in it than without evil in it. As to the two wills in God, the decretive and preceptive, the former is always said by Calvin to be involved in deep mystery. On this subject nothing, he declares, is "better for us than a learned ignorance."[2] In explaining the offers of the Gospel, he, like Augustinians before him, makes them refer to nations, and to signify that the elect are not confined to any one of them. When he comes to the lament of Jesus over Jerusalem (Matt. xxiii. 37), to the expression of the Saviour's will to gather to Himself the people who had willed not to come to Him, he faces the difficulty, and affirms that the duality of the divine will is merely relative to our understanding, or is anthropopathic. Somehow "between the *velle* of God and their [the people's] *nolle* there is an emphatic opposition."

As was the case with the other Reformers, Calvin was not actuated in his zeal for the doctrine of predestination by speculative reasons. He was impelled by its supposed necessity if the truth of salvation by grace alone is to be upheld. A second reason for clinging to it was the dependence upon it of the security and comfort of believers. For Calvin differed from the Lutherans as well as from Augustine, in holding that all true believers are of the number of the elect, since all are preserved from falling.

In Calvin, as in the Lutheran Reformers, in treating of original sin, the imputation of Adam's sin is left in the background. It is the innate sin, derived by inheritance from Adam, which is the primary source of our condemnation. The Augustinian unity of the race, and the consequent responsibility of the race for the first transgression, as far as it was generic, is the underlying conception. Two propositions are constantly asserted by Calvin. One is that we are not condemned or punished for Adam's sin, apart from our own inborn depravity, which we derive from him.

[1] *Consens. Genev.* (Niemeyer, p. 230).
[2] *Opera* (Amst. ed.), Vol. III. p. 641.

The sin for which we are condemned is our own sin, namely, the corruption of nature within us at birth, and were it not for this we should not be condemned. The other proposition is that our nature was vitiated in Adam, and in that condition we received it. On commenting on Rom. v. 12, he says:

"Observe the order here, for Paul says *that sin preceded;* that from it death followed. For there are some who contend that we are so ruined by the sin of Adam, *as if we perished by no iniquity* (*culpa*) *of our own*, *in the sense that he only as it were sinned for us.* But the Apostle expressly affirms that sin is propagated to all who suffer its punishment. And he urges this especially when he assigns the reason shortly after, why all the posterity of Adam are subject to the dominion of death. The reason is, he says, that all have sinned. That sinning of which he speaks is, being *corrupted and vitiated.* For that natural depravity which we bring from our mother's womb, although it does not at once bring forth its fruits, yet it is sin before the Lord and deserves the penalty."

To the same effect are his remarks on Eph. ii. 3, where he says: "Sin is inherent in us, because God does not condemn the innocent." "God is not angry with innocent men, but with sin." In the chapter on original sin in the *Institutes,* we read:

"These two things are to be distinctly observed; first, that being thus vitiated and perverse in all the parts of our nature, we are, on account of this corruption, deservedly held as condemned and convicted before God, to whom nothing is acceptable but justice, innocence, and purity; *for this is not liability to punishment for another's crime;* for when it is said that by this sin of Adam we become exposed to the judgment of God, it is not to be understood as if, being ourselves innocent and undeserving of punishment, we had to bear the sin (*culpam*) of another; but because by his transgression we all incur a curse, he is said to have involved us in guilt (*obstrinxisse*). Nevertheless, not only has punishment passed from him upon us, but pollution instilled from him is inherent in us, to which punishment is justly due. Wherefore Augustine, although he often calls it another's sin (that he may the more clearly show that it is derived to us by propagation), at the same time asserts it to belong to each individual. . . . And so also infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation with them from their mother's womb, are exposed to punishment, not for another's sin but for their own. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, they have still the seed inclosed in them; even their whole nature is as it were a seed of sin, and cannot be otherwise than odious and abominable to God. Whence it follows that it is properly accounted sin in the eye of God, *because there could not be guilt* (*reatus*) *without fault* (*culpa*). The other thing to be remarked is that this depravity never ceases in us, but is perpetually producing new fruits, etc." [1]

[1] *Inst.* I. i. 8.

It is clear that, in Calvin's view, the first thing imputed us as the ground of punishment is our own sinful nature.

Calvin makes the same distinction as the Lutherans made between the visible and the invisible Church.[1] The one comprises all the elect. The other includes the multitude of professed believers, who receive the two sacraments, the word of the Lord, and the ministry who are appointed of Christ to preach it. He did not deny that the Christian societies acknowledging the Pope are "churches of Christ." His warfare, he asserted in his letter to Sadolet, was with the Pontiff and his pseudo-bishops, by whom the truth was perverted and the kingdom of Christ brought almost to destruction. If the Pope could prove his succession from Peter, obedience would not be due to him unless he maintains his fidelity to Christ. His contest was like that of the prophets and apostles with the churches of their time. He indignantly denies that he has withdrawn from the Church.[2] The prelates of the day cannot prove their vocation by any laws, human or divine. The characteristics of a well-ordered church are the preaching of sound doctrine and the pious administration of the sacraments. The servants of God have never been obstructed by the empty title of 'Church,' when it was used to uphold the reign of impiety. His devotion to the true merits of the Church he affirms in the most solemn manner.[3] Schism, in the proper meaning of the term, he utterly condemns. In arguing against the Anabaptists he insists upon the criminality of separating from the Church even when corruption and sin are prevalent among its members. There is no excuse for deserting the Church where the word of God is preached and the sacraments administered.[4] In his protest against these schismatics we might imagine ourselves to be hearing the voice of an enemy of Protestantism in every form. But Calvin's deference to authority considered by him legitimate was profound. The same is true of his attachment to unity, and abhorrence of unlawful mutiny.[5] His reverence for the Church had led him to hesitate about becoming a Protestant. He con-

[1] *Inst.* IV. i. 10.

[2] *Works* (Amst. ed.), Vol. VIII. See Schaff, *Ch. Hist.* VII. pp. 404, 405.

[3] *On the Necessity of Reforming the Church* (1545): full citations in Schaff, Vol. VII. 452 sq.

[4] *Inst.* IV. i. 19.

[5] *Ibid.* I. iv. 10; cf. IV. i. 10.

vinced himself that to renounce the prelacy was not to renounce the Church. "A departure from the Church would be a renunciation of God and of Christ." The original officers in the Church were partly permanent and partly not. The officers ordained to be permanent are the pastors and elders. They are not to be chosen by the congregation. In the polity established at Geneva Calvin did not fully realize his theory on the subject. In this particular he was like Luther.

Upon the general idea and intent of the sacraments, Calvin thought as did the Lutheran Reformers.[1] A sacrament is an outward sign which is at the same time a seal or confirmation of the promises of grace and also a testimony before all, the Creator and His creatures, of our piety towards Him. There is no sacrament without an antecedent promise to which it is subjoined. The word — that is, the teaching of the Gospel as to its significance — is a part of the sacrament. Augustine is right in calling a sacrament a "visible word," it being a mirror of the grace contained in the promises. It is for the increase of faith; yet it confers no benefit on a wicked person. And its validity is not contingent on the intention of the administrator. Its office is precisely like that of the truth of the Gospel.[2] It announces, shows, ratifies the things given of God. To give it efficacy the Spirit must attend it. It has no efficacy *ex opere operato*.

Baptism is a token of purification.[3] It is like a legal instrument attesting the forgiveness of the believer. It is not for the past alone, but for the future; for the believer is ever to remember it as the pledge of his pardon and as designed to reassure him of it. It reminds us perpetually of our new life in Christ and of the sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit. It testifies that being united to Him we shall be partakers of all His benefits.

In the Institutes Calvin makes an elaborate argument in behalf of Infant Baptism. He will not say that infants have the same faith, or knowledge of faith, that adult believers have. The principal warrant for baptizing them is the covenant, the promise of God to the offspring of believers — to believers and their seed. The blessing of little children by Christ is another basis for it. Those who brought little children to Him had the spirit of disciples. As to the need of infants of the blessings denoted by the rite, "they bring their own condemnation into the world with

[1] *Inst.* IV. xiv. 1, 2. [2] *Ibid.* IV. xiv. 17. [3] *Ibid.* IV. xv. 15.

them," their whole nature being, "as it were, a seed of sin," and therefore "abominable to God."[1] The first benefit possible to be imparted to infants is their ingrafting into the Church. The next benefit which they are capable of receiving, which is figured in the sacrament, is their regeneration. The precise nature of this benefit he does not profess to be able to explain. Neither in their case, nor in the case of adults, is there any virtue in the water itself. Whatever is done, is done by the Spirit. Where, by reason of age, there is not yet any capacity of learning, God has His *different degrees of regenerating* those whom He has adopted.[2] Yet nowhere in this prolonged discussion does Calvin say that *all* those baptized children of Christian parents who die in infancy are saved. "If any of those who are *objects of divine election*" depart from life, after baptism, and before they attain to years of discretion, "the Lord renovates them by the power of His Spirit, incomprehensible to us, in such a manner as He alone foresees to be necessary."[3] Farther than this he does not go.[4] Respecting infants who cannot repent and believe, as to the advantage of baptism in the case of such of them as are not of the elect, Calvin encountered a difficulty similar to that which Augustine failed to solve in dealing with the relation of the sacraments to predestination.

Calvin's opinion concerning the Lord's Supper has been already stated. Prior to his establishment in Geneva, his aim had been, in writing on the sacrament, to cultivate peace with the Lutherans by emphasizing the points of agreement with them. Hence at the outset the Zwinglians were somewhat suspicious of him. Zwingli, however, in his latter days, had made room in his theory for a presence of Christ in connection with the Supper, and had made more of the Supper as a pledge of Christ's love. Bullinger and his associates did the same. Consequently the *Consensus Tigurinus*, in 1549, was formed as a symbol of union. But in proportion as Calvin brought forward his points of agreement with Zwingli, he lost the measure of sympathy with which the Lutherans had regarded him. In the *Institutes*, he asserts that

[1] *Inst.* IV. xv. 10. [2] *Ibid.* IV. xvi. 31. [3] *Ibid.* IV. xvi. 21.

[4] Occasionally he appears to embrace all. *Inst.* IV. xv. 20, xvi. 9, 31. The sum of his doctrine is that between baptism and circumcision, there is "a complete agreement in the internal mystery, the promises, the use, and the efficacy." IV. xvi. 16.

the only difference with the Lutherans on the subject of the presence of Christ in the sacrament relates to the manner of His presence.[1] "They suppose Christ not to be present, unless He descends to us; as though we cannot equally enjoy His presence, if He elevates us to himself. The only question between us, therefore, respects the manner of this presence." "I doubt not that He [Christ] truly presents them [the body and blood] and I receive them."[1] By the "energy of His Spirit" He accomplishes that which He promises.[2] Yet it is evident that our being lifted up to Christ is figuratively meant, since of the difficulty from the distance of Christ, Calvin says that he cuts the knot in this way, that Christ, although he does not change His place, by His power *descends* to us.[3] Faith is confirmed, and the seed of an immortal body, like that of Christ, is received by the believing communicant.

Calvin's expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity are characterized by great sobriety and clearness. He is no stickler for terms, provided the central elements of the doctrine are retained. He was even, much to his chagrin, accused of Arianism by one Caroli.[4] He will not contend, he says, for mere words.[5] He would be glad if such terms as 'Trinity' and 'persons' were buried out of sight, if only it were agreed that the Father, Son, and Spirit are one God, and yet are distinguished by some peculiar property. Since the original cause — *principium et origo* — is in the Father, when the Father, Son, and Spirit are mentioned together, the name 'God' is specially appropriate to the Father.[6] Thus the order of the persons is preserved, while nothing is subtracted from

[1] *Inst.* IV. xvii. 31. [2] *Ibid.* IV. xvii. 10.

[3] *Secunda Defensio* (against Westphal), C. R. 37, 72. That this elevation to Christ is figuratively meant is made clear. See Kahnis, *Lehre v. heilig Abendm.*, S. 140, with the comment of Jul. Müller, *Wissenschaftl. Abhandl.*, p. 432. See also, Loofs, *DG.*, p. 435. The connection between the body of Christ and the believing communicant is always said by Calvin to be effected by the Holy Spirit. But it is a *real* connection and reception.

[4] For the circumstances, see Henry, *Das Leben Calvins*, vol. I., p. 178 sq., Schaff, *Ch. Hist.*, vol. VII. p. 632. Calvin said of the Athanasian symbol that no legitimate church — legitima ecclesia — would ever have approved of it. The subject is one on which "we ought to philosophize with great sobriety and moderation." * For the essential orthodox doctrine as against Arians and Sabellians he was strenuous.

[5] *Inst.* I. xiii. 5. [6] *Ibid.* I. xiii. 20.

* *Ibid.* I. xiii. 21.

the deity of the Son and the Spirit. He is only concerned to steer clear of Arianism on the one hand, and Sabellianism on the other.

It is accordant with Calvin's general mode of thought that while the Incarnation is set forth as having for its prime end the redemption of man, yet this is not said to be the exclusive ground of its necessity. He expressly says that if man had remained upright, yet he is so far below the Creator that he could not, without a mediator, have attained to union with Him.[1] He strenuously insists on the full reality of the human nature of Christ, as not affected by its union with the divine.

In one paragraph of the Institutes, Calvin says that the merit of Christ by which we are saved depends merely on the good pleasure of God, which appointed this method of salvation for us.[2] This is interpreted by Thomasius as implying that the work of Christ was not necessary, and as thus suggesting the same Scotist idea that the will of God is the foundation of merit.[3] It is admitted, however, that such a view is not carried out by Calvin. But the real sense of the passage is simply that the mission of the Saviour springs from the *grace* of God, and from no constraint to which He was subject to provide a way of salvation. Calvin is earnest in ascribing the gift of a Saviour to the love of God, although "in a certain ineffable manner, at the same time that He loved us He was nevertheless angry with us until He was reconciled in Christ."[4] God Himself "removes every obstacle in the way of His love towards us." The obstacle lay in God's justice and righteous condemnation of sin. Christ has "satisfied for our sins; He has sustained the punishment due to us; He has appeased God by His obedience."[5] Christ has so united himself to us that what is ours becomes His, and *vice versa*. Like Luther, his mind dwells on this union. He expresses it in the phrase: "Our sins were transferred to Him by imputation." The main thing in the atoning work of Christ is His death. But "there is no exclusion of the work of His obedience which He performed in this life." "Indeed, His voluntary submission is the principal circumstance even in His death." The sacrifice must be freely offered. By "the whole course of His

[1] *Inst.* II. xii. 1; cf. Dorner, *Person Christi*, II. 719, and Baur, DG. III. 179.

[2] *Inst.* II. xvii. 1.

[3] DG. Vol. II. p. 641.

[4] *Inst.* II. xvi. 2.

[5] *Ibid.* 3.

obedience" He has achieved our salvation. The distinction between an active and a passive obedience is not expressed.

Calvin denies the descent of Christ to the under-world (Hades). The only meaning that can be accepted in such a statement, he affirms, is that on the cross Christ, when He felt himself forsaken of God, experienced in His own soul the pains of the lost. Yet He was free from guilt, and God had no feeling towards Him but love.

CHAPTER IV

RISE AND PROGRESS OF PROTESTANT THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND

THE Church of England, from the time of the framing of its formularies under Edward VI., was justly considered to belong to the "Reformed" division of the Protestant churches. On the great subject of contention, the Lord's Supper, it expressly rejected the Lutheran opinion, and preferred an opinion accordant with that of Calvin. It was the influence of Luther's writings on young men in the universities that began the work of doctrinal reformation. As far as the Protestant faith was espoused, it was first in the Lutheran form. When Cranmer gave up transubstantiation, he exchanged this opinion for that of the Saxon Reformers, and condemned the doctrine of Zwingli. For defending the Roman doctrine of the sacraments against Luther, Henry VIII. had received from the Pope the title of Defender of the Faith. His divorce and his renunciation of the Pope's authority were a long step towards a recognition of the exclusive authority of the Scriptures. In 1536, the ten Articles, which were adopted by convocation and sanctioned by the king, made the Bible and the three ancient creeds the authoritative standard of teaching. The Article on Justification rejects human merit, but connects with this denial an assertion of the necessity of works to follow Justification. It is an attempt to unite Lutheran and Roman Catholic tenets. As to the Real Presence, it is affirmed in language which a Lutheran could have accepted. There is a Purgatory, but the Pope cannot deliver souls from it. There are cautions against the abuses connected with confession, invocation of saints, and the use of images in worship. In the discussion which preceded this compromise, Cranmer was on the progressive side. The Protestant parts of the Articles were largely drawn from the Apology for the Augsburg Confession and other writings of Me-

lanchthon.[1] Among other features, the limitation of the number of sacraments to three — Penance being the third — excited much disaffection, especially in the North, where the Roman side had great strength. The creed fell into disuse on the publication, in 1537, of the "Bishops' Book," as it was popularly called, — *The Institution of a Christian Man.* This, too, was the fruit of a compromise. It was framed by a commission sitting at Lambeth. It was decidedly more Lutheran than the ten Articles. It was to a large extent an expansion of Luther's catechisms, but Cranmer's contributions in it were in his best vein. The sacraments were said to be seven, but a sharp distinction was drawn between the three and the remaining four. The sympathy between the English and the German Reformers was manifested in various ways, and was only restrained by the force of the king's will. The power of the Smalcald League had its influence in moving Henry to seek the friendship of the German princes. In 1535, envoys were sent by him to Germany to negotiate with them, with a view to a religious agreement and a political alliance. These proceedings were frustrated, — partly, it is thought, by the agency of Gardiner. The reactionary movement of Henry and the execution of Anne Boleyn, in 1536, broke them off for a time altogether. In 1538, these negotiations were resumed. Henry had a liking for Melanchthon, and was quite desirous that he should come to England. A Lutheran embassy, which Melanchthon was not able to join, came to London to confer with a committee of bishops and doctors, which was appointed by the king. As to propositions respecting doctrine, they arrived at an agreement; but Henry steadily refused to permit the cup to be given to the laity, to give up propitiatory masses, or to allow the clergy to marry. Among papers belonging to Cranmer, there was found by Dr. Jenkyn a manuscript containing in Latin thirteen Articles, on the unity of God, original sin, and other doctrinal topics. It is judged to be the statement of the Articles drawn up at the Conference to serve as a basis of union with the Germans. They are derived in the main from the Augsburg Confession. While they have this connection with the past, they appear to be the groundwork of the Anglican Articles at present in use.[2] In 1539,

[1] See Jacobs, *The Lutheran Movement in England during the Reigns of Henry VIII. and Edward VI.* (1890), c. VI.

[2] See Hardwick, *History of the Articles*, p. 74.

the negotiations with the Germans were continued. They refused to send theologians, but an embassy of civilians came to London. The effort proved abortive. Gardiner and the hierarchical party were now in the ascendant. The six Articles were enacted "for abolishing diversity of opinions in religion." Whoever denied transubstantiation was to be burned at the stake. The needlessness of communion in both kinds, the celibacy of the clergy, the necessity of private masses and of auricular confession, were decreed. The penalty of an attack on either of these last articles was death as a felon, without benefit of clergy. Expressions of dissent from them were to be punished according to their form and degree, by imprisonment, confiscation of goods, and death. Cranmer bowed to the storm. There was in his character a remarkable mixture of compliance with behests which it was impossible for him to withstand, with an unyielding persistence in the pursuit of the end which he had at heart, — reform in doctrine as well as in things external. Further endeavors of Henry to frame an alliance with the Germans failed from their resolute refusal to take a step without his acceptance of the Augsburg Confession. One more doctrinal publication was issued under the auspices of Henry VIII. It was a revision of *The Institution of a Christian Man* and was issued in 1543 under the title, "Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian." Annotations by Cranmer and a few by the king himself were embodied in it.[1] It was approved by Convocation.

With the accession of Edward VI. in 1547, Cranmer and the doctrinal Protestants were left free to carry out their ideas. Up to this time Cranmer had continued to his adhesion to the Lutheran doctrine. In 1538, he tried to induce Lambert, who held the Zwinglian opinion, to renounce it. Lambert refused and was burned at the stake. In 1548, Cranmer published a catechism. It was little more than a translation of a Lutheran catechism which had been rendered into Latin at Nuremberg by Justus Jonas, the intimate friend of Luther.[2] This was the period of the Smalcaldic war and of the Interim in Germany. The hands of Cranmer and Ridley were strengthened by theologians from the Continent. Peter Martyr and Ochino were made professors at Oxford in 1547, and Bucer and Fagius were called to Cambridge in 1549. At a

[1] See Hardwick, p. 65.

[2] See Fisher, *Hist. of the Reformation*, p. 341.

Disputation held in London, in 1548, Cranmer declared himself a believer in the Reformed doctrine of the sacrament and argued against the Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body. In this change, he says himself, Ridley's influence had great weight with him. His words are: "Dr. Ridley did confer with me, and by sundry persuasions and authorities of doctors, drew me quite from my opinion."[1] We can fix the date of this conversion. On August 1st, Traheran writes to Bullinger that Cranmer is on the Lutheran side?[2] The same thing is said in letters from others to Bullinger as late as October 29th.[3] On September 28th, Traheran reports that Cranmer has come over to the opposite opinion.[4] On December 31st, it is said that he had "most openly, firmly, and learnedly" maintained Bullinger's doctrine. In Cranmer's treatise on the sacrament and in his rejoinder to the reply of Gardiner, he advocates distinctly and emphatically the opinion of which Calvin and Bucer were the expositors.[5] The forty-two Articles of Religion were adopted in 1552. In Article XXVIII. (on the Lord's Supper) there is a denial of the doctrine of "the reall and bodilie presence, as thei terme it, of Christe's flesh and bloude, in the sacramente of the Lorde's Supper." In the Elizabethan revision of the Articles, by which they are reduced in number to thirty-nine, the paragraph thus expressly condemning the Lutheran doctrine (including the ubiquitarian opinion) is left out, but the Calvinistic opinion is still explicitly stated. The twenty-ninth of the thirty-nine Articles, "of the wicked which eat not the body of Christ in the use of the Lord's Supper," was confirmed by the Church in convocation (and by the Act of Uniformity in 1662), but is not in the list authorized by the 13th of Elizabeth, where the Articles are only thirty-eight in number. This most Protestant of all the Articles "was confirmed by the Parliament of Charles II., but not by the Act which first imposed the Articles, and which had for its object the admission of Presbyterian orders" — that is, to

[1] Jenkyn's Cranmer (*Examination*), IV. 97.

[2] *Original Letters relative to the English Reformation*, I. 232.

[3] *Ibid.* II. 381, 643.

[4] *Ibid.* 322, 323. See also Hooper's statement, *Ibid.* I. 73. Traheran attributes Cranmer's change of belief to the influence of John à Lasco, who had been himself a Lutheran.

[5] Cranmer says of the doctrine of Bucer (with which he agreed) respecting the Real Presence: "Bucer dissenteth in nothing from Œcolampadius and Zwinglius." *Treatises on the Lord's Supper* (Cox's ed.), p. 225.

meet the case of ministers ordained abroad.[1] In the first Prayer Book of Edward VI., in the Communion Service are the words "The Body of our Lord Jesus Christ which was given for thee, preserve thy body and soul unto everlasting life." In the second Prayer Book of Edward, this clause disappears and substituted for it are the words: "Take and eat this in remembrance that Christ died for thee, and feed on them in thy heart with faith and thanksgiving." The Swiss influence is here apparent. In the Prayer Book of Elizabeth, the two clauses are brought together and are still so connected.[2]

There has been much discussion of the question whether Article XVII. ("Of Predestination and Election") is or is not "Calvinistic." If the meaning of the question is whether, according to the Article, predestination is unconditional or is conditioned on foreknowledge, in the later (Arminian) sense, the answer must be that it is unconditional. It is a decree by "the counsel of God secret to us" — which implies the distinction between His secretive and preceptive will. It relates to those "chosen in Christ out of mankind," "as vessels made to honor." They are called "according to God's purpose by His Spirit," "through grace obey," are justified and adopted. The caution against looking over "the sentence of God's predestination," a doctrine "secret and pleasant to godly persons," would be quite out of place if conditional predestination were referred to. To speak of the Article, however, as "Calvinistic," meaning that its doctrine was learned from Calvin, would be to say too much, although Calvin's influence even then was strongly felt in England. The seventeenth Article asserts the common doctrine of the Reformers — the later views of Melanchthon excepted. It stops short of Augustine's and Calvin's teaching in that reprobation is left out. That is to say, it is an expression of moderate Calvinism, or rather of an opinion which

[1] See Stanley's *Christian Institutions*, pp. 109, 110.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 110–112. Respecting the additions to the Catechism, in the time of James I., see Stanley, p. 110. The Body and Blood "are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper." The Declaration added to the Communion Office in Edward's Prayer Book, omitted in Elizabeth's time, excludes, as restored in 1661, the adoration of "any corporal presence of Christ's natural flesh and blood." It originally read, "the Real and Bodily, the Real and Essential Presence." A "real and essential Presence" of the same is, therefore, not condemned. *Ibid.* p. 111. See, also, Blunt's *Annotated Book of Common Prayer*, p. 199.

Cranmer and his associates held in common with Calvin. When Arminianism was beginning to spread, the "Lambeth Articles" were drawn up as a protest against it. But the rigid Calvinism of these Articles, in their original forms, was decidedly softened by the bishops and other theologians who revised them. They were composed by Whitaker, a stout Calvinist. But in the revised form the perseverance of all believers is exchanged for the perseverance of "the elect," so that room is left open for the Augustinian view. There were other changes of phraseology tending to mitigate the rigidness of the language asserting predestination. And the Lambeth Articles were never incorporated into the Anglican prescribed creed.

The definition of the Church (Art. XIX.) and the assertion of the fallibility of General Councils (Art. XXI.) agree with the ordinary Protestant doctrine. In the Articles nothing is said of Episcopacy. It was not a subject of contention among the Reformers anywhere. On the one hand, Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin have no objection to an Episcopacy existing *jure humano*. Episcopacy in England was no barrier to ecclesiastical fellowship with the Protestant churches on the Continent. Cranmer distinctly asserted the parity of bishops and presbyters, and that bishops need no special consecration. There is no good ground for the opinion that he changed his mind on this subject. Passages from Cranmer's Catechism which have been quoted in support of this assumption were taken by him from the Lutheran Catechism of Justus Jonas, of which mention has been made.[1] Cranmer in his last days was writing to the Continental Reformers with the intent to bring together a general meeting to frame a consensus doctrine. To "unchurch" the Protestant bodies was a thought that never entered into his mind. To Calvin he urges that harmony of doctrine will tend "to unite the *Churches of God*." "The Church of God" — he means the same churches — "has been injured," he says, "by divisions and varieties of opinion respecting the sacrament of unity." Of the same tenor is his letter to Bullinger. To Melanchthon he expresses the same desire for an agreement in the formulating of doctrine among those "*in whose churches* the doctrine of the Gospel has been restored and purified." Nothing is said in this correspondence about polity. Differences in this respect were not thought essential.

[1] See Jacobs, *The Lutheran Movement in England*, p. 323.

The one subject on which there was discord that occasioned anxiety was the Lord's Supper. After the accession of Elizabeth and the return of the exiles, most of whom had sojourned with the Swiss, the fraternal fellowship with the Reformed Churches remained unbroken. As late as near the end of Elizabeth's reign, Hooker recognizes the validity of the ordination practised in the foreign Protestant churches, albeit he considers it not conformed to the Apostolic model. Ministers having no other than Presbyterian ordination, on coming into England, were admitted to livings on the basis of it. Even as late as Lord Bacon wrote his "Advertisement" concerning controversies in the Church of England, he refers to the denial that such persons are "lawful ministers" as a novel and extremely censurable proceeding of "some indiscreet persons." Those ministers thus spoken against he describes as "some of our men," "ordained in foreign parts." The contention that the Episcopal polity exists *jure divino*, and is, therefore, essential to the being of a church, sprung up in consequence of the conflict with the Presbyterians who made a like assertion in behalf of their system. Such was the contention of Cartwright, the champion of the Presbyterian polity. Elizabeth was herself a Lutheran, but in her reign Calvin's personal influence was dominant among the clergy, and Calvinism was long a synonym of orthodoxy. Hooker compares Calvin's sway to the authority of Peter Lombard in the flourishing period of Scholasticism. He deprecates this almost absolute sway, although he lauds Calvin's *Institutes* and Commentaries, and says of Calvin that he was the greatest man whom the French Church — meaning the Protestant Church — has produced. The Calvinistic doctrine of the Lord's Supper was the prevailing doctrine, accepted almost without dissent by churchmen. "The real presence of Christ's body," wrote Hooker, "is not in the sacrament but in the worthy receiver."

CHAPTER V

SECTS IN THE WAKE OF THE REFORMATION — THE SOCINIAN SYSTEM

THE sects which sprang up in the wake of the Reformation had their origin chiefly in the preëxisting tendencies and opinions which appear in the later portion of the Middle Ages. The trumpet of Luther woke into vigorous life all forms of disaffection with the existing order of things in Church and State. Real or imagined defects in the systems of the Reformers called out opposition and dissent, and attempts at organization on a different basis. More radical movements broke out in different directions. The steadfast adherence of the Protestant leaders to the objective means of grace, the Bible and the sacraments, provoked dissent in the form of Mysticism. Their conservatism in matters pertaining to civil and ecclesiastical institutions excited a widespread revolt, varying in its types. Side by side with their unshaken confidence in the fundamental principles of the ancient, pre-scholastic creeds there arose as a concomitant a more far-reaching skepticism which did not spare the earlier, œcumenical creeds. This development was the natural fruit of the seed sown in the period of the Renaissance.

One of the most noteworthy phenomena on the mystical side was the rise of the Schwenkfeldians, the disciples of a Silesian nobleman, Caspar Schwenkfeld, who died in 1561. For a time he stood in a friendly personal relation to Luther, but came out in partial opposition to his teaching. He was probably somewhat influenced by the reading of Tauler and other Mystics. Luther and his followers, he held, made too much of salvation as an objective institute. They were fettered to the external Scriptures, in the room of the divine Word — the word of the Spirit — within the soul. What man needs is the indwelling of God. This was not attained by the first creation, even if sin is left out of the account.

This new, immediate fellowship with God is gained through Christ, in whom the divine presence and illumination are manifest. Christ is truly human, but His humanity, owing to His birth from the Virgin through the Spirit, is susceptible of a reception of God and a close, albeit progressive, union with Him. Through this union in the glorified Christ, the creaturely element vanishes. God and man are now one. Christ imparts to believers His divine nature. This He does in the Lord's Supper, where the bread is the symbol of the true bread of the soul, which is Christ himself. Schwenkfeld did not reject the doctrine of the death of Christ, which effaces guilt; but this was only the stepping-stone to the higher life which Christ makes the possession of His followers through a real, spiritual communication of it. The true believer can live without sin. Infant baptism he did not favor. Schwenkfeld was a man of learning and piety. His followers were not numerous. In 1734 a number of them emigrated to Pennsylvania.

The parties known by the name of Anabaptists embraced large numbers of adherents. This movement is one of much historical importance. The efforts to bring to pass revolutionary changes of a social and political nature is one of its main characteristics. It was only to a part, however, that the wild and destructive fanaticism which belonged to many can be imputed. There were drawn into the movement the mass of oppressed and mutinous peasants whose insurrection and defeat form a dark page in the records of this period. 'Anabaptists' is a word meaning 're-baptizers.' As a rule, the sects bearing this name were hostile to infant baptism and baptized anew such as had received baptism in infancy. There had been opposition to infant baptism among a part of the Waldenses and among the Bohemian brethren — the *unitas fratrum*. It had been opposed, also, by Peter of Bruges and Henry of Clugny. Yet this designation of Anabaptists does not bring out what was really the central principle of the sects to whom it was applied. They insisted that the Church must be composed exclusively of the regenerate, and that the rule of the civil authority over it has no rightful place. The substitution of a kingdom of the saints was the war-cry of some; notably of Thomas Münzer, the prophet of Zwickau, who was beheaded by the magistrates in the Peasant War. Münzer, it is worthy of remark, was acquainted with the writings of Suso, Tauler, and

other Mystics. He pronounced infant baptism unscriptural, but did not give it up. Storch, who was an associate of Münzer at Zwickau, introduced the chiliastic theory, which prevailed extensively among the Anabaptists.

Quite different in spirit from Münzer were the Anabaptists in Switzerland, such as Hubmaier, and such as Grebel, Blaurock, and others who organized a separate church at Zurich, which refused to be governed in ecclesiastical matters by the city, and discarded infant baptism. On this last point, Zwingli had been for a while of a like opinion. Grebel and his associates were devout enthusiasts, but they were believed to aim at the overthrow of the Magistracy, and their movement was quelled, not without cruel persecution. It must be said of Grebel that while he did not approve of rebellion, he preached in a district where the peasants rose in armed revolt, and thus exposed himself to the suspicion of sympathizing with fanatical schemes of sedition. Itinerant missionaries of the sect diffused Anabaptist opinions of the pacific type far and wide in South Germany. Among them Chiliasts were active and influential. Some of the Anabaptist leaders, Denck and Hetzer among them, adopted a mystical form of anti-trinitarian doctrine. An attempt was made at Münster to set up a theocracy (1532–35), but the town was captured and the tyrannical leaders suffered a cruel death. The third and fourth decades of the sixteenth century were a period in which "Anabaptism spread like a burning fever through all Germany." It was not strange that such events as the Münster tragedy should give rise to a general crusade against all who were identified with the Anabaptist cause, — a merciless crusade, because there was little discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. In the Netherlands, after about 1537, the anti-pædobaptists were organized in peaceful communities, free from violence and fanaticism. The leader in this work of organization was Menno Simons. Included in this new body were many in the regions adjacent to the Netherlands. The Mennonites discarded the use of weapons, oaths and every sort of revenge, and would hold no office in the state. They became divided, as to discipline, into a stricter and more lenient party. Later they were influenced doctrinally by the Socinians. Anabaptist congregations were formed at Norwich and other places in England by emigrants from the Low Countries. The practise of immersion was not in vogue at first among the Anabaptists. It

was adopted, it is thought, after a time, by Grebel and his companions in Switzerland. In 1605, Rev. John Smyth, an Englishman, separated from the Independent Church in Amsterdam and rebaptized himself, there being no other to perform that service for him. Whether he baptized himself by immersion or not, and when this mode of baptism began among the Baptists in England, are still subjects of controversy.

The rise and spread of anti-trinitarian opinions, especially the development of Socinianism, constitute an important chapter in the early history of Protestantism. The Reformers, while they subjected the Scholastic theology to a sifting scrutiny, planted themselves on an œcumenical basis — the creeds of the ancient Church. On this ground they stood in company with their Roman Catholic adversaries. This position was not due mainly to the power of tradition and a veneration for the Church of the early centuries. Their religious life was interwoven with the conceptions of God, of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, which are embodied in the ancient formularies. The anti-trinitarians, who were generally Italians and imbued with the spirit of the Italian Renaissance, felt no such restraint. They took the same attitude in relation to the œcumenical faith as towards the systems of the Scholastic age. It is true of Socinianism, as of like sporadic movements preceding it, that it exhibits the combined effect of the Nominalism of the later Schoolmen and of the rationalistic drift of the contemporary Italian culture. Among the Italian Protestants, who sought for a refuge north of the Alps, principally in Geneva and other cities, were cultured persons, such as Camillo Renato, Blandrata, Gentilis, and as Ochino, who in the latter part of his life, agreed with the others just named in the adoption of Unitarian opinions. Lælius Socinus and his nephew, Faustus, were of the same class. But prior to Faustus Socinus the most able and distinguished of the opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity was a Spaniard by birth, Michael Servetus. His theology was in no small degree connected with his studies and speculations in natural science. In his "Errors of the Trinity" and subsequently in his "Restitution of Christianity," which included the substance of the former work, he expounded the system which his acute and restless intellect had wrought out. The doctrine of an immanent Trinity is rejected. God is, in every sense, an indivisible essence.

For personal differences there are substituted eternal self-manifestations. The Logos is impersonal, the image of the world, ever present to God, of which the idea of Christ is the centre. The realizing of this idea in a human person is the self-revelation of God in time. Servetus holds to the miraculous birth of Christ; but his humanity is a divine substance, fitted for the incorporation of the Logos, and so for the manifestation of the Father. A Pantheistic leaven pervades the whole system of Servetus. Next to the error of the Trinity the other two most baleful errors are declared by him to be Infant Baptism and the doctrine of a hierarchy in the Church.

Lælius Socinus was an Italian of good birth and ample means, and was one of the Protestants who crossed the Alps and found an asylum in Switzerland. He visited Calvin at Geneva twice; conversed, also, on theological topics with many other eminent Protestant teachers, and died in Zurich in 1562. His learning, his polished manners, and interest in religious questions, were manifest. In conversation he commonly took the part of an inquirer, was reserved in communicating opinions of his own, but was anxious for relief from doubts and difficulties. Calvin found fault with his excessive curiosity. The papers of Lælius passed into the hands of his gifted nephew, Faustus, who also spent a considerable time in Switzerland at Zurich and at Basle, and originated, on the basis of the hints and suggestions left by his uncle, the system called Socinianism. In 1579, he went to Poland, where Unitarian emigrants before him had settled, and where the influence of Italian culture and opinions was exclusive. At first, the Unitarians at Cracow who held the Anabaptist opinion, demanded of him that he should be rebaptized. Eventually he won them over from their insistence on this test, to which he refused to conform. He became the leader of the Polish Unitarians, who were protected by sympathetic nobles of the country. A summary of the tenets of the Polish Unitarians is given in the Racovian Catechism, composed by the preachers of Racow, and first published in 1605, a year after the death of Faustus. It was translated from Polish into Latin in 1609. In 1659, it was issued in a much enlarged form by Crell and Schlichting, eminent Socinian leaders. The writings of Faustus, together with those of the two authors just named, and the works of Wolzogenius, are the authorities for the exposition of the Socinian system, a system which was wrought out with remarkable logical and critical acumen.

The characteristics that strike us first in looking at this system is the conjunction in it of rationalism and an extreme supernaturalism. This union is accounted for when we observe that religion is conceived of as a way of attaining eternal life, and as having its roots in obedience to God, of whose will it is professed that we are not able by our unassisted faculties to become acquainted. Connected with this view of the nature of religion as ethical in its essence, and of human nature as incapable of discerning supernatural realities, is the conception of God. In Him, will has the central and supreme place. The whole view is closely akin to the rationalism of Scotus and the other Nominalists, who, in despair of otherwise ascertaining truths respecting divine things, fell back exclusively on the testimony of revelation. In accord with this peculiarity of Socinus and his associates, is their large reliance on the miraculous proofs of the divine mission of Christ, and on the external evidences of the authority of the Scriptures. The Bible, especially the New Testament, is the authoritative source of religious knowledge. As Christianity in its principal feature is a revelation of God's will, or of law, and as the New Testament carries this to perfection, the value of the Old Testament is considered to be chiefly historical. Reason is to be exercised in interpreting the contents of the Bible, and Reason is expressly associated with Scripture as a means of deciding what Christianity really is. The point of difference between the Socinians and the later Nominalists lies in the rejection by the former of the doctrines which constitute the mysterious side of Christian theology, — in particular the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. Here we recognize the influence of the Italian Renaissance. Everything is examined and judged in the dry light of the understanding, yet — under the prescribed limitations — with consummate ability.

The Socinians considered the Trinity to be inconceivable and self-contradictory, and thus incapable of being really believed. God is an individual. His will is exerted and manifested in Creation, in His universal Providence, and in the bestowal of rewards upon those who obey Him. What God is in Himself is inscrutable. We only know what He wills, and what He reveals concerning His will. His revelation is made through Christ. He is a man. A combination of two natures, as the orthodox doctrine teaches, is impossible and hence incredible. But God can im-

part superhuman powers to creatures and commit to them offices exalted above the capacity of unaided humanity to fulfil. Christ differs from other men in his miraculous birth. His nature, however, is not the less exclusively human on account of this mode of coming into being. He is the Son of God by adoption. Before He enters upon His ministry He is taken up to Heaven and made acquainted with what He has to teach. Upon His resurrection He is exalted to the exercise of a subordinate but real dominion over God's Kingdom, and so will be qualified supernaturally to exercise judgment. Thus endowed and clothed with sovereignty, He may be called God in the sense in which the Old Testament uses the title respecting creatures raised by Him to a participation in His counsels and His administration. He may even, Socinus taught, be adored, and He may, without sin, be invoked. On this point, an opposite opinion was advocated by Francis Davidis, a prominent Socinian leader. There came to be two parties on the question relative to adoring Christ, the *adorantes* and the *non-adorantes*. The Holy Spirit, in the Socinian theology, is another name for a power of influence, exerted by God. The church doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ is denied. His death is a manifestation of compassion, and its principal significance is the assurance it furnishes of the reality of God's purpose to pardon sin. It is the resurrection of Jesus which, in the Socinian system, is the fact of primary importance. It confirms the divine offer of forgiveness. It brings Christ into the glorified life, wherein He exercises His High Priestly office as an intercessor.

The Socinian exegesis, as far as the divinity of Christ is concerned, encountered the most difficulty in disposing of passages concerning His preëxistence. Some of the Socinians were constrained to teach a preëxistence only in the divine purpose. As to the prologue of John's Gospel, the Logos was said to be impersonal, and the "all things" made were said to denote the things of the Gospel, the spiritual creation which springs from the Saviour's agency among men. The title of Logos is given to Christ for what He is to be and for the exaltation which He is to experience.

Socinus classified the Scriptural passages pertaining to the Atonement under four heads. The passages which speak of redemption by Christ or by His blood, or of His life as being a ransom for us, are pronounced metaphorical. Moses is said to

have redeemed Israel from bondage. The passages which say that Christ died for us or for our sins are said to mean that our sins were the cause or occasion of His death, or that He died to win us from the practice of sin, — nothing else being required as the condition of pardon. The passages which refer to the bearing of our sins by Christ — e.g. 1 Peter ii. 14 — are asserted to denote simply that He took away our sins by moving us to abandon them, or (as possibly in the case of Isaiah lviii. 6), that his sufferings were occasioned by our transgressions, no idea of satisfaction for sins being included. The passages which designate the death of Christ as a sacrifice and Christ as a High Priest contain no idea of expiation, for such an element is not in the Old Testament institutions from which these expressions are derived. The priestly office of Christ consists in His doing everything requisite for the communication to us of the forgiveness promised by God. The capital element in this function of Christ is His intercession above, to which the Epistle to the Hebrews refers. The objections of Socinus to the Church doctrine on grounds of reason are acutely stated. He denies that retributive justice is a property of God's nature any more than His compassion. Both are dependent upon His will. Forgiveness and satisfaction are incompatible. Punishment is something purely personal and hence not transferable. One or the other of two kinds of obedience, active and passive, attributed to Christ, is superfluous, since passive obedience removes all the guilt growing out of a want of active obedience. It is impossible for Christ to furnish the satisfaction required by the orthodox theory. He can endure but *one* eternal death. He is not, as an exalted person, to have on that account a lighter punishment. As God, He does not suffer. If He did suffer, this would not atone for man's sin. Moreover, Christ owes active obedience for Himself. If He did not, it would avail for only one person.

The Socinians held that the natural body perishes utterly and finally, and that the body with which the spirit is clothed hereafter is a new spiritual body. The condition of the soul in the intermediate state is very obscurely indicated, since it is the recipient of no sorrow and the subject of no penal suffering. Without the body, it is near to non-existence, since it is incapable of feeling or perception. As immortality is represented as a gift of God to the righteous, annihilation is the lot of the wicked, but the question

when this lot is experienced — whether at the judgment or later — is also left unanswered.[1]

The ultimate source of the antagonism of the Socinian theology to Evangelical Protestantism lies in the radical difference on the subject of sin and of its effects on the soul. The sin of the first man is not transmitted to his posterity. Men in their natural state are still free to choose the right. Their moral depravity is minified, both as to its guilt and its control, in comparison with the doctrine of the Reformers on this subject. They can still withstand temptation, and comply with the special commandments of the New Testament. The conception of the remedy is matched to the lower conception of the malady from which man is to be delivered. As critics the Socinians set exegesis free from the trammels of dogmatic theology. They pursued their investigations into provinces which had been guarded in a great degree from scrutiny by the force of tradition. Thus they fill an important place in the progress of theological science. But their service for the most part ends here. Their positive construction of doctrine partakes of the weakness of the foundations on which it is made to rest. "With the old dogmas," says Harnack, "Socinianism has at bottom set aside Christianity as a religion. Guilt and Penitence, Faith and Grace, are conceptions which are only saved by inconsistencies — out of regard to the New Testament — from being wholly eliminated."[2]

[1] For the passages on this topic, see Fock, *Der Socianismus*, Vol. II. p. 715 sq.

[2] DG. III. 691.

CHAPTER VI

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC SYSTEM RESTATED IN THE CREED OF TRENT — THE THEOLOGY OF THE JESUITS — JANSENISM — QUIETISM

THE year 1541 may be considered a landmark in the course of the contest between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics. In that year occurred the Colloquy at Ratisbon between the theologians of the two parties. Melanchthon, on the one side, the most pacific of the Protestant theologians, conferred with Contarini, a representative of those on the Papal side who had the least antipathy to Protestant views of justification. They were able to unite on several cardinal points, but were hopelessly at variance on certain other points, including the Eucharist and the authority of the Pope. An armed conflict between the parties in Germany which were organized in distinct leagues was at that time threatened. This effort to avert it proved futile. A year before the conference at Ratisbon, the organization of the Society of Jesus had received the Papal sanction. The various forces that brought on the Counter-Reformation were beginning to operate with an efficiency that went on increasing. The Popes had steadily resisted and baffled attempts to procure the assembling of a General Council. Apart from other considerations, the memory of Constance and Basle was too fresh. At last there was no escape from taking this unwelcome step. The independent action of princes and countries in ecclesiastical affairs was equally, if not more, to be dreaded than a council. The urgent demands of the Emperor, Charles V., could not longer be evaded. At the call of Paul III., in December, 1545, the Council of Trent — Trent being under German rule — assembled. In this first period of the Council, the number of members, all told, did not exceed 112. They were mostly Italians. In 1547, the Council was adjourned *sine die*. It was reassembled by Julius III. in 1551, but in the following year

was again adjourned. After ten years, in January, 1562, it met once more, called together by Paul IV., and terminated its existence in December, 1563. In this third period, 255 persons were counted as members, of whom two-thirds were Italians.

From the beginning, the Council was really under the direction of the Pope. Votes were not taken by nations, as at Constance. The Papal legates presided and in the main controlled the proceedings. It was insisted that no proposals should be brought before the body except by them. By constant correspondence with Rome the Papal approval was secured in advance for all the propositions relative to doctrines for which the sanction of the Council was asked. The topics were discussed in committees or congregations of theologians and canonists, were sometimes taken up in the general congregation, and, when adopted, were solemnly proclaimed in the general sessions of the body. The history of the Council was written by Father Paul Sarpi, who was a moderate Catholic, with a strong anti-papal bias, and also by Pallivicini, with a bias equally strong in the opposite direction. In the copious literature on the subject, the publication by Theiner of the official acts of the Council is a writing of great value.[1]

The difficulties which the Council had to face might seem insuperable. How should it begin? Should the reform of abuses be first undertaken, or should the initial work be the positive enunciation of doctrine and the condemnation of the Protestant tenets? The decision was adverse to the urgent demand of the Emperor Charles. Questions of doctrine and of reform were to be considered together, but it was decided to frame first the definitions of doctrine, in opposition to heretical opinions. These definitions were set forth in a series of decrees, with anathemas appended under each head. In the Council there were advocates of the Episcopal system, which made all bishops as to apostolical succession on a par with the Bishop of Rome. What should be determined on this subject? There were a few members who in their ideas of Justification approached near to the Protestant opinion.

[1] Theiner's work (2 vols. fol. 1874) contains only the official Relation, prepared by the Secretary, of the public proceedings of the Council. Father Paul's *Istoria*, etc., was first published in London (1619). Pallivicini's *Istoria* appeared in 1656–57. Both authors made use of important documents. For the bibliography relating to the Council, see the *Real-Encycl. d. Prot. Theol.* Vol. XVI. p. 12, Möller's *Kirchengesch.* Vol. III. p. 215.

They might, without great difficulty, be overruled and silenced. But there was the marked diversity upon the relation of divine agency to free-will, where the Franciscans followed the Scotist tendency and leaned decidedly to Semi-Pelagian tenets, while the Dominicans, the followers of Aquinas, who had of late brought to the front the more Augustinian type of teaching, were arrayed against them. The decrees were drawn up on the disputed questions, with patient and long-continued labor, and with exceeding skill. The policy adopted was to abstain from any declaration on points where the several schools were at variance, and to select phraseology ambiguous enough to secure the assent of each of them. Since the interpretation of the Tridentine Creed was relegated to the Pope exclusively, its character led of necessity to an augmenting of the Papal prerogative. The discussion of the most weighty dogmatic questions began in the fourth session of the Council. The first thing to be settled was the authoritative sources of dogma. On this point, tradition was pronounced to have equal authority with Scripture. The Bishop of Chiazza asserted in the discussion that this opinion is impious. He soon left the Council and afterwards retracted his obnoxious statement. By this decree, the usages sanctioned by Rome were furnished with an apostolic warrant. The Vulgate translation was made authoritative — "pro authentica habeatur" — in all public addresses, expositions, and debates. The books in it, including the Old Testament Apocrypha, were declared to be canonical, — the Epistle to the Hebrews being set down in the list as the fourteenth Epistle of Paul. Moreover, it was decreed that interpretations of Scripture must be in accord with those of "Holy Mother Church," the judge of "its true sense." This criterion was set up in place of the unanimous voice of the Fathers. In the fifth session, Original Sin was expounded. It was necessary to provide against a collision of the Thomists and Scotists. The anathema was pronounced against all who deny that "the entire Adam" "as to body and soul," was changed for the worse — "in deterius commutatum." The phrase is vague and comprehensive. The merit of Christ, the ground of salvation, is applied in baptism to infants as well as adults. By this sacrament, "the guilt of original sin" is remitted. The evil principle, concupiscence, remains, but brings guilt only to those who consent to its impulses; for as it springs from sin, so is it an incentive to sin. We come in the

sixth session to the decree on Justification, which contains sixteen chapters and is followed by the negations in thirty-three canons. On this subject there was disagreement in the debates on many particulars, and a vast amount of time was spent in settling upon the formulas. At the outset, along with an assertion of the need of the grace of the Gospel, free-will is declared to be attenuated and bent down (*inclinatum*), but by no means (*minime*) extinguished. The merit of the passion of Christ is the basis of the bestowal of the grace whereby men are "made just" (*justi fiunt*). Justification is a translation from the natural state to the state of grace, for which change baptism "or the desire thereof" is necessary. As to the preparation for justification in the case of adults, "prevenient grace" comes first, which men can consent to or reject. It is to be observed that a thread of Semi-Pelagianism runs through the whole series of definitions. If one accepts this prevenient grace, he exercises faith; that is, believes the revelations and promises of God to be true. This is equivalent to saying that he accepts the doctrinal teachings of the Church. When he thus believes, when he begins to *hope* in the divine mercy, and to *love* God, to *hate* sin, and *purpose* to be baptized and to begin a new life, the *preparation* is complete. Next comes the answer to the question what Justification *is* and its causes. It embraces the remission of sins and sanctification. The *instrumental* cause is the sacrament of baptism, the primal cause is God's justice (or righteousness), whereby we are renewed in spirit by the Holy Ghost, who distributes to every one as He wills *and* according to "each one's disposition and *co-operation*." Man receives *at once* forgiveness and grace, hope and charity. By this formula the controversy in the Council on the question whether remission precedes or follows the infusion of subjective righteousness was allayed. Justification is by faith and freely, first because faith is the beginning and root of Justification, and secondly because neither antecedent faith nor works merit the grace itself of Justification. There was a lack of unity among the Fathers of the Council on the subject of assurance. They took refuge in the statement that it is not to be said that sins are forgiven to any one who boasts (*jactanti*) of the certainty of His forgiveness, and "rests in that alone." As one ought not to doubt of the mercy of God, so, in view of his own weakness, he may have "fear and apprehension" (*formidare et timere*). Justification is declared to be

capable of increase. As to Perseverance, one should have a firm hope, but cannot be absolutely assured. If he is not himself over-confident or negligent in doing his part, God's help will not be wanting. Respecting Predestination, very little is said. It is spoken of as a hidden mystery. No one is to presume that if he is justified, he cannot sin or that he is sure to repent if he does sin. Whom God has chosen can only be known by special revelation. For those who have fallen from grace, the sacrament of penance opens the way to receive this grace. Penance is "the second plank after the shipwreck of grace lost." This is the provision for those who sin after baptism. Its parts are confession, absolution, and satisfaction by fasts, prayers, alms, etc. Eternal life is both a grace promised to the children of God and a reward for their good works and merits. It is through the virtue infused by the grace of Christ that their meritorious works are performed. God will have His own gifts to be their merits. The canons emphasize the part taken by free-will in preparing for justification (IX.), and condemns the errors that good works are purely the fruit of justification, do not increase it, and are not meritorious (XXIV., XXXII.).

In the decree on the sacraments (Session VII.) the characteristics of the Roman Catholic system are most distinctly brought out. Through the sacraments, Justification in all its stages is imparted. They are seven in number, all instituted by Christ. They convey grace to all who interpose no obstacle thereto. Three of them, baptism, confirmation, and orders, imprint an indelible character, the meaning of which is not explained. The intention of doing what the Church does is required in the minister. Baptism is necessary to salvation. In the Eucharist (which is treated in Session XIII.) Christ is said to be present in His own substance by a manner of existing not explicable in words, but possible to God. Transubstantiation takes place, and concomitance is affirmed. The highest form of worship (*latria*) is due to the sacrament. The annual festival of *Corpus Christi* is said to have been most piously and religiously introduced into the Church. No one must approach the sacrament except after sacramental confession, a rule that applies to priests as well as laymen. In the twenty-first session, it was declared that the Church has a right to withhold the cup from communicants, and that when this is done, a true sacrament is nevertheless fully received. In the sacrament of

penance (Session XIV.) the priest fulfils the office of a judge. Contrition is the first requirement and element. Attrition is designated as an "imperfect contrition." It assists the penitent, disposing him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament. The language here is not clear, but on the whole it appears that sanction is not given to the Scotist opinion on this topic. All mortal sins must be confessed, and this must be done at least once a year. The reservation of cases, both by the Pope, and by ordinary bishops, each in his own diocese, is sanctioned. At the point of death there is no reservation. Then all priests may absolve all penitents. Satisfaction is required of such as are absolved, the efficacy of which is through Christ. It is both medicinal and penal. In the twenty-fifth session the doctrine concerning indulgences was set forth. Caution was imposed relative to entering, in popular discourses, into subtile and difficult questions about Purgatory. Whatever savors of filthy lucre in connection with this matter of indulgences is to be avoided. It is ordained that all evil gains from the issue of indulgences, "a prolific cause of abuses," shall be abolished. But the people are to be taught that masses, prayers, alms, and the like are to be performed according to the rules of the Church, for the departed. Under the head of Ordination (Session XXIII.), the divine institution of the hierarchy is affirmed. Its divine orders are authorized either by Scripture or tradition (c. II.). Bishops are declared to be superior to presbyters. To bishops belong the right to confirm and to ordain. But the disputed question whether bishops derive their succession directly from Christ, as does the Pope, or through him, was left untouched. There was a strenuous party on the side of Episcopalism and against the Curialists. The brief reference (Session XXIII. Canon VIII.) to the Roman Pontiff, in connection with "legitimate and true bishops," is obscure and indeterminate. Nor is the question settled by the phrases in the Roman Catechism respecting the "legitimate successor of Peter" and the vicar of Christ (c. 10. q. 10). One of the canons on marriage (X.) anathematizes those who place it above the state of virginity, and who say that the state of virginity and celibacy is not better than that of matrimony. On the invocation of saints and the veneration of relics and images, the established traditions were sanctioned, but abuses that may have crept in were to be sedulously weeded out by careful teaching. The Council of Trent did a good service

by enactments relative to the education and morals of the clergy, and by other ordinances bearing on practical reforms in matters ecclesiastical. To the Roman Catholic Church it was of inestimable value as furnishing a definite statement of its dogmas, and a catalogue of the opinions which were to be considered false and heretical.

Buttresses of Papal prerogative, which were not erected in the Council itself, were indirectly supplied in the formularies which, in accordance with an act of the Council, were issued later under the auspices of the Pope. In 1564, the *Professio Fidei*, the form of acceptance of the Tridentine Creed, to be subscribed by priests and instructors of youth, was published by Pius V. It contains an explicit promise of obedience to the Pontiffs. The Roman Catechism — *Catechismus Romanus* — was composed under Dominican influence, and hence the Jesuits often preferred their own Catechism, composed by Canisius. The Roman Catechism makes the Pope the visible head, as Christ is the invisible, of the Church, and styles him the "Vicar and Minister" of the powers of Christ.[1]

The Jesuits were the stanch defenders of Papal supremacy until their own opinions encountered Papal opposition, and finally their policy in the conduct of missions in the East was condemned at Rome. The ablest theological champion of the Roman Catholic doctrine was a Jesuit, Robert Bellarmine, whose work furnished a storehouse of controversial weapons to be used against Protestant heresies. Bellarmine advocates the doctrine of the Pope's personal infallibility as a teacher of doctrine and also of morals. He taught that the authority of bishops is derived, not immediately from Christ, but from the Pope. On the questions which divided Thomists from the school opposed to them, the Council of Trent had managed to steer between Scylla and Charybdis, partly by means of silence and partly by ambiguity. Subsequently there sprung up two movements adverse to one another, and representing extremes as compared with the *via media* of the Council. The Jesuit theologians contended with zeal for an advanced type of Semi-Pelagianism. Against them, there occurred a revival of Augustinianism, the authors of which adhered closely to the tenets of the founder of the system. In

[1] The *Index libr. prohibit.* was issued by Pius IV. (1564). The reading of the Bible in the vernacular is permitted only to such as have a written license from the Bishop and Inquisitor, given upon the advice of the Father Confessor.

the Netherlands, where the revived Augustinianism first appeared, the movement was not due to any Protestant influence, nor was it so, to any material extent, elsewhere. Michael Bajus, at the University of Louvain, promulgated the tenets of the Latin Father in their pure form. Seventy-nine points of his teaching were condemned by Pius V. in 1567. In the list are the statements that no sin is in its nature venial, that free-will without grace to help can only sin, that in the redeemed there is no merit which is not gratuitously given by God, that concupiscence continues to be sin.[1] Afterwards the Louvain faculty as well as Bajus were compelled to abjure the obnoxious theses. In 1588, Molina, a Spanish Jesuit, distinctly propounded Semi-Pelagianism. He brought forward the theory of *scientia media,* — the doctrine, namely, that God, foreknowing what all persons would do under any and all circumstances, sends to perdition such as He foresees would remain obdurate, whatever exertions might be made, even by divine grace, to recover them. This doctrine had been first set forth by Fonseca, a Portuguese theologian. The Molinists were combated not only by many outside of the Jesuit order, but even by a party within it. The debate spread and became so excited that Clement VIII. appointed a special congregation — *Congregatio de auxiliis gratiæ* — to give a decision. This was in 1597. Nothing but an unwillingness to offend the Jesuits deterred him from rendering a decision against them. But the congregation came to no result, and in 1607 Paul V. imposed silence on both parties of disputants, forbidding anything written by them on the subject to be printed.

In various other particulars, the Jesuits inculcated a lax theology. They taught that in the Sacrament of Penance, where there is only attrition, it suffices for Justification.[2] High authorities among them, of whom Bellarmine was one, argued in favor of the proposition that a Pope could not embrace heresy, and that an act believed by one to be sinful, one ought, nevertheless — if it were enjoined by the Pope — to perform.[3] The theory of popular sovereignty was adopted and served as a means of exalting the Popes as deriving their authority, in distinction from princes, directly

[1] For the passages, see Gieseler, KG. Vol. III. iii. § 59; Thomasius, DG. Vol. II. p. 720.

[2] For the passages from Jesuit authorities, see Gieseler, V. III. iii. § 60.

[3] *Ibid.* Vol. V. p. 99.

from God. Laxness in theology was accompanied by a mischievous casuistry and by a not unfrequent inculcation of ethical precepts which strike at the foundations of morality.[1] The doctrine of "probabilism," which, if they did not originate, they took up and spread abroad, sanctioned the doing of an act the lawfulness of which is supported by the authority of a single doctor. The maxim that the end justifies the means, if it be not explicitly avowed, is assumed. It is taught that a man without offending conscience may do an act which conscience forbids, when his design is not to sin, but to promote a good cause. So the doctrine of mental reservation in promises — of qualifications, not expressed, but purely mental — had a wide approval. The rightfulness of tyrannicide was frequently defended by Jesuit authors of high repute. The murder of Henry III. was extensively approved. The assassin of Henry IV. had studied with Jesuits, and had adopted the idea of the rectitude of such a deed. There were also writers on casuistry, for the guidance of priests in the Confessional, who, apart from other baneful teachings, gave such directions and entered into such distinctions in respect to sexual relations as are shameful in their indecency and corrupt tendency. The Jesuit Society did important services to learning. It has comprehended in its ranks many unselfish and holy men. But, while these merits ought not to be overlooked, they ought not to screen from deserved reprobation the sins — in doctrine as well as practice — which brought upon the organization widespread condemnation.

The most noteworthy movement in this period in behalf of Augustinian theology was Jansenism. It became the occasion of a formidable and effective attack upon the Jesuit theology and ethics. Jansenius was a professor at Louvain, and then Bishop of Ypres. He died in middle life, in 1638. On his posthumous work, *Augustinus*, he had labored for twenty-two years. It is a statement and defence of Augustine's system in its genuine form. On Original Sin, the fall of the race in Adam, on human inability, on irresistible grace, and the other kindred points, the actual teaching of the Latin Father was clearly set forth. The book was printed in 1640. Shortly after, it was prohibited by the Inquisitors and by Urban VIII. The Papal bull (*in eminenti*) was not accepted in France by the group of men known as Port Royalists. The Abbot of St. Cyran, Arnauld, Blaise Pascal, and Nicole, were

[1] See Gieseler, *ut supra*.

the leaders in an aggressive warfare upon the theology and ethics of the Jesuits, by whom Jansenism was fiercely assailed. These leaders were devoted Catholics, earnest and ascetic in their piety. All were men of striking abilities. The great genius among them was Pascal, whose *Thoughts* — preliminary notes for an intended work on Apologetics — are marked by originality and insight. In the *Provincial Letters*, Pascal held up to view, in a most attractive literary style and with keen satire, the theology and ethics prevalent among the Jesuits. Innocent III., in 1653, in the bull *cum occasione*, condemned five propositions purporting to be extracted from Jansenius's work. One of them is the proposition that grace is irresistible. Another is that it is Semi-Pelagian to assert that Christ died for all men. In resisting this decision, Arnauld took the ground that the propositions, as they were recited, were not in the *Augustinus*, and that on this question — *question de fait* — the Pope was not infallible. Pope Alexander VII., in 1656, anathematized all those who should say that the five propositions are not in Jansenius. To the formula of assent to the bulls against him, including the last, all the French bishops were finally moved to subscribe. The influence of the Jesuits and the power of their ally, Louis XIV., secured their triumph. The cloister of Port Royal was demolished. But Jansenism was not eradicated. The last stage in the Jansenist controversies carries us into the eighteenth century. The *New Testament with Moral Reflections* of Quesnel was the work of a Jansenist. The Jesuits obtained at Rome, in the bull *Unigenitus*, a condemnation of the work, specifying one hundred and one heresies said to be contained in it. The King's confessor had charged it with containing more than a hundred heresies, and the bull was shaped with a view to make good the charge. The bull went beyond the denial of the plainest utterances of Augustine and other Fathers of the Church, and included the denunciation of doctrines accepted by Christians generally. The Cardinal de Noailles, Archbishop of Paris, had approved of Quesnel's book. Those who called for an appeal from the Pope to a General Council were styled Appellants; the opposite party were the Acceptants. The Appellants were numerous and distinguished. Parliament was in favor of them. The government, especially after Louis XV. acceded to the throne, was against them, and their cause was crushed. The subsequent events relating to Jansenism it does not belong to the History of Doctrine to narrate.

In contrast with the prevalent externalism in religion was the development of mysticism in the form which has received the name of Quietism. Molinos published in 1675 *The Spiritual Guide*, in which he unfolded his ideas pertaining to a devout life and the sources of inward peace. Abstinence, maceration of the body, penances, were deemed by him of little value, save at the beginning of a course of self-discipline. The secret of peace is in contemplation and self-surrender to God. The opposition of the Jesuits was aroused. The Inquisition took up the matter. Molinos was sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. The charge that he retracted his teachings, or that he taught an immoral doctrine of the indifference of exterior acts when the soul is wedded to God, is not sustained by adequate proofs. The ideas of Madame Guyon respecting the bliss of an absorption of the human will in the divine and the absorption of the soul in God, were judged to be heretical by Bossuet and other prelates. Fénelon, who dissented from this opinion, inculcated in his *Maxims of the Saints* a like mystical doctrine. Bossuet was supported in his disapproval of this book by the Sorbonne, and by the Pope, who, in 1699, declared that its teachings are erroneous. Thereupon, Fénelon immediately and in public retracted them.

Bossuet, in his *Exposition of the Catholic Faith*, presented the tenets of the Church in a liberal and plausible form. His polemical work, the *History of the Variations of Protestantism*, (1688) is an ingenious attempt to show that Protestantism is another name for a chaos of conflicting opinions, from which the only escape is in submission to the authority of the Church. During the contest of Louis XIV. for absolutism in matters ecclesiastical as well as civil and secular, the clergy of France, in the Assembly of 1682, asserted the four propositions of Gallicanism, that the Pope's authority extends only to spiritual affairs, that his authority is subordinate to that of a General Council, that he is bound by the canon law and by the special institutions and usages of the French Church, and that his doctrinal decisions are not irreformable unless they have the concurrence of the whole Church. After the King made peace with Innocent XI., the Articles were no longer insisted upon, and the bishops were suffered to disavow them. In this conflict, Bossuet was the champion of Gallican freedom, but, owing to the settlement just referred to, his work in defence of it did not see the light until 1729.

CHAPTER VII

THE ARMINIAN REVOLT AGAINST CALVINISM — THE SCHOOL OF SAUMUR — PAJONISM — THE FEDERAL THEOLOGY

Calvin in his lifetime had to contend against adversaries who assailed his doctrine of Predestination. One was Albert Pighius, a Roman Catholic bishop at Utrecht, who, from a Pelagian point of view, undertook to prove by the usual arguments that the doctrine was destructive of morality. Calvin answered him in his book *De Libero Arbitrio.* Castellio, after he left Geneva, attacked Calvin's opinion. Jerome Bolsec, who had been a Carmelite, and had established himself as a physician at Geneva, was imprisoned, and afterwards banished, on account of his hostility to the doctrine of unconditional election, although the theologians of Basle, Zurich, and Berne counselled milder treatment. In consequence of these attacks, Calvin composed the *Consensus Genevensis.* After the death of Calvin, the extreme supralapsarian form of the doctrine was set forth without qualification by his followers. This was Beza's opinion. Previous opposition was of little account, compared with the great Arminian revolt. Arminianism was an uprising against the Calvinistic doctrine, of signal importance in the history of the Reformed Theology. It appeared in Holland, which, even more than Switzerland, became the centre of theological activity. This was owing, in no small degree, to the influx of Protestant theologians of ability and learning from France. Calvinistic influences more and more gained the preponderance over the Lutheran, and found expression in the Belgic Confession, which was presented to Philip II. in 1562. There were symptoms of dissent from the Calvinistic tenet before James Arminius raised the standard against it. He was a ripe scholar, had travelled extensively, had been a pupil of Beza, and had followed his teaching. Being called upon, how-

ever, to defend the supralapsarian opinion, against Koornheert and others, he entered into investigations which led him to renounce it. When he became professor at Leyden (in 1603), he fell into conflict with his colleague, Gomarus, a rigid Calvinist. Arminius died in 1609, not before he had had time to set forth fully, and in a lucid style, his theological system. There were leaders of great talents to follow in his steps, of whom Episcopius, his successor at Leyden, and Uytenbogaert, were the ablest. Arminianism spread among the clergy and laity. Political differences mingled in the theological dispute. The Calvinists were adherents of Maurice, Prince of Orange. The Arminians, who counted on their side the great statesmen, Olden Barneveld and Hugo Grotius, advocated the union of Church and State, and a Republican system. Strong as the Arminians were in the genius and learning of their chiefs, they were greatly outnumbered, both among the clergy and the laity, by their opponents. These were not at all disposed to tolerate what they considered doctrinal and political heresy. The Creed of the Arminians was set forth in the *Remonstrance* addressed in 1610 to the States of Holland and West Friesland, the document which gave to them the name of Remonstrants. It consists of five Articles. The first asserts conditional election, or election dependent on the foreknowledge of faith. The second asserts universal atonement, in the sense that it is intended, although it is not actually efficient, for all. The third affirms the inability of men to exercise saving faith, or to accomplish anything really good without regeneration through the Holy Spirit. The fourth declares that although grace at every step of the spiritual life is indispensable, it is yet not irresistible. The fifth pronounces the Perseverance of all believers doubtful. Later, the Arminians went further on this last point, maintaining that believers may fall from grace finally. The Remonstrance was met by a counter-Remonstrance from the Calvinists. An epoch in the progress of the contention was reached through the meeting of the Synod of Dort in 1618, which was attended by delegates from England, sent by James I., and from a number of other Reformed Churches. It was unquestionably a learned, as well as an imposing, assembly. The Arminians were not permitted to sit as members, but were invited to meet the Synod and to represent their cause in public conference with its members. Neither their arguments nor their pleas for toleration had

any effect. The Synod condemned their five Articles, sanctioned the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism, and promulgated five heads or chapters of doctrine of its own. Each chapter is divided into a series of specifications. The chapters open with the doctrine of Predestination, which is sub-lapsarian in its form. So far the Dort Creed sanctioned (against Gomarus) the more moderate type of Calvinism. Election is from the fallen race, condemned for their sin in Adam (i.). The elect attain to assurance in various degrees and in an unequal measure (xii.). There is a præterition of the non-elect, and "this is the decree of reprobation" (xvi.). There follows, as in the case of each of the articles, a list of Rejected Errors. The necessity of a complete, objective satisfaction to the divine justice is affirmed. This is through the death of Christ, which owes its atoning value to His divine nature. There was difficulty and discussion respecting the statement to be made as to the relation of the Atonement to the non-elect. The Atonement was declared to be of infinite value, and sufficient to expiate the sins of the world (II. iii.), so that no one is lost for want of an Atonement (vi.). It was, however, the "will and intention" of God that the Atonement should be efficacious only in relation to the elect, who are given to Christ by the Father (viii.). The significance of "limited Atonement" is thus seen to be that in the divine intention — the "intention of love," it was sometimes called — the elect alone were included. The relation of the Atonement to the non-elect is, therefore, only incidental. The corruption of human nature is said to be propagated from Adam (III. and IV. ii.). Without regenerating grace, none can return to God (iii.). The call of the Gospel is made earnestly to all who hear it (viii.). Nevertheless, the acceptance of it is due solely to a discriminating, efficient act of God's grace, founded exclusively on election (x.), an act to be compared to the raising of the dead to life (xii.). The mode of this action of the Spirit is inscrutable (xiii.), but it is not properly coercion, or a destruction of the qualities of the human will (xvi.). The Perseverance of all the regenerated is positively asserted (V.).

The Canons of Dort, both in spirit and letter, present Calvinism, not in its extreme, yet in its unadulterated, form. The glory and majesty of God are in the forefront. The starting-point of the system is the eternal purposes of God. The Arminian system is an attempt to formulate a protest from an ethical point of view.

The end sought is the maintenance of human responsibility and the moral conditions of praise and blame, reward and penalty, while still upholding salvation by grace. But in pursuing this end, the Arminian teachers fell back on the Scotist idea of the absolute supremacy of the divine will. God is not more *bound* to punish than to forgive. The difficulty of avoiding a more or less subtle form of legalism is inherent in all denials of the sole efficacy of grace. The Arminian teachers in their recoil from mysticism and their anxiety to guard the liberty of the will, constructed their system on the basis of the formal principle of Protestantism, the exclusive authority of the Scriptures, rather than on the experience of justifying faith. The testimony of the Holy Spirit to the divinity and verity of the Scriptures gave way to a predominant reliance on miracles and other external evidences. This is the character of the work of Grotius on Christian evidences.[1] In the Arminian theology faith is reception of the doctrines and laws of revealed religion; and faith is justifying, not as an instrument uniting the soul to Christ, but as an imperfect righteousness, which is mercifully accepted by God as if it were perfect. On the subject of Original Sin, the Arminians taught that the inclinations to evil inherited from Adam are not in themselves blameworthy. It is only consent to them that brings real guilt. By Limborch they are represented as only different in degree from the same appetites in Adam. By Episcopius, they are declared to be so controlling in their strength that without prevenient grace, restoring human powers, there is no possibility of finding the way of life and salvation and of returning to God.[2] Thus the gift of the grace of God is made indispensable to an escape from sin and perdition. It would seem to follow that the withholding of grace would be unjust, — that is, that *grace* is a *debt*.

The character of the Arminian theology is illustrated in one of its most important writings, the treatise of Grotius on the satisfaction of Christ, which was written in opposition to Socinianism. Grotius sets out to vindicate the "Catholic doctrine," the orthodox belief. The attack of Socinus had derived its force from the assumption of the Anselmic theory that the relation of sinful man

[1] *De Veritate Christ. Relig.* (1627).

[2] See Limborch, *Theolog. Christiana* (L. III. c. 2, § 24, c. 2, § 1–4, c. 4, § 1); *Apol. Remonstr.* (written by Episcopius), p. 84, b; Episcopius (L. IV. § 5, cc. 1, 2). See Jul. Müller, *Lehre v. d. Sünde*, Vol. II. b. iv. c. 3, § 3.

to God is that of a debtor to a creditor. Grotius discards this idea. The relation of God to man is that of a Ruler (Rector) to a subject. A ruler has a right to remit a penalty, provided the end for which the penalty is ordained is otherwise attained. This end is the preservation of order and the prevention of future transgressions. The death of Christ secures this end, as being a "penal example"; that is, as showing impressively what sin deserves, what the penalty would be were it actually inflicted on the transgressor. It is a manifestation of the Lawgiver's hatred of sin. It is not actual punishment, but rather a symbol of it. Not being the literal penalty, God may determine what other conditions are properly requisite for the issue of a pardon. This, in brief outline, is the *governmental* theory of the Atonement. In the room of the righteous necessity of the penalty, or the obligation of God to inflict it, we have the Scotist conception of the liberty of the divine will in this respect. The penalty is not endured; but Grotius avoids a sanction of the Scotist term "acceptilation," on technical grounds. This term signifies something received, as well as given; and this cannot be said of Christ's endurance of suffering. Calvinists considered that the governmental theory was not a vindication, but a surrender, of the "Catholic" doctrine, — a defence which gave up the citadel to the foe. Grotius simply carried out the Arminian conception of "the wrath of God" as His goodness regulated by wisdom. The motive of the divine government is conceived of as eudæmonistic. Arminius, it is true, lays emphasis on the inflexibility of God's righteousness, which consists, according to Episcopius, in maintaining His truthfulness in attaching a penalty to His commandments. But Episcopius holds that the sacrifice of Christ is a price because God is willing so to regard it.[1] The intercession of Christ in heaven is, among the later Arminians, the chief element in his High-Priestly office.

The Arminians denied the aseity of the Son,[2] which Calvin had taught. He is subordinate to the Father, as the Spirit is to both the Son and Father. The Father is first in dignity and power.[3] Yet the divine nature belongs to Son and Spirit. As to the

[1] See Dorner, *Hist. of Prot. Theology*, II. p. 423.

[2] That is, His αὐτοθεότης.

[3] So Episcopius and Limbroch. See the passages in Winer's *Symbolik*, p. 43, and cf. Dorner, *Person Christi*, II. 891.

person of Christ, Arminian leaders favored the Nestorian conception. Curcellæus and the later Arminians make the agency of the Logos to be a "special influx" or "operation" of the divine nature. It is an assistance of God, involving a communication of divine powers so far as a creature can receive them.

The Arminian scholars did much to liberate exegesis from servitude under dogmatic theology. Clericus and Wetstein carried forward the work of Biblical criticism which their predecessors of the same school had begun. Affinities to Socinianism which lurked in certain features of the Arminian system were developed by the incoming of exiled Socinian scholars. There was a tendency to intermingle the two systems and their adherents. But the earlier founders of Arminianism are unjustly charged with Pelagianism, which they repudiated. They insisted on the agency of the Spirit in regeneration and sanctification as altogether the predominant, as well as a necessary factor. The Wesleyan system, an English product of the last century, was evangelical in its spirit. It has been well described as "Arminianism on fire."

A remarkable attempt to mitigate the repugnance that was often awakened by the Calvinistic doctrine of election is the theory of Amyraldus (in the French, Amyraut), designated as the doctrine of hypothetic universal grace. The innovations which were attributed to his colleagues in the Faculty at Saumur likewise raised much opposition.

The French school of Saumur, one of the Protestant academies of theology, had for its professors, after the year 1633, three men of marked ability and erudition, Louis Capellus (Cappel), Moses Amyraldus (Amyraut), and Joshua Placæus (La Place). Before them, John Cameron, a Scotchman by birth, had produced some commotion by his doctrine as to the operation of grace, which was that the spirit renews the soul, not by acting on the will directly, but rather by an enlightening influence on the intellect. This was broached partly for the sake of parrying Roman Catholic objections to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. Cameron's theory did not attenuate this doctrine in the slightest degree, as was admitted so soon as his theory was understood. His substantial orthodoxy was allowed by those who withheld their sanction from the theory. The most eminent of his pupils was Amyraut. He boldly propounded the doctrine of hypothetical universal grace, as it was called, which was substantially equivalent to a doctrine

of universal atonement. He maintained that there is in God, in some proper sense, a will or desire (*velleitas, affectus*) that all should repent and be saved. In case all should repent, no purpose of God would stand in the way of their salvation. But the indispensable means of repentance — regenerating grace, following election — are not bestowed on them. In the order of nature the decree of election follows the decree providing the atonement. The attempt was made in two National Synods to procure a condemnation of his doctrine, but in both cases it failed. He successfully defended himself, and proved that his theory was not inconsistent with the Creed of the Synod of Dort.[1]

Cappel was a Biblical scholar, and by his critical opinions in this department caused a commotion only less than that excited by his colleague. He taught that the vowel-pointing of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is an invention later than the Christian era, and is clothed with no infallible authority; and that the masoretic text of the Ancient Scriptures is open to amendment from the comparison of manuscripts and versions.

Placæus is one of these three disturbers of theological quiet, with whom we have to do at present. He was understood to deny that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, and to resolve original sin into mere hereditary depravity. At the Synod of Charenton, in 1644–5, Garrisolius (Garrisole), the head of the rival school of Montauban, presided. In no small degree through his influence there was carried through the Synod a condemnation of the opinion attributed to Placæus, although his name was not mentioned. This opinion was pronounced an error, and was declared

[1] A full sketch of the contents of Amyraut's first work, which was on *Predestination and its Principles*, is given by Al. Schweizer, *Die protestant. Centraldogmen*, c. 4. The end of God in creation is the exercise of His love. He willed to impart even a higher good than Adam lost. Hence the gift of Christ and the Atonement. This is made equally for all. There is a compassion for all. To every one salvation is sincerely offered. Their common inability to accept it is owing to the bent of the will, consequent on sin. At this point it is that predestination comes in, whereby a portion of mankind are by grace inwardly taught and enlightened. The will, just as Cameron taught, follows the light thus imparted. As by the Calvinists generally, why this saving light is given to some and withheld from the rest, is left an inscrutable mystery. Only it should not be said that the latter class are predestinated to unbelief. They are simply left as they are. They reject the objective means of salvation, the offer of which is earnestly made. The resemblance of these views to the "New England Theology" will be seen when we come to speak of the latter.

to involve in peril the doctrine of inherent sin itself, on the ground that, apart from the imputation of the first transgression, that doctrine rests on no secure foundation. Placæus did not consider himself to be at all touched by the decree of Charenton. He explained that he denied, not the imputation of Adam's sin, but its priority to the imputation of inherent depravity. He held to imputation, but to *mediate* imputation. This explanation satisfied various prominent theologians who at first arrayed themselves against him. The general theory to which Placæus agreed was that the imputation of Adam's sin and native depravity are inseparable. On all sides there was held to be a responsible participation in the first transgression and the derivation of a sinful nature from Adam. The testimonies collected by Rivet, in connection with the controversy, are clear on this point.[1] Placæus, in his writings, both before and after Synod,[2] maintains that Adam's sin is imputed to us as its authors, the guilt of Adam's first sin and of inherent depravity being one and the same guilt. He had not dropped, as his opponents supposed, the idea of participation in the first sin.[3]

[1] Riveti, *Opera*, T. III. That participation is an essential element in original sin, may be seen especially by reference to the passages, in Rivet, from Pareus, Musculus, Viretus, Bucanus, Polanus, Chamierus, Mestrezatius, Whittaker (Professor at Cambridge), Davenant, Ames, Walæus, Junius, Frisius, Hommius — who says, "Peccatum Adami non est nobis omnino alienum, sed est proprium cujusque, quod propter hanc naturæ communionem singulis hominibus non tantum imputatur, sed a singulis etiam est perpetratum," — Laurentius, Zanchius, Piscator, Textor, Crocius, Bucer, Chemnitz (the author of the *Examen. Conc. Trid.*). Compare the two Dissertations on Original Sin by Rivet himself, *Disput. II.* (T. III. p. 747), and the *Theses Theolog. de pec. orig.* (T. III. p. 824). In the former, sections x.–xvi. (inclusive) and xxiv. deserve particular attention; in the latter, sections 5, 20, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 42.

[2] *Syntagma Thes. Theolog. in Acad. Salm*, etc. Edit. Secunda. P. I. 205 sq. Placæi opera Omnia : Edito novissima : Franequer. *De Imp. primi pec. Adami Disput.* etc. Tom. I. p. 161 sq.

[3] The doctrine of *mediate* imputation is advocated by an eminent Swiss theologian of the seventeenth century, Stapfer, in his *Theologia Polemica.* Jonathan Edwards is a defender of the same opinion. The passages quoted by Edwards from Stapfer (Dwight's ed. of Edwards, Vol. II. pp. 545, 546) explain what I conceive to be the real meaning of Placæus. The language of Stapfer closely resembles that of Placæus; for example, in what is said of our *consent* to Adam's sin (although his *physical* act was not ours). The doctrine of mediate imputation is clearly explained by Dr. H. B. Smith, *System of*

One of the most active opponents of the doctrines of the Saumur professors was Francis Turretine. Though he had studied at Saumur as well as at Paris, he allied himself with the more rigid theologians of Montauban. He became the head of a party at Geneva, which labored to procure the condemnation of the Saumur views by the Swiss Church. Opposed to this party at Geneva were Mestrezat and Louis Tronchin, colleagues of Turretine, and other theologians of a liberal and tolerant spirit. Turretine and his party at length effected a partial success by securing the promulgation and partial enforcement, for a time, in Switzerland, of the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, which they took the lead in framing. They were not deterred from this step by the remonstrance of eminent ministers of foreign churches, among whom were the Paris pastors, the younger Daillé, and the famous Claude, together with the distinguished theologian of Holland, J. R. Wetstein. Turretine and the party to which he belonged professed to regard with charity and toleration the ministers who differed from them on the points of theology to which the *Consensus* relates; they were only anxious to keep the Swiss Church free from erroneous teaching. Their creed is leveled at the peculiar doctrines of each of the three Saumur professors. Against Cappel, they go so far as to assert the inspiration of the Hebrew vowel-points in the Old Testament, and to condemn, also, his critical views respecting the Hebrew text — thus giving their solemn sanction to the Buxtorfian grammar and criticism! Having demolished Capellus, the *Consensus* condemns Amyraldism, — universal atonement and the doctrine that God desires the salvation of all. Amyraut's doctrine of hypothetic universal grace is carefully defined and denounced. Then the Placæan doctrine, or the doctrine which Turretine persisted in ascribing to Placæus, is put under the ban. The *Consensus* never acquired authority outside of Switzerland. Within about fifty years it was abrogated. One of the strongest advocates of this last measure was Turretine's son, Alphonso Turretine, who was as zealous in

Christian Theology, pp. 285, 286, 314–323. (The Editor's Notes must be carefully distinguished from the Author's.)

An interpretation of Placæus, the same as that attached to it by his early opponents, is adopted by Cunningham, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, p. 379 sq., and by Dr. Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, p. 207 sq.

opposing as his father had been in advocating it.[1] The *Formula Consensus* was the manifesto of a theological party.

Another modification of doctrine, designed to blunt the edge of Calvinistic particularism, while preserving its substance, was Pajonism, so called from the name of its author. Claude Pajon became professor of theology at Saumur in 1666. After a short service he left that place to become a pastor at Orleans. He followed Cameron and Amyraut in the opinion that the change wrought in the soul of the regenerate by grace is an effect upon the intellect, and not directly upon the heart or will. The will, by a psychological law, follows the perceptions of truth thus imparted to the intellect. The adoption of this opinion sprung from an aversion to the idea of anything like a physical operation of grace upon the feelings and will. It was held at the same time, however, that given this intellectual insight, the spiritual change ensues according to an invariable moral necessity, albeit the will is active in the production of it. The main peculiarity of Pajon's theory, and the one which chiefly provoked dissent, was his conception of regenerating grace. The Spirit uses the truth of the Gospel as its instrument in effecting the antecedent intellectual change; but the Spirit also uses all the circumstances of the individual, his whole providential environment. This aggregate of objective influence is not the same in different individuals. To this aggregate regeneration, where it takes place, is due. It is the act of God because the antecedent circumstances are the effect of God's ordering and are adapted by him to produce the result. But, although Pajon in words asserted that the influence of the Spirit upon the soul is immediate, and although he was not insincere, yet in reality this assumed influence does not include the exertion of any direct action of the Spirit upon the soul. A leading opponent of Pajon's doctrine was Claude, a distinguished preacher in Paris, and

[1] In a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the younger Turretine says that the *Consensus* would exclude from the ministry many excellent ministers of God; almost all the doctors of the first four centuries and a great number of ages following; almost all of the Reformers, a great part of the Reformed theologians of France, and the ablest among them; a great portion of the German theologians, and almost all the theologians of the English Church.

This letter may be read in the Supplement to Bayle's Dictionary by Chauseppié, — *Art.* "Louis Tronchin," Note C. The earlier letter of F. Turretine to Claude, on the other side, is in curious contrast with the sentiments of his son. This may also be read in Chauseppié.

Jurieu, first professor at Saumur and then pastor at Rotterdam. A prominent supporter was Lenfant, pastor at Chatillon. The pupils of Pajon, Le Céne, and Papin, swerved much farther from the line of orthodoxy, and adopted Pelagian views. Pajonism excited widespread interest in the French Church, but the commotion would have been much greater and more enduring but for the political calamities that fell with such weight upon that church.[1]

More and more, as the first generation of Protestant leaders recedes into the past, the theology of those who come after passes into the scholastic stage. It is the era especially of the earlier decades of the seventeenth century, in both the Lutheran and the Reformed churches. The material principle of the Reformation, and the religious experience out of which it sprung, no longer exerted the same influence in shaping the system as they had at first. The formal principle, the principle of authority, was uppermost in its construction. The Word of God and the Bible were held to be identical, with the loss of certain qualifications which were potent in Luther, and not without a decided influence on the other Reformers, in the formulating of doctrine. The Bible was looked upon as an authoritative text-book, from which doctrines and proofs of doctrine were to be drawn with little or no discrimination as to the use to be made of the different sacred books. Such were the ramifications of the system that little if any space was left for varieties of opinion, and dissent upon any point was treated as a heresy. In the Reformed Church, predestination was taken for the initial principle in the systematic exposition of the Christian religion. The impression often made was that of a divine absolutism enthroned in the souls of men as well as in the visible world of creatures.

A change for the better was effected by the introduction of the Federal Theology or the scheme of the Covenants. The idea of the Covenant of Grace seems to have been based on such passages as Heb. viii. 10; ix. 15, 16. The idea of the Covenant of works which was entered into with Adam, was superadded to that of the Covenant of Grace, which came into operation after his fall. The Covenants were, of course, not conceived of as being like mutual contracts among men. In the origin of them, men simply act the part of recipients. The Covenants are divinely instituted. They

[1] For a detailed account of the history and doctrine of Pajonism, see A. Schweizer, *Protestantische Centraldogmen*, Vol. II. pp. 564–602.

are promises of God. In the Covenant of works, an everlasting good is promised as the reward of a brief term of obedience. The Covenant of Grace is the method of forgiveness and salvation through Christ. The scheme of the Covenants, whatever may be thought of it in other respects, softened the rigor of Calvinistic teaching by setting up jural relations in the room of bare sovereignty.

A leading advocate of the Federal theology was Cocceius, a celebrated theologian of Holland, professor at Franeker and then at Leyden, where he died in 1669. The idea of the Covenant, to be sure, is found in some earlier theologians,[1] but it was Cocceius who gave to the idea a precise and comprehensive form and made it current. Cocceius divides the history of the new Covenant into three parts, or "economies"; the ante-legal, in the era of the patriarchs, where the kingdom was a family, and law was given

[1] See Dorner, *Hist. of Prot. Theology*, Vol. II. p. 36. Dorner refers to the teaching of Eglinus, Professor at Marburg (d. 1622). But Rev. John Ball, a moderate English Puritan, wrote a book entitled, *A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace*, which was published after his death in 1645. It was recommended by Calamy, Reynolds, and other members of the Westminster Assembly. This shows that there was "a fully developed 'doctrine of the Covenants' taught in Britain before the time of the Westminster Assembly." (See A. F. Mitchell, *Catechisms of the Second Reformation*, p. xlii.) William Ames, the famous Independent preacher, who went over to Holland in the reign of James I. and became a professor at Franeker in 1622, taught the *fœdus operum*. See his *Marrow of Sacred Divinity* (1642) c. x., or the *Medulla Theologiæ*, c. x.

There is no mention of such a covenant of works in the Augsburg Confession, the Form of Concord, or in any other of the principal creeds of the Lutheran Church. There is no mention of it in the principal Confessions of the Reformed Church, with the exception of the Creeds of Westminster; for the Formula Consensus Helvetica, where the Covenant appears, is a creed of minor importance and of comparatively insignificant authority. We do not find the doctrine of a covenant with Adam in the First Basle Confession (1532), the Second Basle (or First Helvetic) (1536), the Gallic (1559), the First Scottish Confession (1560), the Belgic (1562), the Heidelberg Catechism (1573), the Second Helvetic Confession (1565), the Hungarian (1570), the Polish (Declaratio Thoruniensis) (1645), or the Anglican Articles (1562). Weissmann, a learned Lutheran, in his *History of the Church in the Seventeenth Century*, has entered into a somewhat full account of the rise of the Federal theology. He explains why the Federal method, which spread in the Reformed churches, especially of Holland, so that the systems constructed on this method could hardly be numbered, did "not find many favorers" among the Lutherans. Weissmann, *Introductio in Memorabilia Eccl. Historiæ Sacræ*, etc. Vol. II. p. 698 sq. *Ibid.* p. 1103.

through conscience ; the legal era, in which grace was shown through the prophets and typical ceremonies, the kingdom being national; the post-legal, in which Christ appeared, and the kingdom became universal. Cocceius carried the method of typical interpretation through the writings and the ceremonial institutions of the Old Testament. The exegesis in its particulars was often fanciful. Although he failed to apprehend the progressive character of the Biblical revelation in this respect, that he made the system of grace pervade the Old Testament as it pervades the New, he yet made a fruitful beginning of Biblical theology. He promoted the study of the Scriptures. He broke the sway of the contemporary Scholastics. He was strongly opposed by Voetius and others among them. There arose in Holland a Cocceian and a Voetian party. The Cartesian philosophy which was favored by the Cocceians brought into the contest a new element. The division was attended by a political antagonism. A schism was threatened, but was averted.

The Federal theology eventually occasioned important modifications in the explanation of Original Sin. The culpable corruption of the descendants of Adam at birth was the common ground on which the Calvinistic expounders of the imputation of the first transgression stood. What is the basis of this imputation? The Federal theory did not abolish the Augustinian idea that the first sin was generic as well as personal. When the law was broken, the Covenant was broken, for the Covenant *was* the law with a gracious promise attached to the condition of obedience. The prevailing theology in the Reformed Church long continued to hold to the literal guilt of men as partners in Adam's transgression, in distinction from guilt merely in the legal sense of exposedness to penalty. The relation of mankind to Adam was distinguished from the relation of the redeemed to Christ and the imputation of his righteousness.[1] It became common, however, to connect the *quasi* realistic conception of race-unity — illustrated often by the figure of the root and branches — with the Federal idea. From this last idea, aid was sought in explaining why the

[1] This distinction is made explicitly and with emphasis, for example, by a leading English Calvinist of the seventeenth century, John Owen. See his *Display of Arminianism*, p. 74. See, also, pp. 71, 73, 74, 80. (Owen's *Works*, Vol. X.) See, also, Owen, *The Doctrine of Justification*, etc., Philadelphia ed., p. 227.

first sin of Adam is imputed to us, but not his subsequent offences or the sins of immediate ancestors. Besides the effect of the Covenant, Owen says: "We were then in him [Adam] and parts of him." We are condemned by reason of "the iniquity of that portion of nature in which we are proprietaries."[1] This may be termed the Augustino-Federal solution of the problem of imputation. The more modern view rests upon the Covenant alone. Adam is conceived to have been constituted in virtue of a sovereign constitution of the Creator a representative of mankind, the kinship of Adam and his descendants being the reason why he and not another is appointed to stand in their place. They have no guilt, in the sense of culpableness, on account of his sin. Their guilt is exclusively a legal liability to the penalty of that offence, by reason of the representative relation established through God's ordinance. It is a legal responsibility. The penalty of this vicarious breach of the Covenant is our inborn natural depravity, and eternal death is the penalty of this depravity.[2] The Covenant theory, separated from the Augustinian idea, gained acceptance more and more, owing to the pressure of the difficulty, which had so deeply perplexed the mind of Augustine himself, of reconciling his doctrine of a generic sin in Adam with Creationism. Creationism was the received opinion in the Reformed Church.

In the Roman Catholic theology the doctrine of immediate imputation has found little favor. It has been broached by certain Nominalists in the Middle Ages. It is remarkable that in the Council of Trent the Federal theory was brought forward by Catharinus, the opponent of Calvin, and a man who was all his life suspected in his own church of being loose in his theology in relation to the points which separated Augustine from Pelagius. According to Father Paul, Catharinus explained his opinion to be that as "God made a covenant with Abraham and all his posterity, when He made him father of the faithful, so when He gave original righteousness to Adam and to all mankind, He made him seal an obligation in the name of all, to keep it for himself and them, observing the commandments; which, because he transgressed, he

[1] Owen, *Works*, Vol. X. pp. 75, 80.

[2] For a clear exposition and vigorous defence of this doctrine of immediate imputation of the first sin, on the ground of the Covenant, or sovereign constitution, see Dr. A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, c. xxi., and Dr. Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II. p. 192 sq.

lost, as well for others as for himself, and incurred the punishments also for them."[1] Against this opinion, the celebrated champion of orthodoxy, Dominicus Soto, protested.[2] He distinguished between the actual sin of Adam and the principle or habit "bred in the mind of the actor." "This habitual quality," remaining in Adam, "passed into the posterity, and is transfused as proper unto every one." "He compareth," says Father Paul, "original sin to crookedness, as it is indeed a spiritual obliquity; for the whole nature of man being in Adam, when he made himself crooked by transgressing the precept, the whole nature of man, and, by consequent, every particular person remained crooked, not by the curvity of Adam, but by his own, by which he is truly crooked and a sinner, until he be straightened by the grace of God." Afterwards, Father Paul observes that the opinion of Catharinus was best understood, "because it was expressed by a political conceit of a bargain made by one for his posterity, which being transgressed, they are all undoubtedly bound; and many of the Fathers did favor that; but perceiving the contradiction of the other divines, they durst not receive it." In his theological writings, composed after the Council, Soto opposed the covenant theory and defended pure Augustinism. Bellarmine declares that the Council intended to condemn the doctrine of Pighius and Catharinus, who denied that innate depravity is properly sinful. This great expounder of Catholic theology maintains that the first sin of Adam was generic. "There could not be anything in infants," he says, of the nature of sin, unless they were participant in the first sin of Adam."[3] This sin is imputed to all who are born of Adam, since all, existing in the loins of Adam, in him and by him sinned, when he sinned."[4]

By common consent of Protestants, Jansenius is considered to have been, on the Catholic side in the seventeenth century, the most faithful follower of Augustine. He read all the writings of Augustine seventeen times. Jansenius opposes the Covenant theory with all his might, as being at war with Augustinian theology. Recent theologians have invented that theory, he says. They could not have excogitated anything more foreign to Augustine's thoughts, more absurd in relation to his system, or more

[1] We quote from the old English translation of Father Paul's *History of the Council of Trent*, pp. 175, 177.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 176.

[3] Vol. III. Cont. II. Lib. V. c. xviii.

[4] *Ibid.* c. xiii.

repugnant to his principles.[1] Augustine held that the greatness of the first sin is the cause of the corruption of nature and of the transmission of corruption; and so that "all things take place by no agreement, but happen from the nature of things, because the children are said to have sinned in the parent and to have been one with him."[2] "In Augustine's view nothing else is original sin, but concupiscence with guilt." Jansenius declares that nobody ever had so wild a dream as to imagine that this great depravation of human nature comes upon men from some agreement made by God with their parents, or is propagated by the positive law or will of God.[3] Augustine, he says, never resorted to any compacts or positive laws of God for the explication of this subject. It was through the nature of things, in Augustine's view, that the first great sin, together with human nature, pass to the posterity of Adam.[4] There are found in Jansenius pages of argument and warm denunciation directed against the Federal theory. It is not merely the idea of imputation without inherent sin — the notion of Pighius and Catharinus — that he opposes, but also the whole conception of a covenant with Adam, entailing a curse on his posterity. The importance of his sentiments on this subject grows out of his standing as a champion of Augustine. He considers the Federal hypothesis an innovation hostile to the spirit of the Augustinian doctrine.

[1] Jansenius, *Augustinus* (Louvain, 1640), T. II. p. 208.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 211. [3] *Ibid.* p. 247. [4] *Ibid.* p. 246.

CHAPTER VIII

THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY — RATIONAL THEOLOGY — THE LATITUDINARIANS

In England in the seventeenth century there were numerous theologians whose writings are worthy of respect. Among them there are found authors of remarkable ability and of unsurpassed learning. Yet the materials for an account of the historical development of doctrine are comparatively scanty. The two systems of Calvinism and Arminianism had been brought out on the Continent. That issue, therefore, in England had only the effect to call forth a large use of dialectic skill and of erudition. The other principal controversy had to do with the constitution of the Church and the nature of its government. Of this long debate the same thing is to be said. The rise of "Rational Theology," and the Latitudinarian school, interesting as it was, by which that type of thought was promulgated, had no characteristics which call for extended treatment in the history of dogmatic theology. This is equally true of that more radical protest against the dogmatic systems which emanated from the school of Deists. The debate caused by the rise of Arianism, learned and sometimes acute as it was, involved scarcely any points not already made familiar by the theology of earlier times.

Within the Church of England the rise and progress of the Anglo-Catholic party is a phenomenon of special interest. Hooker, who died in 1600, may be regarded as standing on the border-line between the period embracing the reign of Elizabeth and the age of the Stuarts. Through most of the former period the *jure divino* theory of Episcopacy had no foothold. A prelate like Whitgift, a vigorous defender of the Anglican polity as lawful and expedient in England, had no disposition to find fault with the foreign Protestant churches for the lack of it. Hooker, notwithstanding his

strong preference of Episcopacy, and his belief — in which he came to differ from his master, Field — that it had prevailed since the time of the Apostles, contended that "there may be sometimes very just and sufficient reason to allow ordination without a bishop."[1] That reason, he admitted, in the case of the foreign churches, was valid. As far as his theological opinions are concerned, Hooker holds to the Augustinian and Calvinistic principle of unconditional election.[2] Thus far he follows Augustine, who has had, he says, "no equal in the Church of God from that day to this."[3] God has ordained by "an act of special or personal providence" "on whom [the Gospel] shall be effectual."[4] But Hooker rejects reprobation and the whole supralapsarian scheme. "Souls were not ordained for hell-fire, but hell-fire for them."[5] He affirms emphatically that God desires the salvation of all. "He longeth for nothing more than that all men might be saved."[6] He follows Augustine on the subject of the Fall and Original Sin. The death of infants is a punishment.[7] In relation to Justification, Hooker firmly adheres to the Protestant doctrine. Nor does he differ materially, as to the effect of the Sacraments, from the teaching of the Calvinists. While he sets the Lord's Supper in a relation to the Incarnation, the reception of Christ is held to be purely spiritual and by "the worthy alone." Nor is there any reference to the Eucharist as a sacrifice, save the mention of it as a thank-offering. "Sacrifice," he says, "is now no part of the Christian ministry."[8] He earnestly contends against the idea that there is a Sacrament of Penance. Ritual practices, such as proved later a characteristic feature of the Anglo-Catholics, are nowhere recommended, and are hardly noticed. It is not by any novelties of opinion that Hooker was distinguished from the Early English Reformers. He founded "no especial school."[9]

[1] *Ecclesiast. Polity*, B. VII. c. 14. 11.

[2] Hooker discusses, in his usual elevated tone, the subject of predestination, in the Fragment of an Answer to a Letter (in Keble's ed. of *Hooker*, Vol. V. App. I).

[3] *Ibid.* p. 580. [4] *Ibid.* p. 574. [5] *Ibid.* p. 575.

[6] *Ibid.* p. 573. Hooker, in the summary statement of his opinions on Election (p. 596), evidently has in mind the Lambeth Articles. It is interesting to notice the points of variation from them (which Keble, perhaps, somewhat magnifies). (c. ii.)

[7] *Ibid.* p. 570. [8] B. V. c. 78. 2.

[9] Barry, in *Masters of English Theology*, p. 59.

Yet the whole turn of his work served to give a new direction to Anglican Theology. The contention of Cartwright and his supporters for a *jure divino* Presbyterianism had much to do in leading their opponents gradually to a like contention in behalf of their system. That reverence for antiquity and the "Primitive Church," that interest in the Fathers and deference to patristic teaching, which had belonged to the English Reformation from the outset, acquired an increasing sway in a class of minds to which the rigid definitions of Calvinism, with its characteristic polity and forms of worship, became more and more unattractive. These were disposed to claim for the Anglican Church a distinct place in the Church Catholic. They felt a growing willingness to withdraw from the fraternal connection with the Protestant bodies with which the English Church under Edward and Elizabeth had been so closely allied. Among the founders of the Anglo-Catholic school, the foremost place belongs, on the whole, to Bishop Lancelot Andrews. Andrews was only five years younger than Hooker, but he lived until 1620. The depth of his learning, which he had at complete command, the variety of his tastes and attainments, — he was much interested in the observation and study of nature, — his logical skill, and the sincerity of his piety, are beyond question. His ritualistic tastes were manifest in the furniture and decorations of his chapel. Yet he did not take upon himself the task of propagating his preferences in respect to symbols and ceremonies. In reply to Roman Catholic champions, Bellarmine and Duperron, he wrote effectively against the pretensions of the Church of Rome. But his polemical writings on this subject, although vigorous, were free from animosity. Still he argues that the Pope is probably Antichrist. Andrews claimed for the Episcopal polity a divine right. His position is explained in his correspondence with Du Moulin. He disclaims, however, the intention to blame the foreign churches for not having bishops. It was not their fault, but the fault of the times.[1] His comments on the Lambeth Articles contain a moderate and guarded approval of Augustinian election, a subject on which he says that he had never debated, either in public or in private.[2] Respecting the Eucharist, Andrews maintains with emphasis the reality of the Presence of Christ. Of the *mode* in which the Bread is the body,

[1] *Resp. ad Ep. III. Opuscula*, p. 211 (Lib. of Angl. Cath. Fathers).

[2] *Minor Works of Bishop Andrews*, p. 294 sq.

"there is not a word in the Gospel." Transubstantiation, therefore, cannot be an article of faith. There is a true "fruition of the body and blood of Christ," and not of a sign or remembrance of it. It is, moreover, a sacrifice, a means of renewing a covenant with God. It is a commemoration of the Sacrifice on the Cross, as the Old Testament offerings were a "præfiguration" of it.[1] In the Sacrament there is an "applying of the Sacrifice" of Jesus. "In rigor of speech . . . there is but one only sacrifice . . . Christ's death."[2]

The ascription of a sacrificial quality to the Lord's Supper, the sacrifice being commemorative in its meaning, and not implying any deficiency to be made up in the Atonement made once for all, is not very uncommon in the divines of the English Church, especially in their Homiletic language.[3] But few writers, even of the Anglo-Catholic type, go so far in their approximation to Roman doctrine as Thorndike, Prebendary of Westminster.[4] It need not be said that he is a stout advocate of *jure divino* Episcopacy. He maintains that the wicked as well as believers receive the body and blood offered in the Sacrament, although they are not "spiritually nourished by the Same." In this sense they do not "eat" the Same; yet in another sense, they do, for they are to be condemned for "eating the Body and Blood" without the faith of a Christian. The Eucharist is affirmed by Thorndike to be not only representative, but propitiatory, its influence being like that of Christ in the exercise of His intervening priesthood on high, the efficacy of which is dependent on the Sacrifice upon the Cross.

With the accession of James I. the Puritan age of English history fairly begins. At this time the Puritans, who were in control in the House of Commons, were generally not hostile to Episcopacy or the Liturgy. But they were, first, thoroughly hostile to political despotism, and, secondly, they were mostly Calvinists, and deeply incensed at the idea of any movements looking

[1] *Against Bellarmine*, c. 8.

[2] *Sermons of the Resurrection*, p. 457.

[3] For a large collection of passages, see No. IV. of the *Catena Patrum*, in the "Tracts for the Times," on the Eucharistic Sacrifice.

[4] Thorndike's ideas on the Eucharist are set forth in the *Laws of the Church*, B. I. cc. i. and ii. For a full collection of extracts, see Chambers, *The Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, as expounded by Thorndike (1855).

to compromise with the Church of Rome. The Anglo-Catholics became the ardent supporters of royalty. In the mixed contest, which was both political and religious, they were easily drawn into sympathy with Arminian theology. James himself was lukewarm in his Calvinism, compared with the generality of the Puritans. He would not have the Articles changed and he would prevent, if he could, the public discussion of the disputed questions. The Calvinists were everywhere against whatever savored of Erastianism; the Arminians were in favor of the close union of Church and State. The defence of the royal prerogative and the defence of Arminianism, or of neutrality between the contending religious systems, became the common ground of numerous ecclesiastical supporters of the Stuarts. Puritanism, in the course of the fierce contest, turned into a warfare against "prelacy." The victory was won by the party zealous for political freedom. The Long Parliament abolished Episcopacy. The Anglo-Catholic party continued to cherish its zeal for the cause of monarchy. The Restoration of Charles II. gave it a new lease of power. In the next reign, in 1683, the Declaration in behalf of the doctrine of passive obedience was framed. The party suffered a signal defeat at the Revolution of 1688, but the Non-jurors did not forsake their position. The prominent representative of the Anglo-Catholics under Charles I. was Archbishop Laud. The public avowal of the advanced doctrine of the *jure divino* authority of bishops is commonly traced to Bancroft's famous sermon at St. Paul's Cross in 1589. But this general doctrine was often held later by Anglo-Catholic leaders who did not press it to the extent of unchurching the foreign Protestant bodies. Bishop Hall, being then Dean of Norwich, one of James's deputies to the Synod of Dort, in his *Apology against the Brownists*, spoke of his love to the Protestant churches abroad, as the "sisters" of the Church of England. Later, at the request of Laud (in 1640), he wrote his work on the Divine Right of Episcopacy. In this work, and in the *Defence* of it, he does not renounce his former position. In this last book, he distinguishes between "the being and the well-being" of a church. The foreign churches "lose nothing of the true essence of a Church, though they miss something of their glory and perfection." Laud, in speaking of the foreign Protestant churches, wrote to Hall, in relation to his *Humble Remonstrance*—published after the *Defence*—that he had been "a little more favorable than our [their]

case will now bear."[1] This remark indicates Laud's point of view. His doctrine of Apostolic Succession included the sacerdotal theory of the ministry. As a theologian, he was a man of no mean ability; he had no intention to carry over the Church of England to the Church of Rome, although he was not inclined to style Rome "Antichrist," or to call it an apostate (instead of a merely corrupted) church. As to the Real Presence in the Sacrament, his opinion was identical with that of Calvin. He defends Calvin against the misrepresentation of Bellarmine. "Calvinists," he says, "maintain a most true and real presence." There is no offering in the Sacrament except a "memory" of the Sacrifice of Christ, an offering of praise and thanksgiving, and a self-surrender of the communicant to God. Laud's sympathy was with the Arminian doctrine. The two opposing opinions on election and kindred topics were to be tolerated. On this point, he was more Catholic than his adversaries. The policy was to silence contention on these litigated questions. But Laud was a lover of ceremonies, and a martinet in respect to them. With him "the beauty of holiness" was a phrase denoting the externals of worship. He was of a hard, inflexible disposition. To enforce uniformity, to compel submission to the ordinances of the Sovereign was his obstinate purpose, whatever tyranny and cruelty might be required to carry it out.

In the Long Parliament, as the hatred of prelacy grew, the Presbyterian party increased in numbers. Their polity was finally adopted, it being an indispensable condition of effecting a union with the Scots in the conflict against the King. In 1642, Parliament called together the Westminster Assembly to give advice in the matter of reconstructing the Church of England. One hundred and twenty-one divines, among whom were men of great learning and weight, were invited to sit in it. Ussher and nearly all the prelates who were invited declined to attend the sessions on account of their loyalty to the King and on account of the control exercised by the Presbyterians. A small number of Independents sat in the body. It was after the withdrawal of the Independents and the Erastians that the vote was taken — the learned Lightfoot dissenting — which asserted the divine right of the Presbyterian system. The Assembly first undertook to modify

[1] The correspondence with Hall is in Laud's *Works*, Vol. X. See, also, Lawson's *Life of Laud*, II. pp. 334 sq.

the thirty-nine Articles, with the intent to make them more sharply Calvinistic. They labored for ten weeks on fifteen Articles, giving to them this character.[1] The adoption by Parliament, in 1643, of the Solemn League and Covenant put an end to the possibility of setting up a modified Episcopacy, — such a form of polity as men like Ussher and Baxter would have agreed in approving. The Assembly dropped the Articles and turned to the framing of a new creed and polity. The creed was based on the Irish Articles of 1615 — Articles adopted by the convocation of the Irish Episcopal Church, the composition of which is attributed to Archbishop Ussher, then professor at Dublin.[2]

It has never been doubted that the Westminster Confession is Calvinistic. Although it brings into the foreground the doctrine of God's decrees, it is, nevertheless, infralapsarian. The "full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divinity of the Scriptures" springs from the witness of the Spirit in our hearts" (I. v.). As to whatever is necessary to salvation, the Scriptures are sufficiently plain (vii.). God foreordains all things, but without violence to the will of creatures. Election is unconditional. The non-elect He is pleased to pass by (*præterire*) and to ordain them to punishment, "to the praise of his glorious justice" (III. vii.). Our first parents "were left to the liberty of their own will" (IV. ii.).[3] Their sin is *permitted* (VI. i.). The Confession sets forth the Federal System, and the Covenant of Grace, as in Cocceius, is extended over the whole period after the Fall (VII.). The guilt of the sin of the first parents is imputed to their posterity and a sinful nature transmitted, "they being the root of all mankind" (VI. 3). In the *Shorter Catechism*, the Covenant with Adam "for himself and his posterity" is given as the reason why "they sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression" (*Quæst.* 16). In the Irish Articles, the "Covenant of the Law" is said to have been "engrafted in his [Adam's] heart," and original sin is said to be the propagated "fault and corruption of nature" in every man born of Adam. It is still a litigated question whether the design of the Westminster divines was to assert mediate or immediate imputation. There is no

[1] See Neal, *History of the Puritans*, App. No. VII.

[2] The Irish Articles directly assert reprobation. They lean strongly to the supralapsarian opinion. (See 14.)

[3] See, also, IX. i. ii.

doubt that underlying their conception of the Fall was the Augustinian idea.[1] Satisfaction to divine justice, reconciliation, and eternal life were procured by Christ for the elect (among whom "elect infants" are included) (VIII. 5). There were some in the Assembly who favored the idea of a design to provide a *possible* salvation for all in case they should repent. Calamy, Arrowsmith, and others advocated substantially the opinion of Cameron and Amyraut, the opinion of the Saumur School, which Bishop Davenant had favored at the Synod of Dort. They contended that God *intended* to provide a salvation for all, although He had a special intention respecting the regeneration of the elect, and that the "world," in John iii. 16, means the entire race of mankind.[2] But the more liberal view, although not excluded, substantially finds no expression in the Westminster creeds.

As in other Protestant creeds, the functions of the Civil Magistracy are defined. As by the Calvinists generally, the right to exercise ecclesiastical discipline within the Church is denied to the civil authority. Yet the civil magistrate is to provide for the unity and tranquillity of the Church, for the preservation of divine truth in its purity and integrity, for the suppression of blasphemy and heresy, and for the removal of all corruptions and abuses, and for the right administration of all divinely established institutions. He has power to convoke synods and to see that whatever is transacted in them be "according to the mind of God" (XXIII. 3). The Assembly could hardly attribute less authority to the magistrate without calling the acts of the Long Parliament, including that to which they owed their own existence, a usurpation. But in thus extending the power of the civil authority they are in accord not only with the practice of Protestants generally, but also of their uniform teaching. Melanchthon is equally explicit. He comprises in the function and obligations of rulers the duty to suppress "the ethnic doctrine of the Pope, the ethnic rites of the invocation of the dead, and the horrid profanations of the Lord's

[1] In Ball's *Short Catechisme*, which had gone through twelve editions in 1628, to the question "Did all mankind sinne in Adam?" the answer is given "Yes; for we were all in his loynes." See A. F. Mitchell, *Catechisms of the Second Reformation*, p. 71.

[2] See *Minutes of the Westminster Assembly*, pp. 152, 154, 155, and *Introduction*, p. lvi. sq. For further illustrations of the liberal view from Arrowsmith's writings, see the editor's notes to the passage; also Schaff's *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. I. p. 770 sq.

Supper."[1] The Lutherans went much beyond the more narrow definition of the sphere of the magistrate, as first set forth by them in the Augsburg Confession.[2] Calvin, it need hardly be said, has the same doctrine as Melanchthon on this subject.[3] In England, ideas of toleration which border on more modern views were entertained by a few Independents.

The Westminster Confession declares the fourth commandment in the decalogue to be a positive, moral, and perpetual commandment, so far as the sanctification of one day in seven as a Sabbath is concerned. It is added that from the resurrection of Christ the Sabbath was "changed into the first day of the week" (XXI. 6). The Reformers, Knox as well as Luther and Calvin, held that the Lord's day is not to be identified with the Old Testament Sabbath. They considered that the fourth commandment was a part of the ceremonial law. With the early Fathers, Justin, Irenæus, Tertullian, and others, they made the Sabbath typical of the continual rest given to God's people in this world and the next. "The substance of the Sabbath," says Calvin, is "not in one day but in the whole course of our lives." The opinion that the observance of one day in seven is an injunction still in force he puts among "the dreams of false prophets."[4] Melanchthon, however, teaches that in the commandment there is a moral part which still remains. The part relating to the seventh day is abolished. But the moral part requires that "on some day the people should be taught the Gospel and the rites divinely ordained be observed." The command is broken by servile labor, and by spending the time in sports and vicious pleasures, on the day "constituted" for the public ministry of the Gospel.[5] The Synod of Dort recognized a moral part of the Old Testament law, and inferred the existence of "a certain and stated day appointed for worship." But Gomarus, as well as Grotius, went no farther in their opinion on this subject. Hooker affirms that one day in seven, or one-seventh part of the time, is ordained for worship by an immutable law. The first day was adopted in the room of the seventh, by the Church, to which in this matter authority is ascribed. A similar idea of the Lord's day is adopted by Andrews. The Puritan doctrine carried in it the obligation to abstain from all employments, save those of ne-

[1] *Loci*, pp. 173, 174 (Hase's ed.).
[2] *Ibid.* Part II. vii.
[3] *Institutes*, IV. xx. 3.
[4] *Ibid.* II. viii. 34.
[5] *Loci*, pp. 123, 124.

cessity and mercy (viii.). It extended the moral part so far as to embrace in it a much closer conformity to the specific regulations of the Old Testament respecting the Sabbath than it was customary to connect with the Lord's day. The so-called "Sabbatarian" view was publicly promulgated by Dr. Bound in 1575, in a sermon that was printed but was suppressed by Whitgift. One of the grievances of the Puritans was James's insisting on the proclamation by the clergy of the liberty of the people to engage in sports on the Lord's day.

A signal attempt among the Puritans to mediate between the Calvinists and the Arminians was made in the laborious endeavors of Richard Baxter, whose mediating system received the name of Baxterianism.[1] He was not less eminent for learning and ingenuity than for ardent piety. Most differences, he judged, grew out of the ambiguity of terms. He was a most voluminous writer. He is the author of two copious and elaborate theological treatises, *The Catholic Theology* and the *Methodus Theologiæ*. On Original Sin, he advocates Augustinian Realism. God's foreknowledge is not dependent on His purposes, but is an independent attribute. To deny all "signs of imperfection" in the Bible is one of the instances of "overdoing" "which tempt men to infidelity." The sufferings of Christ are not the literal penalty due to sinners. They so express God's hatred of sin that they enable Him to attain the ends of government in a better way than by executing the law. On this subject, Baxter waged a controversy with John Owen, who contended for the judicial theory of a vicarious endurance of the penalty. Baxter teaches that sufficient grace is given to all to repent, but that the grace of the Spirit is not given in equal measure to all. Where it is granted in larger measure, it is partly on account of a greater receptivity, but partly for good reasons inscrutable to us. Election is absolute; that is to say, it involves the giving of grace adequate to secure the *certainty* of repentance in a certain portion of mankind.

As we approach the outbreaking of the Civil War, we come upon the first stage of a movement which bears not inaptly the name of "Rational Theology."[2] A lack of sympathy with either

[1] I have given an elaborate statement of Baxter's teachings, in two articles in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. IX.

[2] An extremely interesting historical survey of the whole movement is given by Dr. Tulloch in his *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century*. 2 vols. 1874.

of the contending parties, the High Churchmen and the Puritans, and a disposition to set a higher value upon the powers and prerogatives of reason in matters of religion, are its characteristics. From the outset, the influence of the opinions and spirit of the Arminians is obvious. Lord Falkland was for a time the centre of a group of able and inquisitive men who took up this middle position. Falkland was in favor of Episcopacy, but denied the *jure divino* opinion. He disliked Laud. He said in Parliament of him and of the bishops who were his adherents that they had "defiled our Church by adorning our churches." They have "slackened," he said, "the strictness of that union which was formerly between us and those of our religion beyond the sea: an action as impolitic as ungodly."[1] We must follow reason in interpreting Scripture; where God has not clearly and indubitably revealed, "it will not stand with His goodness to damn man for not following it."[2] John Hales, of Eaton, was a friend of Falkland. His spirit is expressed in the following passage from a letter to Laud: —

"For the pursuit of truth hath been my only care ever since I first understood the meaning of the word. For this I have forsaken all hopes, all friends, all desires which might bias me and hinder me from driving right at what I aimed. For this I have spent my means, my youth, my age, and all I have, that I might remove from myself that censure of Tertullian, '*Suo vitio quis quid ignorat?*' If with all this cost and pains my purchase is but error, I may safely say, to err hath cost me more than it has many to find the truth; and truth itself shall give me this testimony at last, that if I have missed of her, it is not my fault, but my misfortune."

Being chaplain of the English ambassador to the Hague, he had attended the sessions of the Synod of Dort, and sent reports to him of its doings. There he seems to have been by degrees persuaded of the truth of the Arminian doctrine. The saying is attributed to him that after hearing Episcopius address the Synod, he said: "I did bid John Calvin good-night."[3] Hales insisted on the distinction between dogmatic differences and religious differences. The confounding of opinions with necessary truths, he said, "is generally one of the greatest causes which keeps the churches this day so far asunder." The remedy is "mutual for-

[1] See Tulloch, Vol. I. pp. 138, 155. [2] *Ibid.* Vol. I. p. 161. [3] *Ibid.* p. 223.

bearance in this kind."[1] Heresy is an act of the will, not of reason.[2] There may be a schism when the "schismatic is not he that separates," or when "both parties are the schismatics."[3] The foundation of convictions in religion should be personal thought and investigation. The alleged authority of bishops and councils, the real or pretended tests of "universality" and "antiquity," are not proper grounds of belief. Antiquity is "man's authority born some ages before us." "Universality is nothing but a quainter and a trimmer name to signify the multitude."[4] A more famous man belonging to this circle was William Chillingworth. His ability and fondness for debate remind us of an adherent of the modern Oxford School, William G. Ward, who, however, made a full surrender to the authority of Rome. Chillingworth was a godson of Laud. While a student at Oxford he was persuaded by Fisher, an acute Jesuit, to become a Roman Catholic, but, as the result of his thoughts and experience at Douay, he renounced his new creed. Thenceforward, he was a churchman of the moderate and liberal class. The basis of belief is affirmed by him to be Scripture, the truth of which is established by just reasoning, and of the meaning of which every man is to judge. But charity is to be exercised towards such as differ. The way to heaven is not to be narrower "than Christ left it." If instead of being zealous Papists, earnest Calvinists, rigid Lutherans, they would become themselves, and let others "be plain, honest Christians," there would be as to essentials "unity of opinion."[5] Chillingworth was persuaded by Laud to sign the thirty-nine Articles, which he did professedly as "Articles of peace," without an inward assent to all these specific statements. It is remarkable that the work on which his fame rests, the *Religion of Protestants*, was approved by Laud. In this work, Chillingworth proves that the Romanist reasoning on the subject of the seat of authority is reasoning in a circle. The authority of the Church in interpreting Scripture is sought to be proved by the declarations of Scripture. But unless it is conceded that these can be interpreted by private judgment, the thing to be proved is assumed. There are various reasons why Jeremy Taylor is hardly to be classified with the men of whom we have spoken. He was a bishop, was, in his way, a great preacher, and distinguished for

[1] Tulloch, Vol. I. p. 226. [2] *Ibid.* p. 228. [3] *Ibid.* p. 232.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 250. [5] *Ibid.* p. 336.

his devotional writings. Yet he is in accord in his leading principles with Falkland, Hales, and Chillingworth. He was an Arminian, and on such subjects as Original Sin and Regeneration advocates the Arminian opinions. In his *Liberty of Prophesying*, he is a liberal, not only on the subject of toleration, but also on the whole subject of the just foundations of belief. He says that the term "heresy" is never to be applied to "speculative propositions" or to "pious opinions."[1] It means "a wicked opinion, an ungodly doctrine." The Nicene Fathers, although they did well, might better have left the Creed undefined.[2] The "damnatory appendix" of the Athanasian Creed is wrong.[3] General Councils are not infallible and have contradicted one another. The same is true of the Fathers. In interpreting divine revelation, every man must fall back upon reason and private judgment. Taylor believed strongly that Episcopacy is the primitive and the best method of Church government, but not that the absence of it, any more than the want of a liturgy, should exclude churches from fraternal recognition.[4]

Another ecclesiastic, who was, however, on a lower plane of temper and character than Taylor, the author of *Holy Living and Dying*, was Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Norwich, a man of learning and an able controversialist. When a young rector at Sutton he published *The Irenicum, a Weapon-Salve for the Church's Wounds*, the second edition of which he issued in 1662. Its tenor is signified in two of the mottoes on the title-page, one from Casaubon, and one from Grotius. The purport of both is that if men would discriminate between divine right —*jus divinum* — and ecclesiastical law, controversy between good men would be less long and less bitter. This thesis Stillingfleet advocates in relation to Episcopacy and Presbyterianism. The liberal position he proceeds to show was that of the English Reformers and of Anglican divines before his time. In his later years, in 1680, under Charles II., he published the *Unreasonableness of Separation*, wherein he referred to his former work as written in youth and with "great tenderness towards Dissenters *before the laws were established*." He is not carried so far, however, by the altered political circumstances, as to disavow the main principles or question the soundness of the arguments in the earlier treatise.

[1] Tulloch, p. 387.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 393.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 394.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 408.

The specific name of Latitudinarians — or "men of latitude" — was attached by their opponents to a school of "Cambridge Men," — men connected with the University of Cambridge. Unlike the group of men before considered, these, although churchmen, "belonged more to the Puritan side." They were many of them graduates of Emmanuel College, the favorite nursery of Puritan divines, where so many of the early New England clergy were trained. They were appointed under the Long Parliament, and kept in their places by Cromwell. They manifest in its most tangible and effective form a rising spirit of liberalism, which was more stimulated than repressed by the work of the Westminster Assembly. The reading of Bacon and Descartes was not without an influence in originating the Cambridge movement. Of greater influence were the writings of the Arminian scholars. But beyond these agencies, and of chief moment, was the forsaking of Aristotle, and the earnest and sympathetic study of Plato and the Alexandrian Platonists of the Christian school. Bishop Burnet, who was imbued with the spirit of the Latitudinarians, has described them in an interesting passage, which must here be quoted: "These were generally of Cambridge, formed under some divines, the chief of whom were Drs. Whichcote, Cudworth, Wilkins, More, and Worthington. Whichcote was a man of rare temper, very mild and obliging. He had great credit with some that had been eminent in the late times; but made all the use he could of it to protect good men of all persuasions. He was much for liberty of conscience; and being disgusted with the dry, systematical way of those times, he studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider religion as a seed of a deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to this, he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin, and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God, both to elevate and sweeten human nature; in which he was a great example as well as a wise and kind instructor. Cudworth carried this on with a great strength of genius and a vast compass of learning." Burnet adds that the principles of Hobbes, and the impiety produced by them, stimulated these men. So this set of men at Cambridge studied to assert and examine the principles of religion and morality on clear grounds, and in a philosophical method: "all these and those who were formed under them, studied to examine farther

into the nature of things than had been done formerly; they declared against superstition on the one hand and enthusiasm on the other; they loved the constitution of the Church, and the liturgy, and could well live under them; but they did not think it unlawful to live under another form. They wished that things might have been carried with more moderation; and they continued to keep a good correspondence with those who had differed with them in opinion, and allowed a greater freedom both in philosophy and in divinity; from whence they were called men of latitude: and upon this men of narrower thoughts and fiercer tempers fastened upon them the name of Latitudinarians. They read Episcopius much; and the making out the reasons of things, being a main part of their studies, their enemies called them Socinians." "The most eminent of these," says Burnet, — speaking of the preachers allied to the movement, — "were Tillotson, Stillingfleet, and Patrick. This set of men," he adds, "contributed more than can well be imagined, to reform the way of preaching, which among the divines of England before them was overrun with pedantry, a great mixture of quotations from Fathers and ancient writers, a long opening of a text with the concordance of every word of it, and a giving all the different expositions with the grounds of them, and the entering into some parts of controversy, and all concluding in some, but very short, practical applications, according to the subject or the occasion. This was both long and heavy, when all was piebald, full of many sayings of different languages. The common style of sermons was either very flat and low, or swelled up with rhetoric to a false pitch of a wrong sublime." Of the new preachers, he says: "Their style was clear, plain, and short. They gave a short paraphrase of their text, unless where great difficulties required a more copious enlargement: but even then they cut off unnecessary shows of learning, and applied themselves to the matter, in which they opened the nature and reasons of things so fully, and with that simplicity that their hearers felt an instruction of another sort than had commonly been observed before; so that they became very much followed; and a set of these men brought off the city in a great measure from the prejudices they had formerly to the Church."

The chief founders of the movement were Whichcote, John Smith, Cudworth, and Henry More. Benjamin Whichcote deserves to be called the first among them in point of time and in the effect of

his teachings. In his correspondence with Tuckney, his former tutor, his liberalism is clearly expressed, and appears in its contrast with the position, as to doctrine and liberty of thought, of a divine of the old school. "I receive the truth of the Christian religion," says Whichcote, "in a way of illumination, affection, and choice."[1] "Let all uncertainties lie by themselves in the catalogue of disputables; matters of further inquiry."[2] Ralph Cudworth, in the *Intellectual System of the Universe*, presented a learned and profound refutation of Atheism and Pantheism, and a noble exposition of the Platonic system. In his treatise on *Immutable Morality* he defends the doctrine of intuitive morals, and, generally, the validity of ideas not derived from sense-perception. Henry More was an advocate of free inquiry and of toleration. There was in him a peculiar vein of Mysticism, which was attended by the belief that he had occasional visions and states of rapture. One of the best of his writings is his *Antidote to Atheism.* John Smith is the most attractive writer and, with the possible exception of Cudworth, at the head of the four as a speculative thinker. He was, moreover, a preacher of uncommon power. The *Select Discourses* of Smith, published after his death, are the direct source of our knowledge of his opinions. Other prominent theologians of the Latitudinarian party are John Norris, Theophilus Gale, and Richard Cumberland, Bishop of Peterborough.

Conspicuous among the distinctive traits of the Cambridge School were, first, their advocacy of freedom of inquiry, their allowance of a large space for diversity of opinion in respect to non-essentials, their genial temper in controversy, their interest in the cause of toleration, their liking for episcopacy, while rejecting its exclusive pretensions; secondly, their love of learning, their interest in effecting a reconcilement of theology and philosophy; thirdly, their attachment to Platonic studies and Platonic doctrine; fourthly, their conception of religion, as far less a doctrine or a ritual than an inward life; fifthly, their purpose to found a rational theology which should avail to answer atheistic objections. As defects in the Latitudinarian school, Tulloch with justice enumerates three, — their lack of critical qualifications, which led to the confounding of Platonism and New Platonism, the ideas of Plato and those of Plotinus; a certain speculative fancifulness, from the lack of

[1] *Letters to Tuckney*, p. 48.

[2] *Moral and Religious Aphorisms* (547).

"adequate criteria, of knowledge"; "their misappreciation of evidence as to the supernatural and spiritual world."[1] This criticism is illustrated not in More alone, but also, although to a less extent, even in Cudworth. Their positive work, we may add, was rather an essay to construct, than an actual construction, of a definite and stable religious philosophy.

[1] Tulloch, Vol. II. pp. 478–488.

CHAPTER IX

THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY IN ENGLAND — THE ENGLISH DEISTIC SCHOOL — THEOLOGY OF THE QUAKERS — EFFORTS ON THE CONTINENT FOR THE REUNION OF CHURCHES

The ferment produced by the Socinian theology not only extended into Holland, but also had its effect in England. The Socinian and Arminian writings on this subject were the immediate occasion of the Trinitarian controversy. In its first phase it was mainly an historical debate. The great writer is Bishop Bull, whose *Defensio fidei Nicæni*, published in 1689, was a refutation of the views of Petavius, and also of Sandius and Zwicker, both of the Socinian school. Bull sought to show that the ante-Nicene Fathers were orthodox. His learning was great, and he was a strong reasoner. He claimed somewhat more for the correctness of the pre-Arian Fathers than the scholarship of the present day is able to sanction. Bull's later *Judicium Ecclesiæ Catholicæ* — for which he was thanked by Bossuet in the name of the Catholic clergy of France — had reference to the views of Episcopius and Curcellæus. His last important work was his *Primitive and Apostolical Tradition.*

The Trinitarian controversy was carried into the region of Metaphysics. In 1690, Bishop (then Dean) Sherlock put forth his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity. His doctrine was that in God there are three substances undivided, each being conscious of each of the other's thoughts and spiritual states. This triplicity is thus consistent with unity. This book was the signal for the appearance of numerous books and pamphlets, mostly polemical. Dr. Robert South wrote against Sherlock. He denies that self-consciousness constitutes personality. Rather is it true that consciousness presupposes personality. The opponents of Sherlock pronounced his doctrine to be Tritheism. Among the authors

who entered the lists in this controversy, besides South, were Wallis, Stillingfleet, John Owen, and John Howe, one of the best of the Nonconformist theologians, who wrote *A Calm Discourse of the Trinity*. The warfare would have lasted longer and have become more engrossing had it not been for the rise and progress of Deism, a common enemy.

The Arian controversy, properly so called, begins with the publication of Dr. Samuel Clarke's *Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*, in 1720. Clarke was the leading metaphysician of the day. In the Boyle lectures for 1704–5 he had presented his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, which was founded on the existence of one self-existent immutable being, necessarily implied in the existence of the world, and in the implication of eternity and omnipresence in duration and space, these being pronounced to be, not substances, but attributes. A defence of Arianism, to be sure, in the highest form, by such a man, excited a commotion. Clarke's doctrine was that the Son derives His being and attributes from the Supreme Cause, the Father. When the Son had His origin, and whether from the will of the Father or not, the Scripture does not explain. Several answers to Clarke soon appeared. His principal opponent was Dr. Daniel Waterland, who published three successive writings in defence of the orthodox doctrine.

The same tendencies which produced the Latitudinarian movement led, in minds of a different cast and training, to the development of Deism, and gave rise to the Deistic controversy.[1] There were minds less appreciative of the need and the nature of Christianity. There were special coöperative influences, among which was the effect of the Copernican discovery upon the views taken of Scripture, and its effect, along with that of the philosophy of Bacon, and of the new studies in natural science, upon the general mood of feeling. This new mood may be described, for the lack of a better term, as rationalistic. Deism in its English type did

[1] The old work on English Deism is Leland's *View of the Deistical Writers* (1754–56), which is both descriptive and controversial. Lechler's *Gesch. d. Englisch. Deismus* (1841) gives a full and fair account of the Deistic Writings. Hunt's *Religious Thought in England*, 3 vols. (1870–72), gives a sketch of the treatises on both sides of the controversy. Leslie Stephen's *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 2 vols., 1876, is an able criticism of the principal writers in the warfare of opinion, in a spirit not unfriendly to the rationalistic leaders. See, also, Mark Pattison's Essays on the *Tendencies of Religious Thought in England from* 1688 *to* 1750.

not, like the Epicurean theory, deny the Providence of the Deity. It cast aside the belief in a special revelation, and of course the reality of denied miracles. The Latitudinarians sought for the basis of the religious creed in the truths held in common by the various contending Christian, or, at least, Protestant bodies. The Deists did the same in reference to the different forms of religion, including the Christian. The value of the Bible is made to consist in its republication, but without supernatural sanction, of the principles of natural religion, ascertainable and ascertained by "the light of nature."

The "father of Deism" was Lord Herbert, of Cherbury. His treatise, *De Veritate*, which was published in 1624, was an able, if not very successful, effort to set forth the philosophical principles at the foundation of religious inquiry. His principal treatise, *De Religione Gentilium*, brings forward the five truths at the basis of all religions. There is no doubt that he means to be understood to comprise in this list whatever he considers to be true and valuable in Christianity. They are the existence of a supreme God, the duty of worship, the obligations of virtue and piety, the duty of repentance of sin, the fact of rewards and punishment here and hereafter. There is no polemic against Christianity, but there is no doubt that, with most of the Deists, he considered all other religious doctrines the offspring of superstition, or the invention of priests for establishing their sway.

The writer on the Deistic side who more than any other provoked controversy and occasioned numerous writings in defence of Christianity was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). *The Leviathan*, which followed earlier productions from his pen, advocates determinism in philosophy, and is probably the first distinct and logical exposition of that theory, and one of the ablest defences of it. In political ethics, he contended for absolutism in government, embracing the right of the King to control, by his sole authority, all expressions of religious belief and forms of worship. The state of nature is the state of war, where every one desires everything and has a right to everything. The only rescue from destruction, the only way to peace, is in the institution of a common power. Hobbes recognizes no such thing as justice before the organization of society, and society as a product of expediency. Might has the precedence over right. It is only fair to add that the political notions of Hobbes were adopted prior to the Restora-

tion of the Stuarts, and were not first inspired by a spirit of servility to a reigning monarch. Hobbes enters into an analysis of the contents of the Bible. He concludes that the only Article of Faith which it makes the condition of salvation is that Jesus is the Messiah. The extent of the influence of Hobbes is well sketched by Mackintosh[1]: —

"The answers to Leviathan would form a library. But the far greater part have followed the fate of all controversial pamphlets. Sir Robert Filmer was jealous of any rival theory of servitude. Harrington defended liberty, and Clarendon the Church, against a common enemy. His philosophical antagonists were Cumberland, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Clarke, Butler, and Hutcheson. Though the last four writers cannot be considered as properly polemics, their labors were excited, and their doctrines modified, by the stroke from a vigorous arm, which seemed to shake Ethics to its foundation. They lead us far into the eighteenth century; and their works occasioned by the doctrines of Hobbes, sowed the seed of the ethical writings of Hume, Smith, Price, Kant, and Stewart; in a less degree, also, of those of Tucker and Paley; not to mention Mandeville, the buffoon and sophister of the ale-house; or Helvetius, an ingenious but flimsy writer, the low and loose moralist of the vain, the selfish, and the sensual."

Charles Blount was born in 1654 and died in 1693. His first work was *Anima Mundi: or, an Historical Narration of the Opinions of the Ancients concerning Man's Soul after this Life: according to Unenlightened Nature.* The design was to raise the esteem of his readers for heathen philosophy and thereby covertly to depreciate Christianity. The title is an example of the usual method of the Deists, who made no direct assault on Revelation, but either made use of sarcasm or irony, or attacked the validity of the principal arguments in its behalf. Apart from other motives, an open assault was punishable by the civil law. Blount published *The First Two Books of Philostratus, concerning the Life of Apollonius Tyanæus*, translated with copious notes. The obvious purpose was to disparage and refute the supernatural character of Christianity, by presenting in Apollonius a parallel narrative. His miracles are explained on the naturalistic theory and partly by suggestions resembling the modern mythical hypothesis. Blount argues, as did Hobbes, against the Mosaic authorship of

[1] *Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, p. 69.

the Pentateuch, and in favor of a literal (or physical) interpretation of the narrative of the Creation in Genesis. The *Oracles of Reason* were published after his death by suicide. Blount adopted Hobbes's notion of the authority of the State in matters of religion, together with Herbert's five principles and his doctrine of the corruption of the religion of reason by the selfish cunning of priests.

The Latitudinarian theologians defended the cause of religion and revelation. Henry More contended that the higher truth taught by the sages of antiquity was derived either from the Logos, or from the earliest doctrine of the Church and of the Jewish Kabbala. Gale, in his *Court of the Gentiles*, endeavored to show that the wisdom of the heathen philosophers was borrowed from the Jewish Scriptures. Of the writers on the anti-deistic side, there was none abler or more eminent than John Locke (1632–1704). There was in him, associated with great uprightness and a noble love of liberty, a "rationalistic" tone which belonged to him in common with his opponents. His intellectual habit appears in his political theories; in particular in his theory of the Social Compact. His combat with Deism took the form of a revision of orthodox theology, whereby it was hoped to render it less vulnerable. In his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, he defines faith to be an assent to a proposition on the testimony of Revelation, the credibility of Revelation being first proved.[1] This is declared to be the only shield against fancy and enthusiasm.[2] On liberty and necessity, Locke is a determinist. Liberty relates to events consecutive to volition. Choice itself is according to the last dictate of the understanding as regards personal happiness.[3] Yet it appears from his letters that he did not continue perfectly assured of his solution of the problem, but was confident of the fact of freedom. As might be expected, Locke rejects *a priori* proofs of the being of God. He presents an argument of his own from the existence of the soul, and the impossibility that a "cogitative" being should spring from an "incogitative" as its cause. His book on the *Reasonableness of Christianity* was written, as he tells us, to influence disbelievers. Dissatisfied with existing systems of divinity, he had turned from them to the Scriptures. The condemnation of mankind for Adam's sin is an opinion "that shakes the foundation of all religion." To make

[1] B. IV. c. 18. [2] *Ibid.* [3] B. II. § 8 et passim.

Christ to be only the restorer of pure natural religion makes Christianity almost nothing. His own doctrine is that Adam's sin brought upon the race death, or complete annihilation; the race is saved from this death by Christ, and is continued, since by Him is the resurrection; mankind, however, put under a probation of law, sin for themselves; through grace, salvation is offered on the condition of faith; faith is the belief that Jesus is the Messiah; all who believe — Locke explained afterwards that he included, also, the condition of repentance — are saved; all others perish, or become utterly extinct; the heathen may be saved by repentance and using the light they have. The need of revelation is based on five grounds, which include the desirableness of more light respecting God and duty, and new incentives and helps to a virtuous and holy life, — such as the proclamation of immortal life, the example of Jesus, the aids of the Spirit. The orthodox critics of Locke complained that he had not included in his system the Atonement. He answered that his object had been simply to state what was necessary to be believed in order to be saved. In truth, he did not accept the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, but regarded his principal office to be that of a legislator. Nor did he believe in the supreme divinity of Jesus. He pronounces the doctrine of election practically harmful.[1] He raises the question whether all that Luke wrote was inspired.[2]

John Toland (1669–1722) was the author of *Christianity not Mysterious* (1696). He went beyond the assertion of Hobbes and Locke, that there is nothing contrary to reason in Christianity, by maintaining that there is nothing *above* reason in it; that everything is plain to reason, asserting that there is no profit in anything not intelligible. In primitive Christianity there were no unsearchable mysteries, but these have been introduced, in the course of time, partly in accommodation to Judaism with its levitical rites, and Heathenism with its mysteries, and partly by the mixture of philosophy. He wrote also, *Amyntor*, a defence of some remarks in his life of Milton, in which he had been supposed to throw out doubts concerning the canon of the New Testament. He declared that he referred to the apocryphal books of the New Testament, and the apostolical Fathers, whose alleged writings he did not regard as genuine. Toland anticipated Baur in affirming

[1] See extracts in King's *Life of Locke*, Vol. II. pp. 99, 103.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 96, 97.

that the early Church was divided into two parties, the Ebionites or Judaizers, and the liberal party of Paul; and these discordant schools (which, however, he does not affirm to have been hostile) were brought together in an artificial union.

Amyntor drew out Dr. Samuel Clarke's *Historical Account of the Canon of the New Testament in Answer to Amyntor.* The great work of Nathaniel Lardner — *The Credibility of the Gospel History* — was written later, and without reference to Toland. (It appeared in 1727.)[1] Toland's *Pantheisticon*, and other later writings, manifest an embittered feeling towards Christianity and a decline into a kind of "unscientific Pantheism."

Anthony Collins was one of the ablest of the Deists. In his *Discourse of Free-thinkers*, he undertook to prove that free-thinking cannot be restricted. To say that it can be involves a contradiction. Neither ought it to be restricted. Without it, no one can ever be convinced of error. Collins was answered by Bentley, writing under the name of "Philoleutherus Lipsiensis," — a Leipsic Lover of Freedom. Bentley maintains that thinking must be really free, and not subject to the bias of infidel prejudice. It may be observed here that "free-thinkers" came to be a common designation of the Deists. Collins suggests that the Jews may have derived their theological doctrines from Egyptians and Chaldæans. Probably a large portion of the Old Testament, he says, was reconstructed by Ezra. The book of Daniel belongs to the Maccabean age. Collins's work on *Liberty and Necessity* is a very acute argument in behalf of determinism, with an answer to objections. The curious correspondence between his reasoning and that of Jonathan Edwards is not due, as Dugald Stewart suggested that it is, to a use of Collins's work by Edwards. It is not probable that Edwards had read Collins.

Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his *Remarks* on Collins's book, attacks his conception of the will. Clarke asserts that there exists a principle of self-motion in man, a power of initiating motion, or of voluntary self-determination. This power is not deter-

[1] The Boyle lectures, established by the will of Robert Boyle (who had taken part in founding the Royal Society). Boyle died 1691. The lectures were "to prove the truth of the Christian Religion against infidels, without descending to any controversies among Christians." The first lecturer on this foundation was Bentley. After him, are the names of Samuel Clarke (*Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*) and William Whiston.

mined as to the mode of its exertion by anything but itself; that would involve a contradiction. It is self-moving. It is absurd to attribute efficiency to the mental states which are called motives. If they had efficiency, man would be like a clock, or a pair of scales, endowed with sensation or perception. He would not be an agent. What we call motives are bare antecedents, or occasional causes.[1] Clarke shows that the opposite supposition involves an infinite regress of effects with no cause at all. Moreover, uniformity of action does not imply a necessity in the connection of the act with its antecedents. "The experience of a man's ever doing what he judges reasonable to do, is not at all an experience of his being under any necessity so to do. For concomitancy in this case is no evidence at all of physical connection."[2] The argument for necessity from God's prescience, Clarke seeks to confute by maintaining the previous certainty of acts, even on the supposition that they are free, and by claiming for God "an infallible judgment concerning contingent truths," which is only a power that we ourselves possess, carried to perfection.

Woolston attacked the literal interpretation of the New Testament narratives of miracles, and contended for an allegorical treatment of them. Among the replies to Woolston was Bishop Sherlock's *Trial of the Witnesses*, an argument for the historical reality of the resurrection of Christ. Matthew Tindal (1657–1733) wrote *Christianity as Old as Creation*. It was an endeavor to prove the sufficiency and perfection of natural religion, and that Christianity, as far as it is true, republishes it in a form free from corruptions. Among his opponents were Conybeare, Waterland, and Law. Thomas Morgan, in his *Moral Philosopher*, contended that the guides of the Jewish Church, as well as Jesus and the Apostles, had practised an "accommodation" respecting persons and events, in order to conciliate the ignorant and the bigoted. Paul was the great free-thinker of his age. There was a division in the primitive Church, but, unlike Tindal, Morgan holds that a hostility sprang up between the two parties. Morgan's work was the revision of the composition of Warburton's once famous work, *The Divine Legation of Moses*, in which it was maintained that the silence of the Pentateuch on the subject of the future life is a decisive argument for, and not against, the divine origin of the

[1] *Remarks*, etc. p. 9 (London, 1717). [2] *Ibid.* p. 25.

Hebrew religion. Such a silence is without a parallel in similar circumstances, and warrants the conclusion that Moses was bent on protecting his people from the superstitions which in Egypt were inseparably mingled with this tenet. Chubb is a Deistic writer of inferior consequence. Lord Shaftesbury was one of the few Deists of rank and social position. He wrote the *Characteristics*, which found fault with the Gospel for making the hope of reward and the fear of punishment incentives to virtue. Virtue is its own reward, and is vitiated so far as its source is a mercenary motive. Bolingbroke (1678–1751), in writings left to be published after his death, assumes that Monotheism was the primitive religion, and argues for it on the ground of the consent of all tradition that the world had a beginning. Almost everything not contained in the creed of nature is ascribed to the shrewd invention of rulers, who, in order to keep the people in subjection, have played on their fears.

It should occasion no surprise to the historical student that in England, in the middle of the seventeenth century, in the midst of the dogmatic strife, the debate among creeds, there should appear such a development of mysticism, mingled, especially at first, with enthusiasm, as we witness in the society called Quakers. Our attention here is to be directed only to the beliefs of the followers of George Fox and of William Penn. A little less than twenty years after Fox began his preaching tours, the Quakers were joined by Robert Barclay, an educated Scotchman, who became the theological expounder of the tenets of the new sect. His *Apology for the True Christian Divinity* was published in 1675. The Catechism and Confession of Faith, drawn up by Barclay, were adopted by the sect. The central, conspicuous peculiarity in the theology of the Quakers was the doctrine of "the inner light." The reformers had carefully guarded against the introduction of teaching resting upon subjective feeling by insisting that it is the office of the Spirit to make the truths *in Scripture* evident and duly impressive on the minds of men. The Quakers enlarged the function of the Spirit by the doctrine that this illuminating power is bestowed on all men, and that it is not confined to the use of truth already believed, but may communicate additional truth to the mind open to receive it. As the Bible is from God, the Bible is the umpire, so far that nothing contrary to Scripture can be accepted as coming from Him. In keeping with this idea concerning the Spirit

was the doctrine of the Quakers that redemption, although objective, is of no value until there follows a mystical reception of Christ by the soul. This is an essential side of Justification. The discarding of the Sacraments altogether is another natural consequence of the controlling place of the subjective factor in the religious life. It was held that there is a transmitted seed of evil in men since the Fall, but it is not reckoned to our account as sin until actual transgression is connected with it. Election is rejected, although in some cases Grace is said to act with an irresistible power. But all have their time of visitation when they are inwardly called by Christ and are able to hear and obey the call. The equal position of women and their privilege of taking part in religious meetings is an inference from the view taken of dependence upon the Spirit as choosing for his organs whom he will. The same is true of the refusal to permit an order of ministers to exist or a liturgy to be used. The discarding of oaths, the ceasing to use the names of the months and days which are of heathen origin, the use of Christian names in converse with others, and the adherence to modes of dress which fashion has set aside, are all parts of a certain simplicity which is congenial with the spirit of Quakerism. The same literal intepretation of the Sermon on the Mount which appears in various customs, operates, in conjunction with a dominant spirit of Christian kindness, to give rise to an absolute condemnation of all war, whether offensive or defensive.

The seventeenth century, the period of theological warfare and division, witnessed efforts in behalf of the reunion of sundered and hostile churches. Persistent efforts were made to bring to pass a good understanding and union between the Lutherans and the Reformed. In these efforts, George Calixtus and the theologians of Helmstadt earnestly engaged. Such attempts proved abortive. They were resisted generally by the Lutherans. The same result followed projects of this kind looking to a reunion of the Protestants and the Roman Catholics. Erasmus had contended for Christian union on the basis of a common acceptance of essential truths, all minor points being waived, or postponed, not until "the next general council," but until the future life. Calixtus labored in the cause of a reunion on the basis of the Scriptures and of the Church of the first five centuries. The conciliatory spirit of Erasmus and Melanchthon was revived in Hugo Grotius. By his own observation of the bitterness and calamities

incident to the conflicts of party, and affected by his intercourse with Roman Catholics during his sojourn in France, he was moved to exert himself to bring to pass a reconciliation between the two great divisions of the Western Church. In his publications, he sought to mitigate the enmity to Roman Catholic dogmas by showing that more than one interpretation might be attached to them. Certain practices that were condemned by Protestants might be admitted without wrong or harm. His method of union was to ascertain by a universal council the propositions on which all Christians could unite, and to make the resulting creed the basis of ecclesiastical unity. On the Catholic side, Spinola, a theologian of Vienna, engaged in a like undertaking, and travelled through Germany in order to further it. This movement was the occasion of a correspondence between Molanus, a Lutheran theologian, and, afterwards, Leibnitz, on the one side, and Bossuet on the other. The ground that Leibnitz took was almost the same as that taken by Grotius. Both were willing to concede a primacy to the Bishop of Rome. The point on which Leibnitz and Bossuet could not agree was the authority of the Council of Trent. It is interesting to observe, in the pacific writings both of Grotius and Leibnitz, how the sharp antagonism to the tenets of Rome, which had formerly prevailed, is blunted. The mutual intolerance of the Protestant sects, the evils of perpetual discord between them, and of the perpetual contest between Protestantism and Romanism, had inspired a longing for peace on the basis of a comprehensive standard of belief.

PERIOD V

THEOLOGY AS AFFECTED BY MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHES

From the Philosophy of Locke and Leibnitz to the Present

CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHY ON THE CONTINENT AFTER DESCARTES: SPINOZA; LEIBNITZ — PHILOSOPHY IN ENGLAND: FRANCIS BACON; LOCKE; BERKELEY; HUME; REID — THE WRITINGS OF BUTLER AND PALEY — CHARACTER OF ENGLISH THEOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY — THE WESLEYAN THEOLOGY

To find the beginning of the new epoch in the history of philosophy when its independence of theology was asserted, we must go back to Descartes. Instead of starting with the assumption of a multiplicity of beliefs respecting things mundane and divine, philosophy, he taught, begins with universal doubt, and searches for a primal principle, something evident and undeniable. This is the proposition, "I think and therefore I am," which is not a syllogism, but the implication of the being of the thinker in the act of thought. To say that I doubt that I think is a self-contradiction. No other statement respecting myself has this character. The criterion of truth is the clearness and distinctness of the idea. This is inferred from the character of the basal conviction. Next, in the order of the objects of knowledge, is God. The highest and clearest of all our ideas is that of God, the absolutely perfect being. This is not derived from the senses, nor is it formed by an act of my own. It must be implanted by the infinite Being Himself. It is an innate idea. God's existence, moreover, is involved in the concept of God, from which necessary

existence is inseparable. The Anselmic argument is presented in a modified form. Besides, the idea of the supreme perfection of God, including His veracity, cannot be an idea of our own devising. The veracity of God, once ascertained, establishes the truth of our perceptions of the outward world. He cannot deceive us. So we are saved from solipsism. We are sure of the existence of other beings than ourselves. The soul and external things are substances in the imperfect sense that they are not dependent upon one another. God alone is substance in the strict sense, His existence not being conditioned on the existence of anything else. Finite substances are the mind, the thinking substance, and extended substance, or body. How the first finite substance can cognize the second, which is essentially distinct from it, is one of the cardinal problems of which the efforts of Descartes afford no satisfactory solution.

To supply this defect, to build a bridge between the subject and the object, was the endeavor of the "Occasionalists," first Geulincx, and especially Malebranche. The former supposes immediate acts of God whereby, for example, the movements of my body are matched to my volitions. Malebranche's doctrine was that "we see all things in God." All things are contained in a spiritual or ideal way in God. So closely are we united to Him that through Him we behold things even as He does. Ideas, as well as we ourselves, are in God, who is the universal reason. We see things as God sees them.

It was a difficulty, in the system of Descartes, to explain how finite substances can be distinct from the substance in the strict sense of the word. It was a difficulty, in the system of Malebranche, to avoid falling into a pantheistic idealism and merging the finite mind in the infinite. But both philosophers stood firmly on the ground of theism.

Spinoza converted Cartesian principles into an explicit pantheism, in which there is only one substance — *una et unica substantia* — the infinite being. Substantial existence belongs to nothing finite. To that being, as infinite, no predicates can, without contradiction, be attached; for "all determination" — all affirmation of qualities — "is negation," or the subtraction of their opposites. Yet two "attributes" are assigned to the infinite being, thought and extension, whence comes the double theophany, mind, on the one hand, and material things, on the other. All concrete things

are "modes" of these attributes. How the ascription of attributes is consistent with the above-stated maxim is still a puzzle and a subject of controversy among the interpreters of Spinoza. The conception of infinitude excludes personality. With personality, of course, design, final causes, vanish. The consciousness of freedom in man is an illusion which is owing to a failure to perceive the proximate causes of choice. If religion is the communion of person with person, religion disappears in Spinoza's system; and the same fate must befall ethics, if moral liberty be the condition of responsibility. Spinoza was a Hebrew by birth, but was cast out of the synagogue for heresy. His ideas respecting the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and his interpretations, are presented with acuteness in the *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, wherein not a few modern critical theories and judgments are anticipated.

Leibnitz (1646–1716), whose genius and versatility almost make him a peer of Aristotle, constructed a philosophy, the antipode of Spinoza's system. Substance is characterized by activity. Instead of there being but one substance, the universe is composed of a multitude of created substances, which are indivisible, unextended centres of force. Each is independent of the others, yet related to all. Each represents in itself all others, and is, so to speak, a mirror of the universe. Obscure states of representation or perception pertain to the lower orders of monads. In inorganic nature, this representation is compared to a state of slumber. There is in nature a harmony in the action of the monads which is preëstablished by the Creator, and there is a constant co-working of God (*concursus Dei*), which is not destructive of second causes. The soul is a monad, independent of the body, but the two coincide — as when the arm is raised by a volition — through the preëstablished harmony. The mind produces, on the condition of experience, the intuitions. To the maxim, "There is nothing in intellect that was not previously in sense," Leibnitz added the qualifying clause, "save the intellect itself" — *præter intellectum ipsum*. In his doctrine of the will, Leibnitz was a determinist.

In his *Theodicy*, Leibnitz discusses, with great ability and learning, the problem of evil. Why is evil permitted by the Almighty to exist? The question turns finally on the ground of the permission of *moral* evil. The answer is that the system which, *in the nature of things*, is the *best possible*, involves the permission

of sin. Its existence, therefore, constitutes no objection to the doctrine of God's omnipotence or benevolence. The *occasion* of sin is owing to the metaphysical imperfections of man. Being finite, he is liable to over-vivid impressions from objects near at hand, or otherwise exerting an undue attraction. He does not attempt to explicate the *actuality* of sin, which is a voluntary act, but only its *possibility*.[1]

If the tendencies of philosophy on the continent were towards idealism, the drift of English philosophy was in the opposite direction. If, in the one case, a gate was opened that might lead off in the direction of an ideal pantheism, in the latter case a way was left open in the direction of materialism. It was the object of Bacon to cast aside a speculative and conjectural study of nature, and to turn inquiries into the sure and alone fruitful path of induction. Instead of taking for a torch to light his way the idea of final causes, the student was diligently to explore for secondary or efficient causes. But it was the handling of final causes in Physics to which Bacon objected, and not in "Metaphysic," nor did he think of denying their reality in the scheme of nature.[2] As for theology, he says, it "ought to be derived from the Word and works of God, and not from the light of nature or the dictates of reason."[3] "We are to believe His Word, though we find a reluctation in our reason," just as we obey His law when our wills are reluctant.[4]

If the actual influence of Bacon's writings was in favor of an empirical philosophy, Locke was understood to propound a system in which this philosophy is formulated. The sources of our knowledge are declared to be two, — sensation and reflection, the one a perception of external phenomena, the other a perception of that which is within. Of these two fountains of knowledge, sensation is the first. The mind is like a blank sheet of paper on which are written the things that are perceived. There are no innate ideas. But when we proceed with the study of Locke's *Essay* and examine his Letter to Stillingfleet, we find that it is not his intention to deny either that intuitions (as of cause and effect, etc.) are from an inward source, or to call in question their validity. In truth, both Locke and the advocates of the doctrine of innate ideas failed

[1] See Jul. Müller, *Lehre v. d. Sünde*, Vol. I. p. 578.
[2] *De Augment.* B. III. *Works* (Boston, 1864), Vol. VIII. p. 508.
[3] *Ibid.* B. IX. Vol. IX. p. 334. [4] *Ibid.* p. 346.

adequately to define their meaning. Locke understands the phrase to denote ideas of which we are conscious, holding that there are none others. The Cartesians mean by it simply that the intuitions are potentially in the mind from the beginning, although not elicited save on the condition of experience. There is a light of reason, Locke teaches, or irresistible knowledge which is self-evident, and on which demonstration is built. There is in us a faculty enabling us to become conscious of intuitive ideas, a faculty, also, of finding out the moral differences of actions. He presents a demonstrative proof of the existence of God, a truth which he considers to be necessarily inferred from the constitution of ourselves and of the world. Every step in the process is taken with an intuitive certainty. All this stands in at least a verbal inconsistency with the fundamental statements relative to the origin of our knowledge. It was these statements which furnished Condillac and other pure empiricists with the premises for their arguments.

After Locke the two principal English philosophers in the eighteenth century were Berkeley and Hume. Their systems stand in a near relation to theology. Reid, the founder of the Scottish metaphysical school, sought to reëstablish the foundations of knowledge which the speculations of Hume had rendered insecure.

Locke had taught that all our knowledge is of "ideas," but "ideas" he had not undertaken fully or accurately to define. They are another term for sense-perceptions or perceptions of mental phenomena. The *primary* qualities of matter are what we perceive them to be. There are two essential principles in Berkeley's system.[1] In the first place, in opposition to Locke, who was a conceptualist, he was a nominalist. Abstractions are not objects of thought. We cannot represent them. It is only things in the concrete that we can perceive. Secondly, the perception of the primary qualities of matter is as purely subjective as the perception of the secondary qualities, — color, taste, etc. Matter as an object independent of percipient subjects does not exist. Ideas are the only objects which exist. There is no evidence of the existence of any beings but spirits, finite minds and

[1] For Berkeley's teaching, see Prof. A. C. Fraser's excellent edition of the *Works of Berkeley*, 4 vols. (1871), and Professor Fraser's *Life and Letters of Berkeley*.

the infinite mind. To God alone can we refer the origin of the ideas which are evidently not the product of our own minds. He is their author and cause. The world is a world of ideas, and the order of their occurrence, through the divine agency, is what is meant by the laws of nature. To get rid of brute matter, and to have left only a universe of spirits, removed, in Berkeley's judgment, a prime source and support of Deism. He does not examine into the validity of the ideas of cause and substance. This is taken for granted. The principal work of Berkeley in opposition to the free-thinkers is the *Minute Philosopher*, which was published in 1732. It is in the form of a dialogue. In this noble composition the author combats, through his own method, the different types of infidelity current at the time. Berkeley's conception of the nature of religion was more spiritual than that which was prevalent in his day. Under his view of nature, all nature is the manifestation of God. There is an inward light of God's grace which, not less than reason and authority, is the source of Christian belief.

Hume did not advocate nor dispute the reality of external things. His philosophical skepticism struck deeper. It undermined the common beliefs respecting the reality of aught save observed phenomena — the objects of external and internal observation, or, in the Lockeian phrase, of "sensation and reflection." Hume subtracted substance and cause from the catalogue of things known. The notion of cause is the product of customary association. When one event is always noticed to be accompanied by another, — for example, a sensation of burning when there is contact with fire, — we involuntarily expect this concomitance. This necessity of expectation is carried over, without warrant, to the external phenomena. An imaginary tie of necessity is attributed to antecedent and consequent. Pushing forward in this scrutiny, Hume eliminates from things known to be, the soul as a thinking substance, an *ego*, and the Supreme Being. Hume's *Natural History of Religion* appeared in 1757, and his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* in 1779, after his death. In the *Dialogues*, the arguments for the being of God, beginning with the ontological proof, are the object of a searching analysis. The argument of design is alleged to fail, first, as being anthropomorphic in its character, the world being an effect not to be set in analogy with the products of human art; and secondly, as only

proving, if conceded to be valid, a Creator of limited power. In an essay on "Providence and a Future State," Hume pursues this same argument, applying it, also, to the doctrine of a moral government of the world, which, it is said, can only be established by assumptions as to a future state, not justified by the observed facts. In the *Natural History of Religion*, it is argued, from the point of view of the skeptic, that polytheism was the earliest form of religion, that monotheism is the product of the elevation of a favorite deity by his adoring worshippers, and that the constant tendency is to revert to a polytheistic faith by imagining mediators in other inferior deities. Religion originates in the natural habit to refer events that affect our happiness to unknown causes which the imagination personifies. In the *Essay on Miracles*, the design is, not to question the possibility of a miracle, but to show that it is impossible to prove one. Belief is founded on experience. We have had no experience of the "transgression" of natural laws. We have had experience of the falsehood of testimony. Weighed in the scales, therefore, the improbability of the alleged event outweighs the improbability that the testimony, however accumulated, is, for one reason or another, false. Hume endeavored to fortify his reasoning by reference to the testimony for the alleged Jansenist miracles at the tomb of the Abbé Paris. The replies to this ingenious essay were numerous, and did not always hit the mark. Apart from the assumption that belief is founded wholly on experience, Hume departs from his own principles in assuming that experience is all adverse to the recurrence of a miracle. The evidence of such an assertion, as J. S. Mill points out, "is diminished in force by whatever weight belongs to the evidence that certain miracles have taken place." Moreover, the further assumption is that there is no God with moral ends in view, which a miracle in conceivable circumstances might promote. The argument deals with a naked miracle, cut off from all consideration of any special use or design.

Reid assumes the immediate knowledge of fundamental axioms. Proof of them there is none. They are the basis of all proof. Among them is the principle that the qualities of external things, which are perceived immediately, inhere in a subject or substance, and that the same is true of our thoughts. The freedom of the will is another basal principle, under a different class. Still another of the same kind is that what is to occur in nature will

probably be like what has previously occurred in similar circumstances.

The Philosophy of Hume was a destructive assault upon the main position of the Deists respecting the origin of all religions save what they called "the religion of nature." On the other hand, not only by its criticism of the basis of positive belief in general, but also by its dealing with the proofs of the Christian creed in particular, it presented to Christian Apologists problems of the gravest consequence.

Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham, had published (in 1736) his *Analogy* — the *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.* It is sometimes said that Hume, especially in his *Essay on Providence,* successfully answered Butler. In reality Hume's reasoning does not touch the proposition of the *Analogy.* Butler's argument is directed against Deists, and takes for granted that which they concede. He undertakes to prove that *if* there is a likeness between the known course of nature and the system of religion, natural and revealed, objections to the latter cannot be drawn from anything similar in the former, "which is acknowledged to be from Him." He takes it "for proved that there is an intelligent Author of Nature and natural Governor of the world." Butler establishes what he sets out to establish. A more sweeping and radical skepticism, of course, requires to be met in another way.[1]

Next to Butler, the most famous of the English Apologists in this period was Paley. He was not, like Butler, an original thinker, but he was possessed of remarkable tact and common sense, and for lucidity of style is almost unrivalled. In the *Horæ Paulinæ* he pointed out undesigned coincidences between the Acts and the Epistles, proving the authenticity of all these writings. In his *Evidences of Christianity* he marshals, in the most perspicuous and orderly manner, the proofs from testimony of the miracles recorded in the Gospels. To the external argument from miracles is given the leading place in the discussion. The *Natural Theology* is the last in the order of time of this series of works. It is a statement and illustration of the argument of design, the illustrations of it being drawn mainly from human and comparative

[1] In his 22d year (1713), Butler corresponded with Clark respecting his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,* and was convinced by his arguments.

anatomy. It is true that the progress of natural science modifies the form, although it does not lessen, but rather increases, the force of the teleological argument. Our attention is turned more to the general order and progress of nature than to particular specimens of contrivance. Yet an examination of Paley will show that he anticipates the hypothesis of evolution and the theory of indefinite, fortuitous variation, and shapes his argument accordingly. In his theological opinions Paley may be called a latitudinarian, although in his whole cast of thought he was at a wide remove from the school bearing that name.

The most learned contribution to Christian evidences was made by Nathaniel Lardner, a Unitarian in his creed, an indefatigable student, whose *Credibility of the Gospel History*, a thesaurus of the testimonies of antiquity, was published in its different parts at intervals from 1727 to 1755.

The three principal writers on ethics in England, in the last century, were Butler, Price, and Paley. Butler's ethical doctrines are found in his *Dissertation on Virtue* and in his *Sermons on Human Nature*. He teaches that self-love and benevolence — or altruism, to use the phrase now in vogue — are native, constitutional principles. Conscience is the regulative principle, defining their due proportion to one another and binding to its observance. Equal love to self and to one's neighbor and supreme love to God are the sum of duty. Veracity and justice are sometimes treated as forms or branches of benevolence. Elsewhere it is intimated that they are virtues parallel with it, and independent. Price maintained that right is a simple idea, not to be resolved into constituents. Paley taught in his *Moral Philosophy* the utilitarian doctrine. Virtue is defined as the "doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." The sentence is stamped with Paley's characteristic way of thinking as a theologian. Paley makes the springs of virtue to be in self-love. At the opposite pole stands Hutcheson, who identifies virtue with general benevolence, which must enter into every action that partakes of virtue.

The interval between the accession of Anne, in 1714, and the death of George II., in 1760, is a period in the religious history of England to which neither Churchmen nor Dissenters can look back without shame and regret. The efforts at comprehension made by Tillotson and his school after the Revolution were baffled

by the resolute intolerance of the High Churchmen and by the fear of a division in the Church itself. Puritanism had lost not only a great part of its influence, but also a great part of its vigor. A prevalent indifference and skepticism, the spread of vice, partly a heritage from the last Stuart kings, and the ignorance of the clergy, did not lessen a whit the acrimony of ecclesiastical disputes. Convocation was reduced to silence in 1717, and until 1854 was not again allowed to transact business. After the middle of the century the state of things, as regards education and practical religion, only gradually improved. What was the condition of the universities in the period may be learned from such books as the autobiography of Gibbon, who was matriculated at Magdalen College in 1752. Bishop Burnet, in 1713, wrote of those who came to be ordained as follows: "They can give no account, or at least a very imperfect one, of the contents even of the Gospels, or of the Catechism itself." Bishop Butler, in the Preface to the *Analogy*, remarks that it had come to be taken for granted "that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious." In 1751, in a charge, he affirms the deplorable distinction of the age to be "an avowed scorn of religion in some and a growing disregard of it in the generality." The dark picture is somewhat relieved when we see on the canvas such figures as Doddridge and Watts among the Nonconformists, and Bishop Wilson, the author of *Sacra Privata*, among the Churchmen. William Law was the writer who, more than any other, promoted a spiritual awakening. By his *Serious Call*, Dr. Johnson was first aroused "to thinking in earnest on religion." Besides his influence in promoting piety, he was an acute defender of theism and of the truth of Christian miracles. His mystical tendencies, fostered by the influence of Böhme, induced a change which led him to look on the inward life and the inward light as the real verification of Christianity, and to make the office of Christ to be principally the conquest of evil of every sort, and the impartation of a new life to his followers. He did not come, says Law, "to quiet an angry Deity."

Into the details of the history of the great Methodist Revival we cannot here enter. It is only of its relation to the history of doctrine that we have here to speak. If Whitefield was the most persuasive and eloquent preacher of the early Methodists, John Wesley was incomparably the greatest man. He was a trained

scholar, as well as an effective preacher, and he was an organizer, in this respect on a level with the most renowned leaders of the mediæval monastic orders. He was born in 1703 and died in 1791. Wesley, with his brother Charles, and the others of the group of young men at Oxford who originated the Methodist movement, was at the outset a High Churchman and a ritualist. There is a striking resemblance between these young Oxford Methodists and the leaders of the modern Oxford movement. But there entered into Wesley's mind and experience two potent differentiating elements. There was in him, as in his associates, a burning evangelistic zeal; and in his religious experience he was pretty early brought to a living apprehension of the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith alone. At first he fed on mystical and devotional writings. He was devoted to Law and his books; he read with deep sympathy Jeremy Taylor's *Holy Living and Dying;* he was a disciple of Thomas à Kempis, whose *Imitation of Christ* was one of the first books which he caused to be published. He was long a seeker for inward religious peace. He came into intimate relations with the Moravians, and his relation to Spangenberg and others may remind one of Luther's relation to mystical teachers. There was a great change in Wesley's inward life, a change that gave character to his subsequent career, when, on the 28th of May, 1738, at a meeting of a Moravian society in London, he listened to a reading of Luther's Preface to his Commentary on the Romans. There entered into his soul, as by a flash of light, a joyful assurance that his sins were freely forgiven. After this time William Law's teaching seemed to him quite inadequate. He pronounced upon it a too harsh judgment. He parted by degrees from the Moravians, partly because their teachers in London at that time inculcated ideas concerning justification — such as that "weak faith is no faith" — which he denied. In truth, the leaven of quietism in the Moravian Christians with whom he had consorted in London, was now foreign to his convictions.

Wesley was not only conversant with devout writers and certain mystical teachers; he had acquainted himself with the ancient Greek theology. He had studied Chrysostom. He was an Arminian in his creed. On this point Whitefield, who was a devoted Calvinist, parted company with him, and was the leader of the Calvinistic Methodists in England. Wesley's antagonism to the Calvinistic doctrine of election and its correlate of exclusive

divine agency in conversion was intense, and remained so through his life.[1] It is natural to ask how it was that the evangelical Arminianism of Wesley was so different in its tone and its practical effect from the Arminianism of Holland and the same system as held by its English advocates contemporary with him. In the first place, the Dutch Arminianism was early modified by Socinian and other Pelagian elements. The central point in Wesley's creed was always justification by faith alone. Secondly, in Wesley it was not valued predominantly as an ethical theory, but as being identified, according to his view, with the interests of practical religion. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit, of His indispensable agency in conversion and sanctification, was never displaced or lowered in the Wesleyan creed. This faith in the living power of the Holy Spirit, not anything ascribed to unaided human agency, was the secret of the emphasis which was laid on Assurance as a privilege attainable by all believers. From the same source sprang the Wesleyan doctrine of Perfection. All believers may attain to a perfection, which, however, is not a *legal*, but a *Christian*, perfection. It is a state where love to God and man reigns continuously, where there are no presumptuous sins, yet where there are still involuntary negligences and ignorances, transgressions of the perfect law, for which, therefore, forgiveness, through the Atonement, is requisite.

Wesley holds to an inherited corruption, which, however, of itself does not involve the desert of eternal condemnation. We are implicated in the guilt of Adam's sin — how, Wesley does not distinctly explain.[2] Fletcher favors the realistic hypothesis. Watson seems to adopt the federal theory.[3] But the Wesleyan doctrine is that the remedial system, dating from the fall of man, is provided not only as a dictate of divine goodness, but also as required by divine justice in case the race is to be continued in being. The Atonement is a provision under the moral government of God. It is a governmental provision, not a literal satisfaction of the claims of law. It is universal in its design. Regenerating grace is the primary and principal agent in conversion, but grace is not irresistible. The unregenerate who will pray

[1] See, for example, his "Sermon on Free Grace," *Works*, Vol. I., Sermon LIV., and his Controversy with Toplady.

[2] *Works*, Vol. V. pp. 526, 535, 577. Cf. Miley, *Syst. Theol.* II. 506.

[3] *Ibid.* Vol. I. p. 284; Vol. III. pp. 255–257. Cf. Miley, II. 507.

for the Spirit, under a sense of their own inability and looking upward for help, will be blessed with the needed aid from above. The Wesleyan theology insists on the Gospel being a free gift which is intended equally for all, and on a freedom of decision as to the acceptance of it, along with the absolute necessity of regenerating grace. Whatever may be thought of this combination, logically considered, it constituted in the hands of the Wesleyan ministry a most effective instrument in the propagation of Christianity.

There were defenders of Calvinism, in the Church of England, in the eighteenth century. Of their number were Toplady, and Thomas Scott (1747–1821), whose chief distinction was that of a commentator. Ridgley, Watts, and Doddridge, advocates of Calvinism, were dissenters. Nominalistic philosophy and a theory of individualism had now fully superseded the Augustinian conception of race-unity. It is evident that the writers named above are struggling with difficulties on the subject of Original Sin and of Election, which they are conscious of an inability to overcome. They retreat upon the idea of a lessened and qualified responsibility for the sin of Adam. Solutions are suggested only to be given up, or confessed to be inadequate. Election, according to Doddridge, secures such an influence of God on the hearts of the elect that their salvation "should *on the whole* be ascribed to him and not to themselves." Watts, it may be observed, in addition to a like half-hearted, apologetic tone in reference to sin and election, propounds a peculiar opinion on the person of Christ. He holds to the preëxistence of His human nature, which was the first of created beings, and had existed in a mysterious, ineffable union with God the Father. Under the assaults of the champions of Arminian theology, prominent among whom were Whitby and Dr. John Taylor of Norwich, the Calvinistic line — if so it can be called even metaphorically — reeled and seemed anxious chiefly to avoid a complete rout.

CHAPTER II

THEOLOGY IN AMERICA IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES — THEOLOGY OF THE FIRST SETTLERS — JONATHAN EDWARDS AND HIS SCHOOL ("THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY") — THE RISE OF UNITARIANISM: CHANNING, EMERSON, PARKER — THE RISE OF UNIVERSALISM — NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL — THE THEOLOGY OF HORACE BUSHNELL — THE THEOLOGY OF HENRY B. SMITH — CALVINISM IN THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH: CHARLES HODGE

THE settlers of New England were strict Calvinists. Calvinism was the creed of John Robinson, the pastor of the Leyden Church, from which the Pilgrims came over to Plymouth. It was the common faith of the colonists who planted the other New England communities, and adopted the Congregational polity. So it continued to be through the seventeenth century. A writing of William Pynchon, of Springfield, — *The Meritorious Price of Christ's Redemption*, etc., — presenting a view of the Atonement, which is not essentially diverse from the governmental theory, was condemned in 1650 by the General Court, the Colonial Legislature of Massachusetts, and burned in the market-place in Boston. By direction of the Court, it was answered by John Norton, a minister of Boston. In 1648, the "Cambridge Platform" was adopted by a Massachusetts synod. It sanctioned the Westminster Confession "for the substance thereof." The Savoy Confession, which the English Congregationalists had adopted in 1658, was essentially the same as to doctrine as the Westminster creed. It was adopted, with slight changes, by the Boston Synod of 1680. This creed of 1680 was approved by the Saybrook Synod in Connecticut in 1708. But there was an increasing intercourse and interchange of thought with the "mother country." The eighteenth century brought in the Arminian theology, which had

spread among Dissenters as well as Churchmen in England. The Arminian writers, Whitby, John Taylor, Dr. Samuel Clark, were imported and read. What was called Arminianism, coupled with tendencies toward Arian and Socinian opinions, gradually superseded the old creed in the minds and in the teachings of many, especially in eastern New England. The same decline of earnestness in practical religion, which prevailed in England, was experienced on this side of the Atlantic. The "Great Awakening," which began about 1740, was accompanied by the advocacy of Calvinistic doctrines and attacks upon Arminianism. The leaders in the Revival were aided in preaching by the eloquence of Whitefield. Jonathan Edwards, to whom he looked up with admiring reverence, was not only an eminent preacher; he was the theologian of the movement. He was the originator of that modified Calvinism which is termed "New England Theology."

It is pretty clearly implied in a remark of Dugald Stewart that up to his time Jonathan Edwards was the only philosopher of note that America had produced. "He," it is added, "in logical acuteness and subtilty, does not yield to any disputant bred in the universities of Europe."[1] "The foundation of the literature of independent America," writes F. D. Maurice, speaking of Edwards's treatise on the Will, "was laid in a book which was published while it was a subject of the British crown."[2] Edwards is an example of that rare mingling of intellectual subtilty and spiritual insight, of logical acumen with mystical fervor, which qualify their possessor for the highest achievements in the field of religious thought. In this respect, he resembles Augustine, and the typical leaders of Scholasticism, Anselm and Aquinas. Let any competent student take up Edwards's work on the Will, and mark the keen, unrelenting logic with which he pursues his opponents through all the intricate windings of that perplexed controversy, and then turn to the same author's sermon on the *Nature and Reality of Spiritual Light*, or to his book on the Affections. It is like passing from the pages of Aristotle to a sermon of Tauler; only that Edwards knows how to analyze the experiences of the heart, and to use them as data for scientific conclusions. He has left a record of meditations on "the beauty and sweetness" of divine things, when even the whole face of nature was

[1] Stewart's *Works* (Hamilton's ed.), Vol. I. p. 424.

[2] *Modern Philosophy*, p. 469.

transfigured to his vision. We see this cool dialectician, whose power of subtile argument Sir James Mackintosh pronounces to have been "perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed, among men,"[1] overcome by the emotions excited by the contemplation of the spiritual excellence of Christ. Edwards may be ranked with Pascal as an example of precocious mental development. He entered Yale College when he was not yet thirteen. It was while he was a member of college that he committed to writing philosophical remarks that would do credit to the ablest and maturest mind. At the age of twelve, he wrote a letter, which is really a well-reasoned scientific paper, on the habits of the spider, as ascertained from his own singularly accurate observations.[2] His copious *Notes* on physics and natural science, which afford a striking proof of his intellectual grasp and versatility, were written, at least in great part, before he left college. But besides the composition of these, he began, under the head of *Mind*, a series of metaphysical definitions and discussions, which, as emanating from a boy of sixteen or seventeen, are surprising. In them may be found the germs of much that is developed afterwards in his theological writings. A large part of these juvenile papers are devoted to the elucidation and defence of what is known as the Berkeleian doctrine that the percepts of sense have no existence independently of mind; that, although they are not originated by us, but by a power without, that power is not a material substance or substratum, but the will of God acting in a uniform method.[3] The popular objections to the Berkeleian theory are stated accurately, and are answered. Thus the way is open for the conclusion, which Edwards considers to be the truth, that there are only spiritual beings or substances in the universe. There is not wanting evidence of a continued adherence of Edwards to this opinion. In the treatise on "Original Sin," one of his latest compositions and a posthumous publication, this remark occurs: "The course of nature is demonstrated by late improvements in philosophy to be indeed what our author himself says it is, viz., nothing but the established order of the agency and operation of the Author of nature."[4] Here it is altogether probable that

[1] *Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, p. 108 (Philadelphia ed. 1832).
[2] In Dwight's *Life of Edwards*, c. ii.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 669, 674.
[4] Dwight's ed. Vol. II. p. 540.

the reference is to the philosophy of Berkeley. With this passage may be compared incidental statements on perception, in the treatise on the Will, which, however, do not go so far as necessarily to imply the Berkeleian theory.[1]

Locke is the author whose stimulating influence on Edwards is most obvious. He read Locke when he was fourteen years old, with a delight greater, to use his own words, "than the most greedy miser finds when gathering up handfuls of silver and gold from some newly discovered treasure."[2] Yet he read Locke with independence, and not only pursued a theological direction quite opposite to that of his master, but not unfrequently dissents from his opinions and replies to his arguments. Of his relation to Locke we shall soon have occasion to revert.

Edwards felt assured that the reasoning of the current Arminian writers was erroneous and weak. He was quite confident that it could be overthrown with ease. He was offended by the air of invincibility which they seemed to him to assume. He went to the heart of the controversy when, in 1754, he published his *Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of Freedom of Will.*

An examination of the work shows that it is to Locke's chapter on Power that the author was most indebted for quickening suggestions. This discussion, as we are explicitly informed, caused him to perceive that an evil man may properly be said to have a natural or physical ability to be good. Locke anticipates Edwards in combating the proposition that choice springs from a previous state of indifference, an absolute neutrality of feeling, either preceding the act of judgment or interposed between that act and the act of will. Locke's conception of liberty as relating exclusively to the effects of choice, or events consecutive to volition, and not to the origination of choice itself, is precisely coincident with that of Edwards. "Freedom," says Locke, "consists in the dependence of the existence, or non-existence, of any action upon our volition of it." Locke asserts that the question whether the will itself be free or not is unreasonable and unintelligible; and he precedes Edwards in seeking to fasten upon one who asks whether a man is free to choose in a particular way rather than in the opposite, the absurdity of assuming the possibility of an infinite series of choices, or of inquiring whether an identical

[1] Dwight's ed. Vol. II. pp. 206, 207. [2] Dwight's *Life*, p. 30.

proposition is true. "To choose as one pleases," if one does not mean "to choose as one chooses to choose" — which involves the absurdity of a series of choices *ad infinitum* — can only mean "to choose as one actually chooses," a futile identical proposition. In the psychology of the act of choice there is no essential difference between Locke and Edwards. Both represent the mind as perpetually moved by the desire of good. Locke's invariable antecedent of choice, "uneasiness of desire," or last dictate of the understanding as to good or happiness, does not differ from Edwards's "view of the mind as to the greatest apparent good." In one grand peculiarity they coincide: will and sensibility are confounded. The twofold division of the powers of the mind still prevailed in philosophy. We are endued with understanding and will; and mental phenomena which do not belong to the understanding are relegated to the will. The principal inconsistency of Edwards in his discussions of this subject, in his various writings, is the failure persistently to identify or persistently to distinguish voluntary and involuntary inclinations. Inclination and choice are treated as indistinguishable,[1] and yet the one is spoken of as the antecedent and cause of the other. The ambiguity of "inclination" and of its synonyms has been a fruitful source of confusion. It was reserved for the metaphysicians of the present century to establish the bounds between sensibility, an involuntary function, and will. It is important, however, not to overlook the distinction between those choices which are permanent states of the will, and constitute the abiding principles of character and motives of action, and the subsidiary purposes and volitions which they dictate. It is right to add that, however Edwards may have owed to Locke pregnant hints on the subject of the will, these fell into the richest soil; and the doctrine of philosophical necessity was elaborated and fortified by the younger writer with a much more rigid logic and a far wider sweep of argument than can be claimed for Locke's discussion. Locke modified his opinions from one edition to another; and his correspondence with Limborch discloses the fact that he was himself not satisfied with the views of the subject which he had presented in his work. The conviction of Edwards, on the other hand, was attended by no misgivings, and stayed with him to the end of life.

[1] See, e.g., Vol. V. pp. 10, 11.

There are striking resemblances between statements and arguments in Edwards's book on the Will and passages in Hobbes and Collins. Edwards incidentally remarks that he had never read Hobbes, and the same is probably true respecting Collins.[1]

These coincidences between Edwards and the authors above named are really not remarkable. The defenders of the doctrine of necessity naturally take one path. They demand an explanation of the determination of the will, so far as it involves the election of one thing in preference to another. They deny that the mere power of willing accounts for the *specification* of the choice, by which one thing is taken and another rejected. Taking this weapon, the axiom of cause and effect, they chase their opponents out of every place of refuge. Edwards is peculiar only in the surpassing keenness and unsparing persistency with which he carries on the combat, even anticipating defences against his logic which had not been as yet set up. He was anxious to demolish forts even before they were erected. His habit of taking up all conceivable objections to the proposition which he advocates, in advance of the opponent, is one main source of his strength as a disputant. He not only fires his own gun, but spikes that of the enemy.

Of course it is far from being true that Edwards was the first to assert the impropriety of the term 'necessary' as a predicate of acts of will, on the ground that 'necessity' presupposes an opposition of the will which, of course, is precluded when the occurrence in question is itself a choice. I am constrained to that to which my will is opposed, but which nevertheless occurs. That is necessary "which choice cannot prevent."[2] The same objection is made to the terms 'irresistible,' 'unavoidable,' 'inevitable,' 'unable,' and their synonyms, as descriptive of the determinations of the will. If Augustine does not use the above-mentioned terms in an explicit form, yet there lurks continually under his statements the feeling that underlies this criticism; as, for instance, when he speaks of "the most blessed necessity" of not sinning, under which the Deity is placed, "if necessity it is to be called," — "si necessitas dicenda est."[3] But the objection to all

[1] See Hobbes's *Works* (Molesworth's ed.), Vol. II. pp. 247, 410, and Collins's *Inquiry*, pp. 2, 41, 58, 59, 83 sq.

[2] Edwards's *Works*, Vol. II. p. 84.

[3] *Op. imp.* I. 103.

terms implying coercion, especially to the word 'necessity,' is set forth by Thomas Aquinas as clearly as by Edwards.[1]

It is the doctrine of Edwards, then, that the will is determined by "that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition."[2] This antecedent mental state secures the result by a strictly causal efficiency. Moral necessity is distinguished from the natural necessity that prevails in material nature, in that the former is concerned with mental phenomena, with motives and the volitions which they produce; but the difference "does not lie so much in the nature of the *connection*, as in the two terms *connected*."[3] It is cause and effect in both cases. To the objection that morality and responsibility are subverted by this doctrine, Edwards replies that men are responsible for their choices, no matter what the causes of them may be; that moral quality inheres in the choices themselves, and not in their causes. As liberty "does not consider anything of the cause of the choice,"[4] so it is with moral accountableness, with merit and ill-desert. Sufficient that the choice exists in the man as an operation of will.[5] On no other hypothesis than the necessitarian did Edwards think it possible to hold to the omniscience of God and His universal providence and government. Principles which freethinkers maintained for other ends, he defended as the indispensable foundations of religion.

Edwards, as we have intimated, came forward as the champion of Calvinism against Whitby and its other English assailants. He intended "to bring the late objections and outcries against Calvinistic divinity to the test of the strictest reasoning."[6] He scattered to the winds the loosely defined notions of free-will which made it include the choosing of choices, and choice from a previous indifference, or apart from all influence of motives. It is not true that, out of various possible choices, the mind decides upon, i.e., chooses one. Nor is it true that the act of choice starts into being independently of inducements. Although his adversaries must have felt that he took advantage of the infirmities of language, and confuted what they said rather than what they meant, yet it is quite untrue that he was guilty of any conscious unfairness.

[1] *Summa*, Part I. Qu. 5, Art. 4.
[2] *Works*, Vol. II. p. 25.
[3] *Ibid.* Vol. II. p. 34.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 39; cf. p. 191.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 185 sq. (Part IV. § 1).
[6] *Letter to Erskine*, Dwight's *Life*, p. 497.

He had no faith in their conception of freedom, however it might be formulated. But, in prosecuting his purpose, Edwards set up a philosophy of the will which is not consonant with the doctrine that had been held by the main body of Augustinian theologians. It is true that the Wittenberg Reformers, at the outset, and Calvin, in his earlier writings, especially the *Institutes*, pushed predestination to the supralapsarian extreme. The doctrine of Augustine, however, and the more general doctrine even of Calvinistic theologians, the doctrine of the Westminster Assembly's creeds, is that a certain liberty of will *ad utrumvis*, or the power of contrary choice, had belonged to the first man, but had disappeared in the act of transgression, which brought his will into bondage to evil. It was the common doctrine, too, that in mankind now, while the will is enslaved as regards religious obedience, it remains free outside of this province, in all civil and secular concerns. In this wide domain the power of contrary choice still subsists. But Edwards's conception of the will admits of no such distinction. In the room of an acquired slavery of the will, he teaches a determinism belonging to its very nature. Freedom is as predicable of men now as of Adam before he sinned; of religious morality as of the affairs of worldly business; of man as of God. He asserts most emphatically that he holds men to be possessed now of all the liberty which it is possible to imagine, or which it ever entered into the heart of any man to conceive.[1] Of course, there can have been no loss of liberty, no forfeiture of a prerogative once possessed. Philosophical necessity belongs to the very nature of the will. Therefore it binds all spiritual beings alike. This is not the philosophy of Augustine or of the Westminster divines. They held to a mutability of will once belonging to man, but now lost; to a freedom pertaining at present to men in one sphere of action, but not in another.

It is plain that Edwards believed in predestination in the extreme supralapsarian form. He encloses in the network of philosophical necessity all intelligent beings. The sovereignty of God in the realm of choices, as in the realm of matter, and His omnipresent agency, are fundamental in his creed. Sometimes he seems to contend for a naked sovereignty, for the exercise and manifestation, in a certain sphere of pure will. But the impression

[1] *Letter to Erskine*, Dwight's *Life*, Vol. II. p. 293.

is elsewhere corrected.[1] The Arminian objection that, according to Calvinism, a sinful man *cannot* love God, *cannot* repent, is met by a denial. He *can* if he will. If it be asked, *can* he will, the question is pronounced to be nonsensical. He is possessed of conscience and will; he has a *natural ability* to do all duty, notwithstanding the *certainty* that without the operations of grace, he will not, — that is, notwithstanding his *moral* inability. The first is the ground of responsibility; the second, of dependence. Both are absolute.

We turn now to the second great subject on which Edwards entered the lists against the Arminians, for the purpose of recovering the ground which Watts, Doddridge, and other half-hearted apologists for Calvinism seemed to have surrendered. His *Doctrine of Original Sin Defended* did not appear until 1758, just after his death. In this treatise he blinks no difficulties; but, having established by cogent reasoning and by Scripture, with appeals to heathen as well as Christian authority, the tremendous fact of sin, as a universal characteristic of mankind, he endeavors to prove that men are truly, and not by any legal fiction, judged to be sinful from the start, and literally guilty of the primal transgression. To this end, he seeks to bring the continuance of sin in the individuals of the race, onward from the beginning of their personal life, under the familiar law of habit. It is analogous to the self-perpetuation of any habit which arises from an initial act. To prove that Adam's act *was* our act, he launches out into a bold speculation on the nature of identity. Personal identity, he asserts, is the effect of the divine will and ordinance. If it consists in the sameness of consciousness, that is kept up by divine acts from moment to moment. If it be thought to consist in the sameness of substance, even this is due to the perpetual divine preservation; and preservation is not to be distinguished from constantly repeated acts of creation. Our identity is a constituted identity, dependent upon the creative will, and in this sense arbitrary, yet conformed to an idea of order. So the individuals of the human race are the continuation of Adam; they truly — that is, by the will and appointment of God — constitute one moral whole. It is strictly true that all participated in the act by which

[1] See remarks of Prof. E. C. Smyth in the *Andover Review*, March, 1890, in review of observations of Professor Allen (*Life of Edwards*, pp. 59, 60, 297).

"the species first rebelled against God."[1] We are not condemned for another's evil choice, but for our own, and the principle of sin within us is only the natural consequence of that original act. Time counts for nothing: the first rising of evil inclination in us is one and the same with the first rising of evil inclination in Adam; it is the members participating in, and consenting to, the act of the head. The habit of sinning follows upon this first rising of evil inclination, in us as in Adam. Such is the constitution of things; and on the divine constitution, the persistence of individuality, of personal consciousness and identity, equally depends. It is to be noticed that, in defence of his theory, Edwards does not lay hold of the traducian hypothesis of the evolution of souls. He admits that souls are created; but so are consciousness and the substance of our individual being at every successive instant of time. Like Anselm, and the Schoolmen generally, he is a creationist. It is evident that Locke's curious chapter on Identity and Diversity[2] put Edwards on the track on which he advanced to these novel opinions. Locke there attempts to prove that sameness of consciousness is the sole bond of identity, and that identity would remain were consciousness disjoined from one substance and connected with another. Edwards's opinion is peculiar to himself, but there is no reason to doubt that the initial impulse to the reflections that issued in it was imparted by the discussion of Locke. Is an influence of Berkeley as well as of Locke to be assumed in Edwards's speculation? It is really the application of the Berkeleian idea to the mind — a step which of course Berkeley himself had not thought of taking.[3]

The ethical theory of Edwards is propounded in his masterly

[1] Edwards's *Works*, Vol. II. p. 543. [2] Locke's *Essay*, B. II. c. 27.

[3] Professor Fraser, in his ed. of Berkeley's Writings (Vol. I. p. 179, n. 91), says: "In several of his writings Edwards approaches the peculiar doctrines of Berkeley regarding the material world. It is worthy of note that when Berkeley was in Rhode Island, Edwards was settled in Massachusetts." See, also, Vol. II. p. 155 n. An elaborate paper from the pen of Prof. E. C. Smyth, published in the *Proceedings of the Am. Antiq. Soc.* (1895), discusses the "Early Writings of Jonathan Edwards, 1714–1726." Professor Smyth writes after a careful study of the manuscripts. His conclusion is adverse to the supposition that Edwards had read Berkeley. "From across the waters," says Professor Smyth, "the minds that were most stirring his own were, in physics, Sir Isaac Newton's; in philosophy, Locke's." The paper referred to is highly instructive respecting the dates and chronological relation of these early writings of Edwards.

treatise on the "Nature of True Virtue." He does not content himself, as philosophers before him had so often done, with the inquiry, What is the abstract quality of virtue, or the foundation of moral obligation? but he sets forth the nature of virtue in the concrete, or the principle of goodness. This he finds to be benevolence, or love to intelligent being. It is love to the entire society of intelligent beings according to their rank, or, to use his phrase, "the amount of being" which belongs to them. It is thus a proportionate love; supreme and absolute as regards God, limited as regards inferior beings. Under this conception, ethics and religion are inseparably connected. True love to man is love to him as being, or as having being in himself, and is indissolubly connected, if it be real and genuine, with a proportionately greater love to God. This benevolence, which embraces in itself all goodness, is the fountain and essence of specific virtues. It is described as a propensity to being, a union of heart to intelligent being, a consent to being, which prompts one to seek the welfare of the objects loved. It is not synonymous with delight in the happiness of others, but is the spring of that delight. Now, he who actually exercises this love delights in the same love when it is seen in others; and this delight induces and involves an additional love to them, the love of complacency. There is a spiritual beauty in benevolence which is perceived only through experience. The relish which this beauty excites and gratifies is possible only to him who is himself benevolent. There is a rectitude in benevolence, a fitness to the nature of the soul and the nature of things; and the perception of this rectitude awakens the sense of obligation, and binds all men to be benevolent. The natural conscience makes a man uneasy "in the consciousness of doing that to others which he should be angry with them for doing to him, if they were in his case, and he in theirs." This feeling may be resolved into a consciousness of being inconsistent with himself, of a disagreement with his own nature. With the feeling of approbation and disapprobation, there is joined a sense of desert, which consists in a natural agreement, proportion, and harmony between malevolence or injury and resentment and punishment. An essential element in Edwards's whole theory is this double excellence of universal love: first, a rightness recognized by all men, whether they be good or bad; and a peculiar, transcendent beauty revealed only to the good, or on the condition of the exercise of love as a prac-

tical principle. Of the natural conscience in its relation to love he says: "Although it sees not, or rather does not *taste* its primary and essential beauty, i.e., it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to being in general, simply considered, for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that; yet this natural conscience, common to mankind, may *approve* it from that uniformity, equality, and justice, which there is in it; and the *demerit* which is seen in the contrary, consisting in the natural agreement between the contrary, and being hated of being-in-general."[1] The moral sense which is common to all men, and the spiritual sense which belongs to the benevolent, may be called sentiments; but not with the idea that they are merely subjective or arbitrary, and not correspondent to the objective reality. The quality of rightness and the quality of spiritual beauty inhere in love as intrinsic attributes. By means of this distinction between the intrinsic rectitude and the spiritual beauty of the virtuous principle, Edwards built up a foundation for his doctrine of spiritual light, or for that mystical side which has been pointed out in his character and in his conception of religion. The reaction of benevolence against its opposite as being unrighteous and offensive to the sense of spiritual beauty, and as an injury to the beings on whom benevolence fixes its regard, is a form of hatred. This hatred on the part of God and of all benevolent beings toward "the statedly and irreclaimably evil" inspires a feeling of satisfaction in their punishment. Those descriptions in Edwards of the sufferings of incorrigible evil-doers in the future world, and of the contentment of the righteous at beholding them, which grate on the sensibility of most of the present generation, he felt no difficulty in reconciling with the doctrine that impartial and universal love is the essence of virtue.

The disinterested love which is identical with virtue is the antipode of self-love. If self-love signifies nothing but a man's loving what is pleasing to him, this is only to say that he loves what he loves; since, with Edwards, loving an object is synonymous with being pleased with it. It is "the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will."[2] But the proper meaning of self-love is regard to self in distinction from others, or regard to some private interest. Edwards undertakes to resolve all particular affections which do not involve a regard to universal being, and a willingness that the

[1] *Works,* Vol. III. p. 132. [2] *Ibid.* Vol. III. p. 118.

subordinate interest should give way whenever it competes with the rights and the interests of the whole, into self-love. This is true of habits of feeling and actions that are done at the dictate of natural conscience, which may be looked upon "as in some sort arising from self-love, or self-union," or the uneasy consciousness of being inconsistent with one's self. The most questionable feature in Edwards's whole theory is the position to which the natural perception of right and sense of moral obligation are reduced, in order to exalt the sense of spiritual beauty as the one necessary attendant of true virtue. But he is not justly chargeable with displacing the particular affections — love of family, patriotism, and the like — although Robert Hall thinks that Godwin built up his ethical notions on the reasoning of Edwards, as Godwin avowedly leaned upon Edwards in his exposition of liberty and necessity.[1]

In the dissertation on "God's Chief End in Creation," which, like the essay on the "Nature of True Virtue," was posthumous, Edwards "o'erleaped these earthly bounds," and sought to unveil the motive of the Deity in calling the universe into being. He rejects every notion of an indigence, insufficiency, and mutability in God, or any dependence of the Creator on the creature for any part of His perfection or happiness. Every pantheistic hypothesis of this nature he repels. God must be conceived of as estimating the sum total of His own excellence at its real worth. This regard for His glory, or His glorious perfections, not because they are His, but for their own sake, is not an unworthy feeling or motive to action. The disposition to communicate the infinite fulness of good which inheres eternally in Himself, *ad extra*, is an original property of His nature. This incited Him to create the world. That His attributes should be exerted and should be known and esteemed, and become a source of joy to other beings, is fit and proper. His delight in His creatures does not militate against His independence, since the creation emanates from Himself, and this delight may be resolved into a delight in Himself. In God, the love of Himself and the love of the public are not to be distinguished as in man, "because God's being, as it were, comprehends all." Nor is it selfish in Him to seek for the holiness and happiness of the creature, out of supreme regard to Himself, or from the esteem which He has for that excellence, a portion of which He imparts to them,

[1] Compare Hall's *Works* (Bohn's ed.), p. 284; Godwin's *Political Justice*, Vol. I. p. 279 (Dublin, 1793).

and which He reasonably desires to see an object of honor, and the source of a joy like His own. "For it is the necessary consequence of true esteem and love, that we value others' esteem of the same object, and dislike the contrary. For the same reason, God approves of others' esteem and love of Himself." The creature is intended for an eternally increasing nearness and union to God. Under this idea, his "interest must be viewed as one with God's interest," and is therefore not regarded by God as a thing distinct and separate from Himself. Thus, all the activities of God return to Himself as the final goal.

Edwards was acquainted with Hutcheson. "The calm, stable, universal good-will to all, or the most extensive benevolence," and "the relish and reputation of it," or "the esteem and good-will of a higher kind to all in whom it is found," are phrases of this writer[1] which remind us of the American philosopher. But the scientific construction of the theory of virtue, especially in the place which love to God finds in it, is original with Edwards. The younger Fichte expresses admiration for this essay, which is only known to him through the brief sketch of Mackintosh. "What he reports of it," says Fichte, "appears to me excellent."[2] He speaks of the bold and profound thought that God, as the source of love in all creatures, on the same ground loves Himself infinitely more than any finite being; and therefore in the creation of the world can have no other end than the revelation of His own perfection, which, it is to be observed, consists in love.[3] "So," concludes Fichte, "has this solitary thinker of North America risen to the deepest and loftiest ground which can underlie the principle of morals: universal benevolence which in us, as it were, is potentially latent, and in morality is to emerge into full consciousness and activity, is only the effect of the bond of love, which encloses us all in God." The degree or amount of being is a somewhat obscure idea; nevertheless the German critic considers it a true and profound thought that the degree of the perfection of a being is to determine the degree of love to him. Mackintosh, to whom Fichte owed his knowledge of Edwards, apparently fails, in one passage, to apprehend Edwards's distinction between love and esteem, or benevolence and moral complacency.

[1] *Moral Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 69.

[2] "Was dieser von ihm berichtet finden wir votrefflich." *System der Ethik*, Vol. I. p. 544.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 544, 545.

Shortly before his death Edwards refers, in a letter, to an unfinished work, "a body of divinity in an entire new method, being thrown into the form of a history." It was to treat of the redemption of the world by Christ as the centre toward which the whole current of anterior events converged, and from which all subsequent events radiate. There were to be interwoven in the work "all parts of divinity," in such a method as to exhibit to the best advantage their "admirable contexture and harmony." The conception was not unlike that of Augustine in the *De Civitate Dei.* The treatise, in its unfinished state, was published after the author's death, under the title, *A History of the Work of Redemption, containing the Outlines of a Body of Divinity, including a View of Church History in a Method entirely new.* In its incomplete form it remains an impressive monument of the variety of the author's powers and of the broad range of his studies and reflections. The preparation of redemption, the accomplishment of it through the life and death of Christ, and its effects, are the three divisions into which the book is cast. He compares the work of redemption, which he undertakes to delineate in its orderly progress, to "a temple that is building: first the workmen are sent forth, then the materials are gathered, the ground is fitted, and the foundation laid; then the superstructure is erected, one part after another, till at length the top stone is laid and all finished."[1] Of course the acts of the drama, which are still in the future, have to be learned from prophecy.

Edwards's treatise on "Religious Affections" was published in 1746. His satisfaction with the results of the Revival was mingled with not a little disappointment. A portion of the converts fell back to their former life. Excitement of the emotions was attended by evil as well as good fruits. One design of this treatise was to sift the converts, to distinguish between religious feelings which are sound and such as are unhealthy or spurious. The analysis is carried so far — for example, in the distinction of natural gratitude from pious gratitude, and so in respect to other feelings — that the effect of the book was to awaken in the minds of many good Christians in after days a distrust, the antipode of the Assurance which the Reformers valued as a great advantage of their doctrine. But the treatise presents the author's ideal of religious experience. It makes the indwelling of God's

[1] *Works*, Vol. III. p. 171.

Spirit in the souls of true believers the source of an inward state which the natural man cannot conceive of, and begetting a love of God from pure delight in His holiness, — a love which is the fountain of all Christian virtues. In this treatise the mystical element in Edwards, the elements of insight and intuition in his religious thoughts, find a full expression.

In *Five Sermons on Justification* Edwards includes a defence of the proposition that faith justifies, not as being morally worthy, but as a vinculum connecting the soul with Christ. In an essay on the "Trinity," he presents an ingenious philosophical defence of the Athanasian doctrine. A paper by Edwards on "The Satisfaction of Christ" is one of the most profound of his numerous discussions. He begins with the statement that, where there is sin, something of the nature of compensation is required, — either punishment or a repentance, humiliation, and sorrow which are proportionate to the guilt incurred. No repentance answerable to the guilt of sin is possible to men. This Edwards avers on the ground of the infinitude of guilt. Only a brief sketch of the principal points in the exposition can here be given : —

1. Christ is first presented in the character of an Intercessor. Nor is this conception entirely dropped out of mind in the process of the discussion. As a prerequisite to this office, He must enter fully into the mind of the offended party, as well as the distress of the party offending. This absolute sympathy, or identification of Himself in feeling, with both parties, is necessary to qualify Him to intercede. Without it, His intercessions would not be intelligent on His own part, or acceptable and prevailing.

2. The sympathy of Christ with God and with man, the offended One and the offender, *was perfected by means of His death.* Then and thereby it attained to its consummation. Then He understood fully what guilt involves; He appreciated both the holy resentment of God, and the criminality and forlorn situation of man. We do not depart from the spirit of Edwards's teaching, if we say that the prayer of Christ for His enemies, on the cross, emanated from a state of mind that absolutely meets the conditions of acceptable intercession.

3. The substitution of Christ was primarily in His own heart. It was love, which comes under another's burden, makes another's suffering lot its own, lays aside self, as it were, and becomes an-

other. This inward substitution led to, and was completed in, the final act of self-sacrifice.

4. By His voluntary submission to death, Christ signified His absolute approval of the righteousness of the law, on its penal, as well as its preceptive side. He gave the strongest possible proof of His sense of the justice of the divine administration in the allotment of death to the sinner. Being among men, and one of them, He honored and sanctioned the law both by keeping it, by overcoming temptation, and also by sharing, without a murmur, in the righteous penalty which He had not personally incurred.

The originality and attractiveness of Edwards's discussion lies in the circumstance that it is an attempt to find the moral and spiritual elements of the Atonement, and thus unfold its *rationale*. It is not in the quantity of the Saviour's suffering alone, but in the sources and meaning of it, that he is interested. While holding that Christ suffered the penalty of sin, Edwards not only carefully excludes the idea that He was in consciousness, or in fact, an object of wrath; but he dwells also upon those spiritual perceptions and experiences which gave significance to the pain which He endured.[1]

The "Edwardeans," the theologians who modified Calvinism under the stimulus imparted by the writings of Edwards, and in a sense built on his foundations, were at first a small minority. They grew in numbers until their theology well-nigh superseded the traditional type of Calvinism, although they were divided among themselves into different schools. On the other hand, among the Arminians who looked with disfavor on the Revival there was developed a tendency which issued in the Unitarian movement.

We have first to attend to the Edwardean leaders, the representatives of "the New England Theology." Their general aim, like that of Edwards himself, was to wrest from Arminianism its weapons. Their purpose was to maintain the distinctive principle of Calvinism, the "sovereignty" of God, but, at the same time, to present in pulpit instructions such a statement of Christianity

[1] On the memorial window in honor of Edwards, in the chapel of Yale College, of which he is an illustrious graduate, stands the just inscription: "Ionathan Edwards summi in ecclesia ordinis vates fuit, rerum sacrarum philosophus qui sæculorum admirationem movet, Dei cultor mystice amantissimus: hic studebat, docebat."

as would leave unrepenting men without excuse for not accepting the Gospel. Joseph Bellamy (1719–90) published in 1750 the *True Religion Delineated*, an able and spirited work, in which the way of salvation was set forth. It was read in manuscript by Edwards, and was commended by him. It explains Original Sin by the covenant or representative hypothesis.[1] Yet in another publication in 1758, Bellamy refers to Edwards's unpublished treatise on this subject. In his *Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin* (1758), Bellamy contended that the system is "more holy and happy than if sin and misery had never entered." God could have prevented sin without infringing on free-will. He permits sin, in itself "infinitely evil," because it can be overruled to a greater good. The question whether unconverted persons should be urged to pray for regeneration, read the Scriptures as a means to this end, etc., — the question relative to "unregenerate doings," — was much discussed. Bellamy takes ground in the affirmative. In relation to the Atonement, Bellamy represents it to be a satisfaction of divine justice in the sense that God, consistently with His honor and holiness, can offer pardon to men. Christ died for the salvation of all who will repent and believe. The conception resembles that of Amyraut. It is even said in one place that God "heartily" invites all.[2] This goes beyond Bellamy's usual statement that "God has opened a door for all to be saved conditionally." There is at least a near approach to the doctrine of a general Atonement. Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803) was a pupil of Edwards. In certain places he appears to sanction Edwards's theory of an identity with Adam.[3] But his ordinary and more precise teaching is that men are sinners from birth through a divine "constitution," establishing an infallible certainty that, if Adam sins, all men after him will begin their existence as sinners. But their sin is their own, and not his.[4] It is declared to be a free act. As soon as children are capable of "motions and exercises" of heart contrary to the law of God, they sin, although "they have no consciousness" that such "exercises" are wrong. Hopkins brought in the doctrine of "divine efficiency" in the production even of sinful choices. This is deduced from

[1] See Bellamy's *Works*, Vol. I. p. 300. [2] *Ibid.* Vol. I. p. 383.

[3] See Hopkins's *Works* (1852), Vol. I. p. 199. He published with commendation Edwards's book on Original Sin.

[4] *Ibid.* Vol. I. pp. 211, 235.

Edwards's doctrine of a prior infallible certainty of their recurrence. From this time, imputation is discarded from the New England theology. The theory of the Covenant, with Adam as a representative, is exchanged for the theory of "sovereign constitution," or fixed, established connection. Thenceforward the doctrine was that Adam's sin carried with it, by a divine decree, the certainty of his descendants being sinners from the outset of their personal being. From Edwards's definition of virtue as "love to being in general," Hopkins drew out his exposition of disinterested benevolence. Man must love himself, not as *self*, but only as a portion of universal being. Hence followed the doctrine of "unconditional resignation," or a willingness to be finally cast off and to perish, if the glory of God require it. A doctrine often brought forward by the mystics — for example, in the "German Theology" — is presented by Hopkins and his followers in the hard terms of logic. By them, also, it is made an element of practical piety. Hopkins asserted the sinfulness of "unregenerate doings," and the consequent unlawfulness of exhorting sinners to pray for conversion or to do anything preliminary to conversion. The first duty is to repent and believe. Thus there was combined the highest view of divine sovereignty with the highest assertion of "*natural* ability" and consequent responsibility. The *certainty* of conversion, whenever it occurs, is the effect of the special agency of God's Spirit, in pursuance of His elective purpose. Like Bellamy, Hopkins defends the thesis that sin, as a part of the divine system, although the evil act of the creature, is the necessary means of the greatest good.

The younger Edwards — Jonathan Edwards, Jr. — (1745–1801) agrees with Hopkins, his teacher, respecting the sinfulness of "unregenerate doings" and the use of "means" by the unconverted to pave the way to repentance and conversion. He concurs with Hopkins in his idea of Original Sin. He dissents from his views respecting disinterested benevolence. Regeneration, the younger Edwards defines to be the communication of a new spiritual sense or taste, "*in consequence of which* light breaks in upon the understanding, and joy enters the heart." His principal contribution to theology is his *Sermons on the Atonement* together with his *Brief Thoughts* on the same subject. With Grotius, he denies that the Atonement is the payment of a debt. It is a satisfaction to the *general* justice of God, by which is meant that regard to the

greatest good which leads Him, while bestowing forgiveness, to sustain the authority of law. "Christ suffered that in the sinner's stead which as effectually tended to discourage or prevent transgression and excite to obedience as the punishment of the transgressor according to the letter of the law would have done." The end of punishment is the restraining of others from sin. The Atonement does this because it shows God's hatred of sin and His determination to punish it. Vicarious suffering not being the discharge of a debt, does not bind the Ruler to remit the penalty. Other conditions of pardon may be imposed. The *matter* of the Atonement is the sufferings of Christ. His active obedience is only a condition *sine quâ non.*

Thenceforward the governmental theory of the Atonement became a characteristic of the New England orthodoxy. It is remarkable that substantially the Grotian or Arminian tenet on this subject was set in connection with so high a doctrine of divine sovereignty. But this very idea of God's sovereignty inspired a reluctance to seem to fetter the exercise of it by assuming that God is bound morally to extend pardon to the elect. Moreover, the New England divines were ever in quest of a theology that could be preached and defended against gainsayers. Under their doctrine it could not be said by the impenitent, in reference to exhortations to turn to God, that the Atonement was not intended, in any proper sense, for them; that is to say, did not spring from love to them.

Nathaniel Emmons (1745–1801) was on most points of the same mind as Hopkins. He taught in the most explicit terms that God is the universal cause — the cause of sinful as well as holy actions. But He creates men free, and because *they* are sinful it does not follow that He is, any more than He resembles the poison of the asp which He creates. Men begin to sin, "probably," as soon as life begins, — a fact resulting from the sin of Adam. They are not, however, answerable for his transgression: all sin is actual sin. All sins are "exercises" of will. But in Emmons, as in so many, affections or feelings and will are not carefully discriminated. So strongly did Emmons emphasize this atomic view of character that he was understood to teach that the mind consists of a chain of acts or exercises with no substratum of personality beneath. In this part of his system we clearly discern the influence of Edwards's idea of substance and consciousness as a

continuous series of creative acts. Yet the strongest language is used in the assertion of "natural ability," nothing being wanting but choices to render a sinful man holy. The "unconditional resignation" taught by Hopkins is reaffirmed. Justification is defined to be pardon. Being pardoned, an imperfect Christian is rewarded for the amount of holiness of which he is possessed. But his distinction from an unregenerate person is that some of his "exercises" are holy, while in such a person all the exercises are morally evil. Each exercise is perfect in its kind. On this idea of the nature of Christian character Emmons differed from Hopkins.

Opposed to the peculiarities of Hopkins was another school of Edwardeans, of whom President Dwight of Yale College (1752–1817) was the most distinguished representative. An Hopkinsian in early life, he discarded the special opinions of that school. His system is exhibited in a series of sermons. Dwight rejects "divine efficiency" in respect to evil actions. A discourse, entitled "The Soul of Man, not a Chain of Ideas and Exercises," is aimed at Emmons's philosophy. In it, he speaks of theology "in this part of the country" as "verging towards Pantheism." He is moderate in his Calvinism. He holds to the previous certainty of all events, to the divine permission of sin, that foreknowledge and decrees are "coetaneous." Virtue is founded in utility, — that is, in its tendency to promote the happiness of the universe. Virtue in the concrete is benevolence; sin is selfishness. Dwight rejects the doctrine of imputation. We are not responsible for Adam's sin. Through his sin, we become sinners, but *how* we cannot explain. Nevertheless, Dwight asserts that infants are "contaminated in their moral nature," and that this is proved by their death. Regeneration does not consist in the creation of holy exercises, but in the communication of a new taste or disposition; it is instantaneous, and at the moment imperceptible by the subject of it. Dwight is strenuous in advocating "the use of means" — of prayer, etc. — on the part of the unregenerate.

Excelled by none of the New England divines, after the elder Edwards, as a metaphysician, a theological teacher, and as a preacher of impressive power, was Nathaniel W. Taylor (1786–1858). He was a pupil of Dwight. He undertook to complete what he considered an unaccomplished effort of the Edwardeans to reconcile human dependence and personal responsibility. To

this end he held that the conception of "natural ability" must have a reality and fulness of meaning not conceded to it by them. There is no such thing as hereditary sin. Nor is it correct to say that the soul is "corrupt" prior to the exertion of moral agency. When it is said that all men are sinners by nature, it is meant that under all the appropriate circumstances of life they will sin until renewed by the Gospel. Their sin is the result of two factors,—their subjective constitution in its present condition, and their circumstance. To neither can the fact be exclusively referred. Nor is it certain that an infant, transferred to heaven before a sinful act, would, left to himself, there develop a sinful character. All sin is voluntary. In saying that there is no such thing as hereditary sin, the Hopkinsians were right. But they were wrong in resolving sin into particular acts of will. Rather is sin a permanent principle or state of the will, an abiding choice and motive of subordinate choices; and the same is true of holiness. Man is the proximate cause of all his voluntary states and actions. Into the idea of freedom or "ability," Taylor introduced the power of contrary choice, which he held to be continuous and perpetual and indispensable to accountable agency. Had he gone no farther, his theory would be Arminian, if not Pelagian, as his opponents declared it to be. But the prior certainty of all moral choices was also asserted; and this certainty was admitted to be the result, in each case, of their antecedents. In other words, there is a special order of causes — "motives" they are called — which give the certainty, but not the necessity of their effect. The formula, in a brief phrase, is "certainty with power to the contrary"; the certainty of a persistence of all men in sin, from the beginning of moral agency, until, under the influences of grace, they are converted. Conversion is the superseding of the wrong governing principle, love to the world, for the only right ruling principle, love to God. Taylor brought in the threefold, instead of the twofold, division of mental faculties. The sensibility, the involuntary nature, which is neither morally good nor morally evil, is capable of being acted upon by the truths of the Gospel, and by its movements to become the motive of a reversal of the governing purpose, which is the essence of character. The neutral district in the soul, having this capacity, was considered to be the natural love of happiness — to which the not wholly fit name of "self-love" was given. Thus in man, irrespective of grace, there

is a full equipment for obeying the divine law, for accepting the Gospel. He will not, although he can. As to the connection of the race with Adam, their sinful actions are the consequences, following with certainty, but there is no necessity such as destroys the power to the contrary.

The solutions, which had been proposed by his New England predecessors, and by theologians in the past generally, of the problem of the theodicy Taylor considered to be inadequate. Sin is not the "necessary means of the greatest good." It is not better that sin should exist than that it should not exist. Because it is better that sin should enter into the system, wherever sin is found in it, than that it should, in these cases, be prevented by *divine intervention* to exclude it, the conclusion does not follow that it is a good thing, either in itself or "all things considered." It might and would be prevented, if free agents avoided sinning. As to the exclusion of sin, there are two conceivable ways of effecting it. The method of divine power may be incompatible with the constitution of the *best* system of the universe, in which freedom is one main excellence.

Redemption is a method of excluding sin up to the limit prescribed by wisdom — by a regard for the greatest good — to divine interposition. Election is the plan of God for securing the largest amount of holiness and consequent happiness which the necessary conditions of the system render it possible for benevolence to secure. The plan of the dispensation of the grace of the spirit, as for the dissemination of the Gospel, is dictated by benevolence. Thus grace is not given to all in an equal measure. The elect are such as yield to the influences of grace under the most beneficent allotment of them. One reason for the election of a person may be his greater prospective influence in the kingdom. This was apparently the fact in the case of the Apostle Paul. Another reason may be a more pliable disposition in some. But reasons may exist which are to us inscrutable.

There were many who looked upon "Taylorism," not as a vindication, but as a surrender of the Calvinistic positions. A warm controversy arose in New England. Bennet Tyler, and Leonard Woods, Professor at Andover, were prominent writers against the new teaching of Dr. Taylor, Dr. Fitch, and the defenders of it. The antagonists generally clung to the belief in an inherited, properly sinful, bias or tendency to evil-doing, an "inclination" prior to

personal choice. They rejected the definition of regeneration as simply descriptive of a reversal of the central voluntary principle, viewed from the side of divine agency in leading to it. And they held fast to the thesis that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and to the proposition that the exclusion of it by God from the best moral system would involve no contradiction in the nature of things.

The New England theology was cast by Dr. Mahan and Charles G. Finney, in a peculiar form which bore the name of "Oberlin Theology." Finney (1792–1875) taught in his *Lectures on Systematic Theology* (1846) that virtue is the choice of the greatest happiness of the universe, including God; that happiness is the only ultimate good, giving to everything else its value; that the principle of love, the only virtue, is in the will; that obligation is limited by the agent's power; that when a man's generic choice or purpose is to promote the happiness of the universe, he is perfectly holy, and when this is not his choice, he is perfectly sinful; that conversion or regeneration is a change of purpose, but in effecting it there is an agency of the Holy Spirit; that Christian Perfection is goodness up to the measure of present ability, which limits present responsibility; that faith, repentance, sanctification, are as truly the conditions of Justification as the Atonement, which removes an obstacle to pardon. The doctrine of "Perfection" was considered a most prominent feature of the Oberlin Theology.

A younger contemporary of Dr. Taylor, a remarkably able and accomplished expositor of the New England divinity, is Edwards A. Park, who was long a teacher of theology at Andover. But his system has not been published. Its peculiar features may be gathered from his critical biographies of Hopkins and Emmons, from controversial papers in opposition to "Princeton theology,"[1] and from a number of sermons. Dr. Park is a champion of the doctrine of a continued power of contrary choice, coupled with the uniform result of like antecedents. He emphasizes the effect of the Fall upon the propensities to inferior good, regards regeneration as a divinely effected change in the "balance of sensibilities," and advocates the proposition that the rectitude of that benevolence, which is the sum of goodness, is a simple idea, and not the tendency to produce happiness.

Surpassed in learning and philosophical ability by none of the

[1] In the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vols. VIII., IX.

New England School since the elder Edwards, was Henry B. Smith.[1] With Edwards, he maintains the idea of mediate imputation. "The race is not a mere aggregate of units, but rather a physical and moral unity." There is a law of moral descent, although not a mystical identity of substance. Because sin is generic as well as individual, we come into the world in a state of sin and death, and liable to penal evils now and hereafter. Sin is an immanent state and preference. But as there is a bond of race connecting us with Adam, so by a natural bond are we connected with the incarnate Redeemer. The salvation procured by him comes to us individually through faith. The Atonement is not a matter of pure distributive justice. It answers the ends of "public justice," — that is, it shows God's supreme love of holiness and hatred of sin. Thus the Atonement is general. Regeneration affects the immanent preference, which includes the affections and the will. It illuminates the mind and gives to the will a new bent.

The influence of the writings of the earlier theologians of the Edwardean class, in particular of the elder Edwards, and of Dwight, was extensive in Great Britain as well as in America. Andrew Fuller professes to have learned his theology from Edwards. The same is true of Dr. Thomas Chalmers. The *Sermons* of Dwight, partly from their attractive rhetorical character, passed through many editions in England, and were much read in Scotland. In America, the theology of the New England schools eventually encountered the hostility of those Presbyterians in the Middle States who adhered strictly to the Westminster Confession. The spread of the theological principles of Dr. Taylor beyond the limits of New England, was a potent influence, along with others, which led to the division of the Presbyterian Church, in the United States, into the "New School" and the "Old School" branch. Many, however, who fell from choice into the "New School" division, did not accept the distinctive peculiarities of Taylor's system.

The rise and progress of Anti-Trinitarian opinions in New England resembled the like changes that took place in England in the same period. In both cases there was a reaction against Puritan theology and in favor of the Arminian type of thought. The English controversial writers on the Trinity, together with the

[1] See his *Life and Work* (1881).

writers in behalf of the Arminian ideas of sin and grace, were, from the close of the seventeenth century, read on this side of the Atlantic, especially in Boston and its vicinity. The "Convention Sermon," preached annually in that town to the Congregational clergy of Massachusetts, according as the preacher was of the Calvinistic or of the opposite school, indicates the antagonism that was more and more clearly coming to the surface. As early as 1722, Cotton Mather, in his convention discourse, expresses alarm at signs of lower views being cherished respecting the person and offices of Christ. English Arians were in correspondence with American ministers. The deviations of Watts from the orthodox doctrine were not without their influence. In connection with a more or less conscious and explicit loss of sympathy with Calvinistic orthodoxy, there grew up an outspoken hostility to creeds of human composition, and a demand for a large charity and liberty of thought on abstruse questions of divinity. In 1747, Jonathan Mayhew was settled as a pastor in Boston. He was of the class familiar with the writings of Locke, Samuel Clarke, Whiston, John Taylor of Norwich, and others of a like tendency. A part of the clergy, on account of his Anti-Trinitarian belief, declined to take part in Mahew's ordination. In his published sermons, he denounces with vigor the habit of magnifying the importance of opinions in contrast with practices. "Since the substance of Christian duty is love to God and to our neighbor," he says, "this shows us what a Gospel minister's preaching ought chiefly to turn upon." He is not to dwell on "speculative points" or "metaphysical niceties," but on the two commandments enjoining love. In 1750, leading ministers in the neighborhood of Boston, and many of the educated laity, had ceased to believe in the Trinity. In 1768, Dr. Hopkins prepared a sermon to be preached in Boston, "under the conviction that the doctrine of the divinity of Christ was much neglected, if not disbelieved, by a number of the ministers" there. In 1782 James Freeman was chosen pastor of King's Chapel, an Episcopal church in Boston. As the bishop declined to ordain him, he was ordained, in 1788, by his congregation. The liturgy was altered by the omission of passages recognizing the doctrine of the Trinity. "The first Episcopal Church in New England became the first Unitarian Church in America." At the beginning of the new century, a majority of the ministers in Eastern Massachusetts were dissenters from the orthodox

doctrine. The division of parties was stimulated and accelerated by the acceptance by many on the orthodox side of the severe tenets of Hopkins and Emmons. In 1805, the election of Henry Ware, a Unitarian, to the Hollis Professorship of Divinity in Harvard College was the signal for the outbreaking of a heated controversy. In 1810, Noah Worcester published the *Bible News*, in which Christ was said to be a being derived from God, but not made outright, prior to the Creation, and entering into the flesh. He broached this novel opinion, disclaiming alike the Arian and the orthodox doctrine. From about this time, the debate between the respective parties, through periodicals and other channels, was prosecuted with increasing zeal. In 1815, William Ellery Channing, who was to become the most distinguished leader of the Unitarians, writes of the Unitarian ministers: "Their Unitarianism is of a very different kind from that of Mr. Belsham. . . . A majority of our brethren believe that Jesus Christ is more than man; that he existed before the world; that he literally came from heaven to save our race," etc. Channing adds that another class, while they reject the Trinity of persons, profess no definite opinion on the subject, and that another class still, few in number, "believe the simple humanity of Christ." In another letter (November, 1815), he says that the prevalent sentiments of the "Liberal Christians" substantially agree with the views of Dr. Samuel Clarke and Worcester. A sermon of Channing in Baltimore, in 1819, was the signal for the opening of a new stage in the doctrinal warfare. In this sermon the distinctive points of Calvinism were assaulted without reserve. It occasioned the publication of *Letters* in answer by Professor Moses Stuart of Andover, the best equipped of the orthodox scholars in New England. Since Hopkins, the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son had been given up for the most part in this region. Stuart's conception of the Trinity is that of three eternal, immanent "distinctions" in the Deity, not admitting of precise definition, and of the true and proper divinity of the Son and of the Spirit. The ablest and most accurate scholar on the Unitarian side was Professor Andrews Norton whose *Statement of Reasons for not Believing the Doctrines of Trinitarians*, etc., appeared in 1833. There being no central authority among Congregationalists, a formal ecclesiastical rupture could not take place. But practically a division was effected, by the ministers of the respec-

tive parties ceasing to exchange ministerial services with one another, or to unite in clerical associations, and by churches no longer coming together in advisory Councils.

Channing is the most eminent representative of the Unitarian movement in this country. It is true that others among the gifted men who have been conspicuous in that school have equalled or surpassed him in some of the titles to distinction. There have been in their number more eloquent preachers. The younger Buckminster was one, of whom Edward Everett declared that he had the most melodious voice "that ever passed the lips of man;"[1] of whom, also, one of the ablest of the early Unitarian preachers, who afterwards rendered most honorable service in literature and in public life — John Gorham Palfrey — has said that his pulpit utterances approached near "to what we imagine of a prophet's or an angel's inspiration."[2] In the graces of style and delivery, according to the taste of that time, Channing was outdone by the youthful Everett himself, in the short time in which the latter served as the successor of Buckminster in the Brattle Street Church. No doubt, Channing's manner was marked by a glow of chastened earnestness, indicating deep emotions held under restraint, and thus had a peculiar fascination of its own. Sometimes, though rarely, he broke out in a more impassioned strain. Of a sermon preached by him in New York, in 1826, an admiring listener writes: "The man was full of fire, and his body seemed, under some of his tremendous sentences, to expand into that of a giant; . . . his face was, if anything, more meaning than his words."[3]

If there were others who had more of the qualifications considered to be characteristic of the clerical orator than were possessed by Channing, it is also the fact that, as a theological scholar, he was much surpassed by Andrews Norton; in familiarity with philosophical and general literature, by George Ripley; and in a certain cautious accuracy and weight of reasoning in moral science, by James Walker. Nor in devoutness of spirit does he excel the younger Henry Ware and Ephraim Peabody. Those who knew Channing remarked in him something delicate, fastidious, patrician, notwithstanding his humane sympathy; and hence in the aptitude to reach directly the common mind he was

[1] *Memoirs of the Buckminsters*, p. 396. [2] *Ibid.* p. 481.
[3] *Life of Henry Ware, Jr.*, Vol. I. p. 219.

outstripped by Theodore Parker, whose robust energy and racy dialect better fitted him for contact with the multitude. But Channing unites in himself various characteristics which conspire to give him preëminence. A clear mind, not wanting in imaginative warmth, a transparent, natural style, neither slovenly nor overwrought, the sympathies and attainments of a man of letters, even though he was not widely read — are manifest in his writings. Superadded to these qualities, there was a sanctity of spirit which was felt by those who heard him in the pulpit, or met him even casually in conversation. It was not simply that he was sincere, and that he spoke in the accents of conviction. It was not simply that he was above the influence of personal motives, like the love of praise and the dread of censure, and that he had a courage corresponding to his convictions. This necessary attribute in a popular leader he exemplified in an inspiriting letter to Henry Ware, Jr., when the latter was desponding over the poor outlook for their cause in New York, and in other more serious emergencies.[1] Channing's eminence is chiefly due, first, to the elevated fervor which inspired his teaching, and which was of inestimable advantage in a movement in which the intellectual factor stood in so high a ratio to the religious; and, secondly, to the circumstance that he embodied in himself so fully the ethical and philanthropic impulse which principally constituted the positive living force of the Unitarian cause. Following out the humanitarian tendency, he acquired, at home and abroad, a high and, in the main, a deserved fame as the champion of justice in opposition to slavery and other social evils.

It is remarkable that the Unitarian movement was confined chiefly to Eastern New England, and did not extend into Western Massachusetts and Connecticut. In Connecticut there were never more than two or three Unitarian churches, and these in obscure towns. One ground of this fact is, that in that State the Episcopal Church struck a deeper root than in Massachusetts. For all who might dislike the style of preaching and the peculiar measures which characterize what is called "revivalism," with its exciting appeals and its prying interrogation of individuals as to their religious experience, and for all who recoiled from rigorous metaphysical definitions of religious truth, the door of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut stood open. Here was a church with an

[1] *Life of Henry Ware, Jr.*, Vol. I. p. 132.

evangelical creed and evangelical worship, where those who were disaffected with Puritan ways, old or new, could find a quiet harbor. Another reason for the difference of which I speak lay in the circumstances which gave to the Edwardeans a complete ascendancy in Connecticut. The old Arminianism was not so strong or so strongly intrenched there as in Eastern Massachusetts. The Calvinists of the older school, from their greater fear of Arminian doctrine, were inclined to coalesce with the followers of Edwards, as is seen in the case of President Clap, of Yale College (1739–66). President Stiles, of the same college (1777–95), was more of a latitudinarian in his opinions and affiliations; he looked back on the Revival "as the late period of enthusiasm." But he was succeeded by Dwight, whose accession to the presidency secured the complete ascendancy of the school of Edwards. The moderation of Dwight in his theological statements, his strenuous opposition to Hopkinsian extravagances, and, more than all, his commanding influence as a preacher and an instructor of theological students, contributed much towards keeping the Congregational churches and ministers in the old path. This result, however, might not have occurred had there been that deep and varied preparation for a doctrinal revolution which had been going forward in Boston and its neighborhood through the greater part of the eighteenth century.

If we would understand the Unitarian schism, we must take into account the fact that there were not only two interpretations of the Bible which came into collision, but that there were, at the same time, two types of culture. Unitarianism, as it has appeared in history, has been conjoined with no single form of church polity. It has sprung up in the midst of Anglican Episcopacy. It has sprung up at Geneva, in connection with Presbyterianism, and close by Calvin's grave. But it has frequently gone hand in hand with literary criticism and *belles-lettres* cultivation. This was the case in the Italian Unitarianism of the sixteenth century, which arose out of the Renaissance culture, and in the Unitarianism that spread so widely among the gentry of Poland. The same was conspicuously true of the Unitarian party in New England. There grew up about Boston and Cambridge a method of Biblical criticism which was nourished by the study of Griesbach and of Arminian scholars of an earlier date. In connection with these studies there was a new and wider range of literary activity, and

an altered style and standard of literary and æsthetic training. Dwight and the elder Buckminster had been fellow-students and tutors together at Yale College in the latter part of the last century. They broke loose from the metaphysical style of discussion which had been in vogue before in the pulpit, and fostered the reading of the contemporary English classics. But they still exhibit a stiff and somewhat tumid quality of style. In the sermons of the younger Buckminster we find that these faults have been outgrown; although even he expresses himself with a certain formality, and with an avoidance of the vocabulary of common life. From these remaining fetters Channing escaped, thereby evincing the continued advance of literary taste. He speaks somewhere of the habit that had prevailed of shunning familiar words as if they had been soiled by common use. In his own style there is nothing artificial and nothing slovenly. As the Unitarian movement went forward to later stages, the changes in the type of literary culture became very decided and very influential. But at the outset, at the epoch when Channing began his career, one feels, in looking at the writers on the Unitarian side, that they have passed beyond the point of bending entranced over the pages of Sir Charles Grandison, and are likely soon to become insensible to the attractions of Miss Hannah More. Theodore Parker says of Unitarianism: "The protest began among a class of cultivated men in the most cultivated part of America; with men who had not the religious element developed in proportion to the intellectual or the æsthetic element."[1] Of this there can be no doubt — that, along with a real interest in theology and religion, there was a very decided taste and aptitude for literary pursuits. Among those who left the Unitarian pulpit to devote themselves to literature or politics are Sparks, Everett, Bancroft, Emerson, Ripley, Palfrey, Upham. If an equal number of leading minds had withdrawn themselves from the pulpit in the Methodist body — supposing that, in its early days, it had possessed so many able and learned men — or from any other religious body not more numerous than the Unitarians were, the fact would be considered very remarkable. This matter is referred to merely as an indication of the general change of atmosphere, so to speak, in the places where Unitarianism appeared. The old Puritan training, with its altogether predominant devotion to

[1] Weiss's *Life of Parker*, Vol. I. p. 270.

religious and theological writers, its austere jealousy of imaginative literature, and its rigid metaphysical habit, was fast giving way to a different and more diversified type of culture. In the circle of students to which Channing belonged at Cambridge, there was a newly awakened zeal in the study of Shakespeare.

Another powerful agency, after the middle of the eighteenth century, had operated to turn the thoughts of men in that region away from metaphysics and abstract inquiries in theology into another channel. This was the discussion of political questions, which formed the prelude to the American Revolution, and called off many vigorous minds from theological controversy to another arena. These discussions were afterwards carried forward with absorbing interest during the administration of our first presidents, when the French Revolution and the stirring events on the continent of Europe to which it gave rise brought forward questions of the highest moment relating to government and society. Human rights and the well-being of mankind were topics of which Channing had heard from his childhood.

Channing was in contact from early life on the one hand with the strong religious influence which was still felt in Puritan New England, and, on the other, with laudations of mental freedom and with the growing tendencies to liberal or latitudinarian thought in matters of belief. With his sensitive, conscientious spirit and his passion for liberty, he responded to both these influences. There were several critical epochs in his mental history. At New London, where he was at school in his boyhood before entering college, he received during a revival deep and lasting impressions, and, as his biographer tells us, dated his religious life from that time.[1] In college he read with delight Ferguson's work on "Civil Society." The capacities and the destiny of mankind, human nature and human progress, warmly interested his attention. Hutcheson especially, the Scottish writer on "Morals," whose glowing pictures of the beauty of universal benevolence produced a strong effect on many other New Englanders, kindled Channing's enthusiasm to a flame. On one occasion, when only fifteen, walking under the trees with his book in hand, these ideas of his favorite author, which suggested to him the possibility of an endless progress and the glory of disinterested virtue, awakened a rapture that stamped the place and the hour indelibly upon his memory.

[1] *Memoirs of Channing* (3 Vols. 1848), Vol. I. p. 43.

But he passed through a sentimental period of considerable duration. He gave himself up to idle musings, to delicious or gloomy reveries. He would stand upon the beach at Newport, and, in a high Byronic mood, long to rush to the embrace of the waters, whose tumultuous heavings harmonized with the mood of his own spirit. He had read the Stoics, and fancied himself akin to them. He wept over Goldsmith and over a sonnet of Southey, and even over the poems of Rogers. It is hard to believe that these maudlin tempers could ever have belonged to a man of Channing's sterling sincerity. He afterwards deplored them, and was ashamed of them. After graduating, while he was teaching at Richmond, Virginia, his more sensible brother writes to him: "You know nothing of yourself. You talk of your apathy and stoicism, when you are the baby of your emotions, and dandled by them without any chance of being weaned."[1] He was weaned, however. At Richmond a revolution took place in his inward life. "I was blind," he says, "to the goodness of God, and blind to the love of my Redeemer. Now I behold with shame and confusion the depravity and rottenness of my heart. . . . I have now solemnly given myself up to God. . . . I love mankind because they are the children of God." This act of self-consecration put an end to aimless sentiment, and morbid revery, and self-brooding. Thenceforward it should be his undivided purpose to serve God and mankind, oblivious of self. Of this moral crisis in Channing's course we might be glad to have more definite knowledge. It does not appear that perplexities of doctrine or metaphysical problems, such as we might look for in a New Englander sprung from the Puritan stock, disturbed his thoughts in the least at that critical time. In truth, at all times moral and spiritual relations were uppermost in his mind. His strongest objection to the doctrine of the Trinity is the practical perplexities which he supposed it to occasion in worship; his objections to Calvinism are not so much logical, but lie principally in what he terms the moral argument against it. He was never fond of Priestley. In this case, to be sure, the materialistic and necessarian theories of this author were repugnant to his convictions. Much as he honored Locke as a man, and frequently as he refers to him as an example of Anti-Trinitarian belief in conjunction with high intellectual endowments, Locke's philosophical tenets were not congenial to him.

[1] *Memoirs,* Vol. I. p. 108.

He was delivered from them by his favorite writer, Price, whose dissertations won him over to the intuitive school, and who contributed essentially to the formation of his philosophical and theological opinions. This author is really a lucid as well as an animated expositor of the spiritual, in opposition to the empirical, philosophy. He vindicates the reality of *a priori* truth in the spirit of Cudworth. The genial tone of Price and his Anti-Trinitarian opinions also recommended him to Channing's favor.

There is one link of connection between Channing and the earlier New England theologians. This is through Hopkins, who was a minister at Newport in the youth of Channing, and had not a little personal intercourse with him. A notice of his relation with Hopkins brings us naturally to one of the cardinal features of Channing's religious system. He says: "I was attached to Dr. Hopkins chiefly by his theory of disinterestedness. I had studied with great delight during my college life the philosophy of Hutcheson and the stoical morality, and these had prepared me for the noble, self-sacrificing doctrines of Dr. Hopkins."[1] The theory of virtue to which Channing alludes was unfolded in its essential points by Jonathan Edwards. Holiness, goodness, virtue — moral excellence, by whatever name it may be called — consists in Love. It is love towards the universal society of intelligent beings, of which God is the head. This love is impartial; it goes out to every being, and gives to each his due portion. God, the infinite One, is entitled to love without limit. Every one who is of the same order of being as myself I am to love equally with myself. Love is disinterested. I am to love myself not as *my* self, but only as one member of this universal society — a member whose welfare is a proper object of pursuit, not less and not more than is the welfare of any other human being, every other one being of equal worth or value. Self is merged in the sum total of being, as a drop in the ocean. It is obvious that Love, as thus defined, has two directions: one upward to God, and the other outward towards our fellow-men. Not that piety and philanthropy, in their true and perfect form, are really separable from one another; yet it is quite possible for the feelings of adoration, devotion, submission, and the whole religious side of love to engross as it were the mind, so that the interests of man and of human life in this mundane sphere, except so far as man is to be prevented from inflict-

[1] *Memoirs*, Vol. I. p. 137.

ing dishonor on God and ruin upon himself by that means, should be left in the background. God is to be exalted and glorified — this is the main thought. Such was the tendency of Calvinism; of Calvinism in New England as elsewhere. All such statements are, indeed, subject to much qualification. Calvinists demanded righteousness of conduct. Channing was taught by Hopkins to hate slavery. This intrepid old man lifted his voice against slavery and the slave-trade in Newport, when that town was a principal mart of this iniquitous traffic. But, speaking generally, it was the first and great commandment, and the feelings directly involved in it, that mainly absorbed the attention. It was not absolutely forgotten that the second commandment is "like unto it." The duties of man to his neighbor were placed on the ground of religious obligation. But an active, warm-hearted, many-sided philanthropy, which looks after the temporal as well as the eternal interests of mankind, and goes out with tender sympathy to minister to suffering of every kind; which raises hospitals, builds comfortable habitations for the honest poor, visits those who are sick and in prison, cherishes a conception of education as comprehensive as the faculties of the mind — such a spirit of philanthropy was not characteristic of the religion of New England, and Channing and Unitarianism have done much to promote it. The disinterested benevolence of Edwards and Hopkins now turned from lofty and sometimes almost ecstatic meditations upon the sovereignty and perfection of God, and the iteration of the solemn demand to submit to His authority and to live to His glory, to the man-ward side of this principle. Edwards was transported by visions of the sweetness of Christ and of the sublime attributes of God; Channing, by the exalted nature and infinite possibilities of man.

The *dignity of human nature*, then, was a fundamental article in Channing's creed. In every human being there is the germ of an unbounded progress. An unspeakable value belongs to him. His nature is not to be vilified. A wrong done to him is like violence offered to an angel.

This idea of the dignity of man is a great Christian truth. No one can doubt that it was a living conviction in Channing's mind. It imparted to him that "enthusiasm of humanity" which became the passion of his soul. He was not equally impressed by another side to the picture. "It is dangerous," says Pascal, "to make man

see how he is on a level with the brutes, without showing him his greatness. It is dangerous, again, to make him see his greatness without seeing his baseness. . . . Let man estimate himself at his real value. Let him love himself, if he has in him a nature capable of good; but let him not love on this account the vilenesses that belongs to it. Let him despise himself, because this capacity is waste; but let him not on this account despise this natural capacity. Let him hate himself; let him love himself." Channing considered the Church in all past ages to have been immersed in error on religious themes of capital importance. This was his judgment respecting the churches of the Reformation, as well as the church of the Middle Ages. On these topics, which stand in the forefront of Christian theology, he frankly and boldly, but always without bitterness or malignity, declared that the leading Reformers were the victims of superstition. The movement of which he was an advocate was represented as a new instauration of Christianity. The light which had been obscured by dismal clouds had at last broken forth in its full illuminating power. He openly, though without the least arrogance, claims the character of an innovator and a dissentient.

The orthodox critics of Channing miss in him a strong grasp of sin as a principle, revealing itself in multiform expressions or phenomena, entering into numberless phases of manifestation, exercising sway in mankind, and holding fast the will in a kind of bondage. The diversified forms of selfish and unrighteous action are not habitually traced back by him to the *fons et origo malorum* — the mysterious alienation of men from the fellowship of God. The moral malady is not explored to its sources; and hence the tendency is to treat it with palliatives. He is too much inclined to rely on education to do the work of regeneration. He speaks of customary accusations of sin brought against mankind as exaggerated. In dealing with the doctrine of Man, Channing was captivated by an ideal. He saw what man might be, what man ought to be; but not so clearly what man really is.

It must be remembered that the real point of controversy between the two parties in New England was the doctrine of Sin and the correlated doctrine of Conversion. The field of debate was Anthropology. The New England mind was not speculative; and Jonathan Edwards was almost the only one of our divines who showed an extraordinary talent or relish for speculative

divinity. It was the practical side of theology, sin and regeneration in their relation to the conditions of human responsibility, that interested his successors. They wanted to make Calvinism self-consistent, and to parry objections that arose in the minds of their own hearers, or were disseminated by the English Arminian writers. It is remarkable, although the Trinity and the person of Christ were nominally the subject of contention in the Unitarian controversy, how little of importance was contributed on either side to the elucidation of these topics. Even Norton and Stuart, the best-equipped disputants, say little that had not been said before.

The next of the leading ideas of Channing was that of the Fatherhood of God. Against the Calvinistic assertion of the sovereignty of God, he was never tired of proclaiming God's paternal character. He meant and professed to follow the Scriptures; but he dwelt on the paternal relation of God to mankind, and insisted less on the fact that a relation which is practically subverted by their disloyalty can be restored only by their return to filial allegiance. The severe side, the side of judgment and penalty, which is adapted to produce fear, had been held up to view, sometimes disproportionately. Both Edwards and Hopkins had stated in the baldest language that the righteous in heaven would derive satisfaction from contemplating the torments of the lost. This conclusion they supposed to follow by an irresistible logic from the justice of the appointed penalty — as if a due sympathy with the righteous administration of law requires that we should attend and enjoy public executions. In the powerful reaction against representations of this character, against the corresponding portraiture of God, against sensuous pictures of retributive torment, and the predominant appeals to fear, the Unitarians tended to divest religion of those elements which awaken dread in the guilty. Channing, when he was a boy, not only never killed a bird, and avoided crushing an insect, but he let rats out of a trap to save them from being drowned.[1]

What was Channing's conception of Christ? Christ was a preexistent rational creature, an angel or spirit of some sort, who had entered into a human body. He was not even a man except so far as His corporeal part is concerned, but was a creature from some upper sphere. The particular conception which Channing

[1] *Memoirs*, Vol. I. p. 40.

set up in the room of the church doctrine of the Incarnation is one of the crudest notions which the history of speculation on this subject has ever presented. The transitional character of Channing's type of theology is strikingly indicated in this indefinite, unphilosophical sort of Arianism, to which it would seem that he adhered to the end.

Channing did not absolutely renounce the orthodox opinion. Having referred to the opposite view, he says: "Many of us are dissatisfied with this explanation, and think that the Scriptures ascribe the remission of sins to Christ's death, with an emphasis so peculiar that we ought to consider this event as having a special influence in removing punishment, though the Scriptures may not reveal the way in which it contributes to this end." But, in keeping with his transitional position, he lays no stress on this truth. On the contrary, he is unsparing, though never intentionally unfair or extravagant, in his denunciation of the current expressions in which it is set forth. Either from a want of familiarity with the history of doctrine, or from not being addicted to patient intellectual analysis, he is content with giving expression to his revolted feeling. He does not stop to inquire whether a profound truth may not be contained in a statement which, if literally taken, is obnoxious. Nor does he attempt to separate a particular representation of some school in theology from the underlying truth which theology, with varying degrees of success, has been endeavoring to formulate.

Apart from his criticism of adverse views, Channing's positive idea is that Christ does His work of reclaiming men from sin by teaching truth, which is recommended by His spotless character and by His death, and confirmed as having authority by His miracles, especially His resurrection from the dead. Of the teaching of Christ, especially of His ethical teaching, and of the unapproachable beauty and perfection of His character, it is well known that Channing has written much that is admirable. When we inquire specifically what the capital points of that doctrine are which Christ was sent into the world to announce, we find them to be the doctrine of God the Father, and of the immortality of the soul. This last truth is brought home to men's belief by the resurrection of Jesus. These two truths are singled out by Channing, in writing on Christian Evidences, as most important points of the Saviour's teaching. The paternal character of God is de-

clared and evinced, and thereby superstitions and gloomy fears growing out of them are dispelled; and the soul's destiny to survive death is vividly exhibited, and is also proved, by the raising of Jesus from the dead. The Christian revelation is reduced in its contents substantially to these two articles of faith.

It might have been predicted, from the analogies of experience, that the Liberal movement would not stop with the abandonment of the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement, and with the resolution of Christianity into the inculcation of an elevated monotheism, coupled with the truth of immortality, and verified by miracles.[1] A ferment like that which Channing and his associates excited could not stop where it began. In such an atmosphere changes occur fast. The revolution of thought, like political revolutions, could not halt where its authors might wish it to stop, but must move on to more advanced stages.

The first remarkable phenomenon was the development of the Intuitional Theory, if so it may be styled. Schleiermacher, and the French and German philosophers, were read by some. The thoughts of these writers fell into a genial soil. Religious truth, which the older Unitarians, after the manner of Locke and Paley, received on the ground of miraculous proof, was now affirmed to be evident to the soul independently of that species of evidence, which was pronounced to be of secondary value. This view of things involved a carrying of mental freedom further than had been anticipated. It was supposed to threaten the basis of supernaturalism. It awakened alarm. Professor Norton, learned in New Testament criticism and in the early patristic literature, in an address to the Cambridge Divinity School, in 1839, uttered a warning against the new doctrine of a light within the soul, as the latest form of infidelity. Spinoza, Schleiermacher, De Wette, and kindred spirits, were put under the ban, and their followers excom-

[1] Among the works which throw light on the history of Unitarianism in New England, in its successive phases, are the *Memoirs of Dr. Buckminster* and of *J. S. Buckminster*, *Channing's Memoirs* (by W. H. Channing), the *Life of Dr. Gannett* (by his son), the *Biographies of Parker* (by Weiss and by Frothingham), Frothingham's *Transcendentalism*, and the *Memoir of Margaret Fuller*: also, *History of the Unitarians in the U.S.* (by J. H. Allen), articles on *Unitarianism* and on *Channing* (by J. W. Chadwick) in Johnson's *Encyclopædia*, (new ed.). See, also, a learned article on the *History and Literature of the Unitarian Controversy* (by E. H. Gillett), *Historical Magazine*, 2d series, April, 1871.

municated with bell and candle. His position was that "no proof of the divine commission of Christ could be afforded save through miraculous displays of God's power." "No rational man," he said, "can suppose that God has miraculously revealed facts which the very constitution of our nature enables us to perceive." To this address, Mr. George Ripley responded in a scholarly and trenchant pamphlet, in which he earnestly vindicated Schleiermacher and others from the charge of infidelity, and proved by citations from eminent theologians that the internal proof of the Gospel had been considered by the deepest thinkers of various schools the principal evidence of its divine origin.

In this discussion both Ripley and Theodore Parker, who wrote under a *nom de plume* on the same side, professed their belief in the historical reality of the Gospel miracles. By degrees the Transcendental School, of which Ralph Waldo Emerson was the inspiring genius, although he could never act as the general of a party, emerged into a distinct flourishing life. In 1832 Emerson had resigned his office as a pastor in Boston, for the reason that he was not willing to administer the Lord's Supper. He printed by way of explanation a sermon to show that it was not meant to be a perpetual observance. In 1836, in a published address to the Divinity School at Cambridge, he brought forward his characteristic ideas respecting religion, which were considered by the conservative Unitarians to be pantheistic in their import. His utterances won a slowly increasing sympathy and excited, at the same time, an ardent opposition. In this new teaching Christianity was not recognized as a specially revealed or authoritative religion. Inspiration is not limited to the men of the Bible; the soul has voices within it which reveal eternal truth: let the individual hearken for these utterances of the universal spirit, and no longer lean on the crutches of authority. The maxim "Every man his own prophet" seemed to some to need no further verification when Mr. Emerson, professing a carelessness of logic, as with the insight though with none of the assumption of an oracle, and with the subtile, exquisite charm of his peculiar genius, began to improvise in the hearing of sympathetic listeners of both sexes.

A crisis in the development of Unitarianism was reached when Theodore Parker, in 1841, delivered a discourse on "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity," in which the New Testament narratives of miracles were pronounced to be myths. In

1842 he set forth his opinions more fully in a volume entitled *Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion.* Miracles were relegated by Parker to the transient in Christianity, and by him Christianity was classified with the ethnic religions as a purely natural product. Without renouncing theism, he affirmed that its doctrine issues from the progress of religion on the plane of nature, and is not derived from supernatural teaching. The truths which the Unitarians had made the sum and substance of the Gospel he asserted that we know intuitively. What need, then, to use Paley's phrase, of "the splendid apparatus of miracles," to prove what we already know by the light of Nature? The immortality of the soul, it had been said, is established by the resurrection of Jesus. But it is easier, Parker declared, to prove that we are immortal than to prove the resurrection. In short, he pronounced the evidence of miracles superfluous: there was no *dignus vindice nodus.* If there was nothing to prove, why should there be any proof? The essentials of Christianity had been reduced to a *minimum;* that minimum Parker conveyed over to natural theology. His opinions at first encountered a pretty general protest from the side of the Unitarian clergy and churches.

As between the older Unitarians and the orthodox, so now between the conservative Unitarians and the Radicals, there was a striking difference in the type of culture. The intuitional party had given a hospitable and eager welcome to the continental literature, not only to the metaphysicians and theologians, like Cousin, Schleiermacher, and De Wette, but also to the poets and critics — to such as Herder and Schiller, and especially to Goethe. Carlyle's critical essays, before and after he began to pour out the powerful jargon which became the characteristic of his style, were eagerly read, and the new evangel of sincerity, unconscious genius, and hero-worship mingled its stream in the current already swollen by its Teutonic tributaries. The memoir of that woman of rare intellectual gifts, Margaret Fuller, gives one a lively impression of the enthusiasm awakened by the European authors. To men like Professor Norton, a student of German, but who had derived no very agreeable conception of the German mind from the earlier Rationalistic writers whom he had been called upon to confute — to men like him, highly cultivated, according to the older standard, by the perusal of Locke and the English classics, and whose favorite poet was not Goethe but Mrs. Hemans, this influx of

continental speculative mysticism and poetry was odious in the extreme. Some of the devotees of the new culture cherished ardent visions of an improved organization of society, in which existing abuses and hindrances to intellectual progress should be swept away. The Brook Farm Association, with its highly educated circle of members, was one fruit of this class of ideas.

Mr. Parker was not the man to hide his light under a bushel. The open avowal in the pulpit of opinions which had commonly been considered infidel, made it necessary to draw lines. This, on several accounts, was awkward. There was, to be sure, a real difference between those who admitted and those who denied a miraculous element in Christianity. But the promoters of the Unitarian movement had made large professions of liberality. They had called for an unrestricted mental freedom. They had uttered a constant protest against "the system of exclusion," which thrusts men out of the pale of the Church for their opinions. They had made it a merit to cast off the yoke of creeds. Now it seemed requisite to construct a creed, to define Christianity, to separate between liberality and license, and practically to excommunicate ministers, not for an alleged want of the Christian spirit, but for their doctrines. No one will doubt that the appearance of Parkerism was a highly unwelcome phenomenon, and a rather unmanageable one, to the leading representatives of the liberal theology. What added to the difficulty was, that there might not be that amount of agreement among themselves which would appear requisite if a creed were to be framed that should embrace even so much as a tolerably precise definition of the authority to be ascribed to the Scriptures and to Christ.

Channing naturally leaned strongly to an intuitional philosophy. We have seen how he was drawn away from Locke by the influence of Price. He had made much of the moral and spiritual faculties of man, and of the spontaneous response which the contents of the Gospel call forth from human nature. There were not wanting, then, affinities to draw him towards the new school of Liberals. On the other hand, however, he was deeply attached to historical Christianity. His biography contains a number of memorable and beautiful letters in which he expresses himself respecting Parkerism temperately but frankly. In their whole tone they manifest, in the most attractive way, the loveliness of his Christian spirit. He felt that a rejection of the miracles was

a rejection of Christ. The miracles, he says, are so interwoven with His history that, if they are torn away, nothing is left; that history is turned into fable; the historical Christ is gone. But why not let Him go? First, the soul craves not only the *idea*, but the *existence*, of perfection. Christian truth without Christ and His character loses a great portion of its quickening power. The miracles are among the manifestations of Christ's character; they are symbolical of His spiritual influence — for these reasons they cannot be spared. The miracles are credible. God could not approach a darkened, sensual world by mere abstract teaching. The inward perfection of Christ is itself a miracle, which renders the outward acts of superhuman power easy of belief. Channing recoils from pantheism, which he sees to be latent in the mind of the new school of "true spiritualists." Speaking of a sermon which he had heard on "the loneliness of Christ," he says: "I claim little resemblance to my divine Friend and Saviour, but I seem doomed to drink of this cup with Him to the last. I see and feel the harm done by this crude speculation, while I also see much nobleness to bind me to its advocates. In its opinions generally I see nothing to give me hope. . . . The immense distance of us all from Christ" in character is a fact so obvious that not to recognize it implies such a degree of self-ignorance, and of ignorance of human history, "that one wonders how it can have entered a sound mind."[1] In these letters there is no unseemly denunciation, but there is genuine, manly sorrow at the promulgation of opinions that are regarded as undermining historical Christianity.

From about the time of Parker's innovations in theology, the conservative class of Unitarians, who resisted them, were generally, although not universally, simple humanitarians in their doctrine concerning Christ. They discarded the belief of Channing in His preëxistence as an exalted creature. But the repugnance to Parker's negative positions gradually lessened. He came to be commonly recognized by Unitarians as representing one admissible type of Unitarian theology. Even sympathy with his rejection of the miraculous elements and events of the Gospel spread until it became the prevailing sentiment.

The Universalist denomination began in America with the preaching of John Murray (1741–1815), an Englishman, a con-

[1] *Memoirs*, Vol. II. p. 448.

vert to Methodism, and for a time a Wesleyan preacher. He adopted the doctrine of the final salvation of all, which he preached along the Atlantic seaboard, but principally in New England from 1770 until his death. He was a Trinitarian. Another early leader of the Universalists was Elhanan Winchester (1751–1797), who began his ministry as a Baptist pastor. On various points he differed from the theology of Murray. Walter Balfour (c. 1776–1852), a Presbyterian minister from Scotland, preached Universalism in America, and published the *Inquiry*, etc., and other writings in behalf of this tenet. The most effectual agent in propagating Universalism and in giving definite form to its creed was Hosea Ballou (1771–1852). The Universalists have recognized the Scriptures as a divine revelation. They have rejected the doctrines of the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and His expiatory office. At the outset they were generally Restorationists. Later they commonly disbelieved in future punishment altogether; but in more recent times they have often reverted to the former opinion, in some instances with higher views of the person and work of Christ.

By the middle of the present century the themes which had most engaged the attention of the Evangelical party in New England since Edwards's day were beginning decidedly to lose their special attraction. Questions relating to the effect of Adam's sin, to the divine permission of sin, to natural and moral ability, were perceptibly receding into the background. The person of Christ, the Atonement, the authority of the Scriptures, naturalism and supernaturalism, were the topics that were obviously coming to the front. Among those called orthodox, the German theology was modifying the type of theological culture and tendencies in philosophy. To give a single example, Henry B. Smith was thoroughly conversant with the modern phases of German thought. Upon certain able and inquisitive minds, the writings of Coleridge, which were first introduced to American readers by President Marsh of the University of Vermont, opened new vistas of thought and inquiry.

The indirect influence of German speculative thought in some degree, and still more the direct influence of Coleridge, appeared in Horace Bushnell, an original and gifted preacher, but not a technical scholar.[1] If a book was really stimulating, he found it

[1] His *Life and Letters*, edited by his daughter, appeared in 1880.

difficult, he said, to read it through, its effect being to start his "mind off on some track of its own." A few sentences of Coleridge in the *Aids to Reflection* were the germ of an eloquent treatise by Bushnell on "Nature and the Supernatural" (1858). In it the thesis is illustrated that the will by virtue of its power of initiating action is itself a supernatural agent. The first publication, however, which brought Dr. Bushnell prominently before the public as a theological author was his discourses on "Christian Nurture." In this discussion he took up the divine constitution of the family as a provision for planting Christian character in children, and of thus extending the kingdom of God. The organic relation of parents to their offspring, the organic unity of the family, was insisted on in opposition to an extreme theory of individualism. The atomic conception of Christian society was vigorously attacked. It was the design of Providence that character should be transmitted from parent to child. It should be expected of children that they should grow up in the exercise of Christian piety. To take it for granted that the young born in religious households are to be irreligious up to the age of maturity, and are then to be suddenly converted, was pronounced a gross practical error. The main reliance of the Church for the spread of religion should not be revivals and revivalism, but right methods of Christian nurture. Spasmodic excitements and sporadic conversions were of minor utility compared with the silent agency of the family within its own circle. The criticism was made that the author had accounted for the congenital origin and the progressive growth of Christian character on the plane of naturalism, by the law of heredity: there was no more recognition of the agency of the Spirit of God, it was said, than a pious deist, who holds to the immanence of the divine Spirit and Providence in the whole creation, might allow. This criticism, however, was conceded not to be valid as regards the intent of the author, and could be justified only by reference to the apparent drift of a portion of his language. He postulated an operation of Grace, and an operation as immediate as is presupposed in the prevailing creed, in the case of adult conversions. It was evident to all that the book exhibited modes of thought diverse from those in vogue among the principal adherents of the New England theology.

In the volume entitled *God in Christ* (1849), Dr. Bushnell

discussed the doctrine of the Trinity. An essay of Schleiermacher, translated by Professor Stuart, was at the basis of this discussion. This was followed, in 1851, by *Christ in Theology.* In these works it is contended that since language is made up of symbols it is of necessity inaccurate, so that theological definitions are metaphors and creeds are in reality poems. They are only partially successful attempts to express that which can only be set forth in forms of the imagination. Following the hints derived from Schleiermacher, Bushnell undertook to solve the problem of the Trinity by bringing forward the Sabellian hypothesis, — that of the Trinity as solely a method of Revelation, — with which he connected a view that did not essentially differ from the Patripassian theory of the person of Christ. Schleiermacher had been led into his doctrine by his speculative difficulties respecting the personality of God. Bushnell was no Pantheist. Yet he sought to show that personality in the Deity is to us incomprehensible, and appears to clash with the infinitude of the divine attributes. It is through the medium of three modes of personal action that the ineffable One discloses Himself and comes near to the apprehension of His creatures. The Logos is the self-revealing faculty of the Deity; Father, Son, and Spirit are the *dramatis personæ* through which the hidden Being reveals Himself. In Christ, Bushnell said, God manifests Himself under the limitations of human life, — thinking, feeling, suffering with us. The existence of a human spiritual nature, if not expressly denied, was held to be practically of no account. It was substantially the Apollinarian idea. "The human element is nothing to me, save as it brings me to God, or discovers to me, a sinner, the patience and brotherhood of God as a Redeemer from sin. . . . The union of the divine and human, being only for expression, what is there in it for us beyond the expression? There may be a human soul here, or there may not: that is a matter with which we have nothing to do, and about which we have not only no right to affirm, but no right to inquire."[1] This was Bushnell's conception of Christ. God surrenders Himself to the restrictions of a human organization, and subjects Himself to the conditions of an earthly life on our level, as a medium through which to manifest Himself to us. It is all, literally speaking, divine thought, divine emotion, divine action, even divine suffering. This was the fundamental thought in Dr. Bush-

[1] *Christ in Theology*, pp. 93, 96.

nell's Christology, — the thought which, whatever were his mutations of opinion, was always uppermost.

But Dr. Bushnell did not stay by the modal theory of the Trinity. Smitten by antagonistic critics on all sides, he began to explore the history of doctrine, and discovered — discovered more and more — that the Nicene or Catholic definitions embraced welcome features which had been dropped out of later and more provincial representations of the doctrine. There was the great idea of self-expression, — "God of God," "Light of Light," etc.; there was the subordination of the Son, the Revealer, though not in the Arian sense of inferiority of attributes; there was especially a Trinity belonging to the life and activity of the Deity, and not a mechanical juxtaposition of three individuals or "distinctions." "On a careful study of the creed prepared by this council [of Nicæa], as interpreted by the writings of Athanasius in defence of it, I feel obliged to confess that I had not sufficiently conceived its import, or the title it has to respect as a Christian document."[1] However, notwithstanding his effort to prove his close approach to the Nicene formula, he still withholds his assent to the hypothesis of an immanent Trinity. He holds that the distinction of persons is incidental to revelation, which, to be sure, may — but may not — have been eternal. Whether that distinction will ever cease to be, he likewise finds it impossible to conclude. In short, the immanence and eternity of the personal distinctions in the Deity he is not quite prepared to admit. Still later, in an article marked by consummate ability, — the ablest of his contributions to this discussion,[2] — he makes a further advance towards the Nicene standard. Here he argues that the infinity of God engulfs us in Pantheism unless we conceive of Him as a triple personality; the term 'person,' whether as a predicate of the One or of each of the Three, being a figure, an approximative term, and so far indefinable. The "practical infinity of God and the practical personality of God" are both secured by the Trinitarian conception. By some interior necessity of His nature, He is thus "accommodated in His action to the finite; . . . He is eternally threeing Himself, or generating three persons. . . . In some high sense indefinable, He is datelessly and eternally becoming three, or by a certain inward

[1] *Christ in Theology*, p. 177.

[2] *The Christian Trinity a Practical Truth*. *New Englander*, November, 1854.

necessity being accommodated in His action to the categories of finite apprehension, — adjusted to that as that to the receiving of this mystery. . . . We must have no jealousy of the Three, as if they were to drift us away from the unity or from reason; being perfectly assured of this, that in using the triune formula, in the limberest, least constrained way possible, and allowing the plurality to blend, in the freest manner possible, with all our acts of worship, — preaching, praying, singing, and adoring, — we are only doing with three persons just what we do with one; making no infringement of the unity with the Three, more than of the infinity with the One." Here is a certain real immanence of the Trinity. Still, however, there is a relation, as a necessary property of the Deity, to the finite and to revelation; hence a dependence on the finite, at least as a possible existence. It is immanence conditioned on relativity. The Nicene doctrine holds to the Trinity as being independent of such a relation, as belonging to the eternal necessary activity of the Divine Being, because it is the realization to Himself of His own nature. It steers clear of every germ of Pantheism. Bushnell's statement still postulates a potential relation to the finite as the ground or condition of tri-personality. It is evident, however, that the Athanasian theology more and more commended itself to Bushnell's mind. The movement of his thought was in this direction.

Bushnell's departure from the prevalent doctrine of the Atonement was even more provocative of dissent. On the orthodox side in New England there was a popular representation of the work of Christ which was offensively meagre. His death was treated as a make-weight in a scheme of moral government. At a given point a certain amount of suffering was wanted by way of counterpoise to the penalty remitted, and the passion of Christ served the purpose. The defect arising from the limited quantity of suffering was said to be balanced by the dignity of His person. The governmental theory as set forth by the younger Edwards, and before him by Grotius, was the opinion in vogue. The death of Christ was not penalty, but a substitute for it, — an expression of God's abhorrence of sin, equivalent, in respect to the ends of government, to the infliction of the penalty. Very well, said Bushnell, let it be considered an "expression." The correlate of *expression* is *impression*; and if there is expression it must be according to æsthetic laws; it must be in a mode conformed to the laws by

which thought or feeling is conveyed from mind to mind. What are those laws? How is it that the death of Christ is thus expressive? To this question the New England theology, as he contended, gave no intelligible answer. But Bushnell, in his earlier expositions of the subject, gave up altogether the propitiatory idea as a literal truth. Christ, he taught, came into the world to renovate character. This was the one comprehensive end of His mission. Nothing was needed but the reconciliation of men to God, or a new spirit in men. Christ produces this through the power exerted by Him as bringing into visible manifestation the forbearance, pity, yearning, forgiving love of God. Disobedience and distrust are both conquered; they melt away under this face-to-face view of the divine goodness. The restoration of the transgressor to confiding communion with God arrests the progress of that disordered action of our spiritual nature which is the principal penalty of sin. There results a healing of the soul, — inward health and peace. This is the moral view of the Atonement which, in its characteristic principle, was advocated by Abelard. It is not radically different from the Socinian theory. But Bushnell held fast to the divinity of Christ, who is ever present to the believing soul; and he emphasized the truth that our life is perpetually in Christ. He is infinitely more than an example to be copied: he is a power of righteousness. Much that was involved in the old idea of the *unio mystica* Bushnell interwove in his conception. There is a living, spiritual, reciprocal fellowship between the believer and Christ; but propitiation and all kindred terms were declared to be the language of appearance: they are figures, as when we say that the sun rises. A change which takes place in ourselves we metaphorically impute to God. The removal of our distrust and alienation, which sets us at one with Him, we represent to ourselves as a removal of hostility in Him. But this imaginative exercise, Bushnell contended, is necessary to the end in view, — which is the production within us of penitent and trustful feeling towards God. It is the means, therefore, of that change in us which is the indispensable condition of restored communion with Him. The sacrifices of the old covenant were a "transactional liturgy," which was operative in this way. Bushnell's standing illustration is the analogy of prayer. This is not, he tells us, a self-magnetizing process. Prayer is to produce an effect. Nevertheless the effect is only indirectly an effect on

God. He is not changed. The *effort* to change Him produces such a change in *us* that the sole obstacle to the exercise of His beneficence towards us is removed. In this circuitous way we may be said to prevail with God in supplication. In no other way is He said to be propitiated.

It cannot be said that the "altar form," as originally presented, continued to satisfy Bushnell himself. In his elaborate treatise on "Vicarious Sacrifice," he set forth the moral view of the Atonement, — the renewing influence upon character which flows out from Christ, from His sympathy and suffering with us, and His whole collective manifestation. He went beyond his former dogmatic statements so far as to give some place to the voluntary participation of Christ in "the corporate curse" of the race, or in the sufferings which come upon mankind as a retributive infliction consequent upon sin. But he was careful to say that he laid no great amount of stress on this element in his view. One leading proposition, it should be remarked, in this treatise is that the incarnation and suffering of Christ fall under a law of self-sacrifice which is of universal obligation.

It is a fine instance of Bushnell's intellectual honesty that he came before the public once more with a frank avowal of a modification of his opinion on this momentous theme. This was in his *Forgiveness and Law* (1874). He still considered the atoning function of Christ to be nothing exceptional in its principle, to be nothing at variance with general law. It was grounded, as the title-page announced, "in principles interpreted by human analogies." Bnt there had been "an unexpected arrival of fresh light" into his mind. He had caught sight of a meaning and a reality in propitiation which he had not discerned before. It had struck him that in all cases of heavy grievance, even though there is a placable wish and intent, it is psychologically impossible to quiet the resentful, retributive impulse inherent in one's own conscience, save by undertaking some work involving loss and suffering in behalf of the offender. Only by this means is the feeling of forgiveness realized in the heart of the party wronged; only thus are all traces of the vengeful sentiment of justice dissipated. This Dr. Bushnell supposed to be a general fact, holding true of men, and by analogy presumably of all rational beings. It is a fact of experience, however inexplicable it may be. Accordingly God Himself in Christ enters upon a work of self-sacrifice

and self-propitiation. By undergoing suffering, by the cross and passion, He realizes in Himself the clemency which He would fain exercise. He appeases His own justly indignant sentiment. The end was still the recovery of the sinful creature from the guilty and painful bondage of sin. This was the benefit to be imparted. It is to be observed that one leading idea runs like a thread through all his thinking on this subject, in its successive stages. It is God Himself who is active and passive in all the experiences of Christ. They are an expression of God. It is the divine, not the human, which acts and suffers. The human is at best but a transparent glass, through which we look directly into the heart of God. The fundamental thought with which Bushnell started remained with him to the end. There is not a full recognition of the real humanity of Christ.

In this treatise[1] Dr. Bushnell remarks that "the staple of being and capacity" in wicked men diminishes by a natural law, and adds that the possibility is thus suggested that at some remote period they may be quite wasted away or extirpated." The opinion that reprobate men will thus be "annihilated," which, as will be seen, has had its advocates in Germany and in England, has been maintained in the United States in writings of Dr. Lyman Abbott and by other authors. The doctrine — not coupled with the doctrine of "conditional immortality" — of a continued probation of such as do not hear or wilfully reject the offers of salvation through Christ has been supported as the necessary consequence of a general Atonement by able theologians of the Andover School of Theology.

The modifications of Calvinism in the New England theology have met with a steady opposition which has had its principal centre in the Princeton Theological School, founded in 1812. Its doctrines are presented in the elaborate treatise of its most celebrated teacher, Charles Hodge.[2] By him the church doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son is defended. This doctrine was maintained, in opposition to Stuart, by Miller, also a professor at Princeton. On the subject of Original Sin, the doctrine of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin on the basis of the Covenant

[1] p. 147.

[2] *Systematic Theology* (3 vols. 1872). A clear summary of the Princeton theology is given by Dr. A. A. Hodge in his *Outlines of Theology* (1 vol. 1879).

is supported. The realistic hypothesis, which is taught in the system of Shedd, is combated. The relation of Adam is alleged to be that of a representative, acting for the posterity to be born of him, according to a benevolent, as well as righteous, arrangement instituted of God, whereby the penalty of his sin is judicially inflicted upon them. Consequently, they are born with a sinful tendency to evil-doing, which realizes itself at the beginning of personal agency in actual transgressions. This inborn depravity carries in it a just condemnation to eternal death, unless redeeming grace intervenes. A parallelism is affirmed to exist between the relation of Adam on the one hand, as the author and source of condemnation, and the relation of Christ on the other. The righteousness of God requires that all sin should be adequately punished. The Atonement is a substitution judicial in its nature and effect, and thus avails necessarily for the salvation of all for whom it was intended.

The spread of the New England theology, especially in the later developments of the School of Edwards, produced theological contests in the Presbyterian Church. Their result, in connection with other causes of difference, led to the division of that body in 1838, which continued down to 1869–70; the Presbyterian Church of the South, in the interval, in consequence of political estrangement, having broken off from the "Old School" section.

CHAPTER III

THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE EVANGELICAL SCHOOL IN THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH — THE PHILOSOPHY AND THE THEOLOGY OF COLERIDGE — THE EARLY ORIEL SCHOOL: WHATELEY, ARNOLD — THE OXFORD MOVEMENT: ITS SOURCES AND LEADERS: ITS PRINCIPLES AND AIMS: THE TRACTS: THE HAMPDEN CONTROVERSY: THE CONVERSION OF NEWMAN: THE DOCTRINE OF THE EUCHARIST AND OTHER TENETS OF THE OXFORD SCHOOL: THE GORHAM CASE: CANON LIDDON: CANON GORE: J. B. MOZLEY'S THEOLOGICAL TEACHING

THE Evangelical School in the Established Church was largely, although by no means wholly, the fruit of the Methodist revival. If Whitefield was not its founder, he was its efficient promoter. Among the preachers and writers of this school are Henry Venn, Romaine, John Newton, the pastor of Cowper, Thomas Scott, Milner, and Hannah More. Wilberforce's *Practical View*, published in 1797, had a great influence both in Great Britain and America, and was translated into a number of languages. Simeon had a remarkably successful career at Cambridge as a preacher of the Evangelical School. But of this school, great as was the service rendered to the cause of practical religion by it, little is to be said in a history of theology. It formed the strength of the Low Church party, which was prevalent in the early decades of the present century. Its leaders cherished Calvinistic opinions. It was one of their defects that so little was done by them to throw light upon the reasonableness of the doctrines which were inculcated with so much faith and fervor.

The distinction of introducing a new and more spiritual method into English theology belongs to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, equally eminent as a poet and philosopher. Versed in the systems of the later German philosophers, and drawing from these

sources what was congenial with his own thoughts, he still evinces always the originality of true genius. Unhappily, he constructed no system. The most orderly exposition of his religious ideas and speculations is found in the *Aids to Reflection*, and in essays in *The Friend*. But scattered through his writings of a more miscellaneous nature are quickening suggestions and criticisms. Through Coleridge, the characteristic defect of the orthodoxy of the last century, its external and rationalizing mode of explaining and defending Christianity, gives place to a deeper insight and a more profound philosophical apprehension. A fundamental principle in the teaching of Coleridge is the distinction between reason and understanding. It is substantially the distinction of Kant, but modified in such a way that reason is conceived of as the organ of supersensuous realities, by which they are recognized and their existence is verified. It is the faculty of intuitions as to things above sense. With Jacobi, it is described as an organ "bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the universal, the eternal, and the necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent *phenomena*." This doctrine bears directly on the relative place and weight of what are called the "evidences" of religion, both natural and revealed. A second fundamental principle of Coleridge is the distinction between Nature and Spirit. Nature embraces the realm subject to the law of cause and effect. Spirit is self-determining and self-conscious. The will, not being in this network of causation, but self-determining, — that is, originating its own acts and states, — belongs in another and higher order than that of Nature. Coleridge condemns the theory of "modern Calvinism" as really destructive of will, and as dissonant from the conception of early Lutheranism and Calvinism. It is "the difference of a captive and enslaved will, and no will at all."

Coleridge holds of all the ideas of which we are assured by conscience, directly or implicitly, — ideas derived "from the moral being," — that they cannot, like "theoretical positions, be pressed onward into all their logical consequences." On these, the law of conscience, and not the canons of logic, must be heeded. A *veto* at least belongs to this law. Inferences are not to be admitted which are repugnant to the dictates of conscience.

The ultimate source of our belief in God is to be found in the moral and spiritual nature of man. His existence is not literally demonstrable. Some room is left "for will and moral

election." It is a truth corroborated by everything without as well as within us. Scripture teaches us that miracles of themselves cannot work conviction in the mind, — not if a man were to rise from the dead to confirm them. If the spiritual truths "which derive their evidence from within" are not believed, miracles, even were they credited, would be of no practical efficacy. The right order of proofs is inverted by the Paleyan school. There must be "a predisposing warmth" in the soul. Moreover, the attempt must not be made to carry conviction respecting the mysteries of faith by borrowing faulty analogies from human experience. The proofs of the divinity of Christ are in the requirements of our moral being. "On the doctrine of Redemption depends the faith, the duty, of believing in the divinity of our Lord." There is an "utter incompatibility" of the offices of Christ as Saviour and Mediator with a mere creature.

In his posthumous *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, Coleridge has presented striking suggestions respecting the inspiration of the Scriptures. The evidence of the inspiration of the Bible is internal. In the Scriptures, says Coleridge, "I have met everywhere more or less copious sources of truth, and power, and purifying impulses. . . . Need I say that I have found words for my inmost thoughts, sounds for my joy, utterances for my hidden griefs, and pleadings for shame and my feebleness? . . . Whatever *finds* me, bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit," etc. Coleridge does not hold to the infallibility of all parts of the Scriptures. He suggests that the spirit of the whole book is to judge each separate part. But faith in Christ precedes faith in the Scriptures.

Coleridge rejects the Arminian solution of the problem of Original Sin, and criticises Jeremy Taylor's exposition of the subject. His own view is as follows: At the beginning of the conscious life of each individual, his will is found to be determined to the inferior good. This evil direction of the will is common to all men, and is the source of all particular sins of habit and act. This evil disposition presupposes an act originating it, but known only through its consequences. It is a timeless act. "It is a link in the chain of historic instances whereof Adam is the first." It is not, however, instilled into my will by the will of another. The phrase, "the old man," is used in the Epistles of Paul as the equivalent of "Adam," and is used symbolically and universally.

In this matter, every man is the adequate representative of all. That anything further is involved in the relation of our sin to Adam's can neither be denied nor conceived.

Respecting the Atonement, Coleridge says that the four generic representations in the New Testament of this truth are representations not of the redemption act itself, but of its *effects*. These effects are depicted by so many analogies drawn from human relations. The effect itself is denoted by St. John, as far as it can be to our minds, by the term 'regeneration,' involving deliverance from spiritual death. As to the redemption act itself, we are taught that Christ was made a life-giving Spirit, and that the Incarnation, the obedience of Christ, His death for us, which involves a conquest of death for all who receive Him, was necessary. The redemptive act presupposes an Agent who can at once act on the Will as an exciting cause, *quasi ab extra*, and in the will "as the condition of its potential and the ground of its actual being." Regeneration is the sum total of the effect, but its consequences are purification from sin and deliverance from its inherent and penal consequences in the world to come. It is a mistake to attribute to Coleridge the opinion that the atoning work of Christ *consists* in its power to affect the minds of men. That Act is left a mystery on which only partial light can be thrown.

In the view which Coleridge takes of the Church, Coleridge dissents from Hooker. Church and State are not one and the same society in different aspects. He agrees with Warburton that originally they are distinct and independent. The Visible Church of Christ is not to be confounded with the National Church. The former has ministers of its own, appointed and sustained by itself. The National Church is created by the Nation for the moral culture of the people. The Nation, on fixed terms, employs the ministers of the Visible Church, to do the work. The connection, however, is a separable one. Coleridge's hostility both to the identifying of the Church with the State, and of the Church with the clergy, is thus emphatically expressed: —

"As far as the principle on which Archbishop Laud and his followers acted went to reactuate the idea of the Church, as a coördinate and living power by right of Christ's institution and express promise, I go along with them; but I soon discover that by the Church they meant the clergy, the hierarchy exclusively, and then I fly off from them in a tangent. For it is this very

interpretation of the Church, that according to my conviction constituted the first and fundamental apostasy; and I hold it for one of the greatest mistakes of our polemic divines, in their controversies with the Romanists, that they trace all the corruptions of the gospel faith to the Papacy."

From about the year 1815 to the middle of the present century, Oxford was the centre and source of theological movements of great moment. The first of these was connected with what is designated the Earlier Oriel School. It is in strong contrast with the later school, led by John Henry Newman and his associates, which is also linked in its origin to the same college. The principal representatives of the Earlier Oriel School are Richard Whately, who became Archbishop of Dublin, and Thomas Arnold, the head-master of Rugby School. In a sense they stood by themselves. They were not affiliated with the Evangelical Party, not being in sympathy with its tone or with its standard of orthodoxy, and they were at a further remove still from High Church doctrine in any of its phases. Whately, as to his point of view and general spirit as a religious thinker, has been fitly likened to Grotius. He handled with clearness and logical strength whatever subject he took up. In his *Christian Evidences* and in his annotated edition of Paley on the same theme, a quite prominent place is assigned to the external proofs, after the manner of the apologists of the eighteenth century. In his work on the "Kingdom of Christ" he holds fast to the idea that the Church is a distinct society, not to be confounded with the State, with which it may be allied. He approximates to a Congregational idea of the nature of the Church. He denies Apostolic Succession as not capable of proof and as not necessary to the valid exercise of the ministry. The analogies of political obligations are applied to the duty of conforming to existing modes of ecclesiastical organization, and, as an extreme resort, to the right of secession or revolution. In his Essays on Some of the Difficulties in the Writings of St. Paul, he opposes Calvinistic election. This position, with other kindred views, along with his opinions pertaining to the future state — he held to conditional immortality — and his rejection of the doctrine that the observance of Sunday rests on the legal basis of the Jewish Sabbath, were obnoxious to the Evangelical Party. But the Broad Church position of Whately lacked certain vital characteristics of the party bearing the same

name at a later day. This last took a different view of the nature of revelation and of its evidences.

The theological opinions of Arnold are disclosed in his published sermons, his reviews and essays, and in the correspondence printed in Stanley's *Memoir*. Everywhere in Arnold's utterances there is manifest an intense moral earnestness. He gives the foremost place in his creed to the truth of the divinity of Jesus Christ. He rejects the doctrine of the absolute inerrancy of the Scriptures; but he holds that concerning the things of faith, in cases where the Apostles were in error, — as in the expectation of a speedy Second Advent of Christ, — a special provision has been made to guard against conclusions adverse to their authority, and against harmful practical inferences on the part of their readers. He expresses critical views pertaining to the Canon — for example, the origin and date of the book of Daniel — views at variance with the traditional opinion, and foretells that the coming discussion of these topics will produce a commotion like that caused by the Reformation. On the subject of the Church, Arnold reproduces Hooker's theory of the identity of Church and State in a Christian community. Their functions are inseparable. He would make the English Church so comprehensive as to include in it the body of the people, and thus to become literally national. Arnold contends with the utmost ardor of conviction against the doctrine of a priesthood in the Christian Church, a doctrine which he considers to have been the fountain of ecclesiastical tyranny and corruption. Apostolical Succession, and everything which is made a part or warrant of sacerdotalism, he vigorously repudiates.

To the "Oxford Movement," to give it the title usually applied to it at present, Whately and Arnold were always hostile. From the talents of its originators and the interest that belongs to their personal history, and from its profound and, as the event has proved, lasting influence on the Anglican Church in its various branches, the Movement must retain a conspicuous place in the annals of English Christianity. Here we have to consider it in its bearings on Christian doctrine. In that fascinating piece of autobiography, the *Apologia* of Newman, we have an account of the rise and progress of the party of which — up to the time of his secession to Rome — he was the life and soul.[1]

[1] The literature relating to the Oxford Movement is copious. The *Apologia pro sua Vita*, occasioned by a paragraph from the pen of Charles Kingsley,

Newman gives John Keble the credit of starting the Movement by his assize sermon at Oxford in July, 1833, in which Keble discussed the existing perils of the Church. Hurrell Froude was a pupil of Keble, and in his turn influenced his teacher. Froude brought Newman into personal connection with Keble. Pusey, who enlisted somewhat later in the cause (in 1835), brought to the advocacy of it advantages arising from his aristocratic connections, his academic station of Regius Professor, and his repute as an Oriental scholar. The proceeding of these and the rest of the group who participated in the Movement in its early stages, not unlike as it was in some respects to the undertaking of John Wesley and his Oxford associates a century before, differed from it in one striking particular. Wesley and his companions embarked in the work of propagating the Gospel among the people by preaching in-doors and out-of-doors. It was the primary aim of Newman and his friends to produce a change within the Church. Their appeals were to the cultivated class, and especially to the clergy.

The enemy which the Oxford leaders set out to resist and to baffle was "Liberalism." It was the period in Great Britain of Catholic Emancipation and of the Reform Bill. The state of things is sketched by Newman in the *Apologia*, and by William Palmer, a learned scholar who coöperated with the promoters

was published in 1864. It was recast and printed in 1865, as *A History of my Religious Opinions*. The editions after the first introduced some changes, examples of which are given in E. A. Abbott's *The Anglican Career of Cardinal Newman* (1892), Vol. II. c. vii. Church's *The Oxford Movement, Twelve Years*, 1833–1845 (1891), is a sympathetic but candid narrative. The *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, was begun by Liddon and was completed and edited by Johnston and Wilson, in 4 vols. (1893–95). Other important books bearing on the Oxford Movement are the *Remains* of Hurrell Froude; the *Letters* of Newman while in the Anglican Church; the *Reminiscences* of T. Mozley; the *Letters* of James B. Mozley; the *Contributions*, etc., of Newman's younger brother, F. W. Newman (written in advanced age, but of some value respecting J. H. Newman's early days); E. A. Abbott's work, referred to above, together with his earlier *Philomythus* (1891), both of which are adverse in tone, but the first-named especially of value as a careful critical study; the *Autobiography* of Mark Pattison (somewhat cynical, as by one who looks back on his discipleship as a period of delusion). The *Memoirs* of Archbishop Tait, of Dean Stanley, of William George Ward, of Mark Pattison, the *Autobiography* of Isaac Williams, are among the numerous publications which throw almost an excess of light on the general subject.

of the Movement at the beginning, before Romanist tendencies repelled him, and whose work on the Church is one of the most erudite and solid productions emanating from the High Church theologians. "Bulwarks" of the English Church, like the Test and Corporation Acts, had been repealed in 1828. Parliament opened its doors to the admission of Romanists and Dissenters. The democratic principle seemed on the road to a triumph which would strip the Anglican Church of whatever independence had been left to it by former political encroachments. In the progress of political reform ten of the Irish bishoprics had been effaced. Lord Grey had met the spirit of resistance to liberal measures in an uncompromising spirit, warning the bishops in England to set their house in order. It is undoubtedly true that the power of ecclesiastical defence against innovation under the banner of liberalism, seemed feeble. The Evangelical party had somewhat degenerated in character. It could not be counted upon to support measures at variance with Low Church principles. The High Church, not inaptly characterized as "High and Dry," had in it good and scholarly men, whose temper, however, was not adapted to conflict. In it, likewise, among the clergy, there was a worldly, self-seeking class, pervaded by a spirit of insular Anglicanism, in distinction from what may be called a catholic consciousness. Its supporters were, for the most part, inert.

The Oxford Movement was essentially a revival of the Anglo-Catholicism of the days of Andrews and Thorndike. Hooker was revered, and there was a disposition to seek shelter behind his shield; but Hooker cannot fairly be counted among the doctors of this school. Other influences, as Newman has pointed out, conjoined to foster the theological tendency now awakened to a new life. Such was the effect of the writings of Walter Scott, which lent a charm to mediævalism. Such, in a different way, was the impression made by the poetry of Wordsworth. There was no purpose to aid the cause of the Church of Rome. On the other hand, the political concessions to Rome in relation to Ireland formed one of the grounds of complaint. The Movement was a rally against Erastianism. It was an uprising, on the part of a few religious and highly gifted men, in behalf of that conservative, patristic, sacramental form of Anglican piety and theology, of which Laud was the precursor and Andrews the typical representative, which had been cherished among the non-jurors, but

had undergone a long, if not a total, eclipse, at least as to some of its distinguishing features. The ideas and intentions of the authors of the Movement are presented in the document that was adopted at a meeting held at the house of Rev. Hugh James Rose, one of the most eminent High Church divines of the day.[1] It was resolved "to maintain inviolate the doctrines, the services, and the discipline of the Church," "the primitive practice in religious offices," the Apostolical prerogatives and commission of the three orders in the ministry. Dangers to the Establishment was a topic waived for the time in view of graver perils. In some minds, especially in the case of Keble, the liking to the Establishment had become chilled, owing to disgust at the expansion of secular control. Preparatory to the meeting with Mr. Rose, Newman had drawn up a programme, which was published by Mr. Perceval. It is more full and specific than the paper (composed mainly by Palmer) which it was decided to adopt. It comprises four heads: 1. The only way of life is the partaking of the body and blood of Christ. 2. The expressly authorized means is the sacrament. 3. The expressly authorized security for the continuance and due administration of the sacrament is the apostolical commission of bishops. 4. In view of the danger, under present circumstances, that these things will be slighted and practically disowned, several pledges are proposed: (1) to be on the watch for opportunities to inculcate them; (2 and 3) to circulate books and tracts to the same end; (4) to endeavor to secure the revival among Churchmen of daily common prayer, and more frequent partaking of the Lord's Supper; (5) to resist unauthorized alterations of the Liturgy; (6) to diffuse accounts of points in discipline and worship "most likely to be undervalued or misunderstood." The character of this statement may be summed up in one word, — Sacramentalism. It is Apostolical Succession, associated with the efficacy of the Eucharist, and the preservation of the Prayer Book from being robbed of phraseology which was thought to inculcate the views taken of sacramental grace; for this is the motive of the pledge relative to the Liturgy. Other particulars of doctrine were subsequently contended for. One was the authority of Tradition, in connection with Scripture, as handing down the teaching of the Apostles. The authority of the undivided Church, prior to the separation of the East from the West, was maintained by Pusey in

[1] Palmer, *Narrative of Events*, etc. (1883), p. 104.

his *Eirenicon* and in various earlier writings by him, and by the party generally. It was insisted that if justification is by faith, judgment is by works. For other practices, such as the adoration of Christ in the Sacrament, invocation, prayers of a certain kind for the dead, — practices generally supposed to belong distinctively to Romanism, — authority was diligently sought, and not without a degree of success, in earlier doctors of the Anglo-Catholic school. The attitude of the Movement in relation to the Reformers was necessarily that of only partial sympathy, which might easily lapse into antipathy. Not only were the Oxford leaders strangers to that unenlightened hostility to the Church of Rome, which it has commonly been easy to kindle into a flame; they were naturally prompted, both by their own predilections and by their desire to infuse into the current Protestantism phases of opinion common to themselves and to the Roman Church, virtually to take sides on many points with the Romanists. To exhibit the Church of England as one branch of the Church Catholic, the Church of Rome being a coördinate branch; to maintain that for Anglicans there is a seat of authority in the Church Visible, the Church of the first centuries, and a secure possession of sacramental grace through an Apostolic priesthood; in short, to assert the reality of a satisfactory *via media* between Protestantism as ordinarily understood and Rome — such was the task undertaken. The Declaration, in the moderate shape in which it was cast at the meeting with Mr. Rose, received the signatures of seven thousand of the clergy. In a modified form it was signed by 230,000 heads of families. The somewhat informal *propaganda* which had been started at that conference bore its fruit in the *Tracts for the Times;* these gave to the party the nickname of "Tractarians." Subsequently they were popularly styled "Puseyites." Several of the first tracts in the series were composed by Newman. The doctrine on which he specially insisted was that of Apostolic Succession. In the earliest of them presbyters and deacons are addressed. It is said: "I fear we have neglected the real ground on which our authority is built — "OUR APOSTOLICAL DESCENT." The clergy are exhorted to exalt the bishops "as representatives of the Apostles," and to magnify their own office "as being ordained by them."[1] In the preface to the first volume of the *Tracts*, which comprises forty-six, there is the same train of re-

[1] Quoted in Church, pp. 101, 103.

mark. It is said that "Sacraments, not preaching, are the sources of divine grace."[1] In 1835 three elaborate tracts in a series (67, 68, 69) on "Baptism," were contributed by Pusey. They inculcate the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, and the imparting by it of spiritual life. Baptism, it is taught, washes away all guilt. But sins, save venial faults, committed afterwards, could never in this life be fully pardoned. There might be an admission to a lower state of divine favor. But, as Newman phrases it in his explanation of the doctrine of this Tract, there is nothing more "than the *suspension* of our sins over our heads" until the Last Judgment. The contrast between Luther's idea of baptism, as being, through the recollection of it, a source of comfort to the distressed penitent ever afterwards, and Pusey's doctrine is absolute. By this essay space is really cleared for a resort to Confession, to Penance, and Absolution, and for a new conception of the import and value of the Eucharist. Like most of the author's writings, it is thickly strewn with quotations from the Fathers. In 1836 Dr. Hampden was appointed Regius Professor of Divinity. This appointment called out a storm of opposition, in which Pusey and his friends were joined by a large body of conservative Churchmen in the University, who were not of their party. This opposition was based principally on Hampden's Bampton Lectures for 1832, on "The Scholastic Philosophy in Relation to Christianity." It is conceded that he was in truth "unexceptionably, even rigidly, orthodox in his acceptance of Church doctrine and Church creeds."[2] He had even defended the Athanasian creed. His offence lay in his drawing a distinction between the facts of Scripture, the doctrines as there expressed, and the human inferences deduced from them, which he did not consider that the "immemorial judgment of the Church" necessarily bound us to accept. His book was accused of a rationalistic drift. A personal element mingled in the strife, and consequent bitterness. Dr. Arnold's spirit was aflame at what he considered a cruel persecution, and he poured out his hot indignation in the article in the *Edinburgh Review* on "The Oxford Malignants." In the same year (1836), the *Library of the Fathers*, prior to the division of the East and West, under the editorship of Pusey, Keble, and Newman, was announced. Its translations, introductions, and notes were to exhibit from the original sources the genuine

[1] Quoted in Church, p. 108. [2] Church, p. 144.

Catholic theology, before the errors of Romanism or of Protestantism had a being.

For a series of years, the Movement made rapid progress. It was in everybody's thoughts and speech at Oxford, and the ferment excited there spread abroad. The preaching of Newman and his personal fascination were the most potent agency in exciting attention and winning adherents. His influence for a time at Oxford was something almost unprecedented. It was in truth a powerful influence which cast a spell over so many persons of high promise. It was felt by some, as Mark Pattison and James Anthony Froude, who in the reaction from it lapsed into skepticism. It entered as a disturbing force for a while into the minds of devoted admirers of Arnold, such as Arthur Clough, and even in a perceptible degree impressed Arthur Stanley. But the charge made from the beginning against the fomenters of the Movement, that it was really if not consciously Romanist in its character, — some even denouncing it as a treasonable conspiracy to betray the English Church, — was conceived by an increasing number to be sustained by the course of events. Injudicious tracts were published, — notably the tract on "Reserve," by Isaac Williams, which taught that religious beliefs, from prudential motives, may be expressed only in part, and may be veiled until the fitting moment for announcing them arrives. It was the doctrine of "economy," of the "tact and management" rightly to be employed in the inculcation of truth. Aside from circumstances of this kind, among the followers of Newman there were able men whose drift was from the beginning Romewards, and who became conscious of it sooner than Newman was distinctly aware of such a drift in himself.[1] Perplexities that operated to obstruct his progress in that direction retarded them in a less degree. Francis Faber and William George Ward belonged to this section. But it was the issue, early in 1841, of the tract No. 90, from the pen of Newman, that caused the storm of disapproval to break out in the English Church from Anti-Romanists of every shade. The design of the tract was to show that the language of the Thirty-nine Articles admits of a "Catholic" interpretation, and is designed in some cases to oppose dogmas of Rome, but more often abuses connected with them, but not taken up into the Roman system. Its intent was to prove that an Anglo-Catholic need not desert

[1] See Church, p. 208.

the Church of England, although he might in certain instances condemn *Papal* doctrine. It is an extremely ingenious essay. It reads, however, more like the plea of a skilful advocate, than like the opinion of a fair-minded judge. This is substantially admitted by Dean Church, so far as the actual impression made by it is concerned. "Some of the interpretations," says Church, "undoubtedly seemed far-fetched and artificial."[1] There were numerous readers of tract No. 90 who felt it to be an example of immoral sophistry. Especially offensive to Arnold was the attempt to explain away the real purport of the XXIst Article, which declares that General Councils "may err, and sometimes have erred." An example equally open to censure is the comments on the XXVIIIth Article, in which transubstantiation is denied, and on the explanation appended to the Communion Service that the "natural body and blood" of Christ are "in heaven and *not here*." Resort is had to a speculation on the nature of locality, in which it is emptied of the meaning commonly attached to it. This is well styled by the author himself a "specious defence," the validity of which is not absolutely asserted. It is remarkable how Newman leans upon the Homilies for the support of his interpretations of the Articles. The XXXVth Article says of the Homilies that they "contain a godly and wholesome doctrine." Their popular style and patristic phraseology easily lend themselves to this use. He dismisses their repeated designation of the "Bishop or the Church of Rome" as Antichrist, on the ground that the statement does not bear on doctrine.[2]

At this time Newman himself was not without misgivings respecting the title of the Anglican Church to the character of "catholicity." He was in a measure debating with himself. He had grown to believe that a portion of the arguments which he had used against Rome were unsound. This inward questioning had commenced several years earlier. The drawing towards Rome was not a little due to the influence of Hurrell Froude, who was a mediævalist in all his tendencies. In 1834 Froude writes to a correspondent that it is no matter where the pulpit is placed, if it do not "stand in the light of the Altar, which is more sacred than the Holy of Holies in the Jewish Temple."[3] From Froude, New-

[1] p. 248. [2] Tract 90, p. 33.

[3] Quoted by E. A. Abbott, *The Anglican Career of Cardinal Newman*, Vol. I. p. 166.

man says that he derived his admiration for Rome, his dislike of the Reformation, devotion to the Blessed Virgin, and belief in the Real Presence.[1] This is a large debt, although its items are not exhaustively recounted. Newman's memory was haunted by the sounding phrase of Augustine: "Securus judicat orbis terrarum." His faith in Anglicanism as a *via media* was not subverted, but was felt to be less secure. It was no longer a tranquil faith.[2] The severe handling of the tract by the dignitaries of the University and the Church could not fail to strengthen the nascent sense of alienation from a communion which apparently had no shelter under its roof for such as he. For several years after the issue of the famous tract, he gradually withdrew from public activity and social intimacies, and lived, with a few disciples, in retirement in the immediate vicinity of Oxford,[3] much absorbed in the reflections and inward struggles through which he was making his way to the goal that was finally reached in 1845, when he professed conversion and was received into the Roman Catholic Church. In this year he was engaged in composing his essay on "Development." It exhibits the process of thought which yielded a solvent for the difficulties he had felt, arising from the obvious differences between the primitive Apostolic Church, and the Latin Church as it now is.

The effect of this event was like that of an earthquake. Although it was not sudden or wholly unexpected, it spread consternation for the moment among the adherents of the Movement. Beyond their ranks, it seemed to confirm the worst suspicions that had been entertained respecting Newman's sincerity in his professed loyalty to the Church of England and in his opposition to Romanism. This mistrust derived support from the avowals of such as Ward, the author of the *Ideal of a Christian Church*, whose secession preceded that of Newman, and who, with a

[1] Quoted by E. A. Abbott, *The Anglican Career of Cardinal Newman*, Vol. I. p. 137. The whole chapter (VII.) is instructive.

[2] In a letter to J. B. Mozley (Nov. 24, 1843), he says that in 1839, in the study of the Monophysite and Donatist controversies, the feeling "came strongly upon" him that Anglicans were external to the Catholic Church. He was slow in giving way to this feeling. See Newman's *Letters and Correspondence*, Vol. II. p. 384.

[3] J. B. Mozley writes at this time: "With respect to J. H. N., all I know about him is he has been regularly down about things for the last year or two, and that he has expressed doubts about the catholicity of the English Church." *Letters of Rev. J. B. Mozley, D.D.*, p. 157.

blunt, but as it seemed to many, an almost shameless, honesty, avowed that he was delaying his desertion to Rome in order to carry others along into the same camp. The psychological interest, in connection with the many problems, connected with Newman's career and the catastrophe by which he was lost to the English Church, have naturally given rise to a world of comment and discussion. The charge of conscious dishonesty may be at once dismissed. Whatever fluctuation in his expressions may be discerned in the interval between about 1839 and 1845, they are not more remarkable than like phenomena in the experience of Luther during several years after the posting of his Theses, when he was moving in a direction opposite to that taken by Newman. Thirlwall, perhaps the ablest man on the bench of English bishops at that time, — who, however, did not know Newman personally, — expresses the opinion of many when he says "that his mind was essentially skeptical and sophistical" . . . without "the power of taking firm hold on either speculative or historical truth. Yet his craving for truth was strong in proportion to the purity of his life and conscience. He felt that he was naturally unable to satisfy this craving by any mental operations of his own, and that if he was to depend on his own ability to arrive at any settled conclusion, he should be forever floating in a sea of doubt; therefore he was irresistibly impelled to take refuge under the wings of an infallible authority. . . . He bowed to an image which he had first set up. There was at once his strength and his weakness. He could deceive himself and could not help letting himself be deceived."[1] Archbishop Tait writes thus: "I have always regarded Newman as having a strange duality of mind. On the one side is a wonderfully strong and subtle reasoning faculty, on the other a blind faith, raised almost entirely by his emotions. It seems to me that in all matters of belief he first acts on his emotions and then he brings the subtlety of his reason to bear until he has ingeniously persuaded himself that he is logically right. The result is a condition in which he is practically unable to distinguish truth from falsehood."[2] R. H. Hutton, in his appreciative essay on Newman, refers to "the imaginative power which he shows in getting over religious objec-

[1] *Letters of Thirlwall* (1867), pp. 260, 261. Compare the Letter on pp. 268, 269, which speaks of Newman's "utter want of historical tact and judgment."

[2] Benham's *Life of Tait*, Vol. I. p. 89.

tions to his faith."[1] In a memorable passage of the *Apologia*, Newman depicts with graphic eloquence the confused scene of human life and history, implying an aboriginal catastrophe happening to the race.[2] He dwells, also, on the restless character of the human intellect, the impossibility of curbing it in its wayward, wild excursions. Were it not for the conscience and heart, he would be an atheist, or pantheist, or polytheist. On the supposition that God wills to interfere for the rescue of mankind, for retaining in the world a knowledge of Himself, there is no improbability in supposing that He would introduce a power into the world "invested with the prerogative of infallibility in religious matters."[3] This passage brings out that assumption of the probability of an infallible Church, as the only salvation from intellectual as well as moral anarchy, which underlies Newman's entire career. The ark of safety in the flood is an *ecclesia docens*. Failing to find the criteria of such a Church, of such a Seat of Authority, within the pale of Anglicanism, he found it in that imperial, enduring, world-wide Institution having its centre in Rome. Difficulties, historical or doctrinal in its structure, were disposed of by that marvellous sublety so evident in all his writings. They vanished to his eye, as the spots on the disk of the sun disappear in the blaze of its radiance. There is no evidence that he was ever skeptical respecting the fundamental truths of natural or revealed religion. The roots of his personal faith were in his moral nature. But a subtlety so wonderful might be a means of misleading its possessor as well as others. There was a snare in this rare power of delicate discrimination and exquisite expression. A mind of another cast, while assenting to the vivid description of the moral situation of the race and the perils of the intellect, which the passage in the *Apologia* presents, may be moved to assume as probable a divine guidance of men more immediate than through the instrumentality of a human tribunal to sit in judgment on the operations of their minds. There are threads of unity running through the successive stages of Newman's career. One he professed to point out, when, on the occasion of receiving the dignity of Cardinal, he said that for thirty, forty, fifty years he had been contending against liberalism — the idea "that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as

[1] Hutton, *Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters of Faith*, p. 50.
[2] p. 266 sq.
[3] *Apologia*, p. 266 sq.

another." There are two additional facts to be taken into the account if one would explain the career of Newman. The one is the imaginative habit, which even in boyhood led him sometimes to indulge the thought that life is a dream and the world unreal, the idea of its reality being a deception wrought by the angels. Thirlwall, in a letter previously quoted, ascribes to him in one respect the credulity of a "born Papist," and illustrates his meaning by referring to a conception of Newman that the work of the physical universe, from "planetary and sidereal rotation" to the "dislocations of the molecules of an atom," is carried forward by the agency of personal beings. One may conjecture that there is some bond of connection between his youthful fancy that matter is an illusion with such a strange conception. At least we are aided in accounting for his belief that "material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of things unseen."[1] The other fact is the predominant quality of his religious experience as discovered in his sermons in all of the Anglican period. It is the sense of the holiness and righteousness of God that breathes through these discourses. It is a religion in which fear is a pervasive element. The tenderness and love manifested in the Gospel are by no means proportionately emphasized. It is worthy of notice that for so great a theologian he was restricted, not in the amount, but in the range, of his reading. This is true in relation to the department of philosophy. He passes by in silence the German philosophers and the theologians of the present century. "How different," remarked Stanley, "the fortunes of England might have been if Newman had been able to read German!"[2] It was not until 1884 that he read Kant. Then he expressed his sympathy with Kant's making our moral nature the basis of religious beliefs.

After the secession of Newman, Pusey was the recognized leader of the party. In his youthful days, having, as a student in Germany, had an acquaintance with Tholuck and Ewald, he had replied to Rose's strictures on the state of German theology, and had brought forward suggestions on Inspiration more free than the traditional view permitted. But these afterwards were spoken of by him with regret. This supposed indiscretion was fully atoned for during the rest of his life by a rigorous orthodoxy

[1] The words are R. H. Hutton's (*Modern Guides*, etc.), p. 73.

[2] Quoted in Mark Pattison's *Memoirs*, p. 210.

on the critical questions, as is evinced in his commentaries on Jonah and Daniel. His confidence in his own position and in the *via media* was tranquil. His piety was deep and sincere. While he lacks the imagination and power of luminous exposition which belong to Newman, he was a miracle of industry, his acquisitions of learning were large, and his mind was straightforward in its operations. James Mozley said of him that he had no idea of "economy," — that is, of prudential reserve in the expression of beliefs.[1] The editors of Liddon's biography of Pusey say of him that from 1845 to 1858 he was engaged in convincing people that there was a firm foothold for Tractarians in the English Church, and in vindicating "the Anglican claim to the doctrine of Regeneration, of Absolution, of the Real Presence, of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, and other important truths."[2]

In 1843 Pusey preached a sermon on the "Eucharist as a Comfort to the Penitent." It was meant as a counterpart — an antidote, his critics might say — to his disheartening sermon on "Baptism." It was fervid in style, abounds in citations from the Fathers, and in the printed form presented in the Appendix corroborative extracts from the old English divines.[3] Great hostility was awakened by this discourse, and its author was suspended for two years from preaching within the precincts of the University. In the outcry against the sermon, wrong interpretations were fastened upon it. The objections to it from the point of view of adverse, but intelligent, critics, are summarized in a letter of Bishop Wilberforce written at the time. He thinks that its great evil is a sort of "misty exaggeration" of the truth, which is adapted to breed errors in others. He censures its un-Anglican *tone*, its unqualified quotations of uncareful expressions from the Fathers — such as "having on your very lips the blood of Christ," etc., and, most of all, its connection of the remission of sins with the Eucharist, as if the justified man were not in a forgiven state, and as if there were in the Eucharist, the *act*, rather than the *seal*, of remission.[4] The Pauline doctrine of Justification, Wilberforce thought, was virtually denied. As was the case three centuries before, the doctrine of the Lord's Supper became once more in

[1] See E. A. Abbott, Vol. I. p. 218.

[2] *Life of Pusey*, Vol. III. p. vi.

[3] These are reprinted in Pusey's *The Doctrine of the Real Presence*, etc. (1855).

[4] *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, Vol. I. pp. 230, 231.

England an engrossing theme of controversy. To get at the exact doctrine of Dr. Pusey and his school on this subject, is a task of some difficulty. On the one hand the tenet of transubstantiation is not accepted, because it is a mode of explanation not verified by Scripture and not in the creed of the Patristic Church. How does Pusey's opinion differ from the Lutheran? The Lutherans did not hold that in the Sacrament the body of Christ occupies space. Pusey himself defends them from the charge of teaching consubstantiation.[1] "The weak point in the Lutheran system," says Pusey, "is that the only office assigned to the Sacrament is to kindle faith. . . . Union with Christ is the end of the Sacraments and the reward of faith; faith is not *the* object of the Sacraments." Here Pusey fails to do full justice to the Lutheran view. It embraced under the term 'faith' union to Christ. Pusey himself cites the Apology of the Augsburg Confession as teaching a spiritual union with Christ "by faith and sincere love." The real difference from the Lutheran tenet is another, as will soon be pointed out. Respecting the Calvinistic opinion, Pusey himself, in a letter to Newman, truly remarks: "Such persons as Laud, Cosin, not to say Hooker, and, I believe, all our writers until ourselves, have interpreted Calvin, etc., in a sound sense as to the Sacraments."[2] But Pusey's objection to Calvin, so far as the question of the Reality of the Presence is concerned, rests upon an incorrect interpretation of the single passage respecting the communicant being taken up to Christ.[3] Calvin, like Pusey, rejected the notion of a corporeal Presence as of a body, and of a *local* Presence, in the strict and proper sense. Calvin says that "Christ presents the spiritual meat and the spiritual drink to all. . . . He literally offers to them that which they reject."[4] The most obvious point of dissent from Calvin, which is a point of agreement with the Lutherans, is that the body and blood are received really, although not spiritually, by the unworthy, as well as the worthy, communicant. Yet among the authorities appended by Pusey to his sermon, is Palmer, who teaches as the probable opinion of the Church that "Sinners . . . partake only

[1] *Doctrine of the Real Presence*, p. 32 sq.

[2] *Life of Pusey*, Vol. II. p. 224.

[3] See *supra*, pp. 291, 306, where Calvin's opinion is explained.

[4] *Inst.* IV. xvii. 33. "Spiritualem hunc cibum omnibus porrigit Christus," etc. For other references, see Müller, *Wissenschaftl. Abhandll.* p. 424.

of the bread and wine." In truth, very few of the authorities there cited run counter to this statement. Overall and Jackson are among the exceptions. Pusey and most of the representatives of the Oxford Movement hold to the physical reception by the unworthy, and undertake to reconcile this opinion with Art. XXIX., which affirms of the wicked and unbelieving that while they eat and drink "the sign or Sacrament" of the Body and Blood of Christ, "yet in no wise are they partakers of Christ."[1] The main divergence of the Oxford School from the Protestant Reformers relates to the effect of the consecration of the bread and wine, and to the question whether the Real Presence is or is not *extra usum*, that is, independent of the communicant. The Oxford School maintain that after consecration the Presence abides, unless, as may be the case, the Presence is miraculously withdrawn when the consecrated bread is eaten by an animal. *How* the bread and wine are affected by the consecrating act there is no attempt to explain. The simple proposition is that when they are received the body and blood are received.[2] The Caroline divines taught the *extra usum*.[3] Bishop Cosin asserts this with much emphasis.[4] This is true also of Bishop Sparrow in treating of communion of the sick.[5] Both these bishops were active in the revision of the Prayer Book at the Savoy Conference in 1661, when the rubric was introduced into the Communion Service, providing that what is left of the consecrated bread and wine shall not be carried out of the church, but the minister and other communicants shall reverently eat and drink the same.[6]

A certain sacrificial character is attributed by the Oxford School to the Eucharist. Here it is important to inquire, Is the Eucharist

[1] The XXIXth Article was not printed until 1571. The contention is that to be "a partaker of Christ" means here to experience "the *wholesome* operation" of the Sacrament. So Forbes, Bishop of Brechin, *Explanation of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 581. See, also, Bishop Guest's *Articles XXVIII. and XXIX.* (by G. F. Hodges, 1894).

[2] See Forbes, Bishop of Brechin, *Primary Charge* (1857), pp. 26–29, and *Explanation of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 574 sq.

[3] See Hallam, *Const. Hist.* c. VIII. (p. 272 n. in Am. ed. 1847).

[4] *Works*, Vol. V. p. 131.

[5] *Rationale of the Prayer Book* (1684), p. 266.

[6] See Kempe, *Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament*, etc. (1887); also, Cobb, *Kiss of Peace* (last ed.). For clear statements on this and other topics of divinity, from the point of view of the Oxford School, see the able and learned *Digest of Theology*, by H. R. Percival (1893).

a purely commemorative sacrifice of the finished propitiation on the Cross, or is it in itself likewise propitiatory? The answers to this question are not always lucid. The Bishop of Brechin argues that, as the Same Body, which is naturally in heaven, is "supra-locally and mystically" taken and received, its "faculty of impetration" — that is, its intercessory appeal — continues, while yet there is no repetition of the sacrifice of the Cross.[1] The twenty-first of the Articles affirms that masses for "the remission of pain or guilt" are "blasphemous fables and dangerous conceits." Pusey, in a letter to Bishop Bloomfield, states that he had termed the Eucharist a propitiatory sacrifice, but in the sense that the Church in this act pleads the efficacy of the one sacrifice.[2] As to adoration of the Lord in the Eucharist, he cites with approval a saying of Andrews that wherever Christ is present, He is "truly to be adored."[3]

In the letter referred to above, Pusey states that he had called Absolution a "sacrament," in the lower sense of this word. He had taught that there are higher forms of service and devotion to which all are not called. This appears to sanction the Roman tenet as to a salvable, and a higher than salvable, type of Christian character. He defends the adaptation he had made of Roman Catholic books of devotion, and what they say of our Lord's Five Wounds, of the use of "rosaries" (simple forms of devotion), etc. He claims English precedents of a similar adoption of revised Roman productions.[4] It is evident, not only from his writings, but from his practice, — for example, from the disciplinary penances to which he subjected himself with the consent of Keble,

[1] *Sermon*, p. 40. For a clear exposition of the Anglo-Catholic view, see Blunt's *Annotated Prayer Book*, p. 155.

[2] See *Life of Pusey*, Vol. III. pp. 297, 298. For other explanations by Pusey of his teaching on various topics, which, as was natural, was extensively regarded as encouraging Romanism, see his Correspondence with Bishop Wilberforce in 1851. Pusey's "Letters" are in his *Life*, Vol. III. App. to Chap. XII.

[3] J. B. Mozley, with his usual clearness, explains that without faith the body and blood are not partaken of, that the sacrifice of the Eucharist is purely commemorative, and that the worship paid to Christ is "not a worship paid to Him as present under the form of the sacramental elements," but only "a worship paid to Him upon the particular opportunity of the Sacrament." The body and blood is "not the *object* of the worship, but only the *occasion* of it." Mozley's *Lectures*, etc., pp. 208, 209, 213, 216, 217.

[4] *Life of Pusey*, Vol. III. pp. 100, 104, 107, 108.

whom he had persuaded to act as confessor, — that he made such an approach to the Roman Catholic system, doctrinal and practical, as is certainly not compatible with the principles and spirit of the Reformers. This disparity is most apparent in his doctrine as to post-baptismal sins, with the sacramental corollaries adhering to it. "I cannot but think," he wrote in 1845, "that Rome and we are not irreconcilably at variance."[1]

The Anglo-Catholic party were deeply moved by the unsuccessful result of the strenuous efforts made by them in 1848 to prevent the induction of Hampden into the bishopric of Hereford. They were still more exasperated and alarmed by the refusal of the judicial committee of the Privy Council to sanction the decision of the Court of Arches against Gorham, when the Bishop of Exeter declined to institute him to a cure within his jurisdiction. Gorham was charged with rejecting the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, his opinion being that the grace of the Spirit and its effect must *precede* the administration of the Sacrament to infants. Two facts in relation to this case were considered to be in the highest measure grievous. One was the adjudication of a doctrinal dispute by a civil tribunal. The other was the sanction supposed to be given to a heretical opinion. Then followed a new wave of secession to Rome, which carried over Archdeacon Manning and R. I. Wilberforce. Manning, in a work on the "Holy Spirit," published in 1875, founds his allegiance to Rome on his perception of the Christian doctrine on this subject. He came to see, he tells us, that it is in the Church, in the visible Apostolic Organization, that the Spirit has His abode.

It may be added that Pusey did not personally partake in the growing zeal for ritualistic innovations. He insisted, however, that nothing should be prohibited which established law permitted; and, as on other matters, and in common with his party, he always protested against a policy of legal restraint against their type of churchmanship, while immunity was conceded to the advocates of latitudinarian opinions deemed by him to be plainly inconsistent with the Anglican standards.

The late Henry Parry Liddon, Canon of St. Paul's, eminent as

[1] *Life of Pusey*, Vol. III. p. 45. Pusey was confident in his hopes for the future of Tractarianism. He says that "even the pared and maimed Prayer Book of the Church in the United States still affords it a home." Letter (1851), Vol. III. p. 300.

a preacher, was the author of a learned and carefully written volume (of Bampton Lectures) on the "Divinity of Christ." A living writer, Charles Gore, not departing from the essential ideas of the Oxford School, is not unwilling to modify its usual beliefs in some respects, and even to make room for opinions characteristic of the later Biblical criticism. His work on the "Christian Ministry," although defending the High Church theories respecting the origin of Episcopacy, is remarkable likewise for its concessions. For example, it is admitted that in the church of Corinth, to which the Epistle of the Roman Church, written by Clement, was sent, there was no vacancy in the bishopric, and no bishopric, in the ordinary sense, to be vacant, but only a plurality of presbyters, constituting, it is said, a hierarchy with the functions inhering in the Apostolic Succession.[1] Canon Liddon, commenting on the Saviour's "professed ignorance of the day of the last judgment," does not surrender the view that there was a co-existence of ignorance and knowledge. Canon Gore, in his lectures on the "Incarnation,"[2] cautiously and reverently indicates the belief that the "Eternal Son," to a certain extent, "restrained the natural action of the divine being,"[3] that there was a "refraining from the exercise of what He possessed," that "He was so truly acting under the conditions of human nature as Himself to be ignorant."[4] There is a guarded admission of a certain Kenosis. More noteworthy still are the observations of Canon Gore in *Lux Mundi*, on the subject of "Inspiration."[5] There was a conscious inspiration of the Jews as a people, although there were "special men," "the inspired interpreters of the divine message to and in the race."[6] Their natural activity is not superseded by the supernatural influence.[7] In the sacred books the aim is not the discovery of science.[8] In Genesis, the first traditions of the race are given "from a special point of view." The inspiration of prophets is consistent with certain "erroneous anticipations" analogous to St. Paul's expectation of the "second coming of Christ within his own lifetime." Limitations as to "the powers and possibilities of the divine compassion are characteristic of the Psalms and of the

[1] p. 322 sq.

[2] "The Incarnation of the Son of God," *Bampton Lectures for* 1891.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 162.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 266.

[5] *Lux Mundi* (5th ed.), Essay VII. "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration."

[6] *Ibid.* p. 342.

[7] *Ibid.* pp. 342, 345.

[8] *Ibid.* p. 344.

Old Testament generally."[1] The historical record from Abraham downward is "in substance, in the strict sense, historical," yet there "is still room for the admixture of what, though marked by a spiritual purpose, is yet not strictly historical."[2] Inspiration is not shut out if we admit "distinct stages in the growth of the law of worship" — an "unconscious idealizing of history."[3] It may even be admitted with safety that the earlier Biblical narratives prior to the call of Abraham are "of the nature of myth in which we cannot distinguish the historical germ, though we do not at all deny that it exists."[4] The use made by Christ of the Old Testament is not an argument against concessions of this kind.[5] If He had "intended to convey instruction to us on critical and literary questions, He would have made His purpose plainer."[6]

James B. Mozley (1813–78) was a theologian of extraordinary vigor and independence. He was long closely allied with the leaders of the Oxford Movement, with whom he was personally intimate. After the withdrawal of Newman, by whose secession his opinions were not in the least affected, he was led to differ from the party on certain important questions, and, although always a High Churchman, to take up a position by himself. Among his writings in the earlier period is the able, but one-sided, essay on Luther, whose depth and power both of intellect and character he fails to appreciate. A similar comment would not be unjust if applied to his essay on Dr. Arnold. From the epoch marked by the Gorham case, he disagreed with his former associates. He was so far an Augustinian as to consider it necessary to formulate the doctrine of baptism so as to harmonize it with the doctrine of predestination. His treatise *On the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination* (1855) was followed, in 1856, by his work on *The Primitive Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration.* In the later edition (1862) it appears under the title, *A Review of the Baptismal Controversy.* The editor of the volume soon to be noticed says of him, that "he undertook the task of reconciling the tradition about baptism with the theology of what is called Calvinism." He says that "Scripture is silent with respect to infants as recipients of the grace of bap-

[1] *Lux Mundi* (5th ed.), Essay VII. "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration," p. 350.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 351, 352.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 353.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 358.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 358 sq.

[6] *Ibid.* p. 359.

tism," that the Fathers take one view and the Reformers another, and "that according to the rule of our [the English] Church the regeneration of all infants in baptism is not an article of the faith."[1] "There is nothing, in the Gorham judgment, that involves a departure from Anglican principles."[2] In the treatise on Augustinianism, and in the posthumous volume of *Lectures and Other Theological Papers* (1883), Mozley has propounded, in his usual clear and impressive style, his philosophy respecting "Mysterious Truths." This is applied to such truths as Original Sin, the Trinity, and the Atonement. Such, we are told, are truths "which agree with human reason in a large and general way,"[3] which we recognize as truths, but of which we have not the full idea or conception.[4] Our conception is real but indistinct. There is a field of thought where we are not shut up to "pure ignorance or pure knowledge." This is true of the "ideas of substance, cause, Mind or Spirit, Power, Infinity." Of these we have some idea, but "no *adequate* or *complete* idea." Now in the case of truths of this class we are not at liberty to draw logical inferences, practical conclusions, which offend the moral sense. When moral truth is contradicted by logic, there is a flaw in the logic; and this is traceable to the imperfect character of the notions which enter into the premises. Mozley appears to sanction the dictum of Coleridge that, when logic seems to clash with moral intuitions, the superior authority belongs to conscience. As to the truth of Original Sin, the inference of the perdition of infants is under this test excluded. So as to predestination. It is a truth on which sound practical convictions rest; but there is apparently a counter-truth. It, likewise, must not be ignored. They meet somewhere in the region of mystery. Objections — such as that a truth not understood cannot be believed — are grappled with in this essay and in the treatise on "Augustinianism." They are asserted to have their parallel in certain truths of science. Truths at the bottom of all religion "we feel and reach after rather than intellectually apprehend."[5] Here is the place for faith; for "reasonable faith" does not require full intellectual apprehension.[6] The lesson of this philosophy is, for example, that we are not to demand a middle formula between predestination and free-will, a compromise in which neither is embraced,

[1] *A Review*, etc., p. 226.
[2] *Ibid.* p. vi.
[3] *Lectures*, p. 102.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 408.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 114.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 115.

or a formula in which one or the other is given up. Rather are we to hold both, with an interrogation mark or a minus sign — if one may so say — affixed to each, whereby practical inferences, unscriptural or immoral, are ruled out. In the *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages*, Mozley exhibits the progressive character of the Old Testament Revelation. Acts may be done, and may be commanded, which on a higher stage of moral development could not be done, and would not be commanded, but which "are the highest and most noble acts" to which the conceptions of an age, lower down in the scale of moral perception, can give rise. Reference has already been made to Mozley's *Lectures on Miracles*. Among his essays are included extremely valuable discussions of the "Argument of Design" and of "Causation." In the first of these papers, objections brought against the doctrine of final causes in nature, on the ground of evolution as taught by Darwin, are met by an invincible logic.

One of Mozley's sermons is on the Atonement.[1] After rejecting the idea that there is a satisfaction to justice by the literal bearing of the penalty by a substitute, he adds: —

"There is, however, undoubtedly contained in the Scriptural doctrine of the Atonement, a kind, and a true kind, of *fulfilment* of justice. It is a fulfilment in the sense of appeasing and satisfying justice; appeasing that appetite for punishment which is the characteristic of justice in relation to evil. There is obviously an appetite for justice which is implied in that very anger which is occasioned by crime, by a wrong being committed; we desire the punishment of the criminal as a kind of redress, and his punishment undoubtedly satisfies a natural craving of our mind. But let any one have exposed himself thus to the appetite for punishment in our nature, and it is undoubtedly the case, however we may account for it, that the real suffering of another for him, of a good person for a guilty one, will mollify the appetite for punishment, which was possibly up to that time in full possession of our minds; and this kind of satisfaction to justice, and appeasing of it, is involved in the Scriptural doctrine of the Atonement. And so, also, there is a kind of *substitution* involved in the Scripture doctrine of the Atonement, and a true kind; but it is not a literal, but a moral kind of substitution. It is one person suffering in behalf of another, for the sake of another: in that sense

[1] *University Sermons*, p. 175 sq.

he takes the place and acts in the stead of another, he suffers that another may escape suffering, he condemns himself to a burden that another may be relieved. But this is the moral substitution which is inherent in acts of love and labor *for* others; it is a totally different thing from the literal substitution of one person for another in punishment. The outspoken witness in the human heart, which has from the beginning embraced the doctrine of the Atonement with the warmth of religious affection, has been, indeed, a better judge on the moral question than particular formal schools of theological philosophy. The atoning act of the Son, as an act of love on behalf of sinful man, appealed to wonder and praise: the effect of the act in changing the regards of the Father towards the sinner, was only the representation, in the sublime and ineffable region of mystery, of an effect which men recognized in their own minds. The human heart accepts mediation. It does not understand it as a whole; but the fragment of which it is conscious is enough to defend the doctrine upon the score of morals." "Justice is a fragment, mercy is a fragment, mediation is a fragment; justice, mercy, mediation as a reason for mercy — all three; what indeed are they but great vistas and openings into an invisible world in which is the point of view which brings them all together?"

CHAPTER IV

THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (CONTINUED): THE BROAD CHURCHMEN — THE "ESSAYS AND REVIEWS" — THE BROAD CHURCH IN SCOTLAND: THOMAS ERSKINE; McLEOD CAMPBELL — THEOLOGICAL OPINIONS OF MATTHEW ARNOLD — THE CHRISTIAN AGNOSTICISM OF HAMILTON AND MANSEL — POSITIVISM — THE REVIVAL OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY: J. S. MILL — THE AGNOSTICISM OF HERBERT SPENCER — INFLUENCE OF DARWINISM ON THEOLOGY — AGNOSTIC OPINIONS OF T. H. HUXLEY

WHILE the Oxford Movement was spreading, liberalism in the English Church was advancing and assuming different phases. The name of "Broad Church" is indefinite, and embraces under it writers of widely varying tenets. The influence of Arnold was continued, but was greatly modified by the effect of the religious philosophy of Coleridge. The "evidential" or Paleyan spirit, which belonged to Whately and his school, gave way to a different tone. Archdeacon Julius Charles Hare, a warm friend of Bunsen, who had for a time considerable influence on theological thought in England, was 'broad,' yet evangelical in the true meaning of the term. This is apparent in his *Victory of Faith* (1840), and in his earlier work, the *Mission of the Comforter*. Frederick Denison Maurice was a leader, with not a few disciples, in the Broad Church party. He began life as a Unitarian, but became a fervent believer in the Incarnation, which had a central place in his beliefs. Of his many productions in theology and philosophy, perhaps the *Kingdom of Christ* is the most important. In his work on "Sacrifice" and in his *Theological Essays*, he discards the idea of satisfaction by suffering of a penal nature. "Christ satisfied the Father by presenting the image of His own holiness and love." "In His sacrifice, this holiness and love came forth completely." "He bore the sins of the world in the sense that

He felt them with that anguish with which only a perfectly pure and holy being, who is also a perfectly sympathizing and gracious being, can feel the sins of others." "His whole life was a reflection of the mind of God." There is no "artificial substitution," Christ being the "sinless root of humanity," the source of all light in them, "the root of righteousness in each man." Maurice was involved in a controversy in consequence of his expressions on the subject of eternal punishment. His views on this topic are presented in the volume of *Essays*, in his treatise on the Gospel of John, and in his *Letter to Dr. Jelf.* In this last publication he denies that he is a Universalist. Whether suffering hereafter will be without end, he professes himself unable to affirm or deny. The word 'eternal' (αἰώνιος) in Scripture is said to have no reference to time; it is applied to God and to things extra-temporal. It denotes not duration, but a state or quality. Life eternal is the knowledge of God; it is now as well as hereafter. The opposite is the condition of a soul bereft of God. F. W. Robertson and Charles Kingsley were among the many who looked up to Maurice as their inspiring teacher.

Dean Stanley, so prominent a personage among Broad Churchmen, was a much more advanced latitudinarian than men like Hare and Maurice. But his predominant tastes were literary and historical. Although keen in his perceptions, he was constitutionally averse to metaphysics, and, as a rule, we seek in vain in his writings for positive or sharp definitions on litigated points of doctrine. In his *History of the Jewish Church* he follows in general, as he professes to do, in the steps of Ewald. He disavows the intention to discriminate between the natural and supernatural in the events of Old Testament history. In his interesting book on *Christian Institutions*, Stanley touches on various doctrinal topics in a manner characteristic of the author's habit of thought. In baptism no efficacy is imputed to the water. "Infant baptism is a recognition of the good there is in every human soul."[1] "In each little child our Saviour saw, and we may see, the promise of a glorious future."[2] In the Eucharist, the body is "the essence of Christ's character."[3] The Supper signifies that we must "incorporate and incarnate in ourselves — that is, in our moral natures — the substance, the moral substance, of the teaching and character of Jesus Christ."[4] The Cup is a sign of the offering made,

[1] *Christian Institutions*, p. 14. [2] *Ibid.* p. 27. [3] *Ibid.* p. 117. [4] *Ibid.* p. 121

"not by a feeble, erring mortal, but by Him who is by all of us acknowledged to be the Ideal of man and the Likeness of God."[1] It signifies the self-denying, life-giving love of Christ, and is a test of our love and loyalty in self-sacrifice. The rite of Absolution is founded on a "misinterpretation of texts." "The mystical offices of a sacerdotal caste will vanish" — as alchemy and astrology, brutal amusements and scholastic casuistry — "before the growth of manly Christian independence and generous Christian sympathy." The institution of the Clergy or Bishops sprang up after the death of Christ. The primitive offices (the pastoral and intellectual) were in a sense His gift after His earthly life.[2] Episcopacy was a gradual growth. The various grades of the Christian clergy have sprung up in the same ways and by the same divine, because the same natural, necessity as the various grades of government, law, and science.[3] The ministry is divine as being "the inevitable growth of Christian hopes and sympathies, of increasing truth, of enlarging charity."[4] Stanley was in full sympathy with Arnold's theory of the oneness of Church and State, and of the consequent obligation of making the Church as nearly as possible coextensive with the nation by the process of ecclesiastical tolerance and comprehension. The usual note of vagueness belongs to Stanley's statements respecting the Trinity. The name "The Father" in the Creed "expresses to us the whole faith of what we call *Natural* Religion."[5] It represents to us God in nature, "in the heavenly or ideal world."[6] The Son represents to us God in history.[7] In Christ the kindness, wisdom, and tenderness of God are reflected.[8] His life is the Word, the speech that comes out of "that eternal silence which surrounds the Unseen Divinity." "To believe in the name of Christ is to believe that no other approach to God exists except through the same qualities of justice, truth, and love which make up the mind of Christ."[9] "The name of the Holy Ghost represents to us God in our own hearts and spirits and consciences."[10] "The Spirit is manifest in this teaching within us, in the promptings of truth and purity, of justice and humility."[11]

The Oxford Movement appeared to come to a head in the pub-

1 *Christian Institutions*, p. 132.
2 *Ibid.* pp. 216, 217.
3 *Ibid.* p. 218.
4 *Ibid.* p. 220.
5 *Ibid.* p. 288.
6 *Ibid.* p. 299.
7 *Ibid.* pp. 209, 305.
8 *Ibid.* p. 300.
9 *Ibid.* p. 301.
10 *Ibid.* p. 305.
11 *Ibid.* p. 312.

lication of Tract No. 90, and was the signal for the adverse parties to combine against it. In like manner, the publication of *Essays and Reviews,* in 1860, was regarded as the climax of tendencies of liberalism which had excited dread and hostility. The volume was the product of seven authors, each writing independently of the others. The essays were written with great, although unequal, ability. They were from authors who would have found it difficult to agree upon theological formulas. The first essay, by Dr. Temple, would probably have provoked comparatively little antagonism, but for the company in which it was found. Yet through the volume there runs a thread of criticism upon prevailing views relative to the inspiration and authority of the Bible. It was naturally complained that, as concerns the miracles as historical facts, there was a kind of ambiguity or indecision, as well as respecting what is meant by the authority of Scripture. It is intimated by Dr. Temple that there is occasional inaccuracy in the Bible, and it is said that "the principle of private judgment puts conscience between us and the Bible";[1] the effect of which is that, as a matter of fact, interpretation is determined in accord with the verdicts of conscience. The essay of Rowland Williams, on "Bunsen's Biblical Researches," adopts the opinions in what is now called "higher criticism" of that learned, yet somewhat dilettantish, writer. Baden Powell's essay on "The Study of the Evidences of Christianity" is an able discussion, cautious, but at bottom incredulous as to the methods adopted by Apologists in proof of the truth of the Scriptural miracles. The essay of Wilson on the "National Church" points out the comfort to the "ideologist" of perceiving that if the fact of miracles cannot be accepted, their "spiritual significance" is not lost, since they may "be equally suggestive of true ideas."[2] The essay of Godwin on the "Mosaic Cosmogony" argues for the impossibility of reconciling the truths of science with the conceptions of the author of Genesis, believed by him to be accordant with fact. The essay of Jowett on "The Interpretation of Scripture," while it insists that Scripture, contrary to usage in the past, must be "interpreted like any other book," brings forward "difficulties" in Scripture, historical and doctrinal, which are evidently considered by the author to be incompatible with the traditions as to the origin of some of its books and with current opinions as to its inerrancy.[3] Mr. Wilson

[1] pp. 50, 51, 54. [2] p. 227. [3] E.g., pp. 376, 416.

concludes his essay by professing the hope that after death there shall be found receptacles for those who are infants as to spiritual development, — nurseries where the undeveloped may grow up and the perverted be restored, so that finally all shall find a refuge "in the bosom of the Universal Parent."[1] The opinions expressed in the volume by Rowland Williams on the inspiration of the Bible and against the eternity of future punishment were pronounced by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council lawful for an English clergyman to hold.

"Broad Church Theology" — deviations from Calvinism not unfitly so designated — has had conspicuous representatives in Scotland. Thomas Erskine of Linlathen (1788–1870), who was educated as a lawyer, but early retired from legal practice, published in 1820 the *Internal Evidence* for the truth of Revelation. His main idea, then and afterwards, was that the adaptedness of the Gospel to man's nature and needs is the proof of its truth. Faith is the principle of spiritual life, which is awakened by Christ, and is the eternal righteousness which God bestows. In it love is felt to be the law of life. He advocated universal restoration on the ground of the fatherly character of God, whose love will attain to its end and aim.[2] The Shepherd will seek for the lost sheep "until he is found." This doctrine Erskine supposed to be taught by the Apostle Paul in Rom. v. and xi.[3] "Eternal" in Matt. xxv. "means essential in opposition to phenomenal." It does not refer to duration.[4] Erskine's influence upon Maurice, Stanley, and others, by his books, his correspondence, and conversation, was of much weight.

John McLeod Campbell (1800–1872) was excluded from the ministry of the Scottish Church by the Assembly in 1831, for preaching the unlimited Atonement of Christ as the only warrant for bidding men to be assured of God's love to them. He lived, however, to be universally esteemed and honored for his religious excellence. Norman McLeod said of him that he had never seen any one whose character so closely resembled that of Jesus. Campbell published a book on the Eucharist.[5] But his principal production is on the subject of the Atonement[6] — a treatise which

[1] p. 232.

[2] See Erskine's *Letters*, Vol. II. p. 243.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 239.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 135, 240.

[5] *Christ the Bread of Life* (1851, 2d ed. 1869).

[6] *The Nature of the Atonement, and its Relation to Remission of Sins and Eternal Life* (1856, 4th ed. 1873).

for its depth and religious earnestness has commanded general respect. He starts with the alternative of Jonathan Edwards, that sin must be followed by punishment, or by an adequate repentance. Discarding the idea that the Atonement is the bearing of the penalty, he regards it as an adequate repentance effected in the consciousness of Christ, the ingredient of personal remorse being absent, but all the spiritual elements being present which Edwards finds in the experience of Christ. Christ made an expiatory confession of our sins, which was "a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man."[1] Faith is *our* "Amen" to this condemnation in the soul of Christ. Christ enters fully into the mind of God respecting sin; into His condemnation of it, and into His love to the sinner. There was "the equivalent repentance" which Edwards makes the alternative of punishment. With this, sanctioned, reproduced in its essential elements, in the believer, through his connection with Christ, God is satisfied.

Campbell goes beyond the Moral View of the Atonement. He makes the death of Christ necessary to the realization by Him of God's feeling and man's need. Without "the perfected experience of the enmity of the carnal mind to God," "an adequate confession of man's sin" could not have "been offered to God in humanity in expiation of man's sin, nor intercession have been made according to the extent of man's need of forgiveness."[2] Moreover, it is declared that Christ endured, and that it was necessary to the development of His inward experience that He should endure, death, under a sense of its character as "the wages of sin." "As our Lord alone truly tasted death, so to Him alone had death its perfect meaning as the wages of sin, for in Him alone was there full entrance into the mind of God towards sin, and perfect unity with that mind."[3] Christ, as being alone holy, could alone understand, and duly feel, what the forfeiting of life *means*. If men were mere spirits, a response to the divine mind concerning sin could only have had spiritual elements; but man being capable of death, and death being the wages of sin, it was not simply sin that had to be dealt with, but "an existing law with its penalty of death, and that death as already incurred." Hence a response was necessary to "that

[1] *The Nature of the Atonement*, etc., 3d ed., p. 136.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 289.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 302.

expression of the divine mind which was contained in God's making death the penalty of sin."[1] The characteristic of Campbell's view is that suffering, as such, he regards as of no account, but suffering and death are necessary as a *conditio sine quâ non* of that entering into the mind of God — that expiatory confession — which he considers the moral essence of the Atonement. Yet, it will be observed that, according to this representation Christ endures death, and with a vivid, painful, complete consciousness of the penal quality that belongs to it. It may be asked, how could this death come nearer to being identical with penalty, save by the introduction of an element of personal remorse or self-accusation, which Edwards equally excludes?

Campbell's conception approaches nearer to the idea of an objective, penal satisfaction — not, however, a legal substitution — than he appears distinctly to perceive. This is suggested in Dr. R. W. Dale's thoughtful work on the Atonement, in which it is urged that the obstacle to the offer and exercise of divine forgiveness is removed objectively by the sanction which Christ renders to the law of God through His willing endurance of the lot justly suffered by transgressors.

An appreciative criticism of Campbell's treatise is included in Dr. A. B. Bruce's work, *The Humiliation of Christ*. This author, who reviews in an enlightened spirit modern as well as ancient types of opinion respecting the Atonement, finds room for the aspects of the subject which are of later origin, yet does not give up the penal element in the sufferings of Christ, the objective imputation of sin to the Redeemer.[2]

The doctrine of conditional immortality, or the ultimate annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked, has been espoused in England by a number of distinguished writers. It has been advocated with ability in the writings of James Baldwin Brown. It is presented in the *Life of Christ* and in other writings of Mr. Edward White. He maintains that immortality is a truth, not of reason but of revelation, and that it is a gift of God not indiscriminately bestowed. Mr. White connects with this opinion a belief in a continued probation after death for such as have not hardened their hearts by a rejection of Christ. On this point he is in accord with Dorner. Dr. Orr, in his recent work, while bringing forward arguments

[1] *The Nature of the Atonement*, etc., 3d ed., p. 303.

[2] See his 2d ed., p. 351.

against this opinion of Mr. White, says : "The conclusion I arrive at is, that we have not the elements of a complete evolution and we ought not to attempt it. What visions beyond there may be, what larger hopes, what ultimate harmonies, if such there are in store, will come in God's good time ; it is not ours to anticipate them or lift the veil where God has left it drawn ! "[1]

In Mr. Hutton's Essays on *Modern Guides of English Thought,* Matthew Arnold is one of the four later writers to whom a place in this list is accorded. It is, no doubt, owing much to the attraction which he was able, as a master of the literary art, to lend to his discussions of religious topics. His position is unique and hardly falls within the limit of any creed recognized as Christian. Yet he deserves credit for a sincere desire to rescue the Bible from the neglect and even contempt with which it is often treated in these days, especially by the uneducated class. There is an important basis of truth in the general affirmation, on which Arnold is never tired of insisting, that "the language of the Bible is fluid, passing, and literary, not rigid, fixed, and scientific." He is not a profound Biblical scholar, nor, on the other hand, is he a superficial or ill-informed writer, even on matters pertaining to New Testament criticism. Among the exceptions of a general nature to be taken to his ways of thought, there is to be reckoned his overweening regard for that impersonal divinity, the *Zeitgeist,* or "Time-Spirit," as he well renders the German phrase. The "Time-Spirit" was never more self-assured, never more full of disdain for all who questioned its authority, than in the eighteenth century, in the period when a shallow deistic philosophy was prevalent. In the earlier part of the present century the "Time-Spirit" in Germany found in the older and now exploded naturalistic Rationalism, springing from the Kantian school, the acme of possible attainment in the sphere of religion. The injunction of the Apostle is to "hold fast" — not that which is new — but "that which is good."

Arnold wished to find "for the Bible a basis in something which can be verified." The corner-stone of his system, if system it is to be called, is a conception of God which he not only regards as true, and evidently so, but even identifies with the Biblical idea respecting this fundamental point. His theory may be termed an unscientific Pantheism ; or perhaps, inasmuch as he does not

[1] *The Christian View of God and the World* (2d ed.), p. 397.

profess to exhaust the conception of the Deity by his definition, an Agnostic Pantheism. In *Literature and Dogma*, with much, although it can scarcely be said with wearisome, iteration he explains that the equivalent of God is "the Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." Does "Power" here mean "Cause"? There is a Power, a Power exerting itself, or being exerted, a Power exerting itself for a particular end, or producing a definite effect; yet it must not be denominated a "cause." In his second work, *God and the Bible*, he makes an elaborate effort to explain his remarkable definition of God, and the Israelites' conception of Him, and to rule out the idea that under the "Power, not ourselves," there is included the notion of a *being*. In this latter work we are told that we must not think of "the Power that makes for righteousness" as inhering in a subject: this is a misconception; it is anthropomorphic. Yet there is an "operation" of which blessedness is the result. Things are so constituted that the supposed effect is *produced*. It is a "law of nature" like the law of gravitation. It is a "stream of tendency." When we speak, and when the Israelites spoke, of the "Power that makes for righteousness" as "eternal," all that is really signified is that righteousness always was and always will be attended with blessing. Arnold does not seem to be aware that in trying to fence off the conception of *being* as connected with the "Power, not ourselves," he does not succeed in escaping from what he styles "metaphysics." There is an "operation" left; there is "a perceived energy." The doctrine is simply this: that the world — things collectively taken — is such that a certain result, namely, blessedness, is sure to be worked out by the practice of righteousness. It falls short of being a dogmatic Pantheism by the added statement that we cannot "pretend to know the origin and composition of the Power"; we cannot say that it is a person or thing. In one place Arnold professes that he will not *deny* that "the Power" is "a conscious intelligence." But ordinarily he treats the conception that this "Power" is intelligent as pure anthropomorphism. If it be this, why admit it even as a possibility? Perhaps the study of a few pages of Lotze might have convinced him that, if by anthropomorphism is meant the limiting of God, or making Him finite, no such consequence follows from personality.

What becomes of devotion, of what men have always meant by prayer and communion with God, when God is made to be nothing

more than a law of things, "a stream of tendency"? In a footnote Arnold gives the following answer: "All good and fruitful prayer, however men may describe it, is at bottom nothing else than an energy of aspiration towards the Eternal, *not ourselves*, that makes for righteousness, — of aspiration towards it, and coöperation with it." The Eternal, it must be remembered, which is referred to by the use of the pronoun *it*, signifies no being, — this is expressly disclaimed. "It," "the Eternal," is the fact that "righteousness was salvation," and will "go on being salvation." "It," "the Eternal," is the experienced and expected conjunction of these two things. What aspiration towards "it," and coöperation with "it" denote, and with what propriety either of these or both together can be taken to signify *prayer*, in particular the *supplication* which has always been held to be the prime essential in prayer, is not explained.

Considering the tendencies of the time in the direction of Pantheistic thought, it is not a matter of surprise that Arnold should bring forward the notion of an impersonal divinity. There is surely some reason for surprise that Arnold should present his conception as the kernel of the Israelites' faith, the living God of whom the prophets spoke, and in praise of whose perfection the Psalms were composed. He admits, to be sure, that the Hebrews personified, and could not but personify, "the Stream of tendency." Yet he regards the personal qualities which the Hebrews attached to God as an accidental and separable element in their faith. Not even an intuition is allowed them of this imaginary divinity, the connection of righteousness with happiness, but their knowedge of "it" is described as empirical; it is something found out by experience. "From all they could themselves make out, and from all that their fathers had told them," they arrived at the conclusion that righteousness is the way to happiness.

Having subtracted from religion and theology the fundamental truth of a personal God, what account does Arnold give of the substance of Christianity? Certainly he presents thoughts and suggestions of spiritual value, and certain felicitous phrases respecting Christ which easily take lodgment in the memory. The sum of his doctrine is contained in his often-repeated statement of the "method" and the "secret" of Jesus, and the spirit or tone of His teaching. The *method* is that of "inwardness," — "Cleanse the inside of the cup." So far there is nothing novel and nothing

to be disputed in our author's exposition. The *secret* is self-renouncement, — "He that will save his life, shall lose it." The element in which the method and spirit are worked is *mildness*, or what is expressively termed "sweet reasonableness." There was, it is well said, a "winning felicity" and a "balance," free from all fanaticism and extravagance. But the "secret" of Jesus leaves out all that Jesus says of the Father in heaven, of the relation of the human soul to Him, of the joy of personal trust in Him, of His unsleeping care of His children. The Divine Father Himself is left out. It leaves out the conception which Jesus has of the inward life of the soul, of his conscious relation to the Father. It takes no account of the prayers of Jesus, of the saying that He was not alone because the Father was with Him, of His last words, "Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit." We are not surprised when Arnold tells us that Buddhism has not only the sense for righteousness, but has even the "secret of Jesus." But it employs the secret ill, it is added, because it lacks the method, "the sweet reasonableness, the unerring balance." The central, substantial principle, the "secret," is declared to be in both systems the same. The real distinction between them, the radical distinction and source of differences, Arnold omits to point out, — namely, the Pantheistic root of the Buddhistic ethics, in contrast with the doctrine of the living, personal God and Father, which is involved in all the teaching of Jesus, and pervades Christianity as a religious and ethical system.

That Arnold should discard the New Testament miracles altogether, is the necessary consequence of his repudiation of Christian theism. If nature and the course of nature are not traced back to the will of a Creator and Sustainer of all things, there is no room left for the supernatural either in the realm of matter or in that of spirit. Arnold well defines his position on this subject when he says that if we had accounts of the ministry of Christ which we knew to have come from the immediate Disciples, we should not have in them a whit less of the miraculous than the canonical Gospels contain. We must infer that it was impossible for Jesus, in case He really healed the blind and the lame, as the Gospels record, to have furnished any credible evidence that He did it, — any evidence to be relied on in after times, or affording ground for reasonable belief in the facts even to those who were with Him when they occurred. Our conception of Christ Himself

must be seriously affected if it could be assumed that the family of followers whom He associated with Himself, whom He personally taught and trained, were utterly disqualified from giving substantially trustworthy testimony concerning what with their own eyes they saw Him do. In his comments on the Gospels, Arnold shows himself quite capable of discerning the weak side of the criticisms of Baur and the Tübingen School. He rejects the idea that the Fourth Gospel is a theological romance, as Baur conceived it to be, and with it the notion that the Apostle John did not live at Ephesus.[1]

A kind of believing and Christian agnosticism was introduced into theology by Sir William Hamilton and some of his disciples. Hamilton followed Kant in denying that the Unconditioned can be an object of conception or positive thought. The Unconditioned embraces the Infinite and the Absolute. The Absolute denotes that which is free from all necessary relations to any other being — which is free from every relation as a condition of existence. The Infinite denotes that which is free from all possible limitations; than which a greater is inconceivable, and which, therefore, can be possessed of no attribute which it had not from

[1] The contrast is striking between the light humor of Matthew Arnold's prose writings and the gloom of his poetry. In the poems, which are so admirable in their way, one may not doubt that his inmost feeling finds expression. There pervades them a tone of sadness, — a sadness without remedy and without solace. Faith gone, the fountains of joy are dry. And yet he sees that the millions —

"Have such need of joy!"

The want of the world is —

"One mighty wave of thought and joy lifting mankind amain."

But the poet sees no ground of hope. He has no counsel to give to mortals, in their unquenchable yearning for bliss, but to "moderate desire," to be content with what a few days on earth may yield. A lesson may be read in Tennyson the reverse of the despairing inference of Arnold: —

"My own dim life should teach me this,
That life shall live for evermore,
Else earth is darkness at the core,
And dust and ashes all that is;

"This round of green, this orb of flame,
Fantastic beauty; such as lurks
In some wild poet, when he works
Without a conscience or an aim."

eternity. They involve the negation of conceivability. Yet in reference to space, time, and degree, "the three species of quantity which constitute the relations of existence," we are presented with contradictory propositions, one of which, therefore, must be true. For example, we can conceive of space neither as infinitely extended nor as absolutely bounded. Yet one or the other must be real. Hamilton's inference is that the limits of our thought are not the limits of existence. He blames Kant for not showing that the antinomies are due to the fact that the Unconditioned is not a notion, either simple or positive, but "only a fasciculus of negatives." The truth is that we are not able to understand as possible either of two extremes, one of which must be recognized as true.[1] The sources of religious and Christian belief are in our moral nature. Which horn in each case of the dilemma — for example, the dilemma of necessity or freedom — we are to take, is determined by our moral nature. In Mansel's *Limitations of Religious Thought*, the Hamiltonian philosophy is applied to Christian Theology. Faith rests on the feeling of dependence and the feeling of obligation, and on the Christian Revelation. But Rationalism and Dogmatic Theology are both silenced by reason of the inconceivable nature of the objects of faith. Our knowledge in this province is relative. It is symbolic rather than literal. It tells us how God would have us think of Him, but not what He is in itself. This last is incommunicable. Even the moral attributes cannot be affirmed to correspond fully to the same qualities in men. Even his personality must be asserted with a like reservation. Mansel's work evoked energetic protests in very diverse quarters. Among the antagonists who wrote against it were F. D. Maurice, Goldwin Smith, and John Stuart Mill.

Before touching on the renewed appearance of an empirical philosophy in England, a brief reference may be made to a like event in France. The Sensualistic and Materialistic School, which professed to build upon the premises of Locke, was assailed by a spiritual eclectic philosophy, of which Royer-Collard (1763–1845) was the founder. He was a disciple of Reid. The work that he began was carried forward by Victor Cousin (1792–1867) and his followers, of whom Jouffroy (1796–1842) was the ablest. The

[1] Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, p. 527; Appendix, p. 647. "Philosophy of the Conditioned" (in Wright's ed. of *Hamilton's Philosophy*), p. 459.

Eclectic School was influenced by Kant, and to some extent by Schelling. It was under the auspices of Auguste Comte (1798–1857) that the grounds of theism were once more attacked. From him sprung the Positivist School. He maintained that we have no knowledge save of phenomena, or things as manifested to our consciousness. Phenomena are arranged according to their likeness or unlikeness, and in their chronological order of occurrence. How we become possessed of the notions of likeness and of succession is not cleared up. Of efficient or final causes, if they exist, we have no knowledge. Religion is a product of imagination. There are three stages of thought,—the mythical, the metaphysical, and the scientific or positivist. In the first the personifying imagination attributes natural phenomena to personal agents. Theism is the ripe form of this tendency. In the second stage persons are exchanged for substances and causes. In the third, it becomes plain that knowledge is limited to phenomena, to be classified by their degree of resemblance and their temporal relation. In his old age Comte sought, to the disgust of many of his followers, to bring back religion, which his system had banished, in the form of a sentimental worship of humanity, of which woman, the Virgin Mary in particular, is the symbol.

In England, the philosophy of Hume was reproduced by John Stuart Mill. The associational psychology found in him an acute advocate. It is expounded in his *Inductive Logic*, in his *Review of Sir W. Hamilton's Writings*, and in miscellaneous essays. "Intuitions" are the product of experience. They arise from impressions which begin in infancy, and are so frequently conjoined as to seem native to the mind. This is said of geometrical axioms. We are told that there may be other planets where two and two are five. Causation is another name for the invariable association of phenomena by which an expectation as to their recurrence is created that is delusively thought to be instinctive. The mind is a series of sensations with the possibility of other sensations. We are hindered only by the fact of memory from asserting the mind to be nothing but such a "series" conscious of itself. In his later writings, Mill was disposed to believe in a form of theism, and to find considerations in favor of the doctrine of a future life. He attributed weight to the argument of design, but his faith in it was weakened by the appearance of Darwinism.

The agnostic system of Herbert Spencer accords with Hume and Mill in tracing intuitions to an empirical source. It is not, however, the experience of the individual, but that of the race, to which their origin is attributed. Heredity is taken as the clew to the solution of the problem of their emergence in the consciousness of the individual. They are a legacy of remote ancestors, by whom they were gradually acquired. This is one of Spencer's modifications of the Positivist Creed. Moreover, with the Positivist doctrine that all our knowledge is of phenomena, he seeks to connect the Pantheistic theory of an unknown substance or power — called "the Unknowable" — at the root of all phenomena. We only know that it *is*, and that all phenomena are its manifestations in consciousness. From Hamilton is adopted the notion of the relativity of knowledge, and the inconceivability of "the Infinite"; but the supplementary doctrine of Kant and Hamilton of a well-grounded belief in God and in freedom, on the basis of our moral nature, is set aside or left out. That which we call mind in man is the outcome of an all-comprehensive process of evolution. Nervous organism is the product of development; from nervous organism emerge mental phenomena. "Reason rejects" the belief in our personality, unavoidable as this belief is confessed to be.[1] But materialism is disavowed, on the ground that the nerve-movement is not less phenomenal than the feeling; both being assumed to be the "faces" or "sides" of the same unknown reality. "The force by which we ourselves produce changes and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general" is all that we know of cause in the Absolute, the Unknowable. If Spencer made the causal idea as thus derived the symbol for the interpretation of "changes in general," he would be a theist. By deftly resolving *cause* into the physical idea of *force*, he stamps upon his system a Pantheistic character. Were he to predicate intelligence of God, he would be guilty of no graver assumption than when he ascribes intelligence to his fellow-men. It has been conclusively shown that, according to Spencer's principles, whatever anthropomorphism can be laid to the door of Christian theism must be predicated of the whole fabric of natural and physical science. "Relativity" is not more fatal in the one place than in the other. Religion, in Spencer's theory of its origin, begins in the worship of ancestors.[2] The

[1] *First Principles*, pp. 64, 65. [2] *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I. c. viii. sq.

belief in their continued existence after death arises partly through dreams. The "primitive man," too, mistakes his shadow for another man, the duplicate of himself. Epilepsy, insanity, and like maladies confirm the notion that ghosts come and go. Temples were at first tombs of the dead. Fetiches were parts of their clothing. Idols were their images. To explain the worship of plants, animals, and of heavenly bodies, other hypotheses or conjectures, such as linguistic blunders, figures of speech being taken as literal expressions, are brought in.

It is pretty generally agreed that the Darwinian theory of the descent of existing animal species, even when man is included, does not militate against theism, or sap the foundation, however it may vary the form, of the argument of design. "The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not mutually exclusive."[1] Darwin himself, to be sure, admitted an element of "chance" in the variation which furnishes the materials for "natural selection"; but "chance," he said, is an incorrect expression of our "ignorance of the cause of each particular variation."[2] Yet he can see no evidence of design as to the use to be made of the results of variation, and finds here "an insoluble difficulty," like that of "free-will and predestination."[3] Such a difficulty, it is plain, would at best have force as an objection, not against the *existence*, but against the *wisdom*, of an intelligent Creator. However, the fact of such a haphazard variation is disputed or doubted by naturalists of the highest ability who accept the evolutionary hypothesis of Darwin.[4] Intelligent advocates of evolutionary doctrine in its extreme form perceive that the gulf between physical states and consciousness is impassable.[5] It is more and more recognized that such questions as those of the personality of God and the free and responsible nature of man, are beyond the province and the power of physical science to determine. Verified knowledge in this department may affect traditional interpretations of early narratives in the book of Genesis, or ideas relative to their inspiration, but can reach no farther.

[1] Huxley, *Critiques*, p. 307. [2] *Origin of Species*, p. 137.

[3] *Animals and Plants under Domestication*, p. 58.

[4] For example, Dr. Asa Gray, *Darwiniana*, p. 148; Huxley, *Encycl. Brit.* Vol. VIII. p. 751.

[5] For example, Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, p. 121: "The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable," etc.

"It may be remarked," writes an able expositor of natural science, "that scientific men often give utterance to opinions which far transcend the limits which we have assigned for the scope of science. . . . When a scientific man expresses an opinion on such questions as the existence of God and the immateriality of the human soul, his utterances are not science but philosophy, — good or bad philosophy, as the case may be. The opinions of a scientific man on philosophy or theology are no more a part of science than are his opinions on politics or poetry."[1]

One of the class of scientific men who have interested themselves in questions of philosophy and theology — that class, of which Professor Rice remarks that to their opinions "the popular mind often attributes the same degree of probability as belongs to the legitimate conclusions of science" — is Professor Huxley. In his little book on Hume, in his *Lay Sermons*, in his controversial papers against Professor Wace, he has expressed himself too clearly to leave us in any doubt in reference to his philosophical opinions. He has explained how he came to invent the term 'Agnostic,' which describes his position.[2] Professor Huxley thinks that what we call the mind is a collection or series of sensations standing in certain relations to each other, and that this is all we know about it. That there is a thinking agent, such as men generally suppose to exist when they use the word 'I,' there is no proof. Their conviction is not an intuition; it is not a rational postulate; it is naught except a bare hypothesis which there is no ground for affirming as a fact. There is a uniformity of succession in the sensations which constitute the soul, as far as we know anything of it or have any reason to assert anything of it; but there is no freedom of choice, in the sense that the circumstances, internal and external, being the same, any different determination of the will from that which actually takes place is possible. It is a natural inquiry, What space is there, on this view of things, for personal responsibility, or for the obligations

[1] The passage is from Professor W. N. Rice's admirable little book, *Twenty-five Years of Scientific Progress and Other Essays* (New York, 1894), p. 106.

[2] If the name is new, the main thing denoted by it is expressed by the Apostle Paul when he says of the world, that it "*knew not God*," although the agnosticism to which the Apostle referred commonly had a stock of beliefs of its own in regard to the world unseen, therein differing from the agnosticism of which Professor Huxley has the distinction of being the godfather.

of morality? "What we call the operations of the mind," says Professor Huxley, "are functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral activity." But the brain, like everything else that is alive, is developed from protoplasm, the primitive form of living matter. Still Huxley resents the imputation of materialism. He insists that we have no knowledge of anything but the heap of sensations, impressions, feelings, — or by whatever name they may be called. There may be a real something without, which is the cause of all our impressions. In that case, sensations are the symbols of that unknown something. This conclusion Huxley favors, although he is at pains to declare that idealism is unassailable by any means of disproof within the limits of positive knowledge. It is not explained how, if this last alternative is accepted, the idealist is to avoid the conclusion which metaphysicians style 'solipsism.' But the "something" of which the brain is a product is unintelligent; and when the brain dissolves, there is nothing to prove that the phenomena of intelligence continue. There is no proof that the soul — that is, the series of sensations — does not come to an end. The existence of a personal God is another of the propositions which are incapable of being established. "In respect to the existence and attributes of the soul, as of those of the Deity," says Huxley, "logic is powerless and reason silent." As regards the attributes of God, — justice, benevolence, and the like, — he indicates no dissent from the "searching critical negation" of Hume. If there be a God, he thinks it demonstrable that God must be "the cause of all evil as well as all good," — a conclusion which would follow, to be sure, from the tenet that man is not a personal agent, freely originating his voluntary actions, but is no proper adjunct of the opposite doctrine. As a consistent agnostic, Huxley rejects Hume's definition of a miracle as a violation of the order of nature, for the reason that the "laws of nature" are based on incomplete knowledge. But in dealing with the New Testament narratives he follows Hume in treating the miracle as an isolated marvel. He confines his attention to its *unusual* character, if we suppose it to be an actual occurrence. His philosophy admits of no interpretation of it save as requiring an alteration of our conception of the constitution of nature.[1]

[1] On what is meant by the "order of nature," and the relation of miracles to it, see Mozley, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 43.

No more searching and cogent answers to the assailants of the fundamental truths of religion in recent times have appeared than are contained in writings of the most eminent of the English Unitarian ministers, James Martineau. In defending a spiritual philosophy against materialism and agnosticism, he has carried the war with equal energy and courtesy into the enemy's country.[1] Other authors, such as Robert Flint[2] and Samuel Harris,[3] — and not a few other names would have to be added to complete the list, — have exposed the fallacies of antagonistic schools, and have set forth the rational foundations of Christian theism.

[1] Dr. Martineau is the author of *Religion and Modern Materialism* (1874), *A Study of Religion, its Sources and Contents* (1888), *Types of Ethical Theory* (1886), etc. In *The Seat of Authority in Religion* (1890), Dr. Martineau takes up questions pertaining to Revealed Religion. Here he advocates opinions characteristic of the Tübingen School and of the later German Critical School.

[2] Author of *Theism* (7th ed. revised, 1874), *Anti-Theistic Theories* (2 ed. 1880).

[3] Author of *The Philosophical Basis of Theism* (1883), *The Self-Revelation of God* (1887).

CHAPTER V

THE ANGLO-FRENCH DEISM — THEOLOGY IN GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: DEISTIC ILLUMINISM IN GERMANY — ZINZENDORF AND THE MORAVIANS — THE THEOLOGY OF LESSING — THE RATIONALISTIC BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM: SEMLER; EICHHORN — "THE THEOLOGY OF THE UNDERSTANDING" — THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT — THE KANTIAN ETHICAL RATIONALISM — JACOBI AND HERDER — TWO DIVERGENT CURRENTS OF THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT

THE last century witnessed in France the spread of deism, which took its rise in England, and with deism the advocacy and spread of a materialistic atheism. Voltaire (1694–1778), whose sway in the domain of letters surpassed that of any other author since Erasmus, defended deism, as verified both on moral grounds and by scientific proof. He held likewise the doctrine of immortality. At the same time he used his wonderful resources of wit and sarcasm to assail 'superstition,' under which term he included not only perversions and abuses in current conceptions of Christianity, but also the distinctive facts and doctrines of Christianity itself. A step farther was taken by Condillac (1715–80), building upon the premises of Locke, who, as he judged, had failed to press to its proper conclusion the proposition that all mental states spring from sensation. Self-love, Condillac taught, is the source of all our inclinations, whether evil or good. Man's superiority to the brute is largely owing to his possession of language. Yet he does not go so far as to assert the materiality of the soul or to deny the being of God. Helvetius (1715–71), in his work *On the Mind*, carries out the idea of Condillac respecting the principle of self-love, by tracing in detail all virtue to self-interest, and identifying morality with selfishness. The deism of Voltaire was followed by the materialism and atheism of the

"Encyclopædists," — so called from the title of the copious work of Diderot and D'Alembert, the *Encyclopédie*, which was sympathetic with these extremes of infidelity. They were explicitly set forth in *The System of Nature*, of which Baron Holbach (1723–1789), a German by birth, was the author. God, freedom, and immortality are treated as chimeras, and duty is resolved into a form of self-gratification.

Against these debasing opinions Rousseau protested in the *Savoyard Vicar's Profession of Faith* (contained in *Emile*). The fundamental truths of religion rest upon our feeling of their truth, although dogmatic atheism and materialism may be met by reasoning as cogent as the pleas in their favor. The authority of conscience is stamped upon the heart of man. When we examine the evidences of Christianity, we are left in doubts and difficulties. Reasons on one side are balanced by reasons on the other. But the heart speaks with a convincing voice, affirming the inspiration of the Scriptures and that Jesus is more than man. The moral excellence which He exhibited in precept and example, when the time and place in which He lived are considered, could not have had a human origin. Despite oscillation and an excess of sentiment in his utterances respecting religion, Rousseau anticipates in a more indefinite way the ideas of Kant in his *Practical Reason*.

In a work like the present some notice should be taken of the tenets of Emanuel Swedenborg, although it has the appearance of a digression. Swedenborg was born in 1688. Well educated, he was a remarkable proficient in mathematical and physical science, combining scientific insight with practical skill. In 1743 he first believed himself to have a vision of Christ and direct intercourse, through angels and by immediate perception, with supernatural states of existence. By special illumination he was qualified to unveil their nature and to set forth the true theology. He was a voluminous writer. In the *Arcana Cœlestia* and elsewhere he expounds his system. The universe is one whole, the outward world being the counterpart of the inward and spiritual. There is a correspondence between the two. Nature is a parable. In the Bible beneath the literal sense, there is the occult, spiritual meaning, the Word of God, open to the discerning. Swedenborg dissents in many points from the ordinary church theology. He denounces without stint the doctrine of justification by faith alone,

as set forth in the current Lutheran teaching.[1] God is in His essence Love and Wisdom. There is an approach to an ideal theory of matter. God is a single person. The idea of an immanent Trinity is rejected. There was no Trinity before the creation. Jesus derived His body from Mary. That which is divine in Christ is the Father, the name of God after He has "assumed the human"; the divine in this connection with the human is the Son; the divine which proceeds from Him is the Holy Spirit. Thus the Trinity is in Christ. Christ was victor over the powers of hell. A substitutionary atonement is rejected. Christ is glorified, and, through Him, the divine man, we have the true idea of God and are conjoined by love to Him. A physical resurrection is discarded. At death the eyes are opened to the spiritual world in which we exist now. After death men live essentially as they lived here. At length they are drawn by their affinities to hell or to heaven. Angels are the spirits of departed human beings.

It is in Germany, eminently "the land of scholars," that in these latter days, theological thought, as well as investigation, has more than elsewhere flourished. The history of German theology in the modern period comprises in it a record of the different types of "Rationalism" which have appeared, together with a sketch of the counter-movements in the exposition and defence of the evangelical cause. Rationalism is a word of not very exact meaning, but it is used to designate the partial or total denial of the fact of Revelation, or the rejection of the Scriptures as the rule of faith, or, still further, the discarding of what have been generally termed the principles of natural religion.

The first era of Rationalism was the period when the Anglo-French deism was dominant. It was the age of Frederick the Great, who began to reign in 1740 and died in 1786. The sway of France, in opinions as well as in respect to language and manners, prevailed on the Continent. Frederick was himself a disciple of the school of Voltaire, who resided for a time at his court, and corrected the bad French of his verses. It was the period of "illuminism" in Europe, styled by the Germans the period of *Aufklärung*. The reign of superstition, it was thought, was now at an end. Darkness was giving way to the broad sunlight of a new day. Living faith in Christianity, however, did not perish. It survived in Pietism, the name derisively applied to the religious

[1] See, e.g., *The True Christian Religion*, §§ 98, 181, 389.

spirit of those who set a value, and the highest value, on the religion of personal experience, but with less than a just respect for thought and science. It survived in the Moravians, the followers of Zinzendorf (1700–60), with whom Christ and the Atonement had a central place, and whose love and zeal operated as a leaven beyond their ranks. Among them the worship of Christ was sometimes too exclusive to conform to the Apostolic standard, and was one of the peculiarities which incurred the censure of such truly Christian scholars in the Lutheran Church as Bengel, the author of that admirable commentary of the New Testament, the *Gnomon*.

In this period falls the career of the great poet and critic, Lessing, who mingled in the religious controversies of the time. He believed with deists, that true religion is a religion of reason. He dissented from them in holding that religion reaches the rational stage, the stage when its truths are discerned as founded in reason, only at the end of a course of development. Positive religions precede and lead up to this goal. But the historical and statutory part of religion is like a shell, the result of an organic growth, and not superimposed from without. This integument is dropped off by degrees until religion in its rational content or essence remains, having and needing no other support than its recognized reasonableness. He begins his suggestive essay on the "Education of the Human Race" with the remark that "Revelation, in the case of the entire human race, is what education is in the case of the individual."[1] Education gives nothing which the individual could not have from himself, only it gives "more quickly and more easily." The same is true of revelation. As in education, so in revelation, there is an order and a progress. A particular people was chosen for a special education.[2] God caused Himself to be disclosed to them by degrees. He did not commit the fault of a vain pedagogue, whose teaching is beyond the capacity of the pupil. The experiences of the Israelite, out of his own land "with other children," helped him to some knowledge. "A better pedagogue must come, and take the exhausted elementary book out of his hands. — Christ came."[3] The reason of the race in pupilage had advanced. The New Testament is a second, a better, elementary book for the race.

[1] *Werke* (Boxberger's ed.), Vol. XII. p. 348.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 349. [3] *Ibid.* p. 361.

It was necessary that every people should for a while regard it as the *ne plus ultra* of its knowledge.[1] Just as we can dispense, as to the doctrine of the unity of God, with the Old Testament, and, as to the doctrine of immortality, with the New, so will it be as to the other Biblical truths. So it is, Lessing attempts to show, in regard to the Trinity, to which he offers what he thinks a philosophical equivalent,[2] as also to the doctrines of Original Sin[3] and the Satisfaction of Christ.[4] What if here we have taken all the steps towards perfection that temporal rewards and penalties can lead to? "Is not all eternity mine?"[5] In Lessing's posthumous essays and fragments of essays, there are interesting statements indicative of his opinions. He distinguishes between "the religion of Christ," the religion which He as a man recognized and practised, and "the Christian religion," which assumes as true that He was more than a man, and "as such makes Him an object of worship." The religion in the Gospels is not the Christian, but the religion of Christ. The latter is clearly set forth. As to the former, two men will hardly ever, as long as the world stands, be found to attach to it the same meaning.[6] Respecting the evidences of Christianity, proof from miracles avails only to the Apostles and their contemporaries. Lessing is at pains to show that the Gospel was taught before the New Testament was written. Christ, not the Scriptures, is the primary object of belief. In the drama of *Nathan the Wise*, a Jew, Mohammedan, and Christian are brought together in the time of the Crusades. The lesson from the spirit of Nathan, the Jew, is that one's creed is of little moment, provided there is a temper of charity and tolerance. Lessing published the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, purporting to be from a manuscript of an unknown author, found in the library of Wolfenbüttel, of which he had charge. It was really the work of Reimarus, a physician. It was an attack on the credibility of the Gospels. The greatest excitement was occasioned by it. Lessing defended the right and expediency of publishing the book, in the interest of free discussion, and in opposition to an orthodox Hamburg pastor, Göze. He himself wrote an essay, showing much research, on the Evangelists considered as merely human historians.[7]

[1] *Werke* (Boxberger's ed.), Vol. XII. p. 363.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 364.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 365.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 366.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 370.
[6] Vol. XIII. pp. 475, 476.
[7] It is in the Nachlässe, *Werke*, Vol. XIII. p. 350 sq., "Neue Hypothesen," etc.

The period of "illumination" in Biblical and historical criticism, although it had its forerunner in the Socinian and Arminian scholars, was opened by Semler (1725–91), a contemporary of Lessing. In Germany, says Tholuck, "it is Semler by whom, in the whole expanse of Biblical and historical criticism, traditional assumptions and opinions are combated, now the text of the Bible attacked, now the genuineness of Biblical books contested, now the foundation of received views respecting the Church and the history of doctrines taken away." Zeal for exploration in all these directions was kindled in all the German universities. Among the critics, Eichhorn (1752–1827), for fifty-two years a teacher at Jena and Göttingen, brought forward suggestions and problems without number which stimulated thought and demanded solution. For example, the documentary hypothesis as to the composition of Genesis, first propounded by Astruc, was introduced into Eichhorn's *Introduction to the Old Testament.* The way was opened for the discussions relative to the authorship of the Pentateuch and of Joshua, in which, in later times, De Wette, Bleek, Ewald, Hupfeld, and, more recently, Kuenen, Graf, Reuss, Wellhausen, and many others, have taken part. In the period of Semler and Eichhorn, there were not wanting orthodox men of distinction, such as Michaelis, Ernesti, Mosheim, but their orthodoxy was of a dry and unspiritual kind, — a "theology of the understanding," as the Germans commonly characterize it.

It was inevitable that a powerful influence on the course of theology — an influence not confined to his own country and time — should be exerted by the foremost philosopher of modern days, Immanuel Kant (1722–1804). He began as an adherent of the philosophy of Leibnitz in the form in which it was cast by Wolf. The speculations of Hume awoke him from his "dogmatic slumber," and compelled him to inquire for a basis of knowledge not resting on unverified assumptions, or leading to universal skepticism. He was thus prompted to examine the mind itself as an organ of knowledge, and in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to undertake to distinguish between that which is contributed by the object and by the knowing instrument, the mind itself — between the objective and subjective sources of knowledge. By the criteria of universality and necessity we are assured that while objects of perception — "the thing in itself" — are real and external, the "forms" of perception, space and time,

are purely subjective. By the same criteria, we are assured that the "categories," or concepts, by which the understanding, the faculty of judging, connects the objects of perception into an orderly experience, are likewise subjective, and belong to the constitution or mechanism of the knowing agent. For example, *cause* is not a function of things, an external power binding together antecedent and consequent; nor is it, as Hume said, a mere result of customary association, an objectified product of fancy. It is a necessary mode of our mental activity in contact with phenomena, — for it is only of phenomena, not of the *noumena* behind them, that we have cognizance. Only the world as it is related to the mind can we know. The legitimate action of the understanding through the *a priori* concepts or categories "hath this extent, no more." But there is a third department of mental activity, — the Reason. We seek to unify the knowledge acquired by experience — acquired through the understanding. Thence arise ideas or suggestions, the presuppositions of all our judgments. The ultimate premises implied in the different forms of syllogism give us these ideas. They are the unconditioned subject, the *ego*, not capable of being a predicate; the world, as a complete series of conditions resting on nothing beyond itself; God, the supreme condition of "the possibility of all realities." But while we are thus brought, as it were, to the threshold of a supernatural realm, we are stopped there. The reality of the objects thus suggested by reason is not only unverifiable, as beyond experience; it is inconceivable. For the moment it is assumed and reasoned upon, we land in antinomies — in dilemmas, each branch of which in every case is demonstrable, yet each is the contradiction of the other. The mind is straying beyond its province. Thus Kant argues that freedom and necessity are each provable, but each inconsistent with the other. He considers the proofs of the being of God untenable. The ontological proof is a fallacy, a thing being inferred from a thought; the cosmological has to fall back on the ontological for support; and even the argument of design is not demonstrative, and at the best could not establish the infinitude of the divine attributes. Rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology have no foothold. The upshot of the Kantian achievement is the organization of skepticism.

But in the *Practical Reason*, that which is lost is recovered.

The moral nature testifies to God, freedom, and immortality. I *ought*, and, if I ought, it is true that I *can*. I am made for virtue and for happiness, two ends. Of this I am conscious. Then there is a Moral Governor by whom these ends are made to coincide, and an immortality, the scene of their junction. The freedom of which I am possessed is the power of determining the will by the moral law, uninfluenced by the desires. The *Practical Reason* gives the rule: "So act that your act can be generalized into a maxim"; that is, will nothing that you cannot will as universal. Religion, according to Kant, is the recognition of our duties as divine commands. It is throughout ethical and legal. It is the "categorical imperative" that is exalted. There is no place for Love, the content of the law. It is in his *Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason* that we find the exposition of Kant's religious views. In consonance with the thought of Lessing, whatever in religion is exterior to ethics, whether it be facts or doctrines,—the "statutory faith,"—is simply valuable on account of the weakness of human nature. As reason becomes more mature, and as the moral sense comes to exercise control, everything not recognized and verified by reason will cease to be of any account. Even now we must deduce from Scripture in our interpretations that, and that only, which conforms to universal morality. Kant holds that the subjection of the will to the propensities, as it must be self-originated, implies an *Ur-böse*, a transcendental act of which it is the result, an act independent of our present consciousness or memory. The new birth is the reversal of that underlying disposition of the will. The Son of God is the ideal of the perfect man. Saving faith is the belief in that ideal which is represented in Christ. It is not the belief in historical circumstances respecting Him. The various doctrines of the Christian system are subjected to a transformation of the same general character. The Church is a community for mutual help in the practice of virtue. It is thus a family of the children of God. Any service of God beyond the service of morality is either superfluous and sometimes practically harmful, or a useful crutch for the weak. Belief in divine influences on the soul can neither be approved nor denied. Belief in miracles cannot be sustained by proof, and is not helpful in the performance of duty.

The teaching of Kant on the moral side was a most healthful rebuke of the lax tone and low ideals of the deistic illuminism.

Its bracing atmosphere was wholesome for many minds. But it brought in a type of rationalism in which the distinctively religious character of Christianity was eclipsed or subordinated to an ethical legalism, and in which the miraculous parts of the Gospel narratives were interpreted out of them by such devices as the pushing of the notion of accommodation on the part of Christ Himself to a groundless extreme. Misconceptions of an absurd nature were attributed to the Apostles to account for their testimony. Paulus (1761–1848) was the most conspicuous example of this style of exegesis. In dogmatic theology, Wegscheider (1771–1848) believed in a high providential mission of Jesus, but resolved the miracles into mistakes of witnesses and reporters. Other prominent exponents of this general type of teaching were Röhr (1777–1848) and Bretschneider (1776–1848). Even preachers like Reinhard (1753–1812), and theologians like Storr (1746–1805), while not adopting the Kantian theology, were affected by its influence.

A system which made religion a function of the will and exalted the behest of conscience in such a way as to leave no verification of the truths of religion in the voices of the heart — such a lofty but barren legalism could not but evoke dissent and a reaction. Prominent in proclaiming the high place that belongs to feeling in religion was Herder (1744–1803). If not an exact and self-consistent thinker, he was fertile in quickening suggestions, full of a genial enthusiasm, and versatile, a poet of merit and an eloquent preacher. He exerted a kindling influence in every direction. In his book on the *Spirit of Hebrew Poetry*, and in various other writings, he impressed his readers with the sublimity and attractiveness of the Scriptures, although a somewhat undue stress was laid upon their æsthetic and literary charm. Without rejecting the facts of revelation, he dwells on their spiritual import. He is interested in the allegorical significance of Biblical narratives. He assumes a primitive revelation to communicate to men language and the foundations of knowledge. His principal work is the *Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of Mankind.* Nature is looked upon as a progressive development looking towards man as the goal. So there is an ascending development of mankind. But development is not a genetic evolution of organisms, as in recent theories of natural science. The lower stage prefigures the stage that follows. Reason directly recog-

nizes God as the Supreme Reason, the primary cause and the bond of all things. As man's development is incomplete here, we are warranted in our expectation of immortality. Christ knows God as His Father and all men as His brethren, and is thus the ideal man. Inspiration is the enlivening of all the higher powers of the human soul. There are nobler impulses of action than mere law. Such are love and the enthusiasm of truth. With the traditional dogmatic construction of the Christian teaching Herder has no sympathy. Less indefinite than Herder's protest against Kant's philosophy of religion was the protest of Jacobi (1743–1819). He agreed that the fundamental truths of natural religion are indemonstrable. They are objects of an immediate belief, a belief spontaneous, inspired by a necessity of feeling and connected with a spiritual craving. This instinctive faith is an act of Reason. Reason is not, as according to Kant, merely regulative; it is intuitive. "Nature conceals God;" it is a chain of efficient causes, excluding both chance and providence. "Man reveals God." As he is conscious of a power within him which is independent of nature, superior to nature, "so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an experience of His existence."[1] Jacobi's exposition of his ideas in the book *Of the Divine Things* had a great number of sympathetic readers who were repelled by the frigid rationalism of the Kantian School.

Thenceforward, there appear two streams in the field of German thought, a believing Christian theology, founded on the recognition of a "consciousness of God," indigenous in the soul, and a speculative Pantheism, the fruit of a modification, in this direction, of Kant's philosophy.

[1] Jacobi, *Werke*, Vol. III. pp. 424–426.

CHAPTER VI

SCHLEIERMACHER'S THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM

HERDER and Jacobi were only forerunners of a prince among theologians, an extraordinary genius, who exerted an influence proportionate to his powers, Frederic Schleiermacher (1768–1834). He early received deep religious impressions from the Moravians. He was a philosopher who was excelled by none in dialectic and speculative ability. His translation of all Plato's writings is only one evidence of his interest in metaphysical studies. Mingled with the powerful Christian influence in determining the cast of his thought was an early and lasting attraction exerted by the doctrine of Spinoza. On the one hand, a deep appreciation of Christ as the Redeemer, a rare insight, in whatever respects it may be defective, into His character and office among men, and, on the other hand, speculative difficulties in conceiving of God as possessed of attributes of personality — these are the two facts explanatory of Schleiermacher's system. His *Discourses on Religion to the Cultivated among its Despisers* (1799) and his *Monologues* (1800), vague as they are in respect to doctrine, are an impressive, and proved an effective, appeal in behalf of spiritual religion as the true life of the soul. His principal theological work, a consecutive exposition of his system, is *The Christian Faith — Der christliche Glaube* (1822).

In this "epoch-making" treatise the author sets aside the rationalistic dogmatics as identifying religion with ethics, the orthodox dogmatics as comprising propositions not involved in Christian experience, and as deducing its contents from no single principle. Dogmatics is a theological science. As such it is related to the Church. What is the Church? It is a society, a communion (*Gemeinschaft*), based on piety. This is the bond of union. What is piety? It is not a function of the knowing faculty, for its seat is

not the intellect, nor of the will. We are always carried back of the voluntary act to the impulse behind it (*Antrieb*). The seat of piety is feeling. But what specifically is the feeling which constitutes piety? It is the feeling of absolute dependence. It is not the feeling of freedom; it is not the feeling of relative dependence which we have towards the world, or finite things about us. In feeling, the soul is closely united with the object — in the embrace of its object. In knowing, the object stands over against the subject; it is defined. The feeling of absolute dependence coexists with the feeling of relative dependence. It is in the due relation of these feelings, the dominating, determining power of the former that piety consists. They are the "consciousness of God" and "the consciousness of the world." It is by this postulate of piety as purely subjective, that not only at the outset, but always, Schleiermacher steers clear of his speculative difficulties connected with theism. *Christian* piety is the piety which is conscious of being related to Christ as its author, of itself as an effect of the soul's connection with Him. The Church, as the society of the religious, is an organism whose members are active and passive, who give and receive religious impressions (*Erregungen*).

The function of Dogmatic Theology can now be stated. Its principle is the feeling of absolute dependence in its relation to Christ. It is the statement of the contents of Christian experience. Nothing else has any place in this science. Other facts and doctrines belong elsewhere — to Ethics or to other branches of knowledge. Dogmatics considers, first, the pious experience (*Gottesbewusstsein*) in itself; secondly, the development of the sinful experience or principle; and thirdly, the consciousness of grace, or the inward experience of redemption, as related to Christ.

I. It is not *creation*, but divine preservation, that is involved in the religious feeling, the sense of absolute dependence. Creation from eternity is the true conception, God having no relation to time. And the only attribute to be ascribed to God, on the foundation of the religious feeling, is primal causal agency (*ursächlichkeit*). The world as a totality is referred to God, not anything singly considered. He is the immanent cause of the world. His omnipotence only signifies that all separate causes, manifestations of power, are referable to Him. It is not implied in the religious feeling that there is in God surplus, unexerted power. His omniscience signifies that His agency is a living power; but this is all.

Plans and execution of plans are not to be attributed to Him. The activity designated as omniscience is not to be distinguished from omnipotence.

II. Sin is the predominance, the victory, of the flesh over the spirit. It consists in the subordination, the subjugation, of the religious feeling under the lower nature, or worldliness. This condition as common to the race is Original Sin. It is the natural condition of all men from the beginning. Thus there is no real distinction between sin, and the consciousness of sin. Adam was like us in this respect: there was no fall from holiness. Here the creeds are said to be in error.

III. Christ is distinguished from other men by the absolute control from the start of the religious feeling — the sense of God. He is sinless, yet His character made progress by continual victories as the appetencies of nature unfolded themselves. His continuous and perfect religiousness is the indwelling of God in Christ and is the peculiarity of His person.

His person is supernatural as not explicable by circumstances, by His environment, but only by reference to an act of God. This, however, is not to be understood as an interposition in time. It is nature as a whole, or the race, which evolves this person at a particular time. We are not required, therefore, to deny that He had a human father. In Christ the human is wholly passive and receptive. The formula that He had a divine *nature* is questionable, since nature implies passivity. The perfection of Christ is in the *religious* province. He must, moreover, express Himself through national peculiarities and modes of thought. He is not properly styled the Example (*Vorbild*), but the Type, of Mankind. He realizes in Himself the ideal of man.

To Schleiermacher, Christ is the Source of a new spiritual life of communion with God, first realized in the Saviour Himself, and from Him communicated to those who are drawn out of themselves into fellowship with Him. But this effect is conditioned on the entering of the individual within the historically constituted sphere of the Saviour's influence, the community of believers. It is not the effect of a direct, supernatural act of Christ in relation to the individual. Christ is compared to an individual in whom the idea of the State should first come to consciousness, and who should gather the unorganized mass of men from the state of nature into a civil community by taking them up into a participa-

tion in this new life — the life of citizenship. The *redemptive* agency of Christ consists in the imparting to men, through the attractive power which He exerts upon them, that inward consciousness of fellowship with God (*Gottesbewusstsein*) which in Him is absolutely controlling, and holds every other feeling in due subordination to itself. His *atoning* work is the communication to them of His own undisturbed blessedness, which is the concomitant of this filial communion with God. Christ receives the believer to be a partaker of His holiness and blessedness — of His inward spiritual life. He acts upon men to this end. God looks upon the sinner, not as he is actually, but as he is in virtue of his relation to Christ — as he is ideally, as he will be when the process which has begun is complete. Sin still exists in him, but as a vanishing element.

The union of the believer with Christ brings the forgiveness of sin; since, the principle of sin being itself destroyed at the root, sin being driven, as it were, from the centre to the circumference of the character, evil or pain does not break up the harmony of the inward life; if the disciple suffered, the Master suffered likewise: and evil, including death, loses its punitive aspect, and is transmuted into chastisement, or a merciful infliction. Forgiveness does not free from suffering; it simply changes its effect and its significance. The sufferings of Christ are not directly essential to His work as a Saviour. They are needful, first, as His devotion to the work of founding the new kingdom could be manifested in its fulness only by His not giving way to the utmost resistance, even to that which involved the destruction of His person; and, secondly, because His blessedness could only appear in its perfection in the continuance of it through the most extreme suffering, even that which grew out of the withstanding of sin, and out of His own fellow-feeling with sinful men, which attended this most bitter experience.

In the exposition of the priestly office of Christ, Schleiermacher fully develops the idea sketched above. "The fact that only what Christ does corresponds perfectly to the divine will, and expresses purely and completely the reign of godliness (*Gottesbewusstsein*) in human nature, is the foundation of our relation to Him; and on the recognition of this everything that is distinctively Christian rests. In this is included the fact that, independently of his connection with Christ, neither any individual man, nor any particular

part of the collective life of humanity, in any era, is, in and of itself, righteous before God, or an object of His approbation." "In living fellowship with Christ, no one will be, or will be considered by God, anything for himself; but every one will appear only as inspired by Him, and as a portion, in the process of development, of His work." He is like the High Priest in relation to the people; God looks on them as in Him. "His pure will to fulfil the divine will is, by means of the vital fellowship between Him and us, operative in us, and we thus have part in His perfection, if not in the actual realization, nevertheless in the stimulus and spur (*Antrieb*)." Christ has actually fulfilled the will of God, therefore, "not in our stead, but for our benefit." As concerns the passive obedience, or sufferings, of Christ, "in every human community, so far as it can be considered a distinct whole, there is as much evil as there is sin; so that, to be sure, evil is the punishment of sin; not, however, in the sense that each individual suffers completely and exclusively just the evil which stands in connection with his personal sin. Therefore, in every case where another suffers evils which are not connected with his own sin, it can be said that he suffers punishment for others, who, since the sin, as the cause and fountain of evil, has exhausted itself, are no longer smitten with evils in consequence of it. Since Christ, in order to take us up into the fellowship of His life, must enter into the fellowship of our life which is sinful, where sin is continually begetting suffering and evil, He suffered for the entire human race; for to the whole race He chose to ally Himself. As High Priest, moreover, His sympathy with human guilt and ill-desert, or His sympathetic apprehension of it, which was the motive of His redemptive work, reached its highest pitch when it inspired Him to undergo death at the hands of sinners. Here was His victory over sin; and with it, over evil which sin brings in its train. Hence, by the sufferings of Christ punishment may be said to be abolished, because in the communion of His blessed life, evil, which becomes a vanishing element, is no longer felt as a penalty. It is in His sufferings that we behold His holiness, and His blessedness also, which are seen to be invincible under the severest test. By entering into His sufferings, the conviction of His holiness and blessedness is brought home to us. The suffering of Christ is vicarious, in that His sympathetic apprehension (*Mitgefühl*) of sin is complete, even as regards those who are not

themselves distressed by the consciousness of sin; and in the sense that, being Himself sinless, He is not under obligation to suffer. His sympathetic compassion for men as sinners is strong enough to take in all; it exhibits itself fully in His freely giving Himself up to death; and it serves ever to complete and perfect our imperfect consciousness of sin. Christ sustains a relation to us which renders Him the representative of the entire human race, inasmuch as, in the character of a High Priest, He brings our prayers to God, and brings to us the divine blessing. He is the Priest whom all preceding priesthoods imperfectly foreshadow. He is the most perfect Mediator between God and every separate portion of the human race, no one of whom, in and for himself, could be an object for God, or come into any connection with Him. In His consciousness is the norm and the fountain of acceptable piety. Even the penitence which is appropriate for sin, finds its pattern and potence in His sympathetic sense of its evil."[1]

It is impossible not to be struck with the spiritual insight and scientific method which mark Schleiermacher's discussion of this subject. Christ, bringing into the race the life of holy and blessed communion with God; maintaining in Himself this life of filial love and of deep, inward peace consequent upon it, even in the midst of death inflicted by the malignity of men, into whose condition of sin and misery He entered with an exhaustive sympathy; annihilating thus, by His holy constancy, sin as a principle, and with it the suffering of which sin is the parent, and which is put in the way of gradual extinguishment; propagating this inward life, within the circle of His historic influence, by drawing sinful men up into the fellowship of His filial relation to God, and thus giving them, too, the victory of the spirit over the flesh; lifting them, also, above the power of outward calamity to break the soul's calm, and transmuting for them all outward suffering, including physical death, into a means of purification and peace, — these ideas surely include an important part of the Gospel.

But the subjective character of Schleiermacher's theology is manifest in this discussion of the Atonement. Sin is not conceived of strictly as something abnormal, but as a lower stage in human development. The end of the work of Christ is not so much to rescue, as to elevate, human nature. Hence the feeling

[1] *Der Christliche Glaube*, II. 1, § 51 sq.

of guilt and its correlate, the holy displeasure of God, are left out. When the principle of sin is broken in its control, it is conceived that guilt and the sense of guilt disappear of themselves. Guilt is really made to be a spur to an onward development, instead of being retrospective and retributive in its import. Therefore a conscious need of expiation finds no place. According to Schleiermacher, the work of Christ, and His death as a part of it, delivers from sin, and delivers from punishment; but this last effect is within the sphere of the natural order, in the way of cause and effect, and not from any other influence upon the mind of God.

The new life through Christ is progressive. As beginning, it is Regeneration; as in progress, it is Sanctification. Viewed from the side of man, Regeneration is termed Conversion; from the side of God, Justification. When the will ceases to be determined by the "flesh," by the influences of the world of sense, and when the religious consciousness, the incentives emanating from this source, become dominant, the change is "conversion." Justification is the removal by God of our consciousness of guilt and of ill-desert. It begins with forgiveness. This is simultaneous with the sinner's union to Christ, when he begins to contend against his own sin, makes it no longer his own. Then the sense of guilt vanishes. Then he becomes willing to suffer with Christ. Hence natural evil is no longer felt to be penal. Against future evil he is secured by his part in the kingly office of Christ. As Christ lives in us, we become partakers of His Sonship. But Justification is not a distinct act of God in time, but a single, temporal effect of one comprehensive act of God. It is the effect in time of one eternal and universal "purpose" — the last term being figuratively used.

Respecting the miracles of Christ, Schleiermacher is obliged to deny the possibility of miracles in the sense of special interpositions, effects of supernatural power. Whatever phenomena are called miraculous, in case their occurrence is established, are effects of the Power immanent in the world — effects provided for in nature. Miracles are not a component element in our faith in Christ. But the rejection of them would be such an impeachment of the competency of the original reporters as to cast discredit on their testimony, in general, respecting Christ, and thus destroy the basis of faith. This is the case as concerns His resurrection.

His Ascension is not sufficiently verified by the evidence, but nothing can be admitted inconsistent with our faith in Him, — for example, that He lived on in concealment. His Second Advent signifies that the perfecting of the Church is possible only by a sudden advance — as it were, a bound — when the propagation of the race ceases, and the mingling of the good and the evil. It can only be looked upon as proceeding from the kingly office of Christ. The great miracle for us is the effect of Christianity on mankind. The greatest miracle of all is Christ Himself. Schleiermacher must conceive of conversion as exclusively due to God's agency. This is expressed by the term 'Election,' with the additional fact that the occurrence of conversion in each case is at a particular time. But all are ultimately saved. The Church is one, as a nation is one, through the *one spirit* that pervades it and unites all its members, amid individual peculiarities. Reception into fellowship with Christ and reception of the Holy Spirit, are one and the same thing. Faith in Christ precedes a doctrine concerning the Scriptures. They are the first exposition of the Christian faith, and the norm of all that follow it. The call to the ministry is the inward disposition in some to exercise predominantly the forth-going, rather than the receptive, species of activity, both species being characteristic of the members of the Church. Prayer is not to be conceived of as producing an effect on God. True prayer springs from a presage in the Christian mind of what is to be done by Christ, of what is to occur in His kingdom. The prayer, as well as its answer, are products of Christ's agency as king. True prayer has no other object than something that is included in the divine order of events. Moreover, the state of mind out of which prayer arises is one of the conditions, in the natural order, of its fulfilment. The Visible and the Invisible Church are not spatially separated. Every visible part of the Church is a mixture of the Church and the world. The Invisible Church is the sum of all the effects of the Spirit. The Church will be perfect when all reactionary influences of the world upon it and within it cease. This gives the distinction of the Militant and the Triumphant Church. Belief in immortality may be a selfish or an unselfish belief. The real foundation of it is the fact of the union of God and man in Christ, and its design to redeem and perfect the individuals of the race. In eschatology, no systematic construction of doctrine is possible. The con-

tinuance of personal life is represented under the image of the resurrection of the body: it is the taking away of death. The perfection of the Church, from one point of view, — as the Church is no more to be acted upon to its hurt by the world, — is the Last Judgment. From another point of view, as excluding all imperfection, it is eternal blessedness. Schleiermacher argues against the doctrine of eternal punishment, on the ground that it would interfere with the happiness of heaven. Whether the individual at death takes on a new organism, or whether the "general resurrection" takes place at the Last Judgment, is a question on which Schleiermacher gives no decision. The divine government is the causal agency of God as directed to the existence and spread of the Church. The Church, or the kingdom of God, in its whole extent and in all its consequences, is the end of the divine government. Love is the tendency of one to unite himself to another and to live in another. In the Church God unites Himself with men. Thus Love is the controlling principle, just as in the harmonious ordering of redemption God's Wisdom is discovered. But the application of these terms to the undivided causal agency of God is anthropopathic. The Church doctrine of the Trinity is not an "immediate expression respecting the Christian self-consciousness, but only a conjunction of several such expressions." Consistently with his whole system, Schleiermacher declares for the Sabellian conception.

In any brief sketch of Schleiermacher's system justice can hardly be done to the Christian elements that pervade it. Religion is set free from servitude to philosophy, and gains an independent footing for itself. A central place is given to Christ. His influence, His relation to His disciples, is conceived of as deep and controlling. Schleiermacher is not ashamed to call it mystical, in contrast with the rationalistic descriptions of it. Yet it is a system such that one is at a loss whether to call it Christianity leavened with Pantheism, or Pantheism leavened with Christianity. In truth, as it has been said, it is a mixture of the two where each is completely pulverized and both so thoroughly mixed that it is not easy to discern them separately. In the conception of God at the outset His transcendence is sacrificed and absorbed in His immanence. At the starting-point religion is resolved into the sense of dependence. Personality, freedom, fail of a due recognition. The radical assumption of an immanent, intramundane causality

moulds the conception of sin, of the person of Christ, of prayer, of justification — in short, of every point of Christian doctrine. Although personality is wanting in Schleiermacher's conception of God, yet it is something different from the bare substance of Spinoza. It embraces the idea of a living, active energy.

CHAPTER VII

THE LIBERAL EVANGELICAL OR MEDIATING SCHOOL: THE INFLUENCE OF SCHLEIERMACHER; DORNER; JULIUS MÜLLER; NITZSCH — THE SYSTEM OF ROTHE — LIPSIUS — THE CONFESSIONAL LUTHERANS — THE RITSCHLIANS

SCHLEIERMACHER broke a pathway out of the ethical rationalism to a more living apprehension of religion and the Gospel. He was the founder of the School of Liberal Evangelical Theology, which not only drew inspiration from his teaching, but took up rich materials from it to be incorporated in systems differing from his own. The Mediating School, as it is called, counts among its members the great historian Neander, exegetes like Lücke, Tholuck, Bleek, and numerous writers in dogmatic theology, of whom Twesten, Nitzsch, Julius Müller, Rothe, Dorner, are among the most eminent. For many years the *Studien und Kritiken*, a quarterly review, was the organ of the school. It is a school whose representatives naturally have differed widely among themselves in theological opinion. They carry us back to the point of view taken by Origen in his time, where diversity on many important questions is not regarded as a ground for sundering fellowship, and problems not a few are admitted to be waiting for a satisfactory solution. In relation to Schleiermacher, his influence is perceptible in all their theological constructions. At every point, he is both followed, and, if not combated, is criticised. The Mediating School accepted the conclusions of theological investigation; it partook earnestly of the scientific spirit, but planted itself firmly on the ground of supernatural revelation and the evangelical faith. It was "mediating," moreover, as supporting the union of the Lutheran and Reformed churches, on the basis of the consensus of their confessions in things deemed to be essential. Although the epithet "mediating" was sometimes applied

as a term of reproach, the theologians of this class are not chargeable with a weak eclecticism. They were not at all interested in making a patchwork out of conflicting systems. The principal theologians in their ranks have been independent in their thinking, as they have been vigorous and learned in their discussions.

While agreeing with Schleiermacher that religion is not a product of philosophy, but has roots of its own in the spirit of man, they, generally speaking, consider his definition of piety to be quite incomplete. It designates piety in its nascent life in the soul; but piety — faith — involves thought and will as well as feeling. In the origin of religion, psychologically viewed, conscience has a part. Freedom, as well as dependence, is an element. Man not only consciously *depends* on God, he *gives himself* to God. God is personal; personality does not exclude infinitude in the proper idea of the infinite; His power is not confined to the extent of its exertion in the finite world; He is transcendent as well as immanent. The mediating theologians accept the characteristic doctrines of the Reformers. They present modified views of Inspiration, not holding to the inerrancy of Scripture, yet maintaining that the Scriptures as a whole are the norm of doctrine. Justification by faith alone, the Christian life as the offspring of faith, are, likewise, tenets earnestly maintained. They are agreed in believing in the divinity of Christ, although not at one as to the mode of the Incarnation, and the connection of the divine and the human in the historical Christ. They defend the historical verity of the miracles of Scripture, including the miracle of the Resurrection of Jesus, although not holding that all the recorded miracles, more than the rest of the incidents in the Biblical record, have an equal historical verification, or are equally entitled to credence. As on the subject of Inspiration, so on the subject of Eschatology, — for example, in respect to the eternity of future punishment, — there is no absolute concurrence of opinion. As to this particular question, many lean towards a negative judgment, and many consider it doubtful. Commonly it is held by them that the opportunity of repentance and reclamation continues after death, and can only terminate when a state of incurable obduracy supervenes, or the power of spiritual sensibility and of response to the incentives to repentance, is exhausted. As to the probability of the occurrence of such a fatal event in the case of

any, the mediating theologians, it has already been remarked, variously judge, in view of considerations drawn from reason and the Bible.

Dorner is the author of four extended works, all of them monuments of his extraordinary talents and learning, and of his genuine piety: *The History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, *The History of Protestant Theology*, *The System of Christian Doctrine*, and *Christian Ethics.* He is a philosophical, as well as Scriptural, theologian, and suggestions, especially as to the method of historical development, remind one of Hegel. The centre of his system is the union of God and man in Christ, the consummation to which not only the Old Testament Revelation, but all religions, point to or look towards. Dorner rejects the theory of Kenosis. Incarnation, real from the beginning, is gradual in its effect, keeping pace with the ethical development of Jesus. Thus, his limitations as to knowledge, etc., are to be explained. In the experience of justification by faith, wherein faith advances from lower stages to its goal, are contained the truths of which it is the province of Christian thought to gain a scientific apprehension. Here is opened the field of Biblical study and of legitimate speculation. Men in their natural state are in an abnormal condition which is the inherited consequence of the fall, and is displeasing to God, yet not imputed to the individual, until his personality is developed, with the power to struggle against it.[1] There may be said to be a collective sin and a collective guilt. This is punishable, and is punished.[2] But as the evil of the personal subject and of the race are mingled, although the consequence without divine help is a sinking to an even lower depth morally, yet it does not bring final condemnation until and unless sin advances to obduracy under the test presented by a knowledge of the Gospel. Without this knowledge, there is deserved condemnation, and the provision for salvation is wholly of grace. But nothing short of a wilful failure to meet the test involved in the coming of the light of the Gospel can lead to hopeless perdition. They to whom this opportunity has not been given fairly and fully, will enjoy it beyond this life. But that it will prove effectual for good in all cases cannot be confidently asserted. The Anselmic idea of Atonement is discarded, yet the fact of an objective change in the relation of God to mankind through

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II. p. 165 sq.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 173.

the work of Christ is maintained in a discussion pursued with a keen discrimination.[1]

Julius Müller taught theology with a masterly vigor and clearness of discernment, mingled with profound moral earnestness. The weakness of his health in his closing years preventing such a revisal of his lectures on dogmatic theology as he deemed requisite, he directed that they should not be published. But in his treatise on "The Christian Doctrine of Sin" is involved an exposition of the foundations of theism and of certain other leading topics. The belief in God takes its rise in the consciousness of our personality as finite, yet as differing *toto genere* from the world without, and in the conscious subjection to the law of conscience, which is independent, as to its source, of our wills. This belief is elicited and corroborated by the proof (so called) of God's existence and attributes.

All theories to account for sin otherwise than through the self-determination of the creature, or to define it as anything but voluntary selfishness, are confuted. The stages in the development of sin, the nature and degree of freedom consistent with its existence, are pointed out. Müller is led by his reasonings to assume as the ground and cause of sin a transcendent, non-temporal, voluntary act of each individual of the race, — a revival of the hypothesis (in its general character) of Origen. This is an inference from the proposition that our state is, prior to conscious moral choices, culpable, as presupposing a will already determined in the wrong direction, and from the conditions of personal guilt and responsibility.

Carl Immanuel Nitzsch was revered as the Nestor among the Schleiermacherian theologians. He was born in 1789. His *System of Christian Doctrine* is sometimes spoken of as obscure, but its obscurity is owing to no want of precision either of thought or expression, but to the amount of thought which is packed into a small space. It becomes lucid, therefore, to a patient and attentive student. Nitzsch sets forth the doctrine of an immanent Trinity. He considers it as the one complete shield against "Atheism, Polytheism, Pantheism, or Dualism." The Jewish and the Mohammedan conception of God, by their barrenness and emptiness (*Trockenheit und Leere*) have misled into the most

[1] See especially *Glaubenslehre*, Vol. II. pp. 656–659, with the preceding review of theories.

crass Pantheism. Through the Trinity, the realization of the attributes of God is seen to be possible within His own being, without the *necessity* of creation, and the Incarnation to be possible with no confounding of God and man.[1] The world, in its need of redemption, requires such a redemption as shall not only reawaken its religious sensibility and capacity, but shall also impart the power of self-punishment, and of entering, through the death of contrition, into the life of holiness. Here is the need of a Mediator. "The world's unrighteousness spends itself upon the Holy and Righteous One, completes and exhausts itself. He endures it in the glory of His innocence, in order, by His spirit, to punish it upon us. Only as the power and possibility of an actual release of men from sin (*Entsündigung*), of our dying with Him, and rising in a new life, does He suffer death in our place, and make Himself an offering to God. Only thus is He a ransom for many. It is in the depth of His sympathy, and in the endeavor for the world's salvation, that He bears the penalty of its sin." According to Nitzsch, the Scripture teaches an eternal damnation of individuals hypothetically. Grace not being coercive, final resistance is possible, and, supposing it to be actual, there is an eternal condemnation. Whether this "hypothesis" will become "thesis," or actuality, is another question. He argues against the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked. If universal restoration be the fact, or annihilation, or the reduction of the soul to a ruin, bereft of all good as well as evil activity, it is conceivable that the same Apostle who had preached eternal damnation, nevertheless, in his final eschatology (in 1 Cor. xv.), passes beyond and above this expectation. Neander likewise discerns in Paul a progress in his knowledge of eschatology, and a later teaching (1 Cor. xv. 27, 28; Phil. ii. 10. 11; Col. i. 20) of universal restitution. This, he says, would not contradict the doctrine of eternal punishment, as it appears in the Gospels; "for, although those who are hardened in wickedness, left to the consequences of their conduct, their merited fate, have to expect endless unhappiness, yet a hidden purpose of the divine compassion is not necessarily excluded."[2]

None among the modern German theologians excels in originality — and, it may be added, in attractions of character — Richard Rothe. Large as is the debt which he owes to Schleiermacher, he is not to be classified, without much qualification, with the Schleier-

[1] *System d. Christl. Lehre*, p. 188. [2] *Pl. and Tr. of the Christ. Ch.* p. 487.

macherian School. He writes with a faith in theism which, as he tells us, has never been ruffled by a doubt, and with the most decided supernaturalism relative to Christianity, a singular boldness in speculation, not coupled in the least with arrogance. Rothe holds that Ethics and Religion are not to be dissevered. In his great work, the *Theological Ethics*, the two are fused in one system. The starting-point is the Christian's consciousness of God and the idea contained in it. From this religious consciousness Rothe holds that a theology may be deduced by a logical process in which every step implies every other. The process is carried forward independently of the facts of natural and revealed religion. Its results must correspond to these realities, and its freedom from error must be tested by its conformity or dis-conformity to them. Thus he holds to the possibility of a speculative theology, in its foundation, independent of metaphysical philosophy.[1] In his posthumous *Dogmatics*, the system of orthodox doctrine is explained, and undergoes at every point a criticism by which it is greatly modified. In his little work serving as an introduction to *Dogmatics* he states his views of the Bible and its authority. Revelation has two sides. It is *Manifestation*, the objective acts of God in Providence as it is concerned, in the old Dispensation, with the Hebrew people, and in the new with Christ, and *Inspiration*, an illumination of the mind for the interpretation of them. Revelation is in itself miraculous. Special miracles are not in the least in conflict with a right conception of natural law, which is not a chain upon the Creator. The recorded miracles are historical facts, to be tested, however, like the natural events in the narrative, by attention to the evidence in the special cases. Yet belief is not in these days to be exacted of those who — for instance, from misconceptions as to science — find them incredible. The Scriptures are not free from errors. Yet they contain in themselves — that is, the body of these writings contain — when studied, a corrective. Rothe undertakes to explain the inner self-realization of God. An immanent Trinity is excluded. Matter is eternal and necessary, it being the non-ego which God opposes to Himself in the act of self-consciousness. But it does not clash with His perfection as the Absolute, since by a process of creation He can *spiritualize* matter, infuse it with spirit, and thus more fully realize

[1] For a criticism of this position, see Flint's Art. "Theology" (*Encycl. Brit.* Vol. 23, p. 270).

His idea. When man is created there is in him a duality. He is to take up and carry forward the spiritualizing process. He is to spiritualize his own physical being. But selfishness is the natural and necessary result of his relation to matter and the promptings of his material nature. The historic fall of man and the transmission of sin by heredity or imputation are not admitted. Although Rothe does not exclude the freedom of the will, which is involved in the ethical obligation to develop a spiritual body, yet his idea is a species of gnosticism. The design of God is counteracted by sin, flesh dominates spirit, but redemption comes to our aid and deliverance. Rothe contends that the preëxistence of Christ is not asserted by Himself. This doctrine, so far as it appears in Paul and in John, is a subjective inference on their part from His divinity. His miraculous birth is a requisite condition of His freedom from the dominance of the flesh, to which the rest of mankind are subject. He is, however, subject to temptation and reaches mature perfectness through conflict. The Incarnation brings to pass an ethical union of God and man in the person of Christ, which keeps pace in its progress towards absolute unity with his ethical advance. That advance consists or carries in it the conquest over sense, the spiritualizing of the material nature, the progressive origination of a spiritual body. No one, says Rothe, would style this a *merely* ethical unity, if he understood what ethical unity means and involves. Christ is thus truly divine. The Holy Spirit and the glorified Christ are one and the same. The Spirit is not an hypostasis distinct from the ascended Redeemer whose powers correspond to the offices ascribed to "the Spirit" in the New Testament. Rothe was willing to style himself a theosophist and to own thankfully his obligations to Oetinger. Consistently with his general conception of man's composite being and moral task, he makes our completed salvation lie in the absolute conquest by the spirit, the spiritualizing of our whole being. The ultimate consequence of a failure, in whomsoever it may finally occur, to achieve in this way, through the helps of grace, immortality, is the necessary extinction of life and being.

Rothe's exposition of the Atonement is specially interesting. Redemption must take away the consequence of sin to the transgressor, in his relation to God, — his being under the wrath of God, or guilt and punishment. This is possible only through for-

giveness. And redemption must take away sin itself, and restore in man the dominion of the opposite principle. *Both elements mutually condition each other.* God, on account of His holiness and righteousness, cannot forgive the sinner unless he is actually freed from sin; but, on the other hand, this last is impossible if the sinner is not first forgiven, for so long as God repels him, he cannot turn to God, or get rid of sin. Here is an antinomy. Even the holiness and righteousness of God require this to be dissolved and removed; for these attributes are not content with the *mere* punishment of sin; they crave the actual destruction of sin itself, the termination of its control in the hearts of men. So that, in case forgiveness is indispensable to this result, holiness and righteousness call for forgiveness; only they demand inexorably that pardon shall be granted in such a way as to carry in it, likewise, the holy reaction of God against sin; i.e., these very feelings of holiness and righteousness. The solution of the antinomy is the Atonement, or the making of sin *forgivable*, — a modification in the relation between the sinner and God, in virtue of which God, notwithstanding His holiness and righteousness, can forgive the sin which still cleaves to him, and, notwithstanding its presence, can enter into communion with him. There is only one way of effecting this result. If sin is to be forgiven before it is actually removed or destroyed, God must have a guaranty, which is perfect, as inhering in the transaction itself, that sin will in *the future* be in fact wholly put away from the sinner, provided forgiveness is provisionally imparted to him, so that this preliminary reception of pardon, this pardon by anticipation, shall be itself the actual beginning of a continuous process of purification from sin, which will at length be absolutely complete. If forgiveness can be thus the first step, the indispensable and sure antecedent, of the actual deliverance from sin itself, then, and then only, can the relation of God to the sinner be one in which God does not manifest wrath. Nay it will become a relation in which even His holiness and righteousness require Him to receive the sinner, as reconciled, into communion and favor. Sin is so connected with sin, and man so connected with man, that this new possibility must come in with reference to the race of mankind as a whole. This possibility is created, with regard to the race and to individuals, by the perfecting of the second Adam, as Redeemer. In Him dwells the power sufficient for the actual abolition of sin in

mankind, as a whole and as individuals; and He has actually set on foot the historical process which will have this issue, it being presupposed that the anticipatory forgiveness of sin on the side of God takes place. In the case of every individual who by faith enters into fellowship with Christ, there is given to God a *guaranty* for his future complete emancipation from sin, and for the fact that his pardon is only the initial step of the efficient process which is to remove sin in him, and to separate him wholly from it. By the Saviour, then, a foundation is laid for the reception into the relation of fellowship with God of the old sinful humanity estranged from Him, and for an ethico-religious development which will more and more lead that humanity into the way of righteousness.

How has the Redeemer atoned for mankind? Rothe answers, By qualifying Himself to be a Redeemer. What was needed was a human being who should be absolutely qualified completely to effect the abolition of sin, or the recovery of men from its influence and control. Christ has developed Himself in an absolutely normal way to the point of perfection as a moral and spiritual being; and in doing so He has brought Himself into an absolute union, on the one hand with God, and, on the other, with the race of mankind. This is the completed sanctification of the Redeemer, by which He is specially fitted to be, in a perfectly adequate way, the cause and principle of our sanctification. The moral task which Jesus set before Him was that of a complete self-surrender to God, on the one hand, and to man, on the other. He gave all that belonged to Him, including His own sensuous being, His life, as an offering to God, an offering of Himself, and to men as a self-sacrifice, for their best good, and out of love to them. This was a work done in and upon Himself, in the midst of trial, in successful combat with the Tempter of souls; but done for the sake of men. This work culminated in the voluntary endurance of death, which consummated the surrender of everything His own. This submission to death perfected at once His union to God, and His union to men. Love could go no farther. This self-surrender, carried to an exhaustive accomplishment, involved the most strenuous moral exertion on His part. Being a work undertaken entirely for our sake, it was vicarious: the holy One performed a work in the name of the sinner, which the sinner was incapable of performing for himself. Potentially in Him the old sinful race

were regenerated; and He was, therefore, the representative of mankind, and of every individual. His suffering has its ground, not in Himself, the sinless One, but only in the sinfulness of the world, in which He had to fulfil the moral task of His life, and for the sake of which He fulfilled it. He shares the world's suffering, and thereby takes it away; since in overcoming sin, He overcomes evil, or suffering, the consequence of sin, and since, through His fellow-feeling with the sinful world, He felt sympathetically the sufferings that befell men, and which are properly not His — not His in the character which pertains to them in the mind of the ill-deserving who endure them — i.e., as the penalty of sin. Thus He bore the penalties of our sins; not, however, as His own punishment, but as ours. He put Himself in feeling in our place, though without any confusion of consciousness, or self-accusation. Unlike good men, martyrs, He endured suffering in absolute innocence, and His suffering is the absolute ground and cause of our exemption from it, or of its ultimate removal. So that the suffering of the Redeemer is, in an altogether peculiar way, vicarious. By merit is meant a product of moral exertion, which is of a nature to be an instrument adapted and available to all in the work that devolves on them in life as moral beings. The Redeemer by making Himself what He was, the one sufficient instrument of the moral renovation of men, and of their recovery from sin, created this merit — this sacrament as it may be called, universal in its efficacy and value. When through Him we receive the forgiveness of our sins, it is by means of His merit being reckoned to us, or imputed: that is to say, our sin is forgiven, not because there is in ourselves the real possibility and absolute warranty of a future complete deliverance from sin, but because these inhere in the Redeemer; and this deliverance is conditioned on our relation to Him. It lies in that which He has produced as the means of our attaining the end of our being. It is a part of Rothe's conception, that the glorification of Christ, and the power which He exerts upon men, as the dispenser of influences from above, is the legitimate fruit of that spiritual perfection to which He attained in conflict with temptation and through His self-surrender in death. His personal power continues to be exerted in a vastly augmented degree, in this higher development and sphere of His being.

No theologian has laid more stress than Rothe upon the retro-

active bearing of the conflict of Jesus with evil — its effect upon Himself. In Rothe this view stands connected with a particular theory of the relation of matter to spirit, and of the spiritualization of matter. But, independently of this speculation, he insists upon a truth which the interpreters of the New Testament, at the present day, more distinctly recognize than it was formerly the habit to do. Sinless as Christ was from the beginning, the events of His career, the victory over temptation, the experience of sorrow and of death, did not leave His character unaffected. It is characteristic of that great religious genius, Jonathan Edwards, that he should have spoken of the *increase* of the Saviour's holiness in passing through the scenes that preceded and attended the crucifixion. The meaning of His life, as regards Himself, and hence in relation to others, is missed, unless the reality of His temptation, and of all the struggles which the Evangelists record, especially that in the Garden, is fully recognized, and unless His character in the maturity of its perfection is looked upon as the product of His own faithful performance, amid the circumstances in which He was placed, of the work given Him to do. It was of an achievement, as well as of an endurance, that He said: "It is finished!"

It will be observed that Rothe, in common with Luther, Campbell, Edwards, Schleiermacher, ascribes to Jesus a fellow-feeling with sinful men, which carried Him out of Himself and caused Him, though without the least self-reproach, to take up into His consciousness the penal quality which inheres in the ordinance of death, and thus to have an intimate knowledge of what it is to be punished by God, and to be under His frown. The outward inflictions of punishment were there, and the inward experience, also, as far as an utterly self-devoted sympathy could engender it.

But Rothe, with Schleiermacher, conceives of guilt as the mere shadow of sin, vanishing as sin vanishes, and makes the energy of the divine love and righteousness concentrate upon the breaking of the control of sin as a principle, that it may be put on the way to an ultimate extinction. The retributive element, the divine resentment, "the wrath of God," demands nothing but a guaranty for the abandonment of sin; although it should be said, by way of qualification, that God requires the means for working out this result to be originated and gathered by the struggle and sacrifice of the second Adam, on the plane of our human life, subject to all its exposures and penal inflictions.

Lipsius is the author of a system in the creation of which the philosophy of Kant and the theology of Schleiermacher are equally influential. Like so many of his contemporaries of different schools, he attributes our knowledge of God to His self-revelation; yet he declines to draw a distinct line between the natural and the supernatural. He does not differ from Ritschl in ascribing the origin of religion in man to a striving against the bondage which the limitations of the outer world would impose upon the freedom and progress of the soul. With Schleiermacher he holds that creation is not one act of God, but the entire development of the world from the point of view of divine agency. It is thus without beginning or end. Sin is pronounced a necessary stage in human development, the desires being at the outset predominant. Natural evils are considered as penal, not because they are so, but because an evil conscience so regards them. Jesus is the one sinless human being. He is the ideal man, in whom God dwells. He is the "God-filled" man, the object of God's love, the founder of the kingdom of souls in fellowship with God. The Church is conscious of having its foundation in Christ, the typical and the creative source of the realization of the Christian idea.

No sketch, however brief, of the modern theological parties in Germany can omit to refer to the Lutheran Conservatives — "Confessionalists" they are called in common parlance — who have taken their stand upon the historic creeds of their Church. In the religious reaction which followed the deliverance of Germany from bondage to Napoleon, there arose among many a reawakened zeal for the Evangelical doctrine as it had been formulated by Luther and in the Lutheran creeds. The influence of the contemporary leaders of religious thought, as the event proved, could not be wholly escaped; yet their more or less startling innovations were rejected. Among the adherents of the Confessions, the "Erlangen School" of theologians has the most prominent place. Luthardt, whose academic career has been mostly at Leipsic, and Philippi, are writers who have departed least from the traditional tenets, and have been unflagging in their zeal to maintain them. Von Hofmann in his *Schriftbeweiss*[1] undertook to deduce the theological system logically from the Christian experience. He begins, not with the idea of God, but with the

[1] 2 ed. (1857-1860).

new birth, and on this basis he essays to construct a speculative system answering to the facts of Christianity. Von Hofmann was vigorously attacked within his school for giving up the doctrine of vicarious Atonement. Thomasius is justly esteemed for his solid ability both as a writer on Dogmatic theology and on the history of doctrine. In his treatise on "Dogmatics," he advocated the theory of Kenosis, or the self-limitation of the Divine Logos, in connection with the Incarnation.

The "Ritschlian School" is so named from Albert Ritschl (1822–1889), who, although he shows in important points of his teaching the influence of Schleiermacher, so far deviates from him that he is regarded as holding an independent position. Ritschl began as an adherent of the Tübingen School, but he renounced the leadership of Baur, and in the second edition of his book on the *Rise of the Old Catholic Church* (1857) he traverses Baur's main propositions. It is a work of high merit. Later he assumed an independent position, the characteristics of which are brought out in the copious work on Justification especially, and in other productions.[1] Religion he traces to the conflict of the soul of man with the opposing, oppressive forces of nature. The sense of weakness leads to the belief in the aid of more exalted spirits. But religion is not exclusively a feeling of dependence. It embraces, likewise, thought and will. Like Schleiermacher, Ritschl breaks the link between theology and philosophy. He does not, however, utterly discard metaphysics, as he distinctly asserts. Rather is he in concord with Kant in setting aside transcendental reasoning concerning religion, and adopting the ethical postulate of freedom. To Lotze he is here and there indebted. No interference with theology from the side of natural science is possible; for natural science has nothing to do with the world as a whole, and steps beyond its province when it sets up a theory of materi-

[1] *Die Christl. Lehre v. d. Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung* (2 ed. 3 vols. 1882). Among the numerous critical discussions of Ritschl's system, two brief essays may be here mentioned; the first entirely favorable, the other, on the whole decidedly adverse: *Darstellung d. Theol. Albert Ritschl's*, by Julius Thikölter (2 ed. 1887); *Ritschl's Place in the History of Doctrine*, by Charles M. Mead, D.D., 1895. Kattenbusch's *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, by a Ritschlian, is clear and interesting, but it quite fails of a just appreciation of the "mediating" theologians. A critical discussion of *The Ritschlian Theology in its different Stages* may be found in Nippold's comprehensive *Handbuch d. neuesten Kirchengesch.*, Vol. III., Abth. 1.

alism or its opposite. Miracles are defined by Ritschl as striking natural occurrences "with which the special help of God is connected." If supernatural events appear to be recorded in the Bible, there is no religious obligation to consider them to be wrought "contrary to natural laws." Nothing more definite is propounded on the subject. Unlike Schleiermacher, he holds fast to the personality of God, and makes His fundamental attribute to be Love. Respecting the sources of our knowledge of God and of Christianity, Ritschl declares that we are confined to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The Greek theology, he avers, was made to rest upon a cosmology borrowed from the philosophers. The Schoolmen built likewise upon a substructure the materials of which were drawn from Plato and Aristotle; and theology since has followed their example. Instead of a "natural theology," independent of revelation, the Scriptures exclusively are for the Christian the fountain of religious knowledge.[1] They are historical documents bringing to us the knowledge of the revelation made to the prophets and through Christ and the Apostles. The genuineness of the fourth Gospel is not questioned by Ritschl himself. It was defended in his work on the *Rise of the Old Catholic Church.* But his doctrine respecting Christ is deduced from the first three Gospels, for the reason, it would seem, that the fourth is thought to be colored by subjective conceptions. The Scriptures give us the record of the manifestations of God's "righteousness," which denotes His consistent purpose and procedure in the work of saving His people. "Just" and "righteous," Ritschl contends, are used by Paul, as well as in the Old Testament, not in the judicial, classical sense, but as including an element of benevolence. The "wrath of God" is felt and exerted only towards wilful and inexcusable transgressors. In the Old Testament, it is not for these, but for offences not thus grievous, that sacrifices avail. The life of Christ, comprising His obedience and His suffering, was in pursuance of a vocation of which He was conscious. He was inwardly cognizant of the divine purpose of saving grace or righteousness, and of Himself as called to carry out this purpose in founding and conducting to its goal the kingdom of the redeemed. There is no penal or expiatory quality in the death of Christ. In it are perfected and evinced His absolute fidelity and His divine calling. *How* Christ became cognizant of

[1] *Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung,* Vol. III. p. 181.

this eternal, divine purpose, and *how* He became aware of His vocation in relation to it, are questions, it is said, which we are incapable of answering. The preëxistence of Christ as it is taught by John, Paul, and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is their subjective conception. The only real preëxistence of Christ is in the divine foreknowledge and predestination and as being the object of God's eternal love. As such, He is the type of mankind as predestined for the kingdom of God. On account of His perfect purity and fidelity, because He overcame the world and made Himself the vehicle in whom God's purpose and the character of God are manifest, He is raised to the right hand of God. He is — we cannot divine how — entrusted with the government of the world. Therefore, and by reason of His unity with God in love and purpose, He may be called God and is an object of worship. It is not by a coming as an individual into personal relation to Christ that one becomes a partaker of the filial relation to God, but by entering into the kingdom of His followers. Hence the high place accorded to the Church as the fellowship of believers. To believe in Christ is to appropriate the "value of the love of God" revealed in what Christ does for our reconciliation to Him. The expression illustrates the idea of Ritschl — in which he was anticipated by Lotze — of "value-judgments." In Ritschl it signifies that we can only know what God and things divine are in themselves, so far as we perceive that which is of *worth* in relation to our salvation. It is one feature of Ritschl's teaching that everything of a "mystical" nature, such as the idea of personal union and communion with Christ, is discarded. The feeling towards "pietism" is nothing short of antipathy. Justification is the reception of the sinner, conscious of his guilt, into fellowship with God. Along with it reconciliation, or the harmony, now beginning, of his will with the design of God respecting His kingdom, is the fundamental condition of the Christian life.[1]

Ritschl adopts the general view that redemption presupposes

[1] Ritschl has given this summary statement of his theological "standpoint": "In strictest recognition of the Revelation of God through Christ, closest use of the Holy Scriptures as the source of knowledge of the Christian religion; taking of Jesus Christ as the source of knowledge for all parts of the system, in harmony with the original documents of the Lutheran Reformation with respect to the peculiarities in which it deviates from the theology of the Middle Ages." (From a letter to Dr. Schaff, in the supplement to Schaff's *Encycl.*, p. 181, note.)

the universality of sin. But sin is no part of the contents of Revelation. It is simply a fact of experience. It is to be understood by reference to Jesus and the idea of His kingdom. But the New Testament does not assume that sin is an inheritance. It does not teach the Augustinian doctrine. Sin results from the impulse to exercise freedom without restraint, — a native impulse, — and from the allurements to selfishness. There grows up by the joint action of many, from one generation to another, a kingdom of sin, a power of seduction, but this brings not an absolute loss of freedom. The right estimate of sin and of its guilt is possible only in the light of Christ. None are to that degree hardened that they are incapable of repentance. Natural evils are to be counted as punishments no farther than the individual conscience so interprets them. In the religious sense punishment is the deprivation, more or less, of communion with God. Death is neither to be considered the penalty of the first sin nor of one's own personal transgressions. All forgivable sins are to be pronounced sins of ignorance. Whether there be men, and who they are, if there be any, who will actually reach the final stage of wilful resistance to God, it is beyond our power to say.

Ritschl's doctrines have had numerous defenders and numerous opponents. Among the latter, strenuous for a more conservative theology, are Dieckhoff and Luthardt.[1] They maintain that the theory of "value-judgments" makes the question what God, Christ, the Resurrection, are in themselves, a matter of indifference, and attaches importance only to our judgment of their worth to ourselves; that the basis for denominating Him divine is something shared or to be shared by him with all believers; that Justification is not an act of God having respect to the individual, but a subjective enrolling of himself in the body to which that act exclusively relates, and that its ground, moreover, is not laid in the atoning work of Christ.

Discarding as irrelevant in relation to faith the historical evidences of Revelation, the Ritschlians attach weight to the correspondence between the Christian religion and the needs of the soul. This perceived conviction is corroborated by nature and the history of mankind. How shall we ascertain the contents of the consciousness of Christ? How shall we discriminate between

[1] See, also, Prof. C. M. Mead, *Ritschl's Place in the History of Doctrine* (1895).

that which is verifiable in his own feelings and expressions, and that which is not? The Ritschlian theologians and critics afford examples of the temptation to fall back upon purely subjective criteria of judgment on these cardinal questions of history and criticism.

Kaftan is one of the ablest representatives of the Ritschlian tendency. He has presented his system in two connected works, the first on *The Nature or Essence of Christianity*,[1] and the second having for its title *The Truth of Christianity*.[2] He founds religion upon feeling, but not in the exclusive sense, nor with the inferences, of Schleiermacher. He adopts Ritschl's idea of "values." Religion is a practical matter. It springs, not from observations of the world and theoretical judgments, but from our own position in relation to the world, — the attitude which we, with our personal interests, assume. It cannot be forced on any one, like the truths of science. "It is an affair of inward freedom."[3] This is true of all religions. A religion is true so far, and only so far, as it rests upon revelation.[4] "Our religion is founded on the self-revelation of God in the historical personal life of Jesus Christ."[5] It brings to pass in the believer a life in God through Christ; but this union to God is ethical, and not the contemplation of the mystic. The kingdom of God is the Christian idea of the highest good.[6] It was the early mistake of theology to leave this idea, and to found itself, through a mixture with Greek philosophy, upon the conception of the Logos. Faith was turned into something theoretic, a stage of knowledge. The rise of dogmas brought with it the reign of authority in matters of belief. The Scholastic theology made dogmas to be of two classes, — those springing from natural reason, and those having a supernatural source. Protestantism, notwithstanding its rectified idea of faith, was entangled with the Roman Catholic theory. It took the Scriptures and made them the text-book of supernaturally revealed doctrinal propositions.

Kant, despite the dualism of his system, is held to have opened a new era by his doctrine of the practical reason. In truth, the idea of the highest good is at the basis of rational speculation.

[1] *Das Wesen des Christenthums* (2 ed. 1888).
[2] *Die Wahrheit des Christenthums* (1889).
[3] *Das Wesen*, etc. p. 50.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 197.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 202.
[6] *Die Wahrheit*, etc. p. 545.

Its result corresponds with the teaching of Christianity that the highest good is not to be found in the world, but in the superterrestrial kingdom of God.

Kaftan insists that the Scriptures are the documentary sources of historical Christianity. They are the source of the divine revelation. But the New Testament writers did not ascribe to their productions the inspiration which they assumed to exist in the case of the Old Testament record of God's revelations. The theological idea of inspiration works ill to theology, and would require as a supplement an inspired exegesis. Respecting the teaching of Christ Himself, preference is to be given decidedly to the Synoptics. There is no sufficient ground for rejecting the Johannine authorship of the fourth Gospel. The author has, however, a particular aim and point of view, although what he writes rests upon a historical foundation. The essential truth of Christianity is the divinity of Christ, the real indwelling and the complete revelation of God in Him. The beginning of the new life is in the belief in the free, unconditional forgiveness of sins. This is justification, which is followed by reconciliation. The preaching of the kingdom, after the death of Jesus, became in the mouth of the disciples the proclamation of the risen and glorified Jesus. The death and resurrection of Christ are the two sides, the negative and positive, of the same transaction. They are the symbol and the power of the death to sin and the resurrection to life in fellowship with the risen Lord. The opinion that other views — the forensic view, especially — are found in Paul, is avowed by Kaftan, but it is held that as yet we discern no method of connecting them with the fundamental idea just expressed. In general, "we are to turn to account (*verwerthen*) the Apostolic writings first of all as the testimonies of the faith and of the religion of their authors, — that is, of the Christian religion, in which they are for us normative patterns (*Vorbilder*). The key-note (*Grundton*), despite the theological coloring, is in their character as "testimonies *of* faith *to* faith."[1]

One of the most distinguished representatives of the Ritschlian School is W. Herrman. The view which we take of the world as a whole, or the world-whole (*Weltanschauung*), depends on subjective grounds. Its source is in moral and religious feeling. Its root is in the feeling of personal worth which demands that the

[1] *Das Wesen*, etc. p. 248.

world-whole shall be suited to it. In this general position he does not differ from Kaftan. Revelation is not by doctrine, but by the direct manifestation of God in the historical Christ, which the soul feels. But Herrman distinctly indicates the necessity of a groundwork of objective beliefs respecting the person of Christ, and takes a step in advance of the Ritschlian agnosticism. He says that the question how Christ can have such importance for us may be unavoidable, and that here the Christological determinations of the ancient Church "still always mark out the limits within which such attempts must move."[1] Kaftan shows the same tendency to go back of mere "value-judgments." He says that we must believe in the Godhead of Christ, and that He stands in a connection with God that is perfectly unique and not capable of being repeated.[2]

[1] *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott* (1846), p. 46.

[2] *Brauchen wir ein neues Dogma?* p. 58. Cf. Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World* (a work of remarkable ability), p. 449 sq. (1893).

CHAPTER VIII

THE PANTHEISTIC DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN GERMANY: FICHTE; SCHELLING; HEGEL — THE HEGELIAN INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY — THE WRITINGS OF STRAUSS — BIEDERMANN — THE SYSTEM OF BAUR

THE theoretical philosophy of Kant bore fruit which he had not expected to spring from it. In the hands of Fichte it was transformed into idealism. Kant had refused to regard the laws of thought as the laws of things. Space and time are "forms" in which perceived phenomena are set by the subject; the categories by which things are connected are concepts, likewise subjective in their origin; the ideas which bring into unity the judgments are subjective index-fingers which point to nothing that can be considered real. Nothing external is left but the "thing in itself." Fichte drew this sole object within the subjective sphere. It is only a thought. If it be assumed as a cause to account for states of consciousness, the answer is that the principle of causation is purely subjective. Fichte's thesis is that all reality is the product of the activity of the ego, which in its nature is essentially active. The object is simply the limit set to its activity by its own nature. But the finite ego with the object is the product of the impersonal ego, the underlying, absolute source of being. In the room of God there is substituted the moral order of the world. Philosophy begins in the positing of the ego through an act of reflection. Ethics is exalted to the supreme place. Morality and religion are identical. The limit of personal freedom is in the concession of a like equal freedom in others. In the later part of his career, Fichte introduced an element of feeling into the notion of religion, but the conception of Deity would appear to have remained unaltered.

Schelling modified Fichte's conception of the Absolute, the root of all particular existences. It is no more to be called subject

than object. It is equidistant — the point of indifference — between the subjective and the objective, for the world and the perceiving ego are identical in essence and origin. Nature is pervaded through and through with rationality. The knowledge of nature is nature attaining to self-consciousness. But how to cognize the hypothetical Absolute consistently with its being an object in consciousness and thus, according to Schelling's theory, finite? The answer is the postulate of a mystical faculty of "intellectual intuition," by which the soul, somewhat as in the New Platonic Pantheism, breaks through the bonds of consciousness, and has a direct vision of the indefinable — impersonal, of course — Supreme.

Schelling's general idea of the relation of the Absolute to the thinking subject and the object Hegel accepted. Not so did he regard Schelling's mode of bridging the gulf between the finite and the infinite. This had been left in the dark. The conclusion of Schelling's as to their relation had been, as it were, "shot out of a pistol." Hegel professed to set forth the process in which the entire universe is evolved, and necessarily evolved. Thought and being are identical. Thoughts are things, and there are no other things than thoughts. The world is a chain of concepts. The universe, including God, nature, self, is resolved into a chain of concepts self-evolved, comprising and exhausting in themselves all reality. Concrete existences take their places as concepts in the all-comprehending series. This is the world as known to the philosopher. But the philosophic view is the last stage in the development of consciousness. It is in the consciousness of the philosopher that the Deity, the Absolute, becomes fully self-conscious. The process is the self-unfolding of the innermost nature of things. The method of this evolution, starting with the highest abstraction, thence moving onward, is that of thesis, of implied antithesis, and necessary synthesis — the movement advancing, by a momentum in itself, until all things are brought into the net.

Hegel and his followers professed to find an equivalent for the objects of Christian faith and the propositions of orthodox theology in the dogmas of their system. Christianity presents in a popular form that which philosophy exhibits in the form of naked truth. The substantial contents of both are averred to be identical. The Trinity is made to designate the triplicity in the notion of the

Absolute: first, the Absolute in itself; secondly, as developed in the intelligible world, corresponding to the Son; and thirdly, in the philosophy in which the Absolute comes back to itself. The sense of estrangement in man is sin, a necessary phase in his spiritual progress, which gives way to a consciousness of unity with the Absolute. Christ is a man who is conscious of being one with the Infinite Being, and represents in this respect what every man is in idea. That which is predicated of Him specifically is true literally of humanity as a whole. Hegel treated with disdain the "vulgar" rationalism which assailed the truths of Christianity. He professed, no doubt sincerely, to accept them in their real, inner significance. At first, not a few hailed this assumed reconciliation of Christianity and philosophy. A portion of the Hegelians, forming a "right wing," either by affixing to Hegel's statements an interpretation satisfactory to themselves, or by certain modifications of expression, continued to maintain a theistic version of Hegelianism. But when Strauss published his *Life of Jesus*, it became obvious to discerning Christian believers that the transmutation of the truths of the Gospel into Pantheistic equivalents was not anything to rejoice in. Strauss derided the rationalism of the Biblical critics like Paulus, as superficial and jejune. He undertook to show that the narratives of miracles in the New Testament are myths, — unconscious embodiments of the idea of the Messiah that was cherished in early communities of disciples cut off from the corrective guidance of the Apostles. Strauss held the great central truth of Christianity to be the doctrine of a union of God and man in Jesus Christ. It is a popular conception of a deep philosophical truth, — the truth, namely, that God becomes man in mankind collectively taken. For the indwelling and full expression of the Infinite, all the members of the race are required. Christ is divine so far and in the same sense as every other individual of the race is God. And God is the impersonal being, of the evolution of whom all men are the transitory products. The later *Life of Jesus* by Strauss (1864) was designed for cultivated readers generally. Prompted by the criticism of Baur upon his earlier work, he discusses the origin and authorship of the Gospels. Prompted further by Baur's theory of a doctrinal *tendency* as giving rise to narrative matter in the historical books of the New Testament, he modified essentially his definition of a myth, permitting it to be the product of the imagination of an individual, and made room for

conscious invention. Strauss and Baur conceded that the immediate disciples of Jesus testified to His Resurrection. Strauss falls back upon a kind of Stoicism as a substitute for the consolations of religion, and, in contrast with the previous work, manifests a scornful and bitter spirit, especially towards the clergy. In his treatise on Dogmatic Theology, the negative position respecting the Supernatural is consistently carried out. Strauss's learning was not up to the level of his literary power. Superior in all respects to this work is the treatise on "Dogmatic Theology" by Biedermann, a leader of the "young Hegelian School," who, in his *Christian Dogmatics*, as in other writings, did what could be done to infuse warmth into a system which rejects the personality of God and personal immortality. In the idea of God as personal, the mind objectifies "His universal, eternal, absolute, true nature (*Wesen*)." Yet it is held that in the practical religious life the notion of God as personal must be held fast. Sin, although it is a self-determination in which sense and selfish feeling are the source, is a necessary step or stage for a finite being to experience. Neither creeds nor the Bible, nor the "theoretic self-consciousness of Jesus," can be an infallible norm of belief. Biedermann undertakes, and with no small skill and learning, to trace forms of doctrinal conception in the New Testament to divers historical sources, and to prove them unworthy of a literal acceptance.

The influence of Hegelianism on theology is most conspicuous in its effect in the province of historical and Biblical criticism. In this province Baur was the master. His theories respecting the rise and development of Christianity and the date and authorship of the New Testament writings conform to the Hegelian law of development. The Gospel is at first Ebionitic, then comes the liberal or Pauline antithesis, then a synthesis in the Acts and certain Epistles, pronounced to be post-apostolic. The fourth Gospel, after the middle of the second century, completes the process of reconciliation, but the evolution of doctrine proceeds in its triple movement until it brings us to the Nicene doctrine. Extensive as were the researches of Baur, original and sincerely held as were his hypotheses, the agency of an *a priori* philosophy, which excludes the Supernatural in its proper meaning, in the forming of his critical system, cannot be ignored.

In the writings of Otto Pfleiderer, especially in his work on the *Philosophy of Religion*, there is presented a theology which

attempts to combine the essential principle of Schleiermacher respecting the original source of religion, with Hegel. But, unlike Rothe, Pfleiderer, although he holds to the personality of God and the freedom of His agency, discards miracles, and plants himself on the ground of naturalism.

CHAPTER IX

THE LATER ROMAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY — INDIFFERENTISM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY — THE FALL OF THE JESUIT ORDER AND ITS REVIVAL — LIBERALISM OF LAMENNAIS AND HIS ASSOCIATES — PAPAL REIGN OF PIUS IX. — THE DOGMA OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION — THE VATICAN COUNCIL AND THE DOGMA OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY — THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DOGMA

The Council of Trent was chiefly absorbed in the work of building up barricades against Protestantism. It left undecided the questions between Episcopalism and Curialism: Is the seat of authority in the Council or in the Pope, or is it in both united? It gave no unambiguous verdict on the disputed question of grace and free-will. The question respecting the sinless character of Mary from the moment of conception remained where the Scholastic theology had left it, awaiting a dogmatic decision. Time was to decide what would be the fate of the Semi-Pelagian theology of the Jesuits, and of their loose ethical theory of probabilism. With the fortunes of their society, the modern history of Roman Catholic doctrine is closely connected.

In the Church of France, under Louis XIV., Jansenism was prostrated, the Jesuit theology got the upper hand, and the Jesuit casuistry made headway, despite the attacks of the Port Royalists. In the eighteenth century, the spread of free-thinking and of religious indifferentism incited and enabled Roman Catholic sovereigns to restrict to the utmost the exercise of papal prerogatives within their dominions. The reforms of the Emperor Joseph II., in Austria, were prepared for by the work of Febronius, which advocated the reduction of papal authority to a simple primacy, limited as concerns other bishops to the giving of counsels and admonitions. Innovations like those of Joseph II. were adopted in other states. The "punctation" or programme of German

Catholic archbishops who met at Ems in 1786, proposed, in the interest of German prelates, to subtract from the papacy a large portion of the ecclesiastical prerogatives which it had exercised. Movements of this kind in different lands, among statesmen and churchmen, were broken off by the outbreaking of the French Revolution. The Society of the Jesuits owed its temporary downfall to its interference with politics, its worldliness and thirst for gain. Its obstinate contests with other orders, and with the popes themselves, in the conduct of Asiatic missions, had weakened its standing. It was its own practical renunciation of the ideals of its founders, however, that, more than any other single cause, led to its overthrow, and to its abolition by Clement XIV. in 1773. The record of the period during which Napoleon I. was supreme in France includes the story of alternate concessions and resistance on the part of Pius VII. Of this course of events it is true that, great as was the prostration of papal authority, the result was that imperial domination, with Rome for a real, although inconstant ally, extinguished the life of liberal Gallicanism, and, on the fall of Napoleon, left the ground clear for the building of ultramontanism on its ruins. In France this could be done only by degrees. But, as elsewhere, the reaction in behalf of the throne and the altar had its effect. One of the first measures of Pius VII., on his restoration to Rome, was the issue of a bull, on August 7, 1814, authorizing the revival of the Jesuit order. The Jesuits spared no effort to exalt the cause of absolutism in politics and religion. After the restoration of the Bourbons, an extreme theory of the spiritual authority of the Pope, as the great security of public order, was vindicated by Le Maistre, a scholar and diplomatist. After the accession of Louis Philippe, the same tendency was pursued by Lamennais, Lacordaire, Montalembert, and some others. Their contention was in behalf of liberal opinions in politics, together with an anti-Gallican theory of papal sovereignty in the spiritual sphere. But their teachings were condemned in bulls of Pope Gregory XVI., the first in 1832 and the second in 1834.[1] Lamennais became alienated from the Church. Lacordaire concentrated his attention upon preaching, and became a great light in the French pulpit. Montalembert kept up an undiminished interest in Church affairs, and retained his liberal opinions to the end of his life. There is not room here to trace the growth of ultramon-

[1] Extracts in Denziger, pp. 343-346.

tanism and of Jesuit influence in the different Catholic countries. One of the most influential of all Catholic writers on matters of casuistry was not himself a Jesuit, but very friendly to that order, the founder of the Redemptorists, the Neapolitan priest and saint, Alfonso da Liguori (1696–1787). He was at first a Probabilist, but sought for a middle position in "Equiprobabilism," — a position not far removed from the Jesuit ground. If the law concerning an act, he held, is doubtful, if the authorities are evenly balanced, the maxim that right is on the side of the "possessor"[1] — that is, on the side of liberty to do the act — is applicable. A well-nigh boundless deference is paid to the casuistic teaching of Liguori, which, however — on the subject of Equivocation, for example — would be condemned by Protestant moralists. In Germany there sprung up in the second and third decades of the present century a school of liberal Catholics, eminent alike for their learning and their controversial strength. Its rise is due to the influence of a theologian not less engaging in his manners and captivating as a teacher, than he was brilliant in talents, — John Adam Möhler. In his most important work, *The Symbolics*, he rejects the Episcopal system as it was set forth by the councils of Constance and of Basel — the doctrine that "the Pope is *subject* to a general council lawfully convoked."[2] He calls it "one-sided." His ground is that "the dogmatic decrees of the Episcopate (united with the general head and centre) are infallible; for it represents the universal Church."[3] One of Möhler's pupils was Hefele, a profound scholar, the author of the *History of Councils*. Munich became the seat of the liberal school. Its most eminent leader, Döllinger, was the author of learned historical works antagonistic to Protestantism; but in later writings, prior to the breaking out of the controversy on the question of infallibility, manifested a highly appreciative view of the greatness of Luther, and a more irenical spirit in relation to the churches of the Reformation.

Pius IX. assumed the papal office in 1846. He began with a policy directly the reverse of that of his predecessor, Gregory XIX. He showed himself friendly to the liberal Catholics in France. He introduced railways and other modern improvements into the Roman state. He favored civil freedom there and a constitu-

[1] "Melior est conditio possidentis." See the *Kirchen-Lexicon* (1st ed. Vol. VIII. p. 791; also, 2d ed. Vol. VII. pp. 2036, 2037).

[2] *Eng. Transl.* p. 301 n. [3] *Ibid.* p. 302.

tional monarchy. Not able to satisfy the demands of the republicans, he was forced, in 1848, to fly from Rome to Gaeta, where he remained until he was restored, in 1850, by means of French bayonets. He came back an altered man in his spirit and aims. Thenceforward in civil and ecclesiastical relations he was an extreme conservative. He took into his service, under his special control, a group of Jesuit writers, by whom the *Civiltà Cattolica* was issued, a journal devoted to the advocacy of an intense ultramontanism. Enthusiastic from his youth in the homage he paid to the Virgin Mary, he conceived that it was by her special aid that he had escaped with his life in the revolutionary tempest. In 1849, while at Gaeta, in an Encyclical Letter, he called for the opinions of all bishops upon the subject of the immaculate conception of the Virgin. A large majority — about two-thirds of those who made answer — replied as the Pope desired that they should; but others, including German and French bishops, expressed themselves on the other side. To consider the question a commission was appointed, comprising in it leading Jesuit theologians, such as Perrone and Passaglia. Its decision was in accord with the Pope's inclination. In 1854, without assembling a council to determine the question, in the presence of about two hundred bishops, forming a part of a great concourse, Pius IX. declared it to be a revealed truth that the Blessed Virgin, from the first instant of her conception, "was preserved free from all stain of Original Sin." The bull affirmed that all "who should think otherwise in their hearts must" have made shipwreck concerning the faith, and fallen away from the unity of the Church.[1] This dogmatic definition contradicts the opinion of Anselm, St. Bernard, Bonaventura, Aquinas, and with Aquinas the body of Dominican teachers down to recent times. Yet it is undeniable that it was a goal to which a succession of previous steps naturally led. It sanctioned an opinion which had been gaining strength since the advocacy of it by Duns Scotus. Not later than 1661, Pope Alexander VII. had expressed himself on the doctrine in language almost identical with that used by Pius IX., and only declined to pronounce the opposite opinion heretical.

On December 8, 1864, Pius IX. sent out an Encyclical Letter containing an extended syllabus of errors. The preface quotes

[1] For the substance of the bull ("Ineffabilis Deus"), see Denziger, p. 356, or Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. II. p. 211.

with approval the encyclical of Gregory XVI., of August 13, 1832, against Lamennais and the Liberals, in which "insanity" (*deliramentum*) is the name given to the doctrine that "liberty of conscience and of worship is the right of every man," and the doctrine of the liberty of the press. Catholics are exhorted, in the perils of the times, to resort to the Virgin Mary as their "mediatrix" with Christ, and to beseech the intervention of Peter, "the chief of the Apostles," and of Paul. The Syllabus denounces eighty alleged errors, which may be summed up under the heads of Rationalism, Nationalism, and Liberalism, as these were regarded by the eyes of the Pontiff. Among the baneful errors condemned are these: That Roman Pontiffs have exceeded their power in relation to princes, or have erred "in defining matters of faith and morals (23); that the Church may not avail itself of force (24); that schools may be freed from ecclesiastical authority," government and interference (47); that Church and State ought to be separated (55); that there may be a true marriage by a merely civil contract (73). The Syllabus was made up from the contents of previous allocutions, letters, and bulls of Pius IX. It was intended to put into a compact form his manifold protests in opposition to the spirit of the age. An attempt to turn the edge of it was made in France by Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, by affirming that it was aimed not against liberty but the lawless abuses of liberty.

To an assembly of five hundred bishops, gathered at Rome in honor of the eighteenth centenary of St. Peter's martyrdom, Pius IX. first announced his intention to convoke a General Council. This was on June 26, 1867. On the 29th of June, 1868, the encyclical was issued for its convocation. It was understood to be the purpose of the Council to build up such a wall against the errors of the day as the Council of Trent had erected against Protestantism. The Pope always said that it was no part of his purpose to bring forward the matter of papal infallibility. The design was to reassert in a positive form the doctrines embraced in the Syllabus, and to attach to them a new sanction. But in an article published in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, on February 6, 1869, the infallibility of the Pope was declared to be one of the points to be decreed. The same thing was proclaimed elsewhere by Archbishop Manning and other infallibilists. Liberal Catholics were aroused. A powerful and learned attack on the doctrine of papal infallibility was

published in 1869, "The Pope and the Council," by Janus, — the production, it is understood, of Döllinger, Friedrich, and Huber of the University of Munich. Ketteler, Bishop of Mayence, Maret, Dean of the Paris Theological Faculty, and others, published books on the same side. The Council was opened on December 8, 1869. There were present 719 members. Preliminary commissions, appointed by the Pope, had discussed and determined the matter to be submitted for consideration. At the outset, a bull of the Pope laid down the rules of procedure. He was to nominate the officers of the Council. Whatever proposals should be made by bishops were to be submitted to a commission selected by him, and consisting half of Italians. If a proposal were approved by the commission, it must have the sanction of the Pope before it could be discussed. When a decree had been discussed, it went to one of the four special commissions to be corrected, and must then be voted upon without debate. The papal theologians were predominant in all these committees. A new regulation (on the 22d of February, 1870) reversed the old rule that required unanimity for a dogmatic decision, and substituted for it a numerical majority. A protest, dated March 1, against this unexampled rule, although signed by more than one hundred prelates, was of no avail. There were strong anti-infallibilists who disbelieved in the proposed doctrine. Such were Hefele, Archbishop Kenrick of St. Louis, and Strossmayer. Others, of whom Dupanloup was one, opposed the dogmatic definition as inopportune. At the stage of the proceedings when a private vote was taken there were 88 who cast negative votes, 61 a qualified negative, and 91 abstained from voting, although present in Rome. Outside of Rome there was an intense feeling of grief and indignation among Catholics, hostile, on various grounds, to the projected decree. This feeling finds expression in a private letter of Dr. Newman to his bishop, which afterwards found its way into print. "Why," he says, "should an aggressive, insolent faction be allowed 'to make the heart of the just sad, whom the Lord hath not made sorrowful?'" After it was found that no modification of the projected dogma could be obtained, fifty-six bishops in a written protest informed the Pope of their resolve to return to their dioceses. On the same evening, together with sixty additional members, they left Rome. On the final vote, all but two of the 535 fathers present voted "Yea." In the debate, there were not wanting eloquent

voices, notably those of Strossmayer and Kenrick, from the ranks of the opposition. There is not a little discrepancy in the different reports relative to the proceedings in connection with the Council. It is certain that the influence of the Pope and of his supporters was strenuously exerted to carry their measure and to quell resistance. It is certain that the leaders of the minority earnestly complained that the freedom of debate was crippled by unjust restrictions and unseemly interruptions. It is certain that while everything in favor of the dominant party was sent out from the press at Rome, the writings and speeches of its adversaries, like Hefele's pamphlet on the "Honorius Question," and the long argument which Kenrick was not able to deliver, had to be printed elsewhere.

The majority in the Council was united and resolute, and had every aid from the surrounding circumstances. The minority were weakened by the fact that so many opposed the decree, not declaring it to be false, but merely inopportune. The whole force of the surrounding circumstances at Rome was against them. Owing to the peculiar political situation in Europe, the governments remained inert when, in other conditions, they would have spoken with effect. But the minority was fatally hampered by the previous actual exercise of the disputed prerogative of the Pope in the decree of the immaculate conception, which had been received with acquiescence.

The question is often asked, How could the Council establish the Pope's infallibility, without the assumption in the very act that in the Council supreme authority resides? The answer is, that the decree was not the act of the Council, but the act of the Pontiff, the assent of the Council being the destruction of the doctrine of Episcopalism. It was so far an act of suicide on the part of the defenders of the conciliar theory as to the seat of authority. The Vatican decrees do not open with formulas like those of Trent: "The sacred and holy, œcumenical and general" Synod teaches or declares so and so; but it is "We," that is, Pius IX., "the sacred Council approving, teach and define," etc. The Council abrogates the right accorded to it by liberal Catholicism by sanctioning the Pope's declarations that "the definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable *of themselves*, and not from the consent of the Church."

The dogmatic decree declares that when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra*; that is, when in his character of "pastor and doctor of all Christians," he "defines a doctrine regarding faith and

morals," he is possessed of infallibility. How is the dogmatic decree to be interpreted? Of course, it says nothing as to the personal character of pontiffs. It may be good or bad. It does not ascribe inerrancy to the Pope in ordinary conversation on theology and ethics, or to letters or other writings not addressed by him to the entire Church with the explicit intention to define belief, and belief within this restricted circle of topics. But the interpretation of the Vatican decree, even by authorities in the ultramontane party, limits the papal prerogative in a degree quite unexpected, not to say logically untenable. One of these expositors of the dogma is Fessler, who was Secretary of the Council. In his book, in reply to Dr. Schultz, a canonist of Prague, a leader in the Old Catholic party, Fessler affirms that what popes have thought, said, done, or ordained is not pertinent to the question as to Catholic dogmas, but only what they have decided *ex cathedra* to be Catholic doctrine in faith and morals; that things done by popes are not papal declarations *ex cathedra;* that the same is true of their utterances in daily life, books, or ordinary correspondence; that the same is true of their solemn declarations made in the exercise of their jurisdiction as lawgivers in matters of discipline, and in pronouncing judicial decisions and sentences; that remarks accompanying a really dogmatic declaration which is made *ex cathedra* are not a part of the declaration itself, and are not infallible. Applying these criteria, Fessler asserts that affirmations of popes in connection with the condemnation of books, declarations of Leo X. in the bull excommunicating Luther, etc., do not fall under the head of dogmatic decisions. Still more sweeping is the exclusion from this category of papal declarations relating to the "state, to countries, peoples, and individuals." Only one sentence in the bull, *unam sanctam*, is conceded to be *ex cathedra.* We are assured by Fessler that it is not conceded by Catholic theologians that all the sentences in the Syllabus of Pius IX., which are drawn from previous documents, are, according to the decree of the Vatican Council, spoken *ex cathedra.* He avers that no one is guilty of such theological folly (*Unsinn*) as to put a papal declaration on a level with the Gospel. That the Pope's "infallible decisions *ex cathedra* are inspired of God was neither asserted by the Vatican Council, nor ever taught in the Catholic Church." It is not by this method that the Church is saved from being misled by erroneous teaching emanating from its chief pastor.

It was unavoidable that the Vatican decree should be considered by many to imperil the foundations of civil authority. Gladstone maintained this, first in an article in *The Contemporary Review*,[1] and then in a distinct publication, *The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance.* Manning made answer, and Newman, also, wrote on the same side. Gladstone dwelt on the all-pervading presence of the obligation of duty in human conduct. He quoted Manning's language that the "spiritual power" in matters of religion and conscience, is supreme, and the proposition that this power "alone can fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, and can thereby fix the limits of all other jurisdictions." That is to say, the Pope alone is authorized to decide what are the bounds within which the province of the State is confined, and when they are transgressed.

During the sessions of the Council, Döllinger, whom Gladstone pronounced "the most famous and learned theologian of the Roman Communion," wrote that not only must an article of faith be unanimously approved by the bishops united with the Pope, but that the œcumenicity of their acts must be acknowledged and ratified by the whole church. Döllinger and Friedrich, at the head of forty-two Munich professors, publicly protested against the Vatican decree. This began the Old Catholic movement, which spread elsewhere in Germany, in Switzerland, and to some extent in other places. In the assemblies of these dissentients, Döllinger was not willing to unite in the creation of the separate organization which was formed by them. He adhered to his denial of the binding force of the Vatican decrees, and was at length excommunicated. The Old Catholic organization introduced several reforms, such as the giving of the cup to the laity, the abolition of the law of celibacy, the use of the vernacular in the service of worship. Döllinger presided over two Old Catholic conferences, which included several members from Russia, France, and England, for the promotion of Christian union among the hierarchical churches opposed to papal usurpations. At the first of these meetings, held at Bonn in 1874, fourteen doctrinal articles were agreed upon. At the second, held also at Bonn, the next year, there was an agreement upon six articles relating to the doctrine of the Procession of the Spirit, and to the controversy on this subject between the Eastern and Western churches.

[1] October, 1874.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION: CERTAIN THEOLOGICAL TENDENCIES IN RECENT TIMES

THE design of these remarks is to advert to certain drifts in theology which are specially observable in the last few decades. In contrast with what was customary in the last century, we find that emphasis is laid upon the immanence of God. Thus there is recognized in Pantheism a half-truth which, in the combat for the transcendence of the divine Being, in former days, was often overlooked. A measure of reasonableness, moreover, is conceded to the Mysticism which, in past ages, in varied forms, has made much of the inward, living presence of God in the devout soul. The Deistic habit of thought which characterized not only the champions of Deism, but, also, their orthodox opponents, has been supplanted by a deeper conception of the relation of God to the Creation. Accordingly, in Apologetics, the Evidential theology of the last century, which gave the precedence to miracles and to the proofs of them through testimony, has given way to a method which attributes a higher probative value to the internal, spiritual characteristics of the Christian Revelation.

The trend towards a materialistic Pantheism which was often connected with the first proclamation of the law of physical evolution is far less perceptible. Further reflection tends to convince the ablest naturalists of the defects of such a theory of the universe. It is more and more clear that the *moral* history of mankind cannot be resolved into a *natural* history. In one of Professor Huxley's lay sermons,[1] the relation of man to the laws of nature, including men and their ways, is likened to a game with an unseen Power, conceived of as inflexible, but righteous, — a calm, strong angel, who is playing for love, "and would rather lose than win." Entering thus into the illustration are elements at variance with

[1] *Lay Sermons, Addresses*, etc. (1871), p. 31.

the agnostic philosophy. More significant still is the general tenor of one of the latest productions of the same author, the *Romanes Lecture*. The moral task of man is depicted as in direct conflict with the "cosmic process." "The practice of what is ethically best," we are assured, — what we call goodness or virtue, — "involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence." "The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it."[1] It is true that here and there in this lecture, and more distinctly in the added "Prolegomena," this ethical resistance is itself made a part of the "cosmic process" regarded as a whole. But the progress of the author's mind is obviously towards the perception of the free and responsible element that enters into man's constitution, account for its genesis as we may. Even the gloomy, pessimistic outlook upon the future of the world is so far brightened that the author says: "I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may be done to change the nature of man himself."[2] It is admitted to be "an apparent paradox," "that ethical nature, while born of cosmic nature, is necessarily at enmity with its parent."[3]

An interesting instance of a complete advance to a religious and even a distinctly Christian view of the world and of man is that of George John Romanes, the gifted expositor of Evolution, who founded the lecture bearing his name — a name which Huxley cannot record without "deploring his untimely death in the flower of his age."[4] In *A Candid Examination of Theism, by Physicus,* which Romanes published in 1876, he had arrived at a wholly skeptical conclusion as to the being of God and the freedom of the will. Gradually this position was abandoned for that of Christian Theism. He saw that he had attached too little importance to the needs and intimations of the human spirit — to phenomena which it behooves a scientific man not to overlook. He adopted as the most reasonable opinion the doctrine that all causation is volitional, that there is a teleology in nature, and that

[1] See *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays* (1894), pp. 81–83.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 85. [3] *Ibid.* p. viii. [4] *Ibid.* p. v.

the scientific objections to the freedom of the will are not valid.[1] "It is no argument," he came to think, "against the divine origin of a thing, event, etc., to prove it due to natural causation."[2] By a path of his own, an able interpreter of the philosophy of Spencer finds his way to Theism and to the truth of personal immortality.[3]

The reaction against a Deistic, as distinguished from a Theistic, position, is manifest in the method of dealing with the antithesis of the natural and the supernatural. The idea that one is the antipode of the other is no longer satisfactory. There is an impatience of duality, a search for unity, in the plan of Providence. The vague impression that redemption is somehow an afterthought, a remodelling of the scheme of the world to meet an emergency not at first provided for, is dispelled. There is perceived a tendency to follow Augustine and to harmonize the seemingly conflicting parts of the system by the doctrine that the natural *is* supernatural — that, albeit there are two classes of events, they nevertheless constitute one order of things. Hence theologians cast about for a hypothesis concerning the miracles of Scripture that shall do away with the idea that they are anti-natural, and show that, in the circumstances in which they occur, they have their place in the comprehensive order. On the subject of the Atonement, theology seeks for a point of view where all appearance of arbitrariness in the doctrinal explanations of the New Testament as to the purport and effect of the sufferings and death of Christ, shall disappear — where the historic facts shall interpret themselves in accordance with these explanations.

Among Protestants and Roman Catholics the old question respecting the seat of authority in religion is once more eagerly disputed. Since Coleridge and Schleiermacher insisted that the primary object of faith is not the Bible, but Christ, there has been a growing tendency to regard the Scriptures less as an authoritative manual of revealed tenets in theology and morals, than as the medium of disclosing to us the personal Christ and the import of His mission and teaching. The absolute inerrancy of Scriptural statements, especially in the narrative portions of the Bible, is no

[1] See Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, edited by Canon Gore (2d ed. 1895), p. 31.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 128.

[3] John Fiske, *The Destiny of Man viewed in the Light of his Origin* (1884); *The Idea of God as affected by Modern Knowledge* (1885).

longer maintained, in England and America, by numerous theologians who are firmly attached to the principal doctrines of the Evangelical system. An American theological teacher — whose early death was generally lamented — writes as follows, speaking of American Congregationalists:[1] "We are coming more clearly to understand the great purpose of the Bible; namely, to bring the Church and the individual in all ages into vital contact with the historic facts, the divine truth, and the spiritual power of Christianity; and so to discern what is essential and non-essential for the attainment of that purpose. We are most of us ready to admit that false standards have been set up, that an infallibility in non-essentials has been demanded which the Bible never claims, and which, if it existed, would render it less fitted for its end. We are beginning to see that we may grant that the sacred writers were not scientific historians, not philosophers or men of science, not experts in the methods of scientific exegesis or of literary criticism, and yet may rest firm in our conviction that they were so directed by the supernatural influence of God's Spirit as to give us the perfect rule of faith and life." The tendency of opinion to which reference is here made is reinforced at present by whatever is deemed verifiable in the "Higher Criticism." In Germany, one prominent object of investigation of late has been the "consciousness of Christ," and the inquiry has been prosecuted by means of a scrutiny of the Scriptures, in which the inerrancy of their several parts is far from being assumed or acknowledged. At the same time, Protestant theologians, even of the class referred to, are frequently disposed to admit an authority of the Church, in some substantial meaning of the terms. The Christian experience of the Church at large, the collective "Christian consciousness," is considered a trustworthy witness in regard to the substance of the Gospel.[2]

[1] *The Present Direction of Theological Thought in the Congregational Churches in the United States*, a paper read before the International Congregational Council in London (1891), by Lewis F. Stearns.

[2] Professor Charles A. Briggs, a distinguished scholar in the Presbyterian Church, in an Inaugural Address (1891), maintained that there are "three fountains of divine authority"; namely, the Bible, the Reason, and the Church. In subsequent discussions he disavowed the intention to coördinate these.* He alleged in support of his thesis the divine institution of the Church,

* *The Defence before the Presbytery*, p. 82 seq.

The great antithesis between Sacramentalism — the doctrine of the inherent efficacy of the Sacraments — and the opposite view as to their significance remains. With the exception of the Lutheran Church in its doctrine of the Eucharist, Sacramentalism has been connected with belief in the continued priestly office of the clergy. A new obstacle in the way of the reunion of the churches and the portions of churches in which Sacramentalism is the creed has been created by the Vatican declaration of Papal infallibility. Yet the attenuated meaning attached to the new dogma lessens the height of the wall of division among Sacerdotalists, and the toleration of the theory of development, in the room of tradition, as the basis of the Roman system, — an allowance implied in such an act as the raising of Newman to the cardinalate, — removes, in the apprehension of many, a barrier that had kept away from the Church of Rome conscientious historical students.[1]

The reduction of the area of Calvinism, and its partial disintegration in communities where it had long been established, is a fact which challenges attention. If we go back to the dawn of the seventeenth century, we find that the Reformed or Calvinistic creed, to say nothing of its prevalence in Bohemia, Hungary, and other regions of less note, was dominant in Switzerland, the Palatinate, Holland, the Protestant Church of France, of Scotland, and in England, where, to the end of the reign of Elizabeth, the theological influence of Calvin was a controlling power. Arminianism inflicted a severe blow upon the dominion exercised by the Genevan system, not only in Holland, but, more and more, under the

the Ministry, and the Sacraments. On the subject of Biblical Infallibility he said: "The Bible has maintained its authority with the best scholars of our time, who with open minds have been willing to recognize any error that might be pointed out by historical criticism; for these errors are all in the circumstantials and not in the essentials; they are in the human setting and not in the precious jewel itself; they are found in that section of the Bible that theologians commonly account for from the providential superintendence of the mind of the author as distinguished from divine revelation itself." * Opponents of this teaching of Professor Briggs contended for the infallibility of the "original autographs" of the Scriptures.

[1] The difference of the old and the new theory was appreciated by Dr. Pusey: "The Council of Trent does not go, as dear Newman does, on development, but on tradition." — *Life of Pusey*, Vol. III. p. 207.

* *Inaugural Address*, p. 22.

Stuarts, in England. In the last century, among the agencies which contributed still further to diminish the sway of Calvinism in English-speaking communities, the influence of Bishop Butler, through the method of his *Analogy*, is an important factor. In that notable work, so valued a defence of the truths of religion, the doctrine of man's probation has a prominent place. It is not, however, the Calvinistic doctrine of the probation of the race, but the doctrine of the probation of the individual, each for himself, on which the author insists. In the decline of interest in the old disputes on questions which Calvinists had debated with their opponents, in the presence of issues more fundamental, the natural tendency of Butler's discussions had a marked effect on the habit of thought. The Wesleyan movement induced a certain reaction, but Calvinism contended against great odds, owing to the rapid growth and diffusion in America, as well as England, of Wesley's reinforcement of an aggressive Arminianism. The dissatisfaction which has appeared, from time to time, with one feature of Calvinism, which is denominated "limited atonement," the persistence of a strong predilection for the opinion that the salvation of the non-elect is an object of sincere desire in the mind of God, have proved, likewise, a disintegrating force. It is worthy of remark that, among Presbyterians in the United States and Great Britain, in efforts, in some cases successful, and in some cases not, to revise the Westminster Confession, a special aim has been to incorporate in the creed, or to annex to it, the opinion just referred to. To one who looks below the surface of contentions in theology, it is pretty obvious that it is not the doctrine of predestination — the network of teleology in which Calvinism encloses the realms of nature and Providence — that more commonly excites repugnance to this compact and logical system. The theory of determinism, in a more rigid form than any opinion of the Genevan reformer, is not unfrequently expressed by philosophers who, on questions of religion, are of the free-thinking class. The real, even when unconscious, motive of this antagonism is the objection felt to the connected doctrine relative to the outcome of the course of the world — to the Calvinistic eschatology. It cannot be denied that, whether justly or unjustly, to a multitude of minds, in modern days, the system of Calvinism wears an aspect of cruelty. The source of this impression, however, is not so much any dogma pertaining to divine and human

agency, as the tenet as to the actual issues of the divine government and of the drama of human life. In a survey of the theological tendencies of the present day, one general cause of the decadence of Calvinism is entitled to a more particular consideration, and will now be adverted to.

It is plain to keen observers that, in the later days, both within and without what may be called the pale of Calvinism, there is a certain relaxing of confidence in the previously accepted solutions of some of the gravest theological problems. This appears among many whose attachment to the core of the essential truths formulated in the past does not wane, whose substantial orthodoxy, as well as piety, is not often, if it be at all, questioned, and who have no sympathy with agnosticism, in the technical sense of the word. The fact is here stated, with no purpose either to applaud or to censure. It is in part an incidental effect of the exegetical method and spirit in which history, as well as philology, is applied, in a manner somewhat new, to the interpretation of the Bible. The exegesis of the past is felt to be in need of a revisal from fresh points of view and of a larger infusion of literary tact. The reduced confidence in traditional solutions is partly owing to a sense of the need of a sharper distinction between the fundamental truths of the Gospel and the philosophy which has been employed in the formulating of them. This motive may prompt, as is the case with a section of the Ritschlian School in Germany, to an unduly agnostic position respecting the objective reality of the truths themselves, and to the abjuring of philosophy altogether. But such is not the state of mind in the class of orthodox teachers of religion who are here referred to. Even by them the formulas respecting the precise connection of divine agency with human agency, in the composition of the Scriptures, and in regeneration and sanctification, the theodicy as concerned with the introduction and perpetuation of evil, the process of the Incarnation, the mode in which the Saviour's death affects the mind of God and lays a basis for the proclamation of forgiveness, the ultimate destiny of the impenitent and non-Christian portion of mankind, — the formulas on these themes are looked upon with at least a modicum of distrust. A larger space is remanded to the region of mystery. There is a tendency to enlarge the domain of the unrevealed.

The purport of the foregoing statements may be better under-

stood by particular reference to two English theological writers, each of acknowledged worth and eminence, and each a revered leader in his own communion.

The first of these writers is the late Dean Church, who was affiliated with the Oxford Movement and has best recorded its history. The extracts which follow are from letters in reply to correspondents who brought before him their difficulties in relation to eternal punishment, the limitation of the knowledge of the incarnate Christ, the Atonement. They touch incidentally on the principles of Biblical interpretation.[1]

"Whatever one says of the millions of publicans and sinners, or the 'sixscore thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left,' must rest on other premises. There, it seems to me that we are between the certainties of God's justice, mercy, and love, on the one hand; and on the other, our own absolute and hopeless ignorance as to how He deals, and will deal, with these millions, both in and out of Christendom, as to whom the first difficulty that presents itself is,— why they were born for such inevitable lives, and, apparently, certain moral failure. I say apparently, because none but He who knows, in each concrete case, the light given, and the real movements of the will, can know what the failure really is. Scripture, which tells us the doom not only of deliberate sin, but of sinful trifling and carelessness in those who know, or might have known, is silent about these masses of mankind, who, so far as we can see, are without what we have."

* * * * * * *

"The common topic against eternal punishment, 'Could any man of ordinary feeling appoint it? and if not, how could God?' is quite as strong about evil. How can we imagine ourselves, supposing we had omnipotence or omniscience, enduring to bring into being such unintermitting masses of misery and sin? The difficulty of finally dealing with evil is to me a far less difficulty than that of evil itself. The ordinary language about eternal punishment seems to me simply to forget the fact of the equal difficulty of evil. Two difficulties do not make one solution; but at least they ought to teach patience and guarded language.

[1] *Life and Letters of Dean Church* (1894), pp. 315, 318, 319, 328.

"On the other hand, Scripture, though awfully plain-spoken and stern, seems to me very general in its language on this matter."

* * * * * * *

"I have no doubt that we have not yet reached the true and complete method of Scripture exegesis, and that a great deal remains to be done by sober and reverential inquiry, in distinguishing between its definite and precise language ('the Word was God') and its vague or incidental or unqualified language ('hate his father and mother,' 'shall not come out till he has paid the uttermost farthing'). But I shrink much from speculating on the human knowledge of our blessed Lord, or the limitations — and they may have been great — which He was pleased to impose on Himself, when he 'emptied Himself,' and became as one of us. I have never been satisfied with the ordinary explanations of the text you quote, St. Matt. xxiv. 36. They seem simply to explain it away as much as any Unitarian gloss of St. John i. 1. To me it means that He who was to judge the world, who knew what was in man, and, more, who alone knew the Father, was at that time content to have that hour hidden from Him — did not choose to be above the angels in knowing it — as He was afterwards content to be forsaken of the Father. But the whole is perfectly inconceivable to my mind, and I could not base any general theory of His knowledge on it. I think it is very likely that we do not understand the meaning of much that is said in Scripture; — its sense, and the end and purport for which at the time it was said. But it would perplex me much to think that He was imperfect or ignorant in what He did say, whether we understood Him or not."

* * * * * * *

"As far as I understand the difficulty it is this: How could our Lord really have sympathized in all human pain, when He could not, by supposition, have known that which gives it its worst sting, — its apparent uselessness and its helplessness? Well, I can only say that I cannot form the faintest conception how, in the actual depths of that Divine suffering nature, all human pain was borne, and shared, and understood. I can only see it from the outside. I see the suffering; I am told, on His authority, what it means and involves. I can, if I like, and as has often been done, go on and make a theory how He bore our sins, and how He gained

their forgiveness, and how He took away the sins of the world. But I own that the longer I live the more my mind recoils from such efforts. It seems to me so idle, so, in the very nature of our condition, hopeless, just in proportion as one seems to grasp more really the true nature of all that went on beyond the visible sight of the Cross, all that was in Him who was God and man, whose capacities and inner life human experience cannot reach or reflect. But one of the thoughts which pass sometimes through our minds about the sufferings of the Cross, is, what could be the necessity of such suffering? What was the use of it? How, with infinite power, could not its ends have been otherwise attained? Why need He have suffered? Why could not the Father save Him from that hour? Did that thought, in the limitations and 'emptying' (Phil. ii. 7) of the Passion, pass through His mind too ?

"But I suppose that, after all, the real difficulty is not about Him, but ourselves. Why pain at all ? I can only say that the very attempt to give an answer, that the very thought of an answer by us being conceivable, seems to me one which a reasonable being in our circumstances ought not to entertain. It seems to me one of those questions which can only be expressed by such a figure as a fly trying to get through a glass window, or a human being jumping into space ; that is, it is almost impossible to express the futility of it. It is obvious that it is part of a wider subject, that it could not be answered by itself, that we should need to know a great many other things to have the power of answering. And what is the use of asking what we cannot know ? . . . The facts which witness to the goodness and the love of God are clear and undeniable ; they are not got rid of by the presence and certainty of other facts, which seem of an opposite kind ; only the coexistence of the two contraries is perplexing. And then comes the question, which shall have the decisive, governing influence on wills and lives ? You must, by the necessity of your existence, trust one set of appearances ; which will you trust ? Our Lord came among us not to clear up the perplexity, but to show us which side to take."

The second of the writers is the late Dr. R. W. Dale, the respect for whom among the Congregationalists of England, among whom he was an honored leader, was shared by men of the highest worth in the Established Church, and by fellow-Christians

of his own communion in America. The following extracts are from the discourse of Dr. Dale on the "Evangelical Revival" of the last century.[1]

"When the Reformers undertook the task of constructing a theology for the Reformed Churches, the intellectual revolution which began with the Renaissance was incomplete — it is not complete yet — and while they made immense and salutary changes in the dogmas of the Church by a constant appeal to the authority of the Holy Scripture, their method was still powerfully influenced by the decaying Scholasticism. There were other causes which gave to their work a provisional character. Indeed all work of this kind is necessarily but for a time; it has to be done over again whenever any great changes have taken place in the intellectual condition of Christendom. Such changes have plainly been going on very rapidly during the last three hundred years. It looks as if we had almost escaped from the philosophical methods which still retained much of their authority in the time of the Reformers. If the intellectual revolution is approaching its term, the process of reconstructing our theological systems will soon have to be gone through again. . . . Among Evangelical Nonconformists the severe and rigid lines of Calvinism have been gradually relaxed. Mr. Spurgeon stands alone among the modern leaders of Evangelical Nonconformists in his fidelity to the older Calvinistic creed.

"The decay of Calvinism among Evangelical Nonconformists has been largely due to the influence of Methodism. . . . But other influences have been acting on the traditional creed of our churches. . . .

"That general movement of European thought of which I have spoken is rendering it impossible to retain theological theories which were constructed in the sixteenth century. Men whose whole life is rooted in Christ, to whom He is the Eternal Word of God, 'the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His person,' 'the propitiation for the sin of the world,' the Prince, the Saviour, and the Judge of men, are conscious that the rivets which fastened their doctrinal definitions are loosening — they hardly know how or why; that their theological theories, as distinct from their religious faith, are dissolving and melting away.

[1] *The Evangelical Revival and Other Sermons* (1880), pp. 19, 21–25.

While not relaxing their hold on the Divine revelation which has come to them through Christ, they are asking for some more satisfactory intellectual account of the great facts and truths which are their joy and strength. There is hardly a theological definition which they can accept without qualification; there is hardly a theological phrase which is not colored by speculations which seem to them incredible. They have not lost sight of sun and stars; they will tell you that with their increasing years the glory of the sun is brighter to them than ever, and that the stars are more mysterious and divine; but they want a new astronomical theory. The sun and stars are God's handiwork; astronomical theories are the provisional human explanations of Divine wonders."

* * * * * * *

"The work of theological reconstruction must be done. It can only be done effectively when the religious faith and ardor of the Church are intense, and when robust genius and massive learning are united with saintly devotion. A theology which is the creation of a poor and degraded religious life will have neither stability nor grandeur. We must all become better Christians before we can hope to see great theologians.

"Meanwhile — and this, perhaps, is the lesson of the hour — all Evangelical Churches should frankly recognize that the Evangelical theology — not the Evangelical faith — is passing through a period of transition. We should not rigorously insist on the acceptance either of the subordinate details of our creed or of the scientific forms in which we are accustomed to state even its regal and central articles. It would be treason to truth to trifle with the immortal substance of the gospel of Christ; it would be treason to charity to refuse to receive as brethren those who may differ from us about the theological forms in which the substance of the Gospel may be best expressed."

Since the Reformation, in contrast with the more distinctively ecclesiastical ages preceding, the ethical side of the Gospel has been more and more brought into the foreground. The relation of Christianity to political and social reform, to philanthropy in all directions, engages attention. Allied to this spirit is the more absorbing interest in the Life of Jesus, which gives rise to numerous special works of biography, in different languages. Theology concentrates its inquiries upon Christ with a greater subordination of

all other topics. It appears to be felt that the outcome, the ripe fruit, of the Old Testament dispensation is to be found in the Woman and the Child in the manger at Bethlehem. The uppermost question is, What think ye of Christ? This question, and the implications of His person and work, form the rubrics of the theological system.

INDEX

Abbott, E. A., 452, 459, 463.
Abelard, Peter, his characteristics, 221; his confidence in reason, 222; on inspiration, *ib.;* on original sin, *ib.;* on the atonement, 223; on the Trinity, *ib.;* accused and condemned, *ib.;* his service to theology, 224.
Absolution, 258, 280, 330, 331, 466. See "Penance."
Adam's sin, doctrine of. See "Original Sin."
Adiaphoristic controversies, the, 295.
Adoption controversy, the, 205.
Æthiopic Church, the rise of, 156.
Ætius of Antioch, 142.
Agape, the, in the early Church, 46, 168.
Agatho, Bishop of Rome, 159.
Agnosticism, a certain species of in Sir W. Hamilton, 484; also in Mansel, 485; in Spencer, 487; in Huxley, 489. See "Agnostics."
Agnostics, on the possibility of theology, 4.
Agobard, Bishop of Lyons, 203.
Agricola, John, 294.
Aix, Synod of, 205.
Albert the Great, 231, 257, 259.
Albigenses, 263.
Alcuin, 203, 205.
Alexander VII., Pope, 335.
Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, 135.
Alexander of Hales, influence of Aristotle on, 216, 229; on divine and human agency, 249; his idea of a treasury of merits, 250, 259; on the prerequisite for absolution, 260.
Alexandria, theological school at, 39, 94, 127, 151; synods at, 135, 150, 152.
Allegorical interpretation, in Palestinian and Alexandrian Judaism, 26, 27; among the Gnostics, 54; among the Apostolic Fathers generally, 76; Clement of Alexandria on, 94; in Origen, 105; in Methodius, 116; in Bernard of Clairvaux, 224; in Cocceius, 349.
Alogi, the, 100.
Amalric of Bena, 213.
Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan, his writings, 132; his influence on Augustine, 177, 179, 187; on original sin, 187.
Ames, William, 348.
Ammonius Saccas, 31, 40.
Amsdorf, 295, 296.
Amyraut (Amyraldus), his theology, 342, 345.
Anabaptists, their rise, and tenets, 318; in Switzerland, 319; their spread, *ib.*
Ancyra, Synod of, 142.
Andover theologians on continued probation, 444.
Andreæ, 296.
Andreas, Bishop of Samosata, 153.
Andrews, Lancelot, Bishop, his theology, 355.
Angels, the doctrine of, in Philo, 28; in the Gnostic systems, 56; in Justin Martyr, 65 *note;* in Pseudo-Dionysius, 173; the worship of, 124, 172, 198.
"Anglo-Catholic" party and theology, rise of, 353 *sq.*, 357; revived in the Oxford movement, 455 *sq.*
Annihilation of the wicked, doctrine of the, 88, 444, 479, 516. See "Future State," "Immortality."
Anomœans, 142, 143.
Anselm, on the relation of faith and knowledge, 6, 213, 216; realism and creationism conjoined in, 187; on the Lord's Supper, 211; the father of Scholasticism, 216; his writings, 217; on the proofs of the being of God, *ib.;* on original sin, *ib. sq.;* his doctrine of sin compared with that of Augustine, 218; his doctrine of the atonement, 219; this compared with that of Aquinas, 245, 246.
Antioch, school of, its spirit and teaching, 122, 127, 151; synods of, 104, 115, 140, 142.
Antiochian symbols, 140, 141.
Apocalypses, Jewish, influence on early Christian thought, 271.

Apocalyptic element in the N. T. conception of the kingdom, 24.

Apocrypha, use of the term by the Fathers, 121 *sq.;* in the Creed of Trent, 328.

Apollinaris, and the Apollinarian doctrine, 148 *sq.*

Apologists, Greek, their conception of Christianity and of its proofs, 61, 62. See under the several names.

Apostles' Creed, its origin, 70; its oldest form, 71; its relation to the *regulæ fidei, ib.;* in the Western church, 206; incorporated in the Protestant creeds, 283.

Apostolic succession, in Clement of Rome, 76, 79; in Irenæus, 79; Whately on, 450; Thomas Arnold on, 451; the Oxford Declaration on, 454; Newman's contention for, 455; Canon Gore on, 468. See "Episcopacy," "Orders."

Aquinas, Thomas, on the relation of faith and knowledge, 7, 231; his philosophical position, 231; his writings, *ib.;* on the necessity of revelation, 234; on two classes of truths, *ib.;* on miracles, 235; on inspiration, *ib.;* on the being of God, and the proofs of it, *ib.;* on the extent of our knowledge of God, 236; on the divine attributes, *ib.;* on the Trinity, 237; on the incarnation, *ib.;* on creation, *ib.*, 238; on divine and human agency in conversion, 238, 248; on the theodicy and the nature of evil, 239; on the nature of man, 239; on immortality, *ib.;* on the connection of the race with Adam, 240, 242 *sq.;* on the atonement, 245 *sq.;* on the will, 248; on justification, 249; on two classes of virtues, 250; on papal infallibility and prerogatives, 252; on the nature, need, and function of the sacraments, 254 *sq.;* on the effect of baptism, 256; on confirmation, 257; on the Lord's Supper (the doctrine of concomitance), 257; on transubstantiation, *ib.;* on confession, 259; on the doctrine of supererogatory merits, *ib.;* on purgatory, *ib.;* on extreme unction, 260; on ordination, 261; on marriage, *ib.;* his relation to Augustine, 262.

Arianism, rise of, 134 *sq.;* in England, 370 *sq.;* in New England, 418 *sq.* See "Trinity."

Aristides (the Apologist), 36.

Aristotle, his influence on the course of doctrine, after the fourth century, 126; among the Schoolmen, 209, 213, 214, 216, 229, 231, 262.

Arius, his doctrine, 134 *sq.*, 144; the *Thalia* of, 135; his banishment and recall, 139, 140. See "Arianism."

Arles, Synod of (A.D. 355), 142.

Armenian Church, the, as a distinct body, 156.

Arminianism, rise and spread of, 337; in the age of the Puritans, 356; of Wesley compared with the Dutch, 392; in New England, 394. See "Arminians," "Arminius."

Arminians, their creed, 338; their system characterized, 339; on original sin, 346; on the atonement (the governmental theory of Grotius), 340, 341; on the self-origination of the Son, 341; on the person of Christ, 342; the spirit of their scholars, *ib.*

Arminius, James, 337.

Arnauld, 334, 335.

Arnold, Matthew, his theological point of view, 480; on the being of God, *ib.;* on prayer, 482; on the substance of Christianity, *ib.;* on miracles and the supernatural, 483.

Arnold, Thomas, his theology, 451, 456.

Artemon and the Artemonites, 102.

Assurance, the doctrine of, impossible under the Scholastic system, 250; among the Reformers, 274; in Calvin, 299; in the Creed of Trent, 329; among the Wesleyans, 392.

Astruc, 497.

Athanasian Creed, the, 147, 206.

Athanasius, on the orthodoxy of Dionysius, 114; conservator of unity, 120; on authoritative Scriptures and Apocrypha, 121; on the hindrance to the perception of God, 124; his writings, 129; Gibbon on, *ib.;* at the Council of Nicæa, 136 *sq.;* the practical motive underlying his doctrine of the Trinity, 136; on numerical unity of substance, 137 *sq.;* repeated banishments, 140, 143; on the Apollinarian heresy, 149; on the work of Christ, 162; on the Fall, 164.

Athenagoras, 64, 75.

Atonement, doctrine of the, Justin Martyr on, 66; the Epistle to Diognet on, 69; Irenæus on, 86; Tertullian

on, 92; Origen on, 111; the Greek Fathers on, 161, 162; Augustine on, 180; Anselm on, 219, 247; Abelard on, 223; Bernhard on, 225; Hugo of St. Victor on, 226; Peter Lombard on, 227; Aquinas on, 245; Scotus on, 247, 248; the Mystics of the fourteenth century on, 265; Luther on, 276; Zwingli on, 286; Calvin on, 308; the Socinians on, 323; the Creed of the Arminians on, 338; the Dort Creed on, 339; the governmental theory (of Grotius), 340; Episcopius on, 341; Amyraut on, 343; the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* on, 345; Richard Baxter on, 362; John Owen on, *ib.;* Locke on, 375; the Quakers on, 379; Wesley on, 392; Edwards on, 409; Bellamy on, 411; the younger Edwards on, 412; the governmental theory of, characteristic of the New England theology, 413; Henry B. Smith on, 418; Bushnell on, 441–444; Charles Hodge (and the Princeton theology) on, 445; Coleridge on, 449; Mozley on, 471; Maurice on, 473; Campbell on, 477 *sq.;* Swedenborg on, 494; Schleiermacher on, 505, 507; Dorner on, 514; Nitzsch on, 516; Rothe on, 518; Ritschl on, 525.

Augsburg, Confession, 272, 274, 280, 281, 283, 290, 291, 293; Diet of, 272, 287, 290; Peace of, 295.

Augustine, his *De Civitate Dei*, 118, 132, 182; on inspiration, 122; on the decisions of councils, 123; on the proof of the being of God, 124; his mental qualities and writings, 132, 196; eliminates subordinationism, 146; his influence, 176; experience and personal traits, *ib.;* determining factors of his theology, 177; on faith and knowledge, *ib.;* on the attributes of God, 178; on the Trinity, *ib.;* on the person of Christ, *ib.;* on the seat of authority, 179; on the Church, *ib.*, 193; on faith and salvation, 180; on merits, *ib.;* on the atonement, *ib.;* on the incarnation, *ib.;* on the Sacraments, 181, 183, 193, 254, 256; on Providence, 181, 184; on the relation of God to evil, 181; on the resurrection and the future state, 182; his point of view compared with Pelagius, 184; his theory of the will, *ib.*, 191; on Adam's sin and its consequences, *ib. sq.;* his controversy with Julian, 186; on the origin of souls, 187 *sq.;* letter to Jerome, *ib.;* on the nature of character, 190; on baptism, 191; on grace, *ib.;* his earlier and later views of predestination, 191 *sq.;* discordant veins of thought in, 193; dissent from, in the West, 195; his doctrine of predestination revived by Gottschalk, 206; his doctrine of original sin compared with that of Anselm, 218; his relation to Aquinas and the Schoolmen, 262; his influence upon Luther, 272; his system revived by the Jesuits, 332; and by Jansenius and the Port Royalists, 334.

Augustus, Emperor, 29.

Authority, the seat of, presuppositions respecting, in the second period, 121; Augustine on, 179; the mediæval doctrine of, 252; Wyclif on, 265; Luther on, 278; Zwingli on, 287; Calvin on, 298; the Ten Articles (1536) on, 310; the Socinians on, 322; the Council of Trent on, 328; the Arminians on, 340; the Protestant Scholastic view of, 347; John Hales on, 364; Chillingworth on, *ib.;* the Quakers on, 378; the Oxford school on, 454, 455; recent discussions on, 547.

Averroes, 213.

Bacon, Francis, 19, 384.

Bajus, Michael, 333.

Balfour, Walter, 437.

Ball, John, 348, 360.

Ballou, Hosea, 437.

Baptism, the Apostolic Fathers on, 44, 46; earliest formula used, 46; Justin Martyr on, 68; Irenæus on, 87; Origen on, 112; the Greek Fathers on, 167; Augustine on, 181; the Schoolmen on, 255, 256; Luther on, 271, 281; the Lutherans on, 281; Calvin on, 305; form of, in vogue among the Anabaptists, 320; the Creed of Trent on, 329, 330; the Oxford Tracts on, 456. See "Baptism of Infants."

Baptism of infants, recognition of, in Irenæus, 87; Calvin on, 305; Schwenkfeld on, 318; the Anabaptists on, *ib.;* Michael Servetus on, 321; Dean Stanley on, 474.

Barclay, Robert, 378.

Barnabas, the Epistle of, 35; on the person of Christ, 45; on baptism, 46; on the second advent, 47.
Barneveld, Olden, 338.
Barry, John, 354.
Baruch, the Apocalypse of, 27.
Basil, Bishop of Cæsarea, 130; on the Trinity, 143; on the character of infants, 165.
Basilides, his system, 57.
Basiliscus, Emperor, 156.
Basilius, 202.
Baumgarten-Crusius, 16, 21; on Justin (Apol. I. 6), 65.
Baur, F. C., his theory of theological development, 14, 534; divisions of his doctrinal history, 16; his theory of a Pauline-Petrine dissension, 41, 51; on the Clementine writings, 51, 55; his classification of the Gnostic systems, 55; on the Scholastic method, 215; his theory of opposing parties in the early Church anticipated by Toland, 375.
Baxter, Richard, his system, 362.
Bec, the school of, 210.
Bede, the Venerable, 203.
Belgic Confession, the, 337, 339.
Bellamy, Joseph, 411.
Bellarmine, Robert, 16, 332, 333, 351.
Bengel, J. A., 495.
Bentley, Richard, 376.
Berengarius, 210.
Berkeley, Bishop, his philosophy, 285; and Edwards, 403.
Bernard of Clairvaux, character of his piety, 224, 225; opposes Abelard, 225; on faith and knowledge, *ib.;* on the atonement, *ib.;* precursor of St. Francis and the mendicants, 229; on the immaculate conception, 244.
Beryl, Bishop of Bostra, 103.
Beza, 337.
Biblical criticism, among the Arminian scholars, 342; Louis Cappel's contribution to, 343; among the Deists, 376, 377; among the Unitarians in New England, 423; Matthew Arnold's services to, 480; in Germany in the period of "illumination," 497; the influence of Hegelianism on, 534.
Biblical theology in the school of Coccius, 349.
Biedermann, 534.
Biel, Gabriel, 233.
Bigg, Charles, 6, 138.
Bishops, original, identical with presbyters, 76 *sq.;* the guardians of doctrine, 78; gradual precedence of the Roman, 80, 123; their subordination under the papacy, 252; alone may confirm in the Latin Church, 256; Aquinas on their relation to priests, 261; Cranmer on, 315; the Creed of Trent on, 331; Bellarmine on, 332; John Hales on, 364; the Oxford Tracts on, 455; Canon Gore on, 468. See "Episcopacy."
"Bishop's Book," the, 311.
Blaurock, 319.
Blount, Charles, 373.
Blunt, J. H., 314, 466.
Boccaccio, 267.
Boethius, 126, 132, 213.
Bogomiles, the, 202.
Bolingbroke, 378.
Bolsec, Jerome, 337.
Bonaventura, 230, 244, 249, 257, 260.
Boniface II., 197; Boniface VIII., 251, 252, 253.
Bonn, Old Catholic Conferences at, 544.
Bossuet, 16, 336, 380.
Bostra, Council of (A.D. 244), 103.
Bound, Dr. Nicholas, 362.
Boyle, Robert, 376.
Bradwardine, 250.
Bretschneider, 500.
Briggs, Charles A., 548.
"Broad Church" theology, in England, 473–477; in Scotland, 477–479.
Brook Farm Association, 435.
Brown, James Baldwin, 479.
Bruce, A. B., 479.
Bryennios, 35.
Bucer, Martin, 290, 312, 313.
Buckminster, Joseph Stevens, 421.
Buddhism, Matthew Arnold on, 483.
Bull, Bishop George, 20, 99, 144, 370.
Burnet, Bishop, on the Latitudinarians, 366, 367.
Bushnell, Horace, on the possibility of theology, 5; on Christian nurture, 438; on the Trinity, 438–441; on the atonement, 441–444; on annihilation of the wicked, 444.
Butler, Bishop Joseph, 388, 389, 390; indirect anti-Calvinistic influence, 557.

Cæsarius, Bishop of Arles, 197.
Cainites, the, 57.
Cajetan, 243.
Calixtus, George, 379.

Callistus, Bishop of Rome, 82, 102.

Calvin, John, his doctrine on assurance, 274; his influence on Melanchthon, 291; on the Lord's Supper, 291, 306; his relation to Zwingli and Luther, 298–309 *et passim*; his intellectual qualities, *ib.*; his religious experience, *ib.*; his *Institutes*, *ib.*; on the testimony of the Spirit to the divinity and truth of the Bible, 299; on the nature of faith and assurance, *ib.*; on predestination, *ib.*; was he a supralapsarian, 301; on original sin, *ib.*, 302; on two wills in God, 302; on the Church visible and invisible, 304; on the nature of the Sacraments, 305; on baptism, *ib.*; of infants, *ib.*; on the Trinity, 307; on the Athanasian Creed, *ib.*; on the incarnation, 308; on the atonement, *ib.*; on the descent of Christ into Hades, 309; Hooker on, 316; his defences of predestination, 337; on the Lord's Day, 361. See "Calvinism."

Calvinism, its spread resisted by Lutherans, 292; how differentiated from Lutheranism, 300; influence of, in Elizabeth's reign, 316; the Arminian revolt against, 337 *sq.*; in the Canons of Dort, 339; in the school of Saumur, 342; of Pajon, 346; defended by the Puritans, 356; in the Westminster Confession, 359; in the Church of England in the eighteenth century, 393; in New England, 394 *sq.*; as defended by Jonathan Edwards, 400; in the Presbyterian Church, 444; partial disintegration of, 549 *sq.*

Campbell, John McLeod, his treatise on the atonement, 477 *sq.*

"Cambridge Platform," the, 394.

Cameron, John, 342.

Canon of the New Testament, the, its origin, 72 *sq.*; the antilegomena, 74; tests for admission of books into, 75; discussion of, in the post-Nicene period, 121; Luther on, 279; Zwingli on, 287; Calvin on, 299; Dr. Arnold on, 451.

Canonization, condemned by Wyclif, 266.

Cappel, Louis, 343, 345.

Carlstadt, 280, 288.

Carlyle, Thomas, 434.

Carthage, Council at, (A.D. 397) 122; the second, 195.

Cassian, John, his doctrine, 196.

Cassiodorus, 133.

Castellio, 337.

Catechumens, school for, at Alexandria, 39.

Catharinus, 350.

Catharists, the, 263.

Catholic Church, the old, the term 'Catholic,' 70; rise of, in the second century, 70–81; recent organization under this name, 544.

Celibacy of the clergy, rule of Second Trullan Council concerning, 200; deprives them of a sacrament, 261; Wyclif on the, 266; Zwingli on, 287; the Six Articles on, 312.

Celsus, 40, 104.

Cerinthus, 56, 100.

Chalcedon, Council and Creed of, 155, 156.

Channing, William Ellery, on different types of Unitarians, 420; his Baltimore sermon, *ib.*; personal qualities and preaching gifts, 421 *sq.*; his mental history, 425; his doctrine of disinterestedness, 428; of sin, 429; of the Fatherhood of God, 430; of the person and work of Christ, 430, 431; his attitude toward the intuitional philosophy, 435.

Charenton, Synod of, 343.

Charles the Bald, theology in the time of, 203; Ratramnus's letter to, on the Lord's Supper, 207; V., Emperor, 326, 327.

Chartres, school at, 210.

Chaucer, 267.

Cheetham, on the function of bishops of the first century, 81.

Chemnitz, 296.

Chiazza, the Bishop of, 328.

Chiersy, second Council of, 206; first Synod of, *ib.*

Chiliasm. See "Millennial reign of Christ."

Chillingworth, William, 364.

Christ, the person of, in the Pauline epistles, 25; in the Johannine teaching, 26; the Apostolic Fathers on, 44, 45; the Ebionites on, 48, 49; in the Pseudo-Clementines, 50; the Gnostics on, 54, 56; the Ophites on, 57; Marcion on, 59; Justin Martyr on, 63, 65; in the Epistle to Diognet, 68; Irenæus on, 85; Melito on, 89; Tertullian on, 92;

Clement of Alexandria on, 95; the adoptionist and modalistic views of, 98 *sq.;* the Sabellian views of, 103; Paul of Samosata on, 104; Origen on, 107–109, 148; Novatian on, 113; the doctrine of, introduced into baptismal creeds in the East, 116; the Alexandrian and Antiochian schools on, compared, 127; the Arian doctrine of, 134, 136, 148; Marcellus on, 140; Photinus on, 141; the Apollinarian doctrine of, 148; Athanasius on, 149; the Gregories on, 150; the Antiochians on, 151; Nestorius on, 152; Cyril of Alexandria on, *ib.;* Eutyches on, 154; the Chalcedon Creed on, 155; the Monophysite doctrine of, 156 *sq.;* the Monothelite view of, 158; John of Damascus on, 159; Augustine on, 178; the Adoptionists on, 205; the German Reformers on, 281; the Zwinglians on, 289; the Socinian doctrine of, 322; the Arminian doctrine of, 342; Watts on, 393; Channing on different Unitarian views of, 420; Channing on, 430; Bushnell on, 439; Liddon on, 468; Canon Gore on, *ib.;* Baron Holbach on, 493; Swedenborg on, 494; the Moravians on, 495; Kant on, 499; Schleiermacher on, 504; the Mediating School (of Germany) on, 513; Rothe on, 518; Lipsius on, 523; Ritschl on, 526; Kaftan on, 529; Herrman on, 530; Hegel on, 533; Strauss on, *ib.*

Christ, the Second Coming of, in the Synoptists, 24; the Apostolic Fathers on, 47; the Ebionites on, 49; Justin Martyr on, 67; the Montanists' expectation of, 82; Schleiermacher on, 509.

Christ, the work of, the Ebionites on, 49; in the Clementine writings, 50; Justin Martyr on, 62; Irenæus on, 86; Clement of Alexandria, 95; Origen on, 111; the Antiochians on, 151; Gregory of Nazianzum on, 161; the Greek Fathers on, 162; Athanasius on, *ib.;* Edwards on, 408; Channing on, 431; Schleiermacher on, 504 *sq.;* Nitzsch on, 516; Ritschl on, 525. See the two preceding titles and "Jesus."

Christianity, its distinction from other systems, 1; capable of doctrinal definition, *ib.;* the essential truth in, 3; an historical religion, 7; requires theological interpretation, 8; influence of Jewish thought and methods on, 26; tendencies of the age preceding, 29; influence of Greek philosophy on, 29 *sq.;* conception of, in the Pseudo-Clementine writings, 50; peril of, from Gnosticism, 51, 60; Marcion's view of, 59; as conceived by the Greek Apologists, 60 *sq.;* attacked by Julian, 117; defended by Cyril, 118; modified by pagan customs, 171 *sq.;* Abelard on, 222; the Socinian view of, 322; Matthew Arnold on, 482; Hegelian interpretation of, 532. See "Christ, the person of," "Christ, the work of."

Chrysippus, 31.

Chrysostom, his writings, 131; on original sin, 164, 165; on faith and works, 166; on the Lord's Supper, 169, 170.

Church, Dean, 275, 452, 458; on difficulties in the formulas of theology, 552 *sq.*

Church, the, of the first three centuries characterized, 119; its unity threatened, 120; the scene of internal controversy in the Nicene and post-Nicene period, 125; in the East, ritualism in, 200; the division of East and West in, 201; the hierarchical form of, in the Middle Ages, 251.

Church, the doctrine of, Justin Martyr on, 67; the Nicene and the post-Nicene Fathers on, 123; Augustine on, 179, 193; Gregory I. on, 198; Luther at the disputation at Leipsic on, 270; the Lutheran reformers on, 281; Luther on its authority in doctrine, 283; Calvin on, 304; the Thirty-nine Articles on, 315; the Anabaptist view of, 318; Coleridge on, 449; Whately on, 450; Thomas Arnold on, 451; Kant on, 499; Schleiermacher on, 509. See "Bishops," "Episcopacy," "Church and State."

Church and State, after Constantine, 125; Wyclif on, 266; the Anabaptists on, 318 *sq.;* the Arminians on, 338; the Anglo-Catholics on, 357; the Westminster Confession on, 360; Hobbes on, 372; Blount on, 374; Coleridge on, 449; Whately on, 450; Thomas Arnold on, 451; Stanley on, 475. See "Church, the doctrine of."

Church union, Constantine and Athanasius conservators of, 120; gradual interference of the State for the preservation

of, 125; Cranmer's effort toward, 315; John Hales on, 363; efforts toward, in the seventeenth century: Calixtus, 379; Erasmus on, *ib.;* Hugo Grotius's proposal for, 380; Spinola a promoter of, *ib.;* Leibnitz and Bossuet's correspondence concerning, *ib.*

Clarke, Samuel, 371, 376.

Claude, 345, 346.

Claudius Apollinaris, Bishop of Hierapolis, 36.

Clement VIII., 333.

Clement of Alexandria, on faith and knowledge, 6; his personal qualities and career, 39; his writings, 39, 40; on justification, 42; his tendency toward legalism, *ib.;* on the person of Christ, 44; on the division of the Christian books, 73; on bishops and presbyters, 76; on the mission of the Christian theologian, 94; on the sources of Christian knowledge, *ib.;* on Greek philosophy, 94, 95; on the being of God, 95; on the Logos, *ib.;* on the Father and Son, *ib.;* on the Holy Spirit, *ib.;* on the work of Christ, *ib.;* on the freedom of the will, 96; on Adam's sin, *ib.;* on the doctrine of reserve, *ib.;* on the Lord's Supper, *ib.;* on the future state, *ib.;* on Christ's preaching in Hades, *ib.;* on the resurrection, 97.

Clement of Rome, on justification, 42; on the person of Christ, 44; on the Holy Spirit, 46; on the Episcopate, 76; the Epistle of, 34, 75, 77; the second epistle ascribed to him, 34.

Clementine writings, the Pseudo-, doctrinal contents of, 50; origin of, 51.

Cocceius, on the doctrine of the Covenants, 348.

Cœlestine I., Roman bishop, 152.

Cœlestius, 183, 190, 194, 195.

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, his influence in New England, 437; on the distinction between reason and understanding, 447; on the distinction between Nature and Spirit, *ib.;* on ideas derived from conscience, *ib.;* on the source of belief in God, 447; on inspiration, 448; on original sin, *ib.;* on the atonement, 449; on regeneration, *ib.;* on the Church, *ib.*

Colet, John, 268.

Collins, Anthony, 376.

Colosse, heresy in the Church at, 50.

Colossians, Epistle to, the traces of Gnosticism in, 55.

Comte, Auguste, 4, 486.

Conceptualism, 214.

Concomitance, the doctrine of, 257.

Condillac, 492.

Confession, an element of the sacrament of penance, 258; the office of priest in relation thereto, *ib.;* Innocent III.'s prescription concerning, 259; Aquinas on, *ib.;* Wyclif on, 266; Luther on, 271; Zwingli on, 287; the Six Articles on, 312; the Creed of Trent on, 330, 331.

"Confessionalists," the, of Germany, 523.

Confirmation, the Schoolmen on, 255, 256; Wyclif on, 266; the Creed of Trent on, 330.

Constans, 140–142; II., 158.

Constantine, guardian of church unity, 120; his effort to quell the Arian controversy, 135; convokes the Council of Nicæa, 136; recalls Arius, 139; his pretended 'Donation,' 268.

Constantine, the Paulician, 202.

Constantinople, councils and synods at, 141, 145, 146, 150, 157, 159, 171, 201; the Creed of, its origin and contents, 145, 146.

Constantius, 140 *sq.*

Contarini, 326.

Coptic Church, rise of the, 156.

Cordova, the University at, 209.

Corinth, the Church of, the Epistle of Clement to, 34; organization of, 468.

Cornelius, Bishop of Rome, 83, 113.

Councils, significance of in the Nicene and post-Nicene period, 123.

Cousin, Victor, 485.

Covenants, the doctrine of, 347, 348, 351. See "Federal Theology."

Cranmer, 310 *sq.;* his Catechism, 312; on the Lord's Supper, 313; on Episcopacy, 315.

Creation, the Gnostics on, 56; Justin Martyr on, 66; Irenæus on, 85; Origen on, 107; the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers on, 124; Augustine on, 178; the Schoolmen on, 237; Edwards on, 406; Lipsius on, 523.

Creationism, 163, 187 *sq.*, 239, 350.

Cudworth, Ralph, 366, 368.

Cumberland, Richard, 368.

Cyprian, his writings, 39; on sacerdotal function of bishops, 79, 80; on disci-

pline, 82, 83; on the Lord's Supper, 168.
Cyril, Bishop of Jerusalem, 130; his relation to the Creed of Constantinople, 145; on freedom from original sin, 165; on faith and works, 166; on baptism, 167, 169.
Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria, refutes Julian, 117; his writings, 130; on the person of Christ, 152; organizes the Council of Ephesus, 153; deposed, *ib.;* is restored, 154, 155; on baptism, 167; on the Lord's Supper, 169, 170.

Dale, R. W., his treatise on the atonement, 479; on the loosening of the rivets of doctrinal definitions, 555 *sq.*
D'Alembert, 493.
Daniel, the book of, Porphyry on, 119; Anthony Collins on, 376.
Dante, 260, 267.
Darwinism and theology, 488. See also "Evolution."
David of Dinanto, 273.
Davidis, Francis, 323.
Deism, English, influence leading to, 371; its leading representatives and tenets, 372 *sq.;* answered by the Latitudinarians, 374; the Anglo-French, 492 *sq.* See the names of the several writers.
De Maistre, 14.
Demetrius, Bishop of Alexandria, 40.
Descartes, 19, 381.
Determinism, not strictly held by Augustine, 184; in Aquinas, 238, 248; in Hobbes, 372; in Locke, 374; in Leibnitz, 383; in Collins, 376; in Jonathan Edwards, 401. See "Will."
"Diatesseron," the, 37.
Didache, the, analysis and date of, 35; baptismal formula in, 46; on the Second Advent, 47; on the authoritative source of Christian knowledge, 70; its evidence respecting Episcopacy, 77, 80.
Diderot, 493.
Didymus, 129, 171.
Diodorus, 170.
Diognet, the Epistle to, 37, 68, 69.
Dionysius of Alexandria, 114, 115.
Dionysius of Rome, 115.
Dioscurus, oppresses the Nestorians, 154; convenes the Robber Synod, 155; deposed, *ib.*
Diospolis, the Synod of, 194.
Doctrine, various Biblical types of, 8; leadership in the development of, 10; factors in the formulation of, *ib.;* development of, in relation to nations, 13; influence of Greek philosophy on, 29 *sq.;* Vincent of Lerins on the test of Catholic, 123, 196; converted into dogmas in the second period, 125; relation of the patristic to the mediæval period of, 199. See "Theology."
Doddridge, Philip, 393.
Dogma, defined, 2; the term in Biblical and classical usage, *ib.;* history of, defined, *ib.*
Döllinger, 538, 544.
Dominic, 229.
Dominicans, 214, 252, 328.
Donation of Constantine, 268.
Dorner, 21; on Gnosticism, 53; on the relation of Calvin to Luther and Zwingli, 278; his system, 514.
Dort, the Synod and Creed of, 338, 339, 361.
Dositheus, 56.
Drummond, on the Logos in Philo, 28.
Dualism, in Alexandrian Judaism (Philo), 27; in New Platonism, 31; in Gnosticism, 55; in Manichæism, 127; among the Paulicians, 202; among the Catharists, 263.
Dupanloup, 540, 541.
Durandus, 233, 255.
Dwight, Timothy, his doctrines, 414, 423.

Ebionites, their origin, 48; principal types of, 48 *sq.;* Justin Martyr on, 48, 49; their predecessors in the Apostolic age, 49; the Essenian, 50; their menace to Christianity, 51, 60.
Eckart, Master, 264.
Eclectic School, the French, 485.
Edessa, the school at, 154.
Edward VI. of England, 312.
"Edwardeans," the, 410 *sq.;* their influence in Great Britain, 418; in Connecticut, 423. See "New England Theology."
Edwards, Jonathan, originator of the "New England theology," 395; Dugald Stewart quoted on, *ib.;* mental characteristics, *ib.;* his earliest writings, 396; how influenced by Locke, 397; his treatise on the will, 397 *sq.;* how differing from Calvinism, 401; on

original sin, 402; had he read Berkeley? 403; on the nature of virtue, 403 *sq.;* on God's chief end in creation, 406; on the work of redemption, 408; on "Religious Affections," *ib.;* sermons on justification, 409; on the atonement, *ib.*

Edwards, Jonathan, Jr., his doctrines, 412.

Eichhorn, 497.

Elipandus, Bishop of Toledo, 205.

Elkesaits, 50, 51.

Elvira, Council of, 171.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 433.

Emmons, Nathaniel, his doctrines, 413.

Encratites, the, 37.

"Encyclopædists," the, 493.

England, eighth-century culture in, 203; the Renaissance in, 268; the Reformation in, 310 *sq.;* its relation to the German Reformation, 311; theology in, in the 17th to the middle of the 18th century, 389 *sq.;* theology in the 19th century in, 446–491.

England, the Church of, its sympathy with the "Reformed" division of Protestantism, 310; the Articles of, *ib.;* its relation to foreign Protestant bodies, 315; rise of the Anglo-Catholic party in, 353; the Westminster Assembly for the reconstruction of, 358; Calvinism in, in the 18th century, 393; the Evangelical School in, 446 *sq.;* the Early Oriel School in, 450; the Oxford Movement in, 451 *sq.;* the Broad Church party in, 473 *sq.* See, also, "Episcopacy."

Enoch, the Book of, 27.

Ephesus, Council of, 195.

Ephraim of Edessa, 37.

Ephraïm Syrus, 131.

Epictetus, 31.

Epicureanism, 30.

Epigonus, 102.

Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis, 19, 101, 130, 145, 171, 172.

Episcopacy, in the Ignatian epistles, 36; rise of, 76 *sq.;* its governmental function, 77; the *Didache* on, *ib.;* acquires sacerdotal functions, 79: in England in the first age of the Reformation, 315, 316; Cranmer on, 315; in relation to the Thirty-nine Articles, *ib.;* Whitgift on, 353; advance of the *jure divino* theory of, in England, 355; Bishop Andrews on, *ib.;* Thorndike on, 356; in conflict with Puritanism, 357; abolished, *ib.;* first avowal in England of the *jure divino* theory of, *ib.;* Bishop Hall on, *ib.;* Laud on, 358; effect of the solemn League and Covenant on, 359; Falkland on, 363; Jeremy Taylor on, 365; Stillingfleet on, *ib.;* Coleridge on, 449; Whately on, 450; Dr. Arnold on, 451; Gore on, 468; Stanley on, 475. See "Bishops."

Episcopius, 338, 340, 341.

Erasmus, position and services of, 268; his controversy with Luther, 272; on church unity, 379.

Erskine, Thomas, 477.

Essenes, the, 48.

Eucharist, the term, 47. See "Lord's Supper."

Euchites, the, 202.

Eugene III., Pope, 226.

Eulogius, Bishop of Cæsarea, 194.

Eunomius of Cyzicus, 130, 142.

Eusebians, the, 139, 140, 142.

Eusebius of Cæsarea, 118, 119, 130, 135, 138, 141, 168, 170, 172.

Eusebius of Dorylæum, 155.

Eusebius of Emisa, 130.

Eusebius of Nicomedia, 135, 139.

Eutyches, 154, 155, 156.

Evangelical School, the, of the English Established Church, 446 *sq.*, 453.

Evagrius, 131.

Evolution, referred to in Paley, 389; as held by Spencer, 487; by Darwin, 488; consistent with Theism, 488, 545 *sq.*

Excommunication, 82, 266.

Extreme unction, the Schoolmen on, 255, 256, 260; Wyclif on, 266.

Ezra, the Fourth Book of, 27.

Fairbairn, A. M., 16, 22.

Faith, the Apostolic Fathers on, 43; Aquinas on, 249; explicit and implicit, *ib.;* according to Luther, 273 *sq.;* Calvin on the nature of, 299; Arminian view of its relation to justification, 340; its function, according to J. Edwards, 409; see "Faith and Knowledge."

Faith and knowledge, Clement of Alexandria on, 6; the Schoolmen on, *ib.;* Lessing and Hegel on, 7; true view of, *ib.;* Augustine on, 177; John Scotus on, 204; Anselm on, 216; Abelard on, 221; Bernard on, 225; Hugo of

St. Victor on, 226; William of Occam on, 233.
Falkland, Lord, 363.
Fall, the. See "Original Sin."
Fathers, the Apostolic, the term, 34; their place and value in the history of doctrine, 41; Baur respecting, *ib.;* their relation to the Canon, 41, 42; their doctrine of justification compared with the Pauline, 42, 43; traces of ascetic drift in, 44; on marriage, *ib.;* on the person of Christ, *ib.;* on baptism, 46; on the Lord's Supper, *ib.;* on the Second Advent, 47; on inspiration, 75; their method of interpretation, 76.
Fathers, the Greek, their practical motive, 129, 161; on the atonement, 161, 162; on the origin of the soul, 163; on the freedom of the will, 164; on Adam's sin, *ib.;* on the image and similitude of God, *ib.;* on regeneration, 165; on predestination, *ib.;* on faith and works, 166; on baptism, 167; on the Lord's Supper, 168.
Faustus, Bishop of Rhegium, 197.
Febronius, 536.
Federal theology, the, its doctrine of the Covenants, 347; effect of on the doctrine of original sin, 349; anticipated at the Council of Trent, 350; attacked by Jansenius, 351; set forth in the Westminster Confession, 359.
Felicissimus, 83.
Felix, Bishop of Urgellis, 205.
Fenélon, 336.
Fessler, 543.
Fichte, 407, 531.
"Filioque," inserted in the Nicene Creed, 147, 205.
Finney, Charles G., 417.
Fiske, John, 547.
Flacius, 295, 296.
Flavianus, 155.
Flint, Robert, 491.
Florence, Council of, 201, 255.
Florinus, letter of Irenæus to, 38.
Fonseca, 333.
Forbes, Bishop of Brechin, 465.
Forbes, John, of Corse, 20.
Form of Concord, 283; its origin and contents, 296.
Formula Consensus Helvetica, 345.
Forty-two Articles, the, reduced to thirty-nine, 313.
Fox, George, 378.
Francis of Assisi, 229, 230.
Franciscans, the order of, rise and characteristics of, 229, 230, 244, 263, 328.
Frankfort, Synod of, 205.
Fraser, A. C., on the relation of J. Edwards to Berkeley, 403.
Frebonius, 536.
Frederick III., the Elector Palatine, 292.
Freedom of the will. See "Will."
Freeman, James, 419.
Friedrich, Johann, 544.
Froude, Hurrell, 452, 458.
Fulbert, Bishop, 210.
Fulgentius of Numidia, 197.
Future state, the, Justin Martyr on, 67; the *Epistle to Diognet* on, 69; Irenæus on, 88; Clement of Alexandria on, 96; Origen on, 112, 170; Augustine on, 180; the Socinians on, 324; Whately on, 450; Maurice on, 474; Henry B. Wilson on, 476; Thomas Erskine on, 477; views of recent English theologians on, 479; Swedenborg on, 494; Schleiermacher on, 510; the German Mediating School on, 513; C. I. Nitzsch on, 516. See, also, "Annihilation of the Wicked," "Restorationism," and "Immortality."

Gale, Theophilus, 368.
Galen, 101.
Gallicanism, as defined in 1682, 336.
Gardiner, Thomas, 311, 312.
Garrisolius, 343.
Gaunilo, 217.
Gerbert, 209.
Geulincx, 382.
Gibbon, on Athanasius, 129, 140.
Gieseler, his History of Doctrine, 21; on the origin of the Clementine writings, 51; his classification of the Gnostic systems, 55.
Gilbert, Bishop of Poictiers, 226.
Gladstone, William E., 544.
"Gnesio-Lutherans," the, 295.
Gnosticism, its menace to Christianity, 51, 60; general character and spirit of, 51; historical conditions leading to, 52; sources of, *ib.;* main doctrinal interests of, and tenets, 53; allegorical method of, 54; traces of, in the New Testament, 55; classification of its systems, *ib.;* various types of, 56 *sq.;* its effect on doctrinal development, 60.

God, the attributes of, Philo on, 28; in later Stoicism, 31; Justin Martyr on, 62; Origen on, 106; Augustine on, 178; the Schoolmen on, 236; Spinoza on, 382; Jonathan Edwards on, 406; Channing on, 430; Schleiermacher on, 503; Ritschl on, 525.
God, the being of, Plato on, 30; the New Platonists on, 31; Irenæus on, 84; Clement of Alexandria on, 95; Monarchian view of, 98; Sabellius on, 103; Pseudo-Dionysius on, 173; Scotus on, 204, 236; Thomas Aquinas on, 235; the Mystics of the fourteenth century on, 264; the Socinian view of, 322; Matthew Arnold on, 480; Swedenborg on, 494; the Mediating School on, 513; Ritschl on, 525; Biedermann on, 534.
God, proofs of His being, Tertullian on, 90; the post-Nicene Fathers on, 124; Anselm on, 217; Aquinas on, 233, 235; Scotus on, 236; S. Clarke on, 371; Locke on, 374; Descartes on, 381; Hume's criticism of, 386; Coleridge on, 447; Sir W. Hamilton on, 484; Mansel on, 485; J. S. Mill on, 486; Spencer on, 487; Huxley on, 490; Kant on, 498; J. Müller on, 515.
God, His relation to the world, Philo on, 27, 28; the New Platonists on, 31; the Gnostics on, 53, 56–58; Marcion on, 58; Justin Martyr on, 63; Augustine on, 181, 184; Pelagius on, *ib.* See the three preceding titles.
Gomarus, 338.
Gore, Charles, 45, 78, 468.
Gorham case, the, 467.
Gottschalk, his career and doctrines, 206.
Gratian, 252.
Gray, Asa, 488,
"Great Awakening," the, 395.
Grebel, 319.
Gregory I., Bishop of Rome, 133, 168, 174, 198; II., 174; VII. (Hildebrand), 209, 210; IX., 229; XVI., 537.
Gregory, Bishop of Tours, 133.
Gregory of Nazianzum, his writings, 130; on the Trinity, 143; on the Holy Spirit, 144; instated at Constantinople, 145; on the person of Christ, 150; importance of the atonement in, 161; on the idea of a ransom to Satan, 163; 170, 171.
Gregory of Nyssa, his writings, 130; on the Trinity, 143 *sq.*; on the person of Christ, 150; on the idea of ransom to Satan, 163; on the Lord's Supper, 169, 170; a restorationist, 170; 171.
Grotius, Hugo, his theory (the governmental) of the atonement, 340; his efforts at reunion of the churches, 379.
Guitmund von Aversa, 211.
Guyon, Madame, 336.
Gwatkin, H. M., 134, 135.

Hades, the doctrine of, Irenæus on, 87; Tertullian on, 93; Clement of Alexandria on, 96; the Greek Fathers on, 170; descent of Christ into, Marcion on, 59; Irenæus on, 87; Tertullian on, 93; Clement of Alexandria on, 96; Calvin on, 309. See "Future State."
Hadrian, the Abbot, 203.
Hagenbach, 21.
Haggada, the, 26.
Hales, John, 363.
Hall, Bishop Joseph, 357.
Hamilton, Sir William, on the philosophy of religion, 4, 484 *sq.*
Hampden, Bishop, 137, 138, 456.
Hare, Julius Charles, 473.
Harnack, A., on the function and course of doctrinal history, 2; on the Mystic, 13; his divisions of doctrinal history, 17; on the influence of Greek culture on theology, 32; on the origin of the *Didache*, 35; on the date of the Ignatian epistles, 36; on the Clementine writings, 51; on the polity of the early Church, 78; on Hippolytus's interpretation of Theodotus, 101; on the generation of the Son, 109; on the work of Christ, in the Fathers, 128; on the Constantinopolitan Creed, 145; on the writings of Augustine, 180; on Socinianism, 325; *et passim.*
Harris, Samuel, 491.
Hatch, Edwin, on the influence of Greek culture on the clergy, 33; on the polity of the early Church, 78.
Hebrews, the Epistle to the, 121, 122, 279, 328.
Hefele, 124, 538.
Hegel, on faith and knowledge, 7; his relation to the Tübingen critical school, 14, 534; philosophy of, 532 *sq.*
Hegesippus, 42, 76, 79.
Heidelberg Catechism, 292, 339.

Hell, Tertullian on, 94; the Schoolmen on, 259. See "Future State."
Helvetius, 492.
Henry VIII., 310, 311.
Heraclitus, 31.
Heraclius, 158.
Herbert, Lord, of Cherbury, 372.
Herder, 500.
Heresy, defined, 9; its relation to schism, *ib.;* distinguished from defective knowledge and tentative hypotheses, 10; its place in doctrinal history, *ib.*
Hermas, the "Shepherd" of, 34; ascetic drift of, 44; on marriage, *ib.;* on the person of Christ, 45; on the Second Advent, 47.
Herrman, W., 529.
Hilary, Bishop of Arles, 196.
Hilary, Bishop of Poictiers, 131, 145, 157.
Hildebert, Archbishop of Tours, 211.
Hildebrand. See "Gregory VII."
Hincmar, 203, 206.
Hippo, Council of (A.D. 393), 122.
Hippolytus, 19, 38, 82, 100–102.
Hobbes, Thomas, 372, 373.
Hodge, Charles, 345, 444.
Hofmann, von, 523.
Holbach, Baron, 493.
Holy Spirit, the, in the formulation of doctrine, 11; the Apostolic Fathers on, 45; Justin Martyr on, 64; Irenæus on, 85; Clement of Alexandria on, 95; Origen on, 109; post-Nicene writers on, 144 *sq.;* the Constantinopolitan Creed on, 146; the Council of Toledo on, 147; Alcuin on, 205; Carlstadt and the radical reformers on the relation of, to the Word, 280; Calvin on the testimony of, to the divinity of the Bible, 299; the Socinian doctrine of, 323; the Creed of the Arminians on, 338; the Dort Creed on, 339; John Cameron on, 342; Pajon on, 346; the Quakers on, 378; Wesley on, 392; Rothe on, 518. See "Trinity."
Homœousians, 139. See "Trinity."
Honorius, the Emperor, 195.
Honorius, Bishop of Rome, 158, 200.
Hooker, Richard, 316, 353, 354, 361, 455.
Hopkins, Samuel, and the Hopkinsians, 411 *sq.*, 419.
Hosius, 135, 136.
Howe, John, 371.
Hubmaier, 319.
Hugo of St. Victor, on faith and knowledge, 226; on the atonement, *ib.;* on the number of the Sacraments, 254.
Humanism, the influence of, upon theological thought, 267 *sq.* See, also, "Revival of Learning."
Humbert, Cardinal, 210.
Hume, 4, 386, 486.
Huss, John, 267.
Hutcheson, Francis, 389.
Hutton, R. H., on Newman, 460, 462.
Huxley, T. H., his philosophical opinions, 488, 489 *sq.;* his partial recognition of ethical freedom, 545 *sq.*

Ialdabaoth, deity of the Ophites, 57.
Ibas, 151.
Iconoclastic controversy, the, 173 *sq.*
Iconodulists, the, 174.
Ignatius of Antioch, on the person of Christ, 45; on the Holy Spirit, 46; on baptism, *ib.;* on the Lord's Supper, 47; the term 'Catholic' in, 70.
Ignatius, the Epistles of, 35, 77.
Ignatius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 201.
Illuminism, the period of, in Germany, 494 *sq.*
Immaculate conception, doctrine of, 49, 56, 244, 518; made a dogma, 539.
Immortality, in the later Stoics, 31; Justin Martyr on, 67; Origen on, 164; Aquinas on, 239; Scotus on, *ib.;* the Socinians on, 324; Channing on, 431; Theodore Parker on, 434; Whately on, 450; views of recent English writers on, 479; Herder on, 501; Schleiermacher on, 509. See "Future Life."
Imputation, Calvin on, 302; Placæus on, 343; Stapfer on, 344; Jonathan Edwards on, *ib.;* the *Consensus Helvetica* on, 345; in the Federal theology, 349; in the Roman Catholic theology, 350; in the Westminster Confession, 359; discarded from the New England theology, 412; Henry B. Smith on, 418; in the "Princeton theology," 444. See "Original Sin."
Incarnation, the, in Philo, 28; the Epistle to Diognet on, 69; Irenæus on, 85; Origen on, 109; Novatian on, 113; Marcellus on, 141; Apollinaris on, 149; Gregory of Nyssa on, 150; Peter Lombard on, 228; Aquinas on, 237; Luther on, 278; Calvin on, 308; Canon

Gore on, 468; the Kenosis theory, and other recent discussions on, 514 *sq.*
Indulgences, origin of, 208; in relation to the doctrine of merits, 250, 259; in relation to purgatory, 260; Wyclif on, 266; Zwingli preaches against, 286; the Creed of Trent on, 331.
Infallibility of the Pope, William of Occam on, 233; Aquinas on, 252; Wyclif on, 266; Bellarmine on, 332, 333; Arnauld on, 335; the French clergy in the assembly of 1682 on, 336; made a dogma, 540 *sq.*
Innocent II., 223; III., 258, 259, 335.
Inspiration, the Apostolic Fathers on, 75; Nicene and post-Nicene views of, 122; Augustine on, 179; Agobard on, 203; Abelard on, 222; Aquinas on, 235; Luther on, 279 *sq.;* Calvin on, 299; Cappel on, 343; the *Consensus Helvetica* on, 345; the Protestant Scholastic view of, 347; Richard Baxter on, 362; Coleridge on, 448; Dr. Arnold on, 451; Canon Gore on, 468; Dr. Temple on, 476; Jowett on, *ib.;* Herder on, 501; the Mediating School of Germany on, 513; Rothe on, 517; Kaftan on, 529.
Irenæus, an authority in doctrinal history, 19; his career, 37; his character and writings, 38; on inspiration, 75; on bishops, 79; on the primacy of the Roman Church, 80; his theological spirit, 84; on the being of God, *ib.;* on creation, 85; on sin, *ib.;* on the person of Christ, *ib.;* on the Holy Spirit, *ib.;* on the incarnation, *ib.;* on the work of Christ, 86; on baptism, 87; on the Lord's Supper, *ib.;* on Hades, 87; on the millennium, *ib.;* on the future state, 88; his ethical conception of the gospel, 88; two phases of doctrine in, *ib.;* his practical aim, 89.
Isidore of Seville, 20, 203.

Jacobi, 501.
Jacobite Church, the, rise of, 156.
James I. of England, 356.
James, the Epistle of, received as canonical, 121; Luther on, 279.
Jansenius and Jansenism, 334 *sq.*, 351.
Jerome, on the Ebionites, 49; on the identity of bishop and presbyter, 77; his career and writings, 131; the translator of the Vulgate, 132; renounces allegiance to Origen, 171, 172; Augustine's letter to, on the origin of souls, 187; attacks the Pelagian doctrine, 194; his disagreement with Augustine, 196.
Jesuits, their theology and ethics, 332 *sq.;* their decline and revival, 537.
Jesus, the synoptist's view of, 24; in Alexandrian Gnosticism, 57; in Marcion, 59. See "Christ."
Jewish commentaries, 26.
Joachim of Floris, 227.
John, the apostle, his abode at Ephesus, 25; his authorship of the fourth gospel, 25 *sq.;* the incarnation in the teaching of, 26.
John, the Epistles of, the genuineness of, 25; conception of Christ in, 26; trace of Gnosticism in, 55; received as canonical, 121.
John, the Gospel of, its genuineness, 25; conception of Christ in, 26; Justin's acquaintance with, 63; the Monarchians on, 100, 101; Luther on, 279; Matthew Arnold on, 484; Ritschl on, 525; Kaftan on, 529; Baur on, 534.
John à Lasco, 313.
John, Bishop of Antioch, 153, 154.
John the Baptist, 23, 24.
John of Damascus, 19; on the person of Christ, 159; on the Trinity, 160; on the Lord's Supper, 169; summary of his doctrines, 174.
John of Fidanza. See "Bonaventura."
John Philoponus, 133.
John of Salisbury, 228.
John Scotus. See "Scotus."
Joseph II., Emperor, 536.
Jouffroy, 485.
Jowett, Benjamin, 476.
Judaism, Alexandrian, spirit and tenets of, 27 *sq.;* its relation to Gnosticism, 52.
Judaism within and without Palestine, 26 *sq.*
Jude, the Epistle of, traces of Gnosticism in, 55; received as canonical, 121.
Julian, the Apostate, 117.
Julian, Bishop of Eclanam, 183, 186, 191, 195.
"Julianists," the, 157.
Julius, Bishop of Rome (A.D. 337-352), 140, 141; III., 326.
Jurieu, 347.

Justification, the Apostolic Fathers on, 42 *sq.;* patristic compared with the Pauline view of, 43; Aquinas and the Schoolmen on, 249, 250, 256; Luther on, 273; the Ten Articles (1536) on, 310; the Creed of Trent on, 329; the Arminians on, 340; Edwards on, 409; Emmons on, 414; Swedenborg on. 493; Schleiermacher on, 508; the Mediating School on, 513; Ritschl on, 526; Kaftan on, 529.
Justin I., 156.
Justin Martyr, his training and writings, 37; on the Ebionites, 48, 49; his conception of Christianity, 61; on the heathen philosophers, 62; on the work of Christ, *ib.;* his twofold conception of God, *ib.;* on the Logos, *ib.;* on the person of Christ, 63, 65; on the Holy Spirit, 64; on the place of angels, 65; on creation, 66; on the freedom of the will, *ib.;* on the atonement, *ib.;* on the Second Advent, 67; on immortality and the future state, *ib.;* on the Church, *ib.;* on regeneration, 68; on baptism, *ib.;* on the Lord's Supper, *ib.*
Justinian, the Emperor, 156, 157, 171.

Kaftan, his system, 528, 529.
Kant, his system and influence, 4, 497 *sq.*, 528.
Kattenbusch, 71, 524.
Keble, John, 452.
Knowledge and faith. See "Faith," "Faith and Knowledge."

Lacordaire, 537.
Lambert, Francis, 312.
Lambeth Articles, 315.
Lamennais, 537.
Lanfranc, 210.
Laodicea, Council of, 72, 121, 124.
Laodiceans, Epistle to the, 202.
La Place (Placæus), 343.
Lardner, Nathaniel, 376, 389.
Lateran Council, the Fourth, 227, 257, 259; the Fifth, 240, 268.
Latitudinarians, their rise, 366; Bishop Burnet on their leading representatives, *ib.;* their distinctive traits, 368; Tulloch on their defects, *ib.;* their work, 369.
Laud, Archbishop, 357, 358.
Laurentius Valla, 268.
Law, William, 390.
Leibnitz, 380, 383.
Leipsic, disputation at, 270.
Leipsic Interim, the, 295.
Lenfant, 347.
Leo I., Pope, 124, 132, 155; II., 158; IX., 201, 210, 240.
Leo III., Emperor, 174; V., 174; VI., 202.
Leontius of Byzantium, 157.
Lessing, his opinions, 7, 495.
Liberal Evangelical School, the, of Germany, 512 *sq.* See "Mediating theology."
Liberius, Roman Bishop, 143.
Liddon, Canon, 452, 467.
Lightfoot, Bishop J. B., on the date of the Ignatian Epistles, 36; on authorship among the Fathers, 41; on the theory of dissenting parties in the Apostolic age, 42; on the identity of bishop and presbyter in the church at Philippi, 77; on the precedence of the prophetic order in the first century, 80.
Liguori, Alfonso da, 538.
Limborch, 340.
Limbus infantum, 259; *patrum*, *ib.*
Lipsius, 523.
Locke, John, 374, 384, 397 *sq.*, 403.
Logos, the doctrine of, in the prologue of the fourth gospel, 26; Philo on, 28; the Stoics on, 31; Justin Martyr on, 63 *sq.;* Tatian on, 64; Theophilus on, *ib.;* Irenæus on, 85; Tertullian on, 91; Clement of Alexandria on, 94, 95; Paul of Samosata on, 104; Origen on, 107; Methodius on, 116; the Arians on, 134, 148; Marcellus on, 140; Photinus on, 141; Apollinaris on, 149. See "Christ."
Lombard, Peter, on the atonement, 227; on the incarnation, 228; on the image and similitude of God, 240; on Adam's sin, 241; on the nature and number of sacraments, 254; on the effect of baptism, 256; on the Lord's Supper, 257; on ordination, 261.
Lombards, the, 200.
Longland, 267.
Long Parliament, 357, 358.
Loofs, 21; *et passim.*
Lord's Day, the, the early Fathers on, 361; the Reformers on, *ib.;* the Synod of Dort on, *ib.;* Andrews and Hooker

on, *ib.;* the Puritan opinions on, 361 *sq.;* Whately on, 450.

Lord's Supper, its connection with the Agape, 46; the Apostolic Fathers on, *ib.;* Justin Martyr on, 68; Irenæus on, 87; Clement of Alexandria on, 96; Origen on, 112; the Greek Fathers on, 168 *sq.;* Augustine on, 181; Gregory I. on, 198; Radbert on, 207; Ratramnus on, *ib.;* Berengarius on, 210; Lanfranc on, *ib.;* Anselm on, 211; Guitmund von Aversa on, *ib.;* the Schoolmen generally on, 255, 257; Pope Innocent III.'s proscription concerning, 258; Luther on, 271; the Lutherans on, 281, 288; Zwingli on, 286, 289; Carlstadt and the radical Reformers on, 288; the Marburg Articles on, 289; Calvin on, 291, 306, 316; Cranmer on, 313; Schwenkfeld on, 318; the Council of Trent on, 330; Hooker on, 354; Bishop Andrews on, 355; Thorndike on, 356; Archbishop Laud on, 358; R. W. Emerson on, 433; the Oxford School on, 454, 458, 463–467; Dean Stanley on, 474.

Louis XIV., 536.

Louis of Bavaria, 233.

Lucian, 134.

Lucidus, 197.

Luthardt, 523, 527.

Luther, Martin, his gradual perception of the freedom of forgiveness, 269; the doctrine of his theses, 270; his disputation at Leipsic, *ib.;* his three treatises of 1520, 270, 271; on the priesthood of all believers, 270; on orders and ordination, 270, 271; on the Lord's Supper, 271, 281, 283, 288; on baptism, 271, 281; on confession, 271; on justification, 271, 273 *sq.;* his controversy with Erasmus, 272; the author of the Smalcald Articles, 273; two defining characteristics of his theology, *ib.;* his definition of justifying faith, *ib.;* his doctrine of assurance, 274; on the relation of faith and works, 275; his doctrine of justification forensic, *ib.;* on the atonement, 276 *sq.;* on the incarnation, 278; on the authority of the Scriptures, *ib.;* on the Canon and inspiration, 279 *sq.;* on the "Word of God," 280; on the relation of the Word to the Spirit, *ib.;* his conservatism, 283; on the Church as an authority in doctrine, *ib.;* on predestination, 284, 292; compared with Zwingli, 285, 286; in the Eucharistic controversy, 288; points of Melanchthon's dissent from, 291; Calvin's relation to, 298–309.

Lutheran Reformers, two characteristics of their theology, 273; on the doctrine of assurance, 274; on the relation of faith and works, *ib.;* on the Sacraments, 280; on the person of Christ, 281; on the Church, *ib.;* on the ministry as related to the Word and Sacraments, 282; on original sin, *ib.;* their system differentiated from Calvinism, 300. See "Luther, Martin."

Macedonians, the, 145.

Macedonius, Bishop of Constantinople, 145.

Mackintosh, Sir James, 373.

"Magdebury Centuries," the, 20.

Magistracy, the civil, the Westminster Confession on, 360; the Reformers on, *ib.* See "Church and State."

Mahan, Asa, 417.

Maimonides, Moses, 213.

Major, George, and the Majoristic controversy, 294, 295.

Malebranche, 382.

Mandæans, 127.

Mani, 127.

Manichæism, its rise, doctrines, and spread, 127.

Manning, Cardinal, 467.

Mansel, H. L., 5, 485.

Marburg, Conference of, 289.

Marcellus of Ancyra, 140, 141.

Marcianus, 155.

Marcion, his temper and doctrines, 58; his canon, 59, 74; spread of his system, 59.

Marcus Aurelius, 31.

Marius Mercator, 195.

Maronites, the, 159.

Marriage, pronounced a sacrament by the Schoolmen, 255, 261; Aquinas on, 261; the Creed of Trent on, 331. See, also, "Celibacy of the Clergy."

Marsilius Ficinus, 235.

Martin I., Bishop of Rome, 158.

Martineau, James, 491.

Martyr, Peter, 312.

Martyrs, veneration of, 172.

Mary, the mother of Jesus, 150, 152, 155, 159; the worship of, 172, 244, 263, 486, 540.
Mather, Cotton, 419.
Maurice, Duke of Saxony, 295.
Maurice, Frederick Denison, 473.
Maxentius, 157.
Maximilla, 82.
Maximus, 158, 159.
Maximus, the Confessor, 173, 204.
Mayhew, Jonathan, 419.
Mead, Charles M., 524, 527.
"Mediating Theology," the, of Germany, 512 *sq.*
Meier, 138.
Melanchthon, his works, 272; presents the Augsburg Confession, 273; on the relation of faith and works, 274; on the Church, 282; on original sin, *ib.;* points of dissent from Luther, 291; his change of opinion on the Lord's Supper, *ib.;* personal traits, 292, 294; his adoption of Synergism, 293; on the necessity of good works, *ib.;* at the colloquy of Ratisbon, 326; on the civil magistracy, 360; on the Lord's Day, 361.
Melchisedekians, the, 101.
Meletius of Antioch, 143–146.
Melito, Bishop of Sardis, 36; materials for doctrinal history in, 89.
Memnon, 153, 154.
Menander, 56.
Mennas, epistle to, 171.
Menno Simons and the Mennonites, 319.
Merit, the doctrine of, Augustine on, 180; Alexander of Hales on, 250; the Schoolmen on, 259; Wyclif on, 266.
Messiah, prevalent Jewish conception of, 27.
Mestrezat, 345.
Methodist revival, 390; its relation to the Evangelical School of the Established Church, 446.
Methodius, Bishop of Patara, his teachings in opposition to Origen, 115, 170; on sin, 164.
Michael Cærularius, 201.
Milan, Synod of, 142.
Mill, J. S., his philosophy, 6, 486.
Millennial reign of Christ, the doctrine of, in Irenæus, 84, 87; in Tertullian, 93; rejected by Clement of Alexandria, 97; in Origen, 112; introduced among the Anabaptists, 319.
Miltiades, the rhetorician, 36, 75.
Minucius Felix, 37.
Miracles, Aquinas on, 235; prominence of the proof from, in the Arminian system, 340; Woolston on, 373, 377; Hume on, 387; Parker on, 434; Channing on, 435; Matthew Arnold on, 483; Huxley on, 490; Lessing on, 496; Kant on, 499; Wegscheider on, 500; Schleiermacher on, 508; the German Mediating School on, 513; Rothe on, 517; Ritschl on, 525; Strauss on, 533.
Mitchell, A. F., 348, 360.
"Modalists," the, 99, 102, 103.
Möhler, 14, 538.
Molina and the Molinists, 333.
Molinos, 336.
Möller, W., 135, 159, 327.
Monarchianism, on the being of God, 98; two types of, *ib.;* vanquished by Origen, 104.
Monasticism, 172.
Monophysites, the, and the Monophysite controversy, 156 *sq.*
Monothelite controversy, the, 158.
Montalembert, 537.
Montanism, its rise, 81; its teachings and practices, 82; its spread and influence, *ib.*
Montanus, 81.
Montauban, the school of, 343, 345.
"Moralism," in the Apostolic Fathers, 42, 43; in the Apologists, 61; in Irenæus, 88; in Tertullian, 92; in Pelagius, 183; in the Schoolmen, 251; in Arminianism, 340.
Moravians, the, 495.
More, Hannah, 446.
More, Henry, 368, 374.
More, Thomas, 268.
Morgan, Thomas, 377.
Mosheim, 20.
Mozarabic Liturgy, the, 205.
Mozley, J. B., on Newman, 16, 459; on the Lord's Supper, 466; his career and writings, 469; on mysterious truths, 470; on the progressive character of Old Testament revelation, 471; on the atonement, *ib.*
Müller, Julius, 21; on the origin of the belief in God, 515; on the ground and cause of sin, *ib.*
Münscher, 16, 20.
Münzer, Thomas, 318.
Muratorian Fragment, the, 74.

Murray, John, 436.
Mysteries, the Greek, their influence on Christian usages, 32, 166, 172.
Mysticism, the nature of, 11; kinds of, *ib.;* point of similarity to rationalism, 13; revived and systematized by the Schoolmen, 230; in the fourteenth century, 264; in the wake of the Reformation, 317; its development in the form of Quietism, 336; in Thomas More, 368; in the Quakers, 378.
Mystics, the, of the fourteenth century, their theology, 264.

Naassenes, the, 57.
Nazarenes, 48. See "Ebionites."
Neander, 16, 17, 21; his classification of the Gnostic systems, 55; on Justin's idea of the Holy Ghost, 65; on Augustine's Realism, 185; on the eschatology of Paul, 516.
Nestorians, the, their separation from the Greek Church, 154.
Nestorius and the Nestorian controversy, 151 *sq.*
"New England theology," 410–418; influence of, in England, 418; in the United States, *ib.*, 445.
New Platonism, 31, 173, 177, 204.
Newman, J. H., his theory of development, 14 *sq.*, 459; on the term 'consubstantial,' 32; his program of doctrine for the Oxford School, 454; on Apostolic succession, 455; his influence on the Oxford Movement, 457; his tract on the Thirty-nine Articles, *ib.;* his conversion and its effect, 458 *sq.;* explanation of his career, 460 *sq.*
Nicæa, Council of, convoked, 136; parties represented at, 138; its doctrinal work, 139; the Second Council of, 174, 200.
Nicene Creed, its formation, 138 *sq.;* how changed in the Constantinopolitan, 146; addition of "filioque" to, 147; adopted in Lutheran creeds, 283. See "Nicæa, Council of."
Nicholas I., Pope, 201.
Nicholas von Amsdorf, 294.
Nicole, 334.
Niedner, his classification of the Gnostic systems, 55.
Nitzsch, Carl Immanuel, 12, 515.
Nitzsch, Friedrich, 17, 21.
Noetus, 102, 103.
Nominalism, 213, 214, 216, 233, 262.
Norris, John, 368.
Norton, Andrews, 420, 421.
Novatian and the Novatians, 83, 113.

"Oberlin Theology," the, 417.
Occam, William of, 5, 257, 262.
"Occasionalists," the, 382.
Ochino Bernardino, 312.
Octavius, 37.
Œcolampadius, 291.
"Old Catholic" Movement, the, 544.
"Old School" Presbyterians, the, 418.
Olevianus, 292.
Ophites, the, 57.
Optatus of Milevis, 180.
Orange, Council and Creed of, 197.
Orders and ordination, the Schoolmen on, 255, 261; Wyclif on, 266; Luther on, 270, 271; Hooker on, 316, 354; the Creed of Trent on, 330, 331; the Quakers on, 379.
Oriel School, the Early, its representatives and theology, 450, 451.
Origen, his training and career, 40; his writings, *ib.*, 104; on inspiration, 75; his spirit and aim, 105; a scriptural theologian, *ib.;* his allegorical method, *ib.;* his doctrine of reserve, 106; on the attributes of God, *ib.;* on the freedom of the will, 107, 116; on creation, 107; on the Logos, 107, 148; on the relation of the Son to the Father, 107; on the person of Christ, 107, 109, 148; on the Incarnation, 109; on the Holy Spirit, *ib.;* on the preëxistence and fall of men, 109, 163; on the design of the world, 110; on divine justice, *ib.;* on Providence, 111; on the work of Christ, *ib.;* on the future state, 112, 170; on baptism, 112; on the Lord's Supper, 112, 168; on the Resurrection, 112; his teaching and influence, 113, 116, 119; dissent from, in the East, 115, 128, 170; the crusade against, and its issue, 171.
Original sin, the doctrine of, Clement of Alexandria on, 96; the Greek Fathers on, 164; Augustine on, 184 *sq.;* Ambrose on, 187; Pelagius on, 190; John Cassian on, 196; Anselm on, 217 *sq.;* Abelard on, 222; Aquinas on, 240, 242 *sq.;* Scotus on, 241; Peter Lombard on, *ib.;* the Lutheran Reformers on, 282; the Form of Concord on, 283; Zwingli on, 288; Flavius on,

296; Calvin on, 301, 302; the Socinians on, 325; the Creed of Trent on, 328; the Dort Creed on, 339; the Arminians on, 340; Placæus on, 343; the Federal theology on, 349; the Federal theory of, anticipated by Catharinus, 350; Dominicus Soto on, 351; Bellarmine on, *ib.;* Jansenius on, 352; Hooker on, 354; the Westminster Confession on, 359; Richard Baxter on, 362; Locke on, 374; the Quakers on, 379; the Wesleyan doctrine of, 392; Jonathan Edwards on, 402; Bellamy on, 411; Hopkins on, *ib.;* imputation discarded from, in the New England theology, 412; Jonathan Edwards, Jr., on, *ib.;* Emmons on, 413; President Dwight on, 414; Taylor on, 415; Park on, 417; Henry B. Smith on, 418; Charles Hodge (the Princeton theology) on, 444; Coleridge on, 448; Mozley on, 470; Schleiermacher on, 504; Dorner on, 514; Rothe on, 518; Ritschl on, 527.
Orosius, 194.
Orr, James, 479, 530.
Osiander, Andrew, and the Osiandrian controversy, 295.
Otto, 99.
Owen, John, 350, 362, 371.
Oxford Movement, the, 452–472; sources of information concerning, and leaders, 451, 452; contrasted with the Wesleyan movement, 452; occasion of its rise, *ib.;* its general character and principles, 453 *sq.;* on the doctrine of the Sacraments, 454, 456, 463–467; its particular aim, 455; its propaganda through the Tracts, *ib.;* the Hampden controversy, 456; the *Library of the Fathers* projected, *ib.;* progress of, 457; the secession of Newman, 458 *sq.;* Pusey assumes leadership of, 462.

Pachomius, 171.
Pajon, Claude, and Pajonism, 346.
Paley, William, 388, 389.
Pallivicini, 327.
Palmer, William, 452.
Pamphilus, 170.
Pantænus, 39.
Pantheism, has roots in Plato's theory of ideas, 30; in John Scotus, 204; combated by the Schoolmen, 213; of Spinoza, 382; of Matthew Arnold, 480; of Schleiermacher, 510; modern German schools of, 513 *sq.;* seen to be a half-truth, 546.
Papacy, the, its growth, 251 *sq.;* its prerogatives in the Middle Ages, 252; so-called "Reformers" before the Reformation concerning, 263 *sq.;* Luther on, 270 *sq.;* Erasmus on, 272; Melanchthon on, 282; Calvin on, 304; Servetus on, 321; and the Council of Trent, 326–332; how regarded by the Jesuits, 332; Bishop Andrews on, 355; in the eighteenth century, 536 *sq.;* and the Vatican Council, 539 *sq.*
Papias, 27, 36, 47.
Park, Edwards A., 417.
Parker, Theodore, 422, 433 *sq.*
Pascal, Blaise, 335.
Paschasius Radbert, 203, 207, 208.
Patripassianism, 99, 102.
Paul, the Apostle, his training, 8; his epistles on the person of Christ, 25; relation to Peter, 41; compared with the Apostolic Fathers on justification, 43; attitude of the Ebionites towards, 49, 50; quoted to defend Gnosticism, 54; his eschatology, 516.
Paul, III., Pope, 326; IV., 327, 333.
Paul of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch, 103 *sq.*, 115.
Paulicians, their origin and doctrines, 202.
Paulinus, 146.
Paulus, 158, 500.
Pelagian controversy, the, 183 *sq.;* in the East, 194.
Pelagius, his career and personal qualities, 183, 194; his point of view compared with Augustine, 183; on the relation of God to the world, 184; on human freedom, *ib.;* on Adam's sin, 190; his writings, *ib., note;* his conception of the nature of character, *ib.;* on the privileges of the baptized, 191; on grace, *ib.;* attacked in the East, and condemned, 194, 195. See "Pelagian controversy."
Penance, Gregory I. on, 198; rise and growth of the system of, in the Western Church, 208; recognized as a sacrament by the Schoolmen, 255, 256; modification of, in the Middle Ages, 258; three elements of, and the relation of the priest thereto, *ib.;* Luther's thesis on, 270; Zwingli on, 287; the

Creed of Trent on, 330, 331; the Jesuits on, 333; Hooker on, 354; Pusey's defence of, 466.
Penn, William, 378.
Pentateuch, the, the rise of the modern criticism of, 497.
Peratæ, the, 57.
Percival, Henry R., 465.
Perfection, the Wesleyan doctrine of, 392; Oberlin view of, 417.
Perseverance, Augustine on, 192; Calvin's doctrine of, 302; Arminian doctrine of, 338; doctrine of the Synod of Dort on, 339; the Council of Trent on, 330.
Peshito, the, 74.
Petavius, 20, 138.
Peter, the Apostle, his relations with Paul, 41; the episcopal precedence of, 80; the Schoolmen on the primacy of, 252; the Epistles of, received as canonical, 121; Luther on, 279; apocryphal Gospel of, 74.
Peter, Archbishop of Alexandria, 116.
Peter, Abbot of Cluny, 223.
Petrarch, 267.
Pfleiderer, Otto, 534.
Philippi, 523.
Philippians, the, Polycarp's Epistle to, 36.
Philippists, the, 295.
Philippopolis, Council of, 141.
Philo, the sources of his system, 27; dualism in, *ib.;* his doctrines, 28 *sq.;* forerunner of New Platonism, 31.
Philosophy, contrasted with Christianity, 1; relation of, to theology, 7, 213; set free from subjection to the Church, 19, 381; influence of Greek, on doctrine, 29 *sq.;* after Plato and Aristotle, 30; in the second period, 126; in the Scholastic period, 213. See Table of Contents.
Photinus of Sirmium, 140, 142.
Photius, 201, 202.
Pictures and images in the churches, 171, 172, 174, 200, 203, 263, 287, 310, 331. See, also, "Iconoclastic Controversy."
Pietism, 494.
Pighius, Albert, 337.
Pilgrim Fathers, the, 394.
Pius IV., 332; V., 332, 333; VII., 537; IX., 538 *sq.*
Placæus (La Place), his doctrine of imputation, 343.

Plato, his doctrine of ideas, 30; on the being of God, *ib.;* on the soul and redemption, *ib.;* his influence on Justin Martyr, 63; on the Schoolmen, 213, 214; on the Latitudinarians, 366.
Plotinus, 31.
Plutarch, 29.
"Pneumatomachians," the, 145.
Polycarp, 36, 37, 41, 45; the martyrdom of, 37.
Porphyry, 118, 214.
Port Royalists, the, 334.
Positivism, 486.
Possessor, 197.
Pothinus, 37.
Powell, Baden, 476.
Praxeas, 102, 103.
Prayer-book, the, of Edward VI., 314.
Predestination, Origen on, 111; the Greek Fathers on, 165; earlier and later views of Augustine on, 191 *sq.;* John Cassian on, 196; the Gottschalk controversy on, 206; John Scotus on the term, *ib.;* Luther on, 284, 292; Zwingli on, 287; Calvin on, 299 *sq.;* the Thirty-nine Articles on, 314; the Creed of Trent on, 330; the *scientia media* theory of Molina concerning, 333; the Arminians on, 337, 338; the Dort Creed on, 339; Amyraut on, 343; J. Wesley on, 391; in Protestant Scholasticism, 347; Hooker on, 354; the Westminster Confession on, 359; Richard Baxter on, 362; Edwards on, 401; Canon Mozley on, 470.
Presbyterians, the English, influence of their *jure divino* claim on Episcopacy, 316, 355; in the Westminster Assembly, 358.
Price, Richard, 389.
Princeton theology, 444.
Prisca, 82.
Probabilism, the doctrine of, held by the Jesuits, 334, 538.
Prosper of Aquitaine, 132, 196.
Providence, Origen on, 111; Augustine on, 181; the Thomists and Scotists on, 238. See, also, "God, relation of to the world."
Prudentius, 207.
Pseudo-Clementine writings, the. See "Clementine Writings."
Pseudo-Dionysius, 126, 167, 173, 204, 213.
Pseudo-Isidorian decretals, 251.

Pulleyn, Robert, 227.
Purgatory, Augustine on, 183; Gregory I. on, 198; Scholastic doctrines of, 259; relation of indulgences to, 260; Luther's thesis on, 270; Zwingli on, 287; the Ten Articles (1536) on, 310; the Creed of Trent on, 331.
Puritans, rise of the, 356; their aim, 356, 357; their view of the Lord's Day, 361.
Pusey, Edward B., on the seat of authority, 454; becomes leader of the Oxford Movement, 462: his personal traits, 463; on the Eucharist, *ib.;* his doctrine of the Eucharist, compared with the Lutheran and Calvinistic, 464.

Quadratus, 36.
Quakers, the tenets of, 378.
Quesnel, 335.
Quietism in the Roman Catholic Church, 336.

Rabanus Maurus, 203, 206, 207.
Rabulas, 154.
Racovian Catechism, the, 321.
"Rational Theology" in England, 362.
Rationalism, and the Scriptures, 12; general spirit of, 12, 13, 19; in Abelard, 222; of the Socinians, 322; in Germany, 494 *sq.*
Ratisbon, Colloquy at, 326.
Ratramnus, 203, 207.
Realism, in Augustine, 185; its later prevalence, *ib.;* conjoined with creationism in early theologians, 187; two main forms of, 214; of Anselm, 217; of Scotus, 232; opposed by Durandus, 233; 216, 224.
Reason, in the formulation of doctrine, 11; Clement of Alexandria on, 94; Bernard of Clairvaux on, 225; the Schoolmen on, 212; Abelard on, 221; the Socinians on, 322; place of, in the "Rational Theology," 363, 366; Falkland on, 363; John Toland on, 375; Anthony Collins on, 376; Coleridge on, 447; Lessing on, 495; Kant's definition of, 497; Herder on, 500; Jacobi on, 501.
Recared, King of Spain, 147.
Redemption, central truth of Christianity, 4; Plato on, 30; the Gnostics on, 57, 58, 60; Marcion on, 59; Justin Martyr on, 62; Irenaeus on, 86; Clement of Alexandria on, 95; in Manichæism, 127; Athanasius on, 136; the Antiochians on, 151. See "Christ," *et passim.*
Reformed Church, 292, 347, 350.
Regeneration, Justin Martyr on, 68; Irenæus on, 87; Tertullian on, 93: Clement of Alexandria on, 96; the Greek Fathers generally on, 165; the Mystics of the fourteenth century on, 265; Pajonistic view of, 346; Wesley on, 392; the younger Edwards's definition of, 412; President Dwight on, 414; Henry B. Smith on, 418; Coleridge on, 449; the Oxford Tracts on, 456; Schleiermacher on, 508.
Regensburg, Synod of, 205.
Regulæ fidei, 71, 72, 76.
Reid, Thomas, 385, 387.
Reimarus, 496.
Reinhard, 500.
Remigius, 207.
Renaissance. See "Revival of Learning."
Renan, 21.
Reserve, the doctrine of, in Clement of Alexandria, 96; in Origen, 106; tract of Isaac Williams on, 457.
Restorationism, Origen on, 112; rejection of his opinion, 170; as held by American Universalists, 437; held by Thomas Erskine, 477; held by Schleiermacher, 510; position of the Mediating School respecting, 516.
Resurrection, Justin Martyr on, 67; Clement of Alexandria on, 97; Origen on, 112; Augustine on, 182.
Reuchlin, John, 268.
Reuter, 193.
Revelation, the Nicene and post-Nicene writers on, 124; Thomas Aquinas on, 234; Jeremy Taylor on, 365; the Deists' method of treating, 373; the Latitudinarians on, 374; Locke on the need of, 375; the attitude of Rationalism toward, 494; Lessing on, 495; Rothe on, 517; Herrman on, 530.
Revelation, the Book of, traces of Gnosticism in, 55; concerning its canonicity, 121: Dionysius of Alexandria on, 114; Zwingli on, 287.
Revival of Learning, the, effect of, on theological thought, 18 *sq.*, 267 *sq.*
Rheims, school at, 210; Council of, 226.
Rice, W. N., on the theological opinion of men of science, 489.

Richard of St. Victor, 226, 230.
Ridgley, 393.
Ridley, Bp., 312, 313.
Rimini, Council of, 143.
Ripley, George, 433.
Ritschl, A., 13, 17, 21; his system, 524-527.
Ritschlian School, the, 527-530.
Robber Synod, the, 155.
Röhr, 500.
Roman Catechism, the, 332.
Roman Catholic theology, the later, 536 *sq.*
Romaine, William, 446.
Romanes, G. J., his advance from skepticism to Christian Theism, 546.
Rome, see of, 80, 120, 126, 128; Synod at, 140, 210.
Roscellin, 217.
Rothe, Richard, his system, 516-522.
Rousseau, 493.
Royer-Collard, 485.
Rufinus, 132, 171.
Ruysbroek, 264.

Sabellianism, 99; its conception of the Trinity, 103, 137.
Sabellius, 102, 103.
Sacramentalism, characteristic of the Oxford Movement, 454 *sq.;* and its opposite in recent times, 549.
Sacraments, the, Irenæus on, 87; Origen on, 112; the Latin view of, 166; influence of the heathen mysteries on, 167; Pseudo-Dionysius's list of, *ib.;* the doctrine of the Greek Fathers on, *ib.;* Augustine on, 181, 183, 193; Gregory I. on, 198; Hugo of St. Victor on, 254; Peter Lombard on, *ib.;* Abelard on, *ib.;* Aquinas on the nature and need of, *ib.;* on the number and function of, 255; Aquinas on the indelible character of three of, *ib.;* Duns Scotus on, *ib.;* Durandus on, *ib.;* Aquinas on the *ex opere operato* effect of, *ib.;* the Mystics of the fourteenth century on, 264; Wyclif's view of, 266; Luther on, 271; the Augsburg Confession on, 280; Zwingli on, 288, 289; Calvin on, 305; the Ten Articles (1536) on, 311; the "Bishop's Book" on, *ib.;* the Creed of Trent on, 330; Hooker on, 354; the Quakers on, 379; the Oxford Declaration on, 454; the Tracts on, 456. See, also, the several Sacraments.
Sardica, Council of, 141.
Sarpi, Father Paul, 327, 350.
Satan, the Gnostic conception of, 56, 57, 59; in Manichæism, 127; Christ a ransom to, Origen on, 111; the Greek Fathers on, 162, 163; Augustine on, 180; Abelard on, 223; Bernard of Clairvaux on, 225; Peter Lombard on, 227.
Saturninus, his system, 56.
Saumur, the school of, 342 *sq.*
Savonarola, 265.
Savonières, Synod of, 207.
Savoy Confession, the, 394.
Schelling, his philosophy, 531.
Schleiermacher, Frederic, his influence on New England Unitarianism, 432 *sq.;* on Bushnell, 439; his personal qualities, 502; on the principle and scope of dogmatic theology, *ib. sq.;* on the, attributes of God, 503; on sin, 504; on the person and work of Christ, *ib. sq.;* on the atonement, 507; on the regenerate life, 508; on miracles, *ib.;* on the Second Advent, 509; on the Church, *ib.;* on prayer, *ib.;* his eschatological views, *ib.;* on the divine government, 510; on the Trinity, *ib.;* his system characterized, *ib.;* his influence, 512.
Scholasticism, characteristics and maxim of, 212; rival tendencies in, 213; its principal philosophical problem, *ib.;* in the universities, 214; method of, 215; divisions of the era of, 216; prominence of Mysticism in, 230; influence of Scotus on, 232; influence of the Revival of Learning on, 267; in later Protestant theology, 347.
Schoolmen, the, on faith and knowledge, 6, 212; defects in their method, 212; influence of Plato and Aristotle among, 213; Nominalists and Realists, *ib.;* Dominicans and Franciscans, 214; Baur on, 215; subjects and methods of their speculation, *ib.;* Mysticism in, 230; their apologetics, 235; on the attributes of God, 236; on creation, 237; on the origin of the soul, 239; on the image and similitude of God, 240; on Adam's sin, 240 *sq.;* on the immaculate conception, 244; on divine and human agency in conversion, 248; on justification, 249, 250; on explicit and implicit faith, 249; on papal infallibility and prerogatives,

252; on the nature, number, and function of Sacraments, 254 *sq.;* on baptism, 256; on confirmation, *ib.;* on the Lord's Supper, *ib.;* on penance, 258; on the five abodes of the invisible world, 259; on extreme unction, 260; on ordination, 261; on marriage, *ib.;* relation of, to Augustine, 262. See "Scholasticism."
Schwane, 254.
Schwenkfeld, Caspar, and the Schwenkfeldians, 317.
Scotists, the, 233, *et passim.*
Scott, Thomas, 393, 446.
Scott, Walter, 455.
Scotus, John Duns, his characteristics and his influence upon Scholasticism, 232; on the proof of the being of God, 236; on the extent of our knowledge of God, *ib.;* on immortality, 239; on the image and similitude of God, 240; on the fall, 241; on the atonement, 247; on divine and human agency in conversion, 249; on the Sacraments, 255; on the Lord's Supper, 257; on the prerequisite for absolution, 260; his point of view, 262.
Scotus, John "Erigena," his career and system, 203 *sq.*, 206.
Scriptures, the Sacred, source of doctrine, 11; attitude of the Traditionalist, the Mystic, and the Rationalist toward, 11, 12; their authority, the basis of Protestant creeds, 18; rise of a scientific scrutiny of, 19; the method of the Fathers in the interpretation of, 76; Irenæus on, 84; Origen on, 105; Nicene and post-Nicene writers on, 122; Augustine on, 179; Luther on, 278; Calvin on, 299; the reading of, in the vernacular restricted by the Roman Catechism, 332; Louis Cappel on, 343; the Protestant Scholastic view of, 347; the Westminster Confession on, 359; Matthew Arnold on, 480; other recent views on, 493, 500, 513, 517, 525, 529. See "Inspiration," "Canon," "Biblical Criticism."
Sect, import of the term, 9.
Seleucia, Council of, 143.
Semi-Pelagianism, relation of John Cassian to, 196; revival of the controversy on, 197; opposed by Gottschalk, 206; conception of sin in, 218; its doctrine of divine and human agency set forth by Duns Scotus, 249; defended by Melanchthon, 272; held by the Franciscans, 328; in the Creed of Trent, 328 *sq.;* espoused by the Jesuits, 332, 333.
Semler, 20, 497.
Sends, in the Frankish Church, 208.
Seneca, 31.
Sens, Council of, 223.
Sentences, the books of, 227, 228.
Septuagint, legend respecting it, 75, 122.
Sergius I., Pope, 201.
Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 158.
Servatus, Lupus, 207.
Servetus, Michael, his system, 320.
Severians, 156.
Shaftesbury, his *Characteristics*, 378.
Shedd, W. G. T., 16, 21; his realistic hypothesis, 445.
"Shepherd," the, of Hermas, 34, 75.
Sherlock, Bishop, 370, 377.
Sibylline Oracles, the, 27.
Simeon, Charles, 446.
Simon Magus, 50, 56.
Sin, Irenæus on, 85; Tertullian on, 93; Origen on, 110, 111; the Greek Fathers generally on, 161, 164; Augustine on, 185, 218; Pelagius on, 190; Peter Lombard on, 241; Leibnitz on, 383; the New England theologians on, 411-418, *passim;* Channing on, 429; Schleiermacher on, 504; Dorner on, 514; J. Müller on, 515; Lipsius on, 523; Ritschl on, 527; Biedermann on, 534. See "Original sin."
Sirmian creeds, the, 142, 143.
Six Articles, the, 312.
Smalcald Articles, the, 273.
Smith, Henry B., his theology, 418.
Smith, John, of Cambridge, 368.
Smyth, Professor E. C., on Jonathan Edwards's relation to Berkeley, 403.
Smyth, Rev. John, 320.
Socinianism, its origin and leading representatives, 320, 321; characteristics of the system, 322; its creed, *ib.;* its attack on the Anselmic theory of the atonement, 323; its effect, 325; in England, 370. See, also, "Unitarianism."
Socinus, Faustus, 320, 321.
Socinus, Lælius, 321.
Socrates, gives ethical character to philosophy, 29.
Socrates, a continuator of Eusebius, 131.

Soissons, Councils of, 217, 223.
Solemn League and Covenant, the, adopted, 359.
Sophronius, 158.
Soto, Dominicus, 351.
Soul, the doctrine respecting, in Philo, 28; in Plato, 30; in Tertullian, 90, 93; in the Greek Fathers, 163; in Augustine, 187; in Aquinas, 239.
South, Robert, 370.
Sozomen, 131.
Spanish Arabian schools, 209.
Spencer, Herbert, his agnostic theory, 4, 487.
Spinola, 380.
Spinoza, 382, 432.
Stanley, A. P., 474 *sq.*
Stapfer, 344.
Stearns, Lewis F., 548.
Stiles, Ezra, 423.
Stillingfleet, Edward, 365, 367, 371.
Stoicism, 31, 90, 96.
Storr, 500.
Strauss, D. F., 533.
Strigel, Victorin, 296.
Stuart, Moses, 420.
St. Victor, the School of, 226.
Subordinationism, in Tertullian, 91; in Origen, 109; in Dionysius of Alexandria, 115; in Gregory of Nyssa, 144; eliminated in the West, 146. See "Trinity."
Supralapsarianism. See "Arminianism," "Calvin," "Will."
Suso, Henry, 264, 265.
Swedenborg, Emanuel, his system, 493.
Synesius, Bishop of Ptolemsis, 126.
Systems, theological, relaxing of adherence to, 551.

Tait, Archbishop, 460.
Tatian, his writings, 37; his conception of Christianity as a philosophy, 61; on the Logos, 64, 66.
Tauler, John, 264, 269, 317.
Taylor, Jeremy, 364.
Taylor, Nathaniel W., his theology, 414.
"Teaching of the Twelve Apostles." See "Didache."
Temple, Bishop, 476.
Ten Articles (of 1536), the tenets and sources of, 310.
Tertullian, materials for doctrinal history in, 19; his training and personal qualities, 38; on the philosophers, *ib.*, 90; his writings, 39; a Montanist, 82; on the power of binding and loosing, *ib.;* on tradition, 90; on the soul, *ib.;* on the proof of the being of God, *ib.;* on the Trinity, 91; on the Logos, *ib.;* on the person of Christ, 92; on the atonement, *ib.;* legalism in, *ib.;* on human freedom and sin, 93; on regeneration, *ib.;* on the millennium, *ib.;* on the Monarchians, 99.
Theodore I., Bishop of Rome, 158.
Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, 208.
Theodore of Mopsuestia, 122, 131, 151, 154, 157. See "Antioch, School of."
Theodore of Tarsus, 203.
Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus, 131, 153, 155, 157.
Theodosius the Great establishes the Nicene orthodoxy, 145; II., 153, 154.
Theodotus, the Currier, his humanitarian doctrine, 101.
Theodotus, the Money Changer, 101.
Theognis of Nicæa, 139.
Theology, the possibility of, 4 *sq.;* its relation to faith, 6; its relation to philosophy, 7; reasons for the science of, 8; progressive character of, *ib.;* incentives to the development of, 9; Baur's theory of the development of, 14; Newman's theory of the development of, *ib.;* influence of the Renaissance on, 18 *sq.;* authentic sources of, 23; influence of Greek philosophy on, 29 *sq.;* at Alexandria, 39; earliest treatises on, 40; in the Greek Apologists, 61; course of, in the East after the fourth century, 128 *sq.;* ruling ideas of the Greek Fathers, 161 *sq.;* mediæval compilations in, 203; the Roman Catholics restated in the Creed of Trent, 326 *sq.;* as affected by modern philosophy, 381–393; Schleiermacher on the principle and scope of, 502; recent tendencies of, 546 *sq.* See, also, "Doctrine."
Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, 37, 64, 75.
Theophrastus, 101.
Thirlwall, Bishop, 460, 462.
Thirty-nine Articles, the, the groundwork of, 311; reduced from the forty-two Articles, 313; on the Lord's Supper, *ib.;* is Article XVII. (on predestination) Calvinistic? 314; on the Church, 315; the Westminster Assembly's par-

tial revision of, 359; Newman on (in Tract XC.), 457.
Thomas à Kempis, 264.
Thomasius, 17, 21, 65, 524.
Thomists, the, 233, *et passim.*
Thorndike, Prebendary, 356.
"Three Chapters," the, 157.
Timothy, the Epistles to, traces of Gnosticism in, 55.
Tindal, Matthew, 377.
Toland, John, 375, 376.
Toledo, Council of, 147.
Toplady, Augustus, 393.
Toucy, Synod of, 207.
Tours, the school at, 210.
"Tractarians," the, 455. See "Oxford Movement."
Tradition, how viewed by the early Fathers, 76 *sq.;* Tertullian on, 90; its place in the Nicene and post-Nicene writers, 123; its authority in the Middle Ages, 213; in the Creed of Trent, 328; in the Oxford School, 454; *vs.* Development, 549.
Traditionalism, 11.
Traducianism, in Tertullian, 93; Augustine's attitude toward, 187 *sq.*
Traheran, on Cranmer's change of belief, 313.
"Transcendental" School in New England, the, 433.
Transubstantiation, the doctrine of Paschasius Radbert on, 207; Berengarius on, 210; Lanfranc on, *ib.;* modified by Guitmund, 211; first use of the term, *ib.;* Anselm on, *ib.;* William of Occam on, 233; the term authoritatively sanctioned, 257; the Schoolmen on, *ib.;* rejected by Wyclif, 266; Luther on, 271; the Six Articles on, 312; the Creed of Trent on, 330; Bishop Andrews on, 356; Tract XC. of Newman on, 458. See "Lord's Supper."
Trent, the Council of, its organization, 326; Papal control of, 327; difficulties confronting, *ib.;* on the sources of doctrine, 328; on the Vulgate, *ib.;* on the test of orthodoxy, *ib.;* on original sin, *ib.;* on justification and assurance, 329; on perseverance, 330; on predestination, *ib.;* on penance, *ib.;* on the Sacraments, *ib.;* its service, 331.
Trinitarian controversy in New England, 418 *sq.*
Trinity, the doctrine of, the era o[f] [c]ontroversy upon, 17; first use [of] the term, 91; Tertullian on, *ib.;* Cl[em]ent of Alexandria on, 95; the Monar[c]hian controversy upon, 98 *sq.;* the Sabellian view of, 103; Paul of Samosata on, 104; Origen on, 107 *sq.;* Novatian on, 113; Dionysius of Alexandria on, 114; Dionysius of Rome on, *ib.;* Methodiu[s] on, 116; the younger Nicæans on, 143; John of Damascus on, 160; Augustine on, 178; Roscellin on, 217; Abelard on, 223; Gilbert of Poictiers on, 226; Aquinas on, 237; Calvin on, 307; Michael Servetus on, 320; th[e] Socinian doctrine of, 322; Bisho[p] Sherlock on, 370; controversy in New England on, 418 *sq.;* Professor Moses Stuart on, 420; Bushnell on, 438–441; Stanley on, 475; Swedenborg on, 494; Schleiermacher on, 510; C. I. Nitzsch on, 515; Rothe on, 517; Hegel on, 532. See "Arianism," "Christ, the person of."
Tronchin, Louis, 345.
Trullan Council, the First, 159; the Second, 200.
Trypho, Justin's dialogue with, 27, 37, 67.
Tübingen School, the, 14, 41, 51, 534. See "Baur, F. C."
Tulloch, John, on the Latitudinarians, 368.
Turretine, Francis, 345, 346, *note.*
Turretine, Alphonso, 345.
Tyler, Bennet, 416.
Tyndall, 488.
Tyre, Synod at, 140.

Ultramontanism, 537, 539.
Unitarianism, rise of, 320; in Poland, 321; in New England, its rise, 418 *sq.;* Channing on the various types of, 420; its chief representatives, 421; confined chiefly to Eastern New England, 422; its cultivation of Biblical criticism and *belles lettres*, 423; Theodore Parker on, 424; its promotion of philanthropy, 425; its theology as taught by Channing, 427–432; radical development in the intuitional theory, 432; the Transcendental School, 433; Parkerism, 433 *sq.;* gradual prevalence of the progressive school in, 436. See, also, "Socinianism."

Universalism, in America, 436. See "Restorationism."
Urban IV., 258; VIII., 334.
Ursinus, 292.
Ussher, Archbishop, 358, 359.
Uytenbogaert, 338.

Valentinus, 58.
Vatican Council, the, 158, 540 *sq.*
Venn, Henry, 446.
Vercelli, Synod of, 210.
Victor, Bishop of Rome, 38.
Vigilantius, 172.
Vincent of Lerins, 123, 196.
Voetius, 349.
Voltaire, 492.
Vulgate, the, 131, 328.

Waldensians, the, 263.
Walter of St. Victor, 227.
Ware, Henry (Sr.), 420.
Ware, Henry (Jr.), 421.
Waterland, Daniel, 371, 377.
Watts, Isaac, 393.
Wegscheider, 500.
Weissman, 348.
Wesel, John, 265, 285.
Wesley, John, his theology, 390 *sq.*, 452.
Wesleyanism, 342.
Wessel, John, 265.
Westminster Assembly, 358; Confession, 274, 359 *sq.*
Westphal, Joachim, 292.
Whately, Richard, his theology, 450.
Whichcote, Benjamin, 366, 367.
Whiston, William, 376.
White, Edward, 479.
Whitefield, George, 390, 391, 395, 446.
Wilberforce, Bishop, 446.
Will, the, the Stoics on, 31; Justin Martyr on, 66; Tertullian on, 93; Clement of Alexandria on, 96; Origen on, 107, 110; the Antiochian School on, 151; the Greek Fathers on, 164; Augustine on, 184, 191; Pelagius on, 184; Aquinas on, 238; Luther on, 284, 292; the Augsburg Confession on, 293; Melanchthon's change of view on, *ib.*; the Philippists on, 295; the Form of Concord on, 296; S. Clarke on, 376; Spinoza on, 383; Locke on, 397 *sq.*; Edwards on, 397 *sq.*; Taylor on, 415; Professor Park on, 417; Rothe on, 518. See, also, "Determinism."
William of Occam, 233, 249–257, 262.
William of Champeaux, 214, 226.
Williams, Isaac, 457.
Williams, Rowland, 476.
Wilson, Henry B., 476.
Winchester, Elhanan, 437.
Wisdom of Solomon, the, 27.
Wittenberg Concord, the, 290.
Wolzogenius, 321.
Woods, Leonard, 416.
Woolston, Thomas, 377.
Worcester, Noah, 420.
Wordsworth, William, 455.
Wyclif, John, his theology, 265 *sq.*

Zahn, on the date of the *Didache* and "Shepherd," 35; on the Apostle's Creed, 71, 100, 141.
Zeno, the philosopher, 31.
Zeno, the emperor, 156.
Zephyrinus, Bishop of Rome, 102, 103.
Zinzendorf, 495.
Zosimus, Bishop of Rome, 194, 195.
Zwingli, his intellectual qualities and religious experience, 285; compared with Luther, *ib.*, 286; the starting-point of his theology, 286; a social reformer, *ib.*; his disputations and articles of belief, *ib.*; his theological works, 287; on the Canon, *ib.*; on predestination, *ib.*; on original sin, 288; his controversy with Luther on the Lord's Supper, *ib. sq.*; efforts at reconciliation, 289 *sq.*; relation of Calvin to, 298–309, *passim.*
Zwinglians, 272.

Date Due

FACULTY
FEB 20 '62
APR 16 '62
DEC 19 '63
JAN 20 '64
NOV 20 '65
FACULTY

PRINTED IN U. S. A.


Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library
1 1012 01027 7947